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DESCRIPTION OF THESIS (C. O’Donoghue)
The primary objective of the thesis is to study the degree of redistribution in the Irish 
Tax-Benefit System. The first part of the thesis {chapter 2) describes the main features 
of the system and examines the potential redistributive effect of the system. It also sets 
the system in its historical context by charting the development of the system in the post 
war era.
Chapter 3 examines the redistributive effect of the sub-components of the tax-benefit 
system separately on a cross-section of the population by decomposing standard 
redistributive and progressivity measures. This chapter examines in detail the effect of 
the reforms from 1987 to 2000.
The use of a short accounting period such as a month will tend to exaggerate the degree 
of redistribution within a tax-benefit system. It is desirable therefore to examine the 
degree of redistribution over a measure such as lifetime income, as this more fully 
reflects the standard of living an individual faces. As lifetime income data is not 
available, a dynamic microsimulation model has been constructed to generate synthetic 
life histories of a sample of the Irish population, so that lifetime incomes can be 
constructed. A number of chapters then describe the characteristics of this model. 
Chapter 4 considers the main issues involved in designing a dynamic microsimulation 
model and assesses how the main dynamic models internationally have dealt with the 
issues discussed. Chapter 5 describes how this model dealt with these design issues. 
Chapters 6 and 7 respectively describe the behavioural equations used by the model to 
simulate demographic/education and market behaviour respectively.
A number of analytical chapters have been included using the dynamic microsimulation 
model. Chapter 8 examines the degree of redistribution over life-cycle. Chapter 9 
analyses the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits over the lifetime. Chapter 10 
examines the degree of intra versus inter personal redistribution in the tax-benefit 
system.
The previous chapters examine the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system in 
isolation by considering its effect in a steady state world. However neither the world nor 
the tax-benefit system are in a steady state. The system has evolved over time. In 
Chapter 77, we examine the degree of inter-generational redistribution of the Irish 
Welfare State since the foundation of the state in 1921.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Redistribution in the Irish Tax-Benefit 
System
1.1 Introduction
Redistribution can be classified as the mechanism by which the distribution of income is 
changed. It is this topic with which we are interested in this study. There are a number 
of objectives of welfare states including the provision of public goods, acting as a social 
safety net, as insurance instruments for unexpected life events, for correcting for poor 
inter-temporal decision making and for correcting market failures. Many of these 
objectives employ some element of redistribution, defined here as the transfer of 
resources between individuals at one point of time or across an individuals lifetime. 
Within the redistributional heading, redistribution can broadly be classified under a 
number of headings including (a) income smoothing, (b) insurance, (c) vertical 
redistribution and (d) horizontal equity (see Barr, 1993).
One of the main reasons for redistribution is to smooth income over the life-cycle. 
Rowntree (1902) cycle of “want and plenty” was one of the first illustrations of life­
cycle needs. This cycle highlighted that individuals often fell into poverty during 
childhood, escaped poverty during their 20’s until they have children and then 
experience poverty again until their children earn, before falling again into poverty in 
old age when they can no longer work. Much of the early welfare state instruments 
focused on reducing life-cycle needs such as pensions paid to the elderly, child benefits 
paid to families with children and pensions paid to widows. Glennerster (1995) points 
out that the social policy as a counter-life-cyclical device was an important determinant 
of the Beveridge report in 1942, that influenced post-war social policy developments in 
both Britain and Ireland.
As an insurance mechanism, policy instruments insure against unforeseen income 
reductions such as unemployment, sickness or the death of a spouse, conditions that 
existed in the social insurance system in Ireland since before the establishment of the 
Department of Social Welfare in Ireland in 1947. Vertical redistribution refers to the 
transfer of resources from rich to poor, while horizontal redistribution, redistributes
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towards people with needs due to e.g. age, family size, disability. All of these 
mechanisms can be regarded as being redistributive, whether between persons (inter­
personal) or across an individual’s life-course (intra-personal). All mechanisms are also 
overlapping somewhat. Being poor may be because of an unforeseen life event, while 
income smoothing may involve horizontal redistribution. Horizontal redistribution may 
also have a vertical redistributive effect if groups who are targets of this type of 
redistribution also tend to be poor as in the case of the elderly.
The welfare state is the chief mechanism used for redistribution in public policy. 
However because the operation of instruments within public policy often move in 
different directions or have effects that are hard to measure it can be difficult to 
determine the extent of redistribution. These issues are described in more detail below. 
We also briefly consider the rationale for the state to carry out redistribution and to 
make other interventions in the market under three main headings, the achievement of 
efficiency gains, the pursuit of social justice and the exercise of self-interest through the 
political process. Finally we consider some practical issues related to the measurement 
of redistribution.
The primary mechanism for redistribution in a state apparatus is the welfare state. It is 
however difficult to define clearly what the welfare state is. It is usually the term used 
for the state's involvement in the areas of health, education, cash benefits and other 
services such as housing, personal social services and food.
Welfare state services can be categorised as either publicly or privately financed and 
provided (See Barr, 1993). Examples of publicly provided services include employment 
services or public libraries and museums. Some services have a mixture of public and 
private provision and financing. For example, some public provided services may be 
privately financed completely. Partial subsidisation as in the case of university 
education, will involve in some degree of redistribution of resources. On the other hand, 
some welfare services are privately provided, but publicly financed as in the case of GP 
services. Finally some degree of redistribution may result from welfare services that are 
both privately financed and privately provided. This is a result of the use of regulation 
as a redistributive device. Examples include the recent legislation in Ireland that new 
private housing developments include social housing.
This study focuses on a narrow set of welfare state instruments, personal taxes, social 
contributions and social benefits. Taxes and benefits contribute to each form of
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redistribution described above. As an insurance benefits can be designed to redistribute 
towards individuals who have unforeseen life events as in the case of invalidity or 
unemployment benefits. As an income-smoothing device, they can redistribute from 
working lives to retirement as in the case of old age pensions. By means testing benefits 
they can be used as a form of vertical redistribution. Additional payments to cover child 
dependants, old age or sickness can serve to horizontally redistribute to individuals with 
different needs. Turning to the redistributive impact of taxation, as an insurance 
mechanism it primarily serves a financing purpose, although through horizontal 
measures such as provisions such as widow’s and disabled persons tax allowances may 
aid the insurance mechanism. As most income tax systems are progressive, there is a 
strong vertical redistributive mechanism, where for a given revenue constraint, the 
richer pay higher taxes. The progressivity of taxes also acts as a source of income 
smoothing as during periods of higher income, individuals pay proportionally higher 
taxes than during periods of lower incomes. Again horizontal measures such as old and 
family tax instruments aid the income smoothing objective.
Over the last 15 years, there have been numerous studies into the standard of living in 
Ireland. The primary focus has been on the measurement of poverty, deprivation and 
inequality (See for example Callan and Nolan, 1993 and 1999). A branch of this 
research has focused on the impact of government policy on these measurements 
(Callan, O’Neill and O’Donoghue, 1995), while another branch has focused on the 
impact of policy on work incentives (Callan and Doris, 1999). Because of the data 
available, the welfare measures considered have typically been based on a short 
accounting period of either a week or year. As a result it has not been possible to 
examine the redistributive impact of public policy when considering longer-term 
welfare measures. Also as the surveys that have been used thus far have been mainly of 
cross-sections of the population, the redistributive effect of policy that has been 
examined has been between people. Intra-personal redistribution has been ignored. In 
general, the impact of government policy has been investigated in aggregate such as the 
impact of all taxes and benefits on poverty or inequality. At the other extreme, the 
minutiae of particular policies or reforms have been examined. There has however been 
no systematic description or analysis of all the main components of the tax and benefits 
systems. The objective of this thesis will be to fill in some of the gaps in the research 
agenda relating to the redistributive effect of government tax and benefit policy. The 
principle objectives will be to:
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• Describe the tax-benefit system and how it reached its current state,
• Examine in detail the contribution of the components of the tax-benefit. system 
contribute to redistribution using traditional methods of cross-sectional analysis.
• Investigate the level of redistribution over the life-course.
• Examine the redistributive nature of the system using, longer term measures of 
welfare.
• Investigate the actual level of redistribution between persons as compared to intra­
personal redistribution.
• Study the trend in government policy over time and the resulting impact on inter­
generational redistribution.
The purpose of the this chapter is to describe the background to the set of analyses 
considered in this study, to examine the nature of redistribution and to summarise the 
main methodological hurdles necessary for this research. Section 2 shall discuss the 
rationale for redistribution. Section 3 shall describe some methodological issues, while 
section 4 will summarise the main analyses carried out in this study.
1.2 Rationale for Redistribution
We now ask, what is the rationale for redistribution? Rationales can be divided into, 
efficiency, ethical and political reasons.
Efficiency
Although economists often discuss an equity/efficiency trade-off, there are situations 
where on efficiency grounds alone, there is a rationale for redistribution. Barr (1993) 
gives a good survey of the efficiency rationale for redistribution. The invisible hand 
theorem states that the market will be optimal if a number of conditions hold, that there 
is perfect competition, no market failures and perfect information. When some or all of 
these conditions do not apply, then there is a reason for the state to intervene on 
efficiency grounds.
Intervention can be efficient where perfect competition fails, as in the case where price 
taking doesn’t exist in a monopoly situation. In these cases, regulation such as price
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ceilings or anti-trust legislation or subsidies to achieve the socially optimal level of 
production can be used. Market failures can also occur when there are public goods, 
externalities or increasing returns to scale.1 Markets cannot produce public goods, 
making a case for public production. Externalities occur where an economic agent 
imposes costs or benefits on society without cost or benefit to themselves resulting in a 
non-optimal levels of production in a market. If the marginal cost (or benefit) is 
exceeded by the average cost (or benefit) at all levels of output, then increasing returns 
to scale takes place, resulting in an industry going bankrupt or become monopolised by 
a single firm. There is therefore a case for intervention by the state through use of a 
lump-sum subsidy or for the industry to become nationalised.
Perfect information breaks down where consumers have imperfect knowledge about 
quality and or prices or the future. As Barr (1993) outlines, markets are generally more 
efficient, the better consumer information is, the more cheaply and effectively it can be 
improved, the easier it is for consumers to understand available information, the lower 
the costs of choosing badly and the more diverse are consumer tastes. If one of these 
assumptions breaks down, then there may be a case for state intervention. Producers and 
consumers can suffer from imperfect information, for example insurers may not have 
full information about riskiness of applicants for insurance or consumers may not be 
aware of the preparation process for foods. Similar arguments regarding price 
information relate to individuals’ information about their future. The efficiency 
advantages of perfect competition depend on perfect information.
Another rationale for state provision occurs where insurance markets are inefficient2, 
namely adverse selection, moral hazard and probabilities of the risks being realised 
being close to 1. Adverse selection occurs where individuals take out insurance 
knowing that they are bad risks without the insurer knowing this. In an unemployment 
insurance market it would not be possible to tell an individuals risk without knowing 
their employment record, which is costly and difficulty to verify. Even if known, it is 
not necessarily a good indication of risk. In a private insurance market, people with a 
higher risk of unemployment are more likely to seek insurance, the opposite is true for
1 For a good to be classified as a pure public good, it must satisfy the following conditions, non-rivalness 
in consumption, non-excludability and non-rejectability. Non-rivalness implies that the marginal cost of 
an extra user is zero, non exlcudability, means that no one can be excluded from consuming, and so 
cannot be charged.
2 Insurance has two purposes. Firstly it as a means of protection against unforeseen risk such as 
unemployment or sickness or an actuarial mechanism which insures against foreseeable risks such as old 
age or death. Individuals are prepared to pay for insurance because they are risk averse.
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those with low risk, thereby putting up premia. By making unemployment insurance 
compulsory for everyone adverse selection is avoided. Moral Hazard relates to the 
extent to which individuals can control their entrance to and exit to an insurable event 
such as unemployment. It is not possible to distinguish between individuals who are 
unemployed out of choice and those who are unemployed because there are not enough 
jobs. Exogenous events are insurable, but those which result from choice are not, 
making it impossible for private insurance markets to offer insurance. Whereas 
compulsory insurance can overcome problems associated with adverse selection, it 
cannot overcome moral hazard completely. Insurance schemes can however guard 
against moral hazard to some extent through availability for work requirements, 
contribution conditions and benefit duration. The final reason why it is necessary for 
unemployment insurance to be provided by state or quasi state institutions is that 
insurance companies would have little incentive to offer insurance at an affordable cost 
to individuals who have a probability of unemployment of close to one.
Another example of the inefficiency of the market relates to time preferences. 
Individuals may prefer to consume now rather than investing and thereby achieving a 
sub-optimal equilibrium for society as a whole. Expenditure on public education 
illustrates this point. The social rate of return to education is higher than the private rate 
of term, which implies if left to market forces, education expenditure would be 
insufficient, implying that human capital accumulation would be lower, in turn reducing 
economic growth.
Voluntary redistribution, or altruism, is a source of efficiency gain. In this case it is 
perfectly rational for higher income to voluntarily transfer resources to lower income 
people. A number of criticisms outlined by Barr include the free rider problem which 
gives an incentive for the rich to vote for redistributive taxation and also the fact that in 
voluntary redistribution is optimal only if the optimal redistribution is what the rich are 
prepared to give. Amiel and Cowell (1992) have done some empirical work on 
preferences with regard to redistribution and found that a substantial minority would be 
prepared to have some people become worse off if certain groups’ income increased, 
indicating the existence of an income externality.
Ethical Grounds
The next rationale for redistribution is on ethical grounds. Boadway and Keen (1999) in 
their survey of redistribution that there can exist a desire for redistribution as a form of
ethical behaviour not explicitly governed by economic behaviour. Individuals can be 
considered as if they have two personalities, a selfish one that guides their actions in 
day to day economic activities and the second, a selfless, ethical perspective, that guides 
their participation in social decisions.
Barr (1993) describes some of the different theories of social justice, Collectivist, 
Liberal or Libertarian. Each has different views as to the degree of redistribution is 
desirable. Collectivists desire that the distribution of outcomes should be equal and thus 
wealth should be redistributed on ethical grounds. Liberal or utilitarian theories of 
society argue that the objective of public policy should be to maximise the utility of the 
members of society and as a result as the marginal utility of income falls with income, 
under most social welfare functions, some degree of redistribution is optimal. Finally 
even Libertarians, who see the optimal distribution as the result o f competitive market 
force on legally acquired endowments (Barr, 1993), advocate a certain amount of 
redistribution to prevent destitution and for the policing of the market.
Political Grounds
Boadway and Keen (1999) argue that except for Pareto improvements, redistribution 
involves the exercise o f coercion and sovereign power and in that sense [redistribution 
] is an inherently political matter. This study asks the what and how questions. What 
level of redistribution is there in the system? How is the level of redistribution 
achieved? A political approach would ask, why? For example as shall be shown in 
Chapter 2, the period from the 1950’s in Ireland saw a large increase in the redistributive 
impact of public policy, with benefit levels rising and coverage expanding. On the 
revenue side, the weight of financing shifted from regressive indirect to progressive 
income taxes. It would be interesting the question what political forces drove these 
changes.
Boadway and Keen (1999) survey some of the political reasons for the existence of 
redistribution. They classify three forms of decision-making, direct democracy, 
representative democracy and interest groups. Much of the literature on public choice 
focuses on decision making using majority voting rules. In the case of redistribution, it 
is argued that majorities will vote to have resources transferred from the minority to 
them. Full redistribution towards inequality does not occur it is argued because of 
efficiency losses due to high taxation, greater power of the wealthy and also because it 
maintains an incentive for the poor to become rich. However in practice, it is rare that
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such issues are placed directly to a plebiscite, rather decisions are made through the use 
of elected intermediaries. In representative democracies, what is important is that 
prospective governments carry with them as broad a coalition of interests as is 
necessary to achieve election and stay in power. Political parties will also tend to have 
their own particular set of policies, which although broadly tradable in order to get 
elected will serve as a general guide to policy action if possible. Party loyalties will also 
have an effect. In the case of a single policy issue, where there is uncertainty of the 
preferences of the electorate, then parties will adopt a platform between their preferred 
options and that of the median voter.
In Ireland, there have been a number of clear political pressures on redistributive policy 
over time. During the economic downturn of the 1930’s, the Fianna Fail party 
campaigned on a platform of rescinding reductions made by the previous government in 
pensions and unemployment benefits. An example of the effect of majority voting is 
the acceptance of the population of relatively high personal taxes relative to corporate 
taxes. This would seem to be indicative of both the traditionally high unemployment 
risk, which has lead to high migration levels and the relatively high proportion of self- 
employed in the Irish Labour Market. Also, in Ireland where nearly 85% of the 
population are owner occupiers, attempts to introduce property and wealth taxes have 
seen massive political opposition (See Sandford and Morrisey, 1985). The constitutional 
requirements can also have an influence on redistributive policies as for example 
provisions that protected the family have prevented married couples being treated less 
favourably than cohabiting couples (See Kennedy, 1988). Membership of the European 
Union has also seen equality legislation resulting in discriminatory elements of the 
benefits system being reformed.
The influence of interest groups has a number of notable examples. For example, the 
Catholic church in the 1950's strongly opposed the establishment the introduction of 
free health care for mothers and children as they opposed the intervention of the state in 
the life of families.3 This resulted in a dramatic backdown by the government of a key 
government policy (See, Lee, 1989). The influence of the agricultural sector meanwhile 
saw the elimination of work tests for farmers claiming unemployment assistance (See 
Callan et al., 1996). In industrial relations, unions recently have been able to negotiate
3 This is a policy on which the church has changed their policy in recent times as groups such as the 
Conference of the Religious in Ireland (CORI) has been a strong advocate for redistributive policies.
18
favourable tax-benefit reform in exchange for wage restraint in national wage 
bargaining agreements (See, O’Donnell and O’Reardon, 1996).
Increased provision of welfare services in neighbouring countries can result in changed 
preferences and an increased demand for them in a country. We can see this in the 
relationship between the UK and Ireland. Because of the large-scale migration both to 
and from Britain, many families have close links with Britain.4 The media also carries 
many news items from the UK. Therefore, policy developments in the UK have had a 
very strong influence on redistributive policy in Ireland (See, Lee, 1989). For example, 
the Beveridge reforms of the post-war UK influenced the formation of the Department 
of Social Welfare in 1947, and the subsequent benefit reforms in 1953. In recent times, 
a clear objective has been to bring Irelands personal tax system in line with the UK's5. A 
separate reason that has resulted in similar redistributive systems in Ireland and Britain 
is due to the objective of unification with the Northern Ireland (Department of Social 
Welfare, 1992).
1.3. Methodology -  Measuring Redistribution
In this section, we consider some of the methodological issues related to the 
measurement of redistribution. Issues considered here in relation to the measurement of 
redistribution include, the accounting period used for measuring this transfer, the groups 
of people between whom resources are transferred, the institutional factors that 
contribute to this redistribution of resources.
Redistribution and the Accounting Period
The accounting period used can influence the degree of redistribution measured. The 
use of short accounting periods will tend to increase the degree of income inequality 
measured within a population. This is because of the nature of short-term mobility and 
life-cycle effects. For example, students may be classified as currently poor but in fact 
have be rich over the entire lifetime. At the other end of the life-cycle, pensioners will 
tend to be lower down the income distribution, but yet during their working lives, may 
have been higher up the distribution. Panel studies have shown that there is considerable 
income mobility over time. For example Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) found that in Britain
4 The UK and Ireland since the independence has had a free trade and movement area covering the whole 
British Isles. There was also a currency union until 1979.
5 In various Budget Speeches by the Finance Minister.
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only 37% of the poorest decile group were still in the bottom decile after 4 years, 1991- 
1994. For these reason a number of writers have advocated that long term income 
measures are better measures of welfare. Friedman (1957) advocated the use of a 
permanent income concept which ignored the effect of temporary income changes and 
life-cycle effects.
Fiscal policy instruments that depend on income also tend to use short accounting 
periods (i.e. of a year or less). For example, benefits and social insurance contributions 
depend on weekly income and income taxes, annual income. Therefore during poor 
periods of the life-cycle individuals will tend to be net beneficiaries from redistributive 
polices and net losers at other times. However, when one factors in the points about life­
cycle income mobility, the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits may be less strong 
if a longer accounting period were used. The existence of social insurance where 
contributions are paid during working periods and benefits received during non-working 
periods is an example of redistribution over life-cycle. The social insurance system 
using a short accounting period will be seen to be quite redistributive, but much less so 
when a lifetime perspective is used. While longer accounting periods highlight the 
degree of total redistribution between individuals over the lifetime, shorter accounting 
periods are more appropriate for measuring issues related to short term need such as 
poverty analyses.
Intra-personal versus Inter-personal Redistribution
In the previous section we highlighted that life-course redistribution and income 
mobility over the life-cycle would reduce the degree of redistribution one sees in a 
system when longer accounting periods are compared with shorter accounting periods. 
The reason for the fall in the degree of redistribution is due to the level of intra-personal 
redistribution, or redistribution over an individual’s lifetime from periods of high 
income to periods low income. For example, pensioners are one of the largest net 
beneficiaries from the tax-benefit system in any one period. As most pensioners receive 
contributory benefits, receipt of benefit represents a return on contributions made during 
the lifetime rather than as a pure distribution from rich to poor. Similarly short term 
unemployed may end up paying more back into the system when in work than they 
received out of work. Finally there are also life-cycle effects on earnings, with those 
with more experience receiving higher earnings. Because of the progressive nature of
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the income tax system, they will tend to pay a higher average tax rate during periods of 
their lifetime when in receipt of higher earnings.
Other than for classification purposes, why is there an interest in intra-personal 
redistribution? The existence of intra-personal redistribution in tax-benefit systems 
implies that such objectives could be achieved through private savings mechanisms. 
Feldstein (1997) argues that doing this would raise the economic welfare of the 
population because the rate of return to private investments is higher than the rate of 
return implicit in an unfunded benefits system.6 Thus, it would cost less to provide the 
same degree of transfers than a public system, reducing total tax rates and related 
distortions created by the tax system. Another objective is that enforced state decisions 
about transfers over ones lifetimes reduces individual choice and thus total welfare. As 
much of the intra-personal redistribution results from income related instruments such 
as means tested social benefits and progressive income taxes, administrative costs due 
to income testing may well be higher for the public provision of intra-personal 
redistribution. Conversely, private savings instruments may require higher 
administrative costs to management and promotion purposes.
There are a number of problems however. Much of the intra-personal redistribution 
occurs during the early years of one adult life, when attending university, receiving 
relatively lower incomes because of seniority rules or having children. Without state 
guarantees to allow savings to go negative for these objectives as in the case of student 
loans, capital market imperfections are likely to limit this type of income smoothing. 
Miles and Timmermann (1999) point out that a move to private insurance with higher 
returns is likely to lead to higher risk. Thus whereas on average the population would be 
able to have the same benefit coverage for a lower contribution rate, there could be 
substantial numbers of losers. Furthermore moving to a private pension system will 
involve transition costs, as current generations save for themselves, but also meet the 
liabilities of the currently retired. In addition, many risks covered by public transfer 
programs are uninsurable.
Redistribution Between Generations
So far we have considered redistribution between different people alive at the same time 
and over individual’s lifetimes. Another type of redistribution is between generations.
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For example, like other, governments, Ireland has very often run a current budget 
deficit, borrowing money to pay for current expenditure, therefore redistributing from 
future generations to earlier generations.
One of the main motivating factors in the study of intergenerational redistribution is the 
effect of demographic ageing where due to the increased size of elderly populations 
relative to the working population, tax-burdens will have to increase to finance 
pensions. Fahey and Fitzgerald (1997) found that in Ireland over the medium term, the 
fiscal pressure due to demographic factors will actually improve, due to fewer elderly 
and children. Studies that focus on later periods such as the Department of Finance 
(1998), have however found that fiscal pressures will increase sharply after this period, 
due to the size of the birth cohorts that will retire, coupled with a decline in the working 
population due to a fall in fertility rates. The Budget Strategy of Ageing Group of the 
Department of Finance (DOF) find that the cost of ageing is set to rise by 7% of GNP 
over the next half-century (DOF, 1999).
Kessler (1996) argues that during “the decades to come there will be much debate, 
criticism and questioning about the whole issue o f intergenerational transfers”. If one 
generation gains significantly more than another, then there is potential for generational 
conflict. This is the case currently in the USA, where much coverage has been given to 
intergenerational tensions. Many of the younger generation in the USA find themselves 
with falling real earnings, while their baby boom elders experience the fruits of the 
longest boom in American history. At the same time they are faced with financing the 
baby boom generation in retirement as the social security system reserves end in the 
next two decades: “we fear fo r  the future...our generation labors in the expanding 
shadow o f a monstrous national debt....those in power have practised fiscal child 
abuse, mortgaging our future” (Third Millennium, 1999). Furthermore intergenerational 
conflict also worsens not only from the cost of the ageing electorate but also due to the 
ageing of the electorate and the increased number of elderly voters, who have the 
incentive to vote to increase the share of resources going to them.
We must consider the notion of intergenerational equity. Clearly policy makers do not 
aim to have complete intergenerational equity, the idea that each generation is as well 
off as another. Assuming a constantly rising level of wealth, this would require huge
6 The implicit rate of return in a publicly funded pay as you go benefit system relies on a combination of 
the labour-force growth rate and the growth rate of earnings.
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transfers from future generations to earlier generations. Instead the most that 
redistributional policies aim for is that at any point in time intergenerational inequality 
is lessened. For example an objective of government policy has been to ensure that 
pensioners also benefit in terms of increased pension payments from economic growth. 
Pensioners in Ireland can thus expect to receive more than they put in. Hughes (1985) 
who found that the rate of return received by pensioners in Ireland was on average much 
higher than that received by investors highlights this. Each generation receiving more 
from the state than they put in is however not necessarily a problem for the public 
finances for as Samuelson (1958) pointed out that each generation can receive more 
than they contributed if economic growth outpaces population growth. However if 
public net expenditure rises much faster than the rate of economic growth as happened 
in the 1980’s and may happen this century, then public expenditure becomes 
unsustainable.
Unit o f Analysis
An issue raised by Falkingham and Hills (1995) relates to the incidence of the 
instruments simulated. For example who actually benefits from social transfers received 
by an individual in a household? In Ireland, most benefits are paid to a claimant but 
depend on the characteristics of others in the family unit. We assume that benefits are 
shared equally between adults in the family. FH also highlight the question of what 
should be done about child benefits, whether they should be considered incident on 
children or parents. We assign child benefits equally to the parents. Income taxes in 
Ireland until 2000 were assessed optionally on a joint basis. These are assigned within a 
family proportionally to market income. Another unit of analysis issue relates to the fact 
in the current version of the model used to produce life-course income trajectories, we 
do not simulate the standard of living of the parents of the members of this cohort. As a 
result, we cannot measure the standard of living of the individuals’ childhood. Our 
measure of lifetime income refers therefore to the period from 18 to birth.
Measures o f Redistribution
This section describes the measures used to measure the redistributive effect of the tax- 
benefit system. In this thesis, we use measures based on the Lorenz Curve to examine 
the degree of these phenomena.7 The Lorenz Curve for pre-tax market income is simply
7 The methods described here are standard methods for examining the degree of redistribution and 
progressivity in tax-benefit system (See for example Palme 1996 and Decoster et al. 2000).
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a graph of the cumulative population share versus the cumulative income for population 
ranked by order of their income. The Gini coefficient is a standard index of inequality, 
defined in equation (1):
= l-2 jT M(p>2p (!)
where p is the cumulative population share and LM(p) , the Lorenz Curve at point p. A 
population with no income inequality would have a Lorenz Curve of 45° and therefore a 
Gini of 0. If Lorenz Curve A lies completely inside curve B, then it is possible to say 
that population A has greater inequality than population B, with Ga > Gb- However if 
the Lorenz Curves cross, it is not possible to make inequality comparisons without 
using a value judgements. The generalised Gini coefficient due to Yitzhaki (1983), 
defined in equation (2), allows value judgements to be taken into account. In this case 
higher values of v indicate greater weight being placed on those in the lower end of the 
income distribution. If v = 0, then social welfare function is unconcerned about 
inequality, always taking a value of 1 regardless of the distribution. When v = 2, G(2) is 
the same as the standard Gini coefficient, while as v—»oo, all the weight is placed on the 
lowest income, to produce a Rawlsian social welfare function.
G„ (v) = 1 -  v(v -1 )£  (1 -  p) - 1 Lm (p)dp (2)
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the tax-benefit systems on 
inequality. The measure used here is the generalised Reynolds-Smolensky index, which 
is defined as the difference between the generalised Gini coefficients for market income 
and post-instrument income, defined in equation (3).
n ? ( v )  = G „ (v ) -G „ tit(v)
= v(v - 1 /£  (1 -  Pr 2 [Lm (p) -  LUAA (p)Vp)
This effect is known as the redistributive effect. Palme (1996) however argues that it 
should be known as an equalising effect. This because the difference of two Gini- 
coefficients does not imply a redistribution of income as it is not necessarily the case 
that both Lorenz Curves on which they are based, have the same ordering of units.
“More specifically, the difference for a certain proportion o f individuals cannot be
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interpreted as the share o f income redistributed from those on the right side o f the point 
to those on the left as the two groups do not necessarily consist o f the same individuals 
when comparing the two Lorenz curves
The generalised Reynolds-Smolensky index of redistribution can be decomposed into 
the redistributive effect before reranking (the difference between the Lorenz curve for 
market income and the concentration curve for post instrument income) and the 
reranking effect of the instrument (the difference between the concentration curve and 
the Lorenz curve) as highlighted in equation (5). Equation (5) can be further 
transformed in equation(6) into three components, the progressivity (or departure from 
proportionality)( n * ( v ) ), the relative size of the instrument in question ( aj(\ + a ) ) and 
the horizontal or reranking effect (D(v))  (see Kakwani, 1984). Progressivity is a 
measure of the difference between the level of redistribution of an instrument relative 
to an instrument with the same revenue effect but where the effect is proportional to 
income. It is therefore a measure of the incidence of an instrument. If an instrument is 
disproportionally focused on the lower (upper) half of the distribution, then it is 
regressive (progressive). If an instrument is regressive (progressive), the concentration 
curve for the instrument will fall outside (inside) the Lorenz curve of market income. If 
the instrument is proportional to income, the concentration curve will be exactly the 
same as the Lorenz curve for market income. In terms of income taxes, progressivity 
relates to the ability-to-pay principle, whereby those with higher incomes are more able 
to pay higher taxes. A progressive income tax is therefore redistributive and thus 
inequality reducing. On the other-hand, benefits are redistributive if they are regressive, 
so that those with lower incomes receive higher benefits. In this paper we use the 
Kakwani index of progressivity, which is the difference between the Lorenz curve for 
income and the concentration curve for the instrument in question. In addition, by using 
the generalised version of the index, we can examine the sensitivity of the results to 
different assumptions about value judgements.
n  As (v) = Gu ( v ) -  GMaA ( v )
= (G„ ( V )  -  CUAA (v)) + (CUAA (V )  -  GUtA (v)) <5)
n f (v )= -  a 
1 + a
n U v) + D(v) (6)
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If tax-benefit instruments are based on characteristics other than income then income 
units may have a different order of incomes before and after the operation of the 
instrument. For example in Ireland, social benefits usually have extra components for 
dependants. After the operation of the benefit, families will shift up the distribution 
relative to single people. Similarly, the existence of joint taxation may result in lower 
tax liabilities for married couples than single people with the same income. This type of 
redistribution is known as horizontal redistribution. Changes in the order of income 
units in a distribution will result in the Lorenz curve of post instrument income being 
different to its concentration curve. The Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index, which is the 
difference between the Lorenz and concentration curves, is the measure of horizontal 
equity we use. There have been a number of criticisms of this measure. For example 
Kaplow (1989) agues that it does not measure well the degree of horizontal 
redistribution as it ignores large changes in the distribution that do not affect the 
ordering of households, while small changes in income that result in reranking result in 
a change in horizontal equity. Palme (1996) points out that using the Gini coefficient 
will give highest weight to the area, typically around the median where the most 
observations occur and where because of a higher density, reranking is more likely to 
occur. He suggests that using the generalised index allows one to place a higher weight
o
on other areas of the income distribution.
In order to explain the reasons for changes in the redistributivity of the system as a 
whole it is necessary to look at what has been happening to sub-components. Equation 7 
demonstrates how the redistributive effect of sub-components A and B, using the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index can be aggregated to produce the redistributive for a 
broader instrument C. Similarly, the progressivity of different sub-components can be 
aggregated to produce an aggregated Kakwani index.
- ( i + f l ) n " ( v ) - a + « n " ( v )
n c (v) = ------------- — —-----------------------( G * -  CM^ B ) ,a * - b  (7)
n g  (v) = aI1 * (V) + m,,<yV\ a * - b  (8)
a + b
where a and b are the average rates of instrument A and B (negative if the reduce 
income).
8 See Atkinson, 1980, Auerbach, and Kaplow 2000 for further critiques of measures of horizontal equity.
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So far we have discussed the redistributive effect of instruments with respect to original 
market income. This however may produce results different to what one might 
necessarily expect in the literature. This is because very often the income base for an 
instrument may differ from market income. This is particularly true for income taxes. 
The income base on which income taxes are based are often extended beyond market 
incomes in that other components of the tax-benefit system are taxable in the case of 
benefits and in some countries, other components are deductible from the tax base in the 
case of social contributions. In addition other expenditures such as mortgage interest 
payments or medical insurance are deductible, while other allowances may reduce the 
tax base further. Pfahler (1990) outlines a method to decompose the progressivity of 
gross income taxes II * into the progressivity of its components Here we adapt the 
method so that the progressivity of income taxes can be decomposed into the 
progressivity of the rate structure relative to the tax base (market income plus taxable 
benefits minus allowances), m+B-a^ r  ^ allowances (A) and the progressivity of the 
additional components of the tax base (B). Equation (10), described the decomposition 
for the Reynolds Smolensky Index.
n f  (v)=„+e_ X  (v)—-— ( v ) + T - ^ r n ' ( v )  (9)
l —a + b  1—a + b
nss =
RS
1 - t 1 - t
(10)
[t(l + b ) / ( l -a  + b)]Tl 
1 - t
RS
Decomposing Inequality/Redistribution by Population Characteristics
In addition to identifying the redistributive effect of different policy instruments, we 
would also like to identify individual and household characteristics, such as education, 
age, family structure, age at death, lifetime labour market characteristics that drive 
redistribution. Because of the difficulty in decomposing measures based on the Gini 
index, we use a slightly different methodology here.
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Many inequality measures can be decomposed into population groups. Morduch and 
Sicular (1998) however argue that decomposition by population groups is dependent on 
sample size, so that the use of many sub-categories often is not feasible given data
age, which might be more properly regarded as continuous variables. Use of large 
numbers of categories, also make the calculations quite difficult.
Because of these problem related to this method, they introduced a regression-based 
method to investigate the contribution made by population factors. Their method starts 
with a decomposition of total income Y, into a regression equation as detailed in 
formula (11).
Where X  is an n x M  vector of attributes described in table 2 and e, an n x  1 vector of 
residuals. The next step involves splitting for each unit, i, total income into the 
component Ytm, accounted for by each independent variable pi as defined in formula
Instead of using a decomposition method for population groups, we can therefore use a 
decomposition method for income characteristics. Inequality is broken up into the 
“absolute factor contribution”, S/is defined in equation (13).
constraints. This method makes it difficult to examine the influence of variables such as
Y = X p  + e (11)
( 12).
M +1
m =l
For m = 1,..., M (12)
where Y? = X™p m,
For m = M + 1
(13)
/ /
where p f  is the correlation between component f  and total income and %f  = is
factor f s  factor share.
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It is necessary to employ an inequality index that is robust to the existence of zero
/
incomes such as I2, half the squared coefficient of variation, 0(See Jenkins,
1
1995). It also has the advantage of being easy to decompose. We must note however,
its components accounted for by these independent attributes as described in (14).
Measuring Inter-personal and Intra-person Redistribution
To examine the variability of incomes between individuals and the variability of 
incomes over their lifetime, we turn to another method, the decomposition of inequality 
or variability between population sub-group. If one regards the set of all annual incomes 
as the total population, where the groups are individuals, then one can decompose total 
variability of incomes into a factor attributed to between individuals (between group 
variability) and variability across the life-course (within group variability). Utilising the 
I2 index, within group variability is defined in formula (15), between group variability is
defined in formula (16).10 Utilising the fact that the population share is (j^)> we see 
that between person inequality, is in fact the inequality of mean lifetime income.
that it gives less weight to poorer individuals than indices such as the Theil L and T 
indices.9 In this way, from (13) above, total income variability can be decomposed into
M +1
(14)
where / =  —nt
(15)
where Wj = v 2f j  1, v;. the income share of each person j  and / .  is the population share of person, in
this case
9 We must note however the different conclusions which can be drawn from different choices of 
inequality indices or decomposition methods.
10 Bjorklund and Palme, 1997 use a similar decomposition method but instead use the I0, Theil L and Ij 
Theil T indices.
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where f i j is the mean lifetime income for person j  and (l the mean population lifetime 
income.
A measurement problem common to most static distributional studies, is that taxes and 
benefits are compared to market income to get the redistributive effect. This method 
therefore ignores the fact that the distribution of market income may be different in the 
absence of a welfare state. However as it is a standard method to assume, we make the 
same assumption.
1.4. Objectives, Implementation and Thesis Outline
As described in the previous section, there are a number of gaps in the study of the 
redistributive effect of the tax-benefits system in Ireland. In this section we will outline 
some of the objectives of this thesis, that hope to fill some of these gaps and discuss the 
primary implementation methodology, microsimulation.
The primary objective is to study the size of redistribution in the Irish Tax-Benefit 
System. The first step therefore is to describe the principle components of the system. In 
writing this thesis, the author had to pull together information together from many 
different sources, from publications of the Irish Revenue Commissioners, The 
Department of Social Welfare, consultations with practitioners and reports and studies 
by academics, as there is no centrally located description of the Irish tax-benefits 
system. Chapter 2 describes the main features of the system. It also tries to set the 
system in its historical context by charting the development of the system in the post 
war era. When one examines the impact of a system on a whole population, it is easy to 
miss the detail of the system. A third objective therefore of this chapter will be to 
examine the redistributive forces of the tax-benefit system, independent of the existing 
population structure. The chapter examines the changing generosity of particular 
instruments for different types of family by following the trend in the implicit 
equivalence scale used in the system. Replacement rates are used to highlight the 
generosity of the system relative to existing standards of living in the country over the 
period examined. The chapter also considers the degree of insurance cover within the
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system and finally examines the way in which instruments interact to produce 
redistribution.
As outlined above, quite a number of studies in Ireland have examined the redistributive 
impact of the whole tax-benefit system in Ireland. There however has been no 
comprehensive examination of the impact of the sub-components separately on the 
redistributive effect. Chapter 3 attempts to do this by composing standard redistributive 
and progressivity measures of the whole system into the effect of the individual 
instruments such as tax allowances, schedules and particular benefits on the 
redistributive impact of the system on the population. As we shall see in Chapter 2, 
there has been quite a degree of tax-benefit reform over time. This paper will examine 
in detail the reforms from 1987 to 2000, where the tax system moved from being a joint 
tax system with the use of tax allowances to an individualised system that uses tax 
credits. The benefit system meanwhile moved from a situation with much 
differentiation between benefits, favouring those with insurance records and those on 
long term receipt of benefit to one whereby the level of the poorest has risen the most. 
In order to examine the effect of different policies and to isolate the impact of particular 
sub-components, a static microsimulation model, partially developed by the author has 
been used. This model takes as a basis a representative sample of the population and 
thus allows the redistributive impact of the system on the whole population to be 
examined.
Chapter 3 examined the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system between 
individuals at one point in time. However as argued above, the use of a short accounting 
period as a week or month will tend to exaggerate the degree of redistribution within a 
tax-benefit system. It is desirable therefore to examine the degree of redistribution over 
a measure such as lifetime income, as this more fully reflects the standard of living an 
individual faces.
The components of lifetime income or the life cycle transitions are another very 
important area of investigation. Insurance systems attempt to cope with negating the 
costs of short term risks. For instance any examination of the effectiveness of a social 
security systems would need to look at how adequate the system coped with risks. 
Lifecycle studies like these allows one to examine taxes paid and benefits received over 
an individuals lifetime. As a result it is possible to disentangle the lifetime 
redistributive nature of a welfare system; intra-personal redistribution versus inter­
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personal redistribution. Inter personal redistribution is what has been traditionally 
investigated in cross-section analyses, namely how much is redistributed from one 
category of individual to another. Intra-personal redistribution on the other hand focuses 
on the redistribution which takes place over the life cycle from periods of wealth such 
as at the height of ones earning ability to periods of need such as when bringing up 
children.
Longitudinal data sets are required to carry out analyses of this kind. Harding (1990) 
gives a description of types of data sources used in longitudinal analyses. Panel data is 
one of the most useful forms of longitudinal data, however there are not many sources 
available. The main datasets are household panel surveys, which ask the same questions 
year after year of households, so that transitions can be studied. Examples include the 
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). In a number of 
Scandinavian countries, detailed administrative data is available which contains 
economic and social characteristics over their lifetime (for example Andreassen et al.,
1996). In 1994, however the a new panel study began in virtually all of the member 
states of the European Union11, the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(ECHP).
Unfortunately, when one wishes to examine periods as long as a lifetime, most panel 
data sets are insufficient as most cover too short a period. An exception is the work 
done in Sweden by Bjorklund (1993) who because of the availability of sufficiently 
long panel data was able to empirically look at the distribution of lifetime income. 
Bjorklund and Palme (1999) using the same data were able to examine the redistributive 
effect over this accounting period of the tax-benefit system in Sweden. Normally 
therefore, in order to examine such a distribution of income, it is necessary to use 
simulation.12 Dynamic microsimulation models can be used to generate synthetic life 
histories of individuals, in effect simulated panel datasets, so that these issues can be 
examined.
11 All except for Sweden.
12 Other ways of producing longitudinal data include synthetic cohorts and pseudo cohorts. The former 
refers to a cohort, which is generated from one cross-section survey. The characteristics of the different 
age cohorts of the cross-section are used to represent the life cycle of the cohort. Pseudo cohorts refer to 
attempts to combine different cross-section surveys conducted in different years to produce a single data 
set. It is not a panel survey because the same people are not interviewed year on year, but it has the 
advantage of having interviewed the same cohort year on year. Thus, the average characteristics of a 
particular cohort can be tracked over time.
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Microsimulation is a methodology for carrying out an economic analysis by simulating 
the economic factors of interest at the micro level. Microsimulation models, which 
study fiscal and social policy take a micro-dataset and simulate the impact of 
government policies at the individual, family or households level. A dynamic 
microsimulation model ages a sample over time, modelling life course events such as 
demographic changes like marriage and giving birth, educational achievement or labour 
market changes such as movements in and out of employment or changes in earnings. In 
this way a synthetic panel data set is generated for each individual in the base sample.
Dynamic microsimulation has existed for over thirty years, having started with Guy 
Orcutt in the 1960’s at Harvard (Orcutt et al, 1961). However the perceived benefits did 
not outweigh the very high costs of the technique. As a result dynamic microsimulation 
models were only built in a very small number of countries (USA and Germany). The 
cost of computing was very high; running a dynamic model required a mainframe 
computer. Computer programming was also at its infancy; for example the development 
of the first DYNASIM model was an advancement of computing technology in addition 
to being an advancement in economic modelling (Lewis and Michel, 1993). Panel data 
required to estimate the transition equations were also rare. In recent years computing 
costs have decreased dramatically and panel data has become more widely available 
which has allowed for an increase in the number of models. Data limitations, a lack of 
knowledge and the problems with projections over long periods of time still make the 
approach often inappropriate for detailed public planning. However the approach can be 
a very useful tool in addressing many policy issues, providing the answers to “w hat...if’ 
questions rather than to “what will happen” questions.
Studies which have concentrated on two types of investigation, lifetime income and 
intra-personal redistribution include Wolfson, (1989), Harding (1993) and Falkingham, 
Hills, Lessof (1995) have used what is known as a dynamic cohort model. These are the 
analyses considered here. Cohort models age a single cohort over its entire lifetime, 
predicting each individual's major lifecycle events. Dynamic population models 
meanwhile age entire cross-sections and have focused on analyses of future populations 
such as the impact of demographic changes on the income distribution, (Galler and 
Wagner, 1986 and Wertheimer et al., 1986).
In order therefore to examine the redistribution over the lifetime and the degree of intra­
personal redistribution of the Irish tax-benefit system, it has been necessary to construct
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a dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland. The bulk of the thesis relates to the 
construction of this model and its use for empirical analysis of the redistributive effect 
of the tax-benefit system. Chapter 4 considers the main issues involved in designing a 
dynamic microsimulation model and also considers how the main dynamic models 
internationally have dealt with the issues discussed. As part of this chapter a short 
description of the main models is included in an appendix. Chapter 5 describes how this 
model dealt with the design issues. One of the conclusions is that if flexibility is not 
built into the model design, dynamic models despite large time investments can quickly 
become redundant. Therefore in order to avoid these problems and allow the model to 
continue to be used post PhD and to be expanded to allow for improved data and 
behavioural equations, a flexible and robust design framework is described.
However, the model framework is merely the skeleton of the model. The meat is the 
behavioural equations incorporated. These are described in Chapters 6 (Demographic 
and Education Processes) and 7 (Labour Market and Capital Processes).
Chapter 8 studies the impact of the tax-benefit system over the life-course. It considers 
the degree of redistribution for individuals of different ages and life-course 
characteristics. Chapter 9 analyses the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits over 
the lifetime. Firstly the impact of different personal characteristics on lifetime income is 
examined. Nextly we investigate the distribution of lifetime income and the impact of 
the tax-benefit system over the distribution. This effect is also decomposed by personal 
characteristic. Finally we consider the effect of life-course income mobility and the 
resulting lifetime income distribution. We examine the relative degree of intra versus 
inter personal redistribution in Chapter 10. Intra-personal redistribution is largely driven 
by life-course factors. We also examine the effect personal characteristics have on intra­
personal redistribution.
The previous chapters examine the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system in 
isolation by considering its effect in a steady state world. However neither the world nor 
the tax-benefit system are in a steady state. The system has evolved over time. In 
Chapter 11, we examine the degree of inter-generational redistribution of the Irish 
Welfare State. Because of the evolving nature of the tax-benefit system, it is impossible 
to examine this by itself. Instead we examine the impact of the entire tax and public 
expenditure system over time. Utilising assumptions about the age-incidence of taxes 
and public expenditure, we are able to examine the differential level of public
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expenditure for different birth cohorts in Ireland and thus investigate which cohorts did 
relatively better and which worse as the system has developed. Lastly we consider the 
sustainability of the whole system, utilising forecasts of the economy and a method 
known as generational accounting.
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Chapter 2. Redistributive Forces of the Irish Tax-Benefit System
2.1.Introduction
This chapter describes the Irish personal tax-benefit system and examines the forces 
within the system, which drive redistribution within it. The Irish tax-benefit system is in 
many respects typical of the Anglo style of welfare state, with relatively insignificant 
social insurance systems, where means testing and progressive income taxes are more 
important (Esping-Andersen, 1996). There are a number of important differences 
between the UK and Irish tax-benefit systems. Firstly means testing tends to be more 
important in the Irish case (See Evans et al., 2000). Social insurance is less well 
developed than* in the UK, with benefits payable at a flat rate and with no earnings 
related components. Although flat rate benefits tend to be of higher value than in the 
UK (See Callan, 1997), the absence of an eamings-related old age pension results in 
lower social insurance contributions. Having a larger self-employed population, the 
coverage of social insurance also tends to be lower. Structurally, means tested benefits 
are designed differently to the UK. Instead of almost universal coverage for a common 
means tested benefit, Income Support, Ireland has a set of categorical instruments 
covering contingencies such as unemployment, old age disability, lone parenthood etc., 
with different means tests and eligibility conditions, but similar levels of benefit. 
Together however, the system covers the same set of contingencies as in the UK. This 
reflects the incremental expansion of coverage of social benefits since the foundation of 
the state, at which point both countries had almost identical tax-benefit systems, largely 
having no sweeping reforms such as the UK’s Beveridge and Fowler reforms. Like the 
UK, Ireland has a form of in-work benefit payable to families with children in work. 
Housing Benefits are less important, but growing in importance with the high house 
price growth currently in the country. Income taxes until 2000 differed from the UK in 
that, couples can optionally have their income taxed jointly.13 Another difference is that 
workers on average wages tend to have higher marginal tax rates, although again more 
recently these have fallen towards UK levels. Like the UK however the taxbase tends to
13 This feature is being abolished from the 2000 budget.
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be wider than in other countries with less reliefs. For example, social contributions are 
not deductible from the income tax base.
This chapter describes the development of the Irish tax-benefit system in the modem era 
(from 1955-2000). Ireland has seen some of the biggest changes in Europe both socially 
and economically over this period. These changes have been accompanied by large 
changes in the tax-benefit system. Although this thesis primarily focuses on the 
redistributive power of the Irish tax-benefit system as it currently stands, this chapter 
provides some of the historical context in which the system developed. Section 2 
describes the principle trends in revenue and social expenditures over the period. 
Section 3 describes the structure of the Irish tax-benefit system and the main changes 
that occurred over the period. Section 4 describes changes the implicit equivalence 
scales or in effect the official view on the economies of scale of living in multi-person 
households, in the system over time. Section 5 catalogues trends in the replacement rate 
over time. The replacement rate measures the ratio of incomes when out of work to in 
work. It is therefore a measure of the generosity of benefits compared to prevailing 
standards of living. Section 6 considers the importance of insurance element of the 
system. Section 7 combines all the components of the system together and examines 
how different instruments interact.
2.2.Revenue and Expenditure 1955-1998
Table 1 describes trends in expenditure on welfare benefits and revenue from income 
taxes and social insurance contributions in Ireland between 1955 and 1998. Over the 
period, benefits rose from a relatively low base of 4.8 per cent of GNP in 1955 to a peak 
in the late 1980’s before falling back in the 1990’s. In the context of the classification, 
here into social insurance, assistance and universal child benefits, insurance benefits are 
the most important.14 Being the dominant expenditure, the trend in insurance benefit 
expenditures mirrors the trend in total expenditure. This however disguises the fact that 
assistance benefits too increased in value over the 1970’s and 1980’s, while there has 
only been a limited decline in total expenditure in the 1990’s. Child Benefits on the 
other hand have been very stable at about 1 per cent of GNP from 1955 to the present.
Reasons for these trends are now examined. One of the main reasons is the change in 
the structure of the tax-benefit system. The period from 1950’s until the 1980’s, saw the
14 In relative terms, these are much less important than in other European countries.
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expansion of the role of social insurance, from a less important position than social 
assistance in 1955 to being nearly twice as important in 1980. The introduction of 
widow’s (now survivor’s) and old age pensions in the 1950’s and 1960’s were the main 
factors. Unemployment insurance benefits existed from the foundation of the state, but 
too rose over this period, partly because of generous indexation. A more important 
reason however is due to the expansion in “demand”, especially in the 1970’s for 
unemployment benefits and in 1980’s for invalidity benefits. Both these factors can be 
explained by the severe economic position of Ireland during the late 1970’s and during 
the 1980’s. Rising numbers of unemployment initially increased unemployment 
insurance payments. As these benefits only last for 15 months at most, the continuing 
recession resulted in greater numbers having to rely on assistance payments. Youth 
unemployment also increased and thus the numbers without sufficient contributions 
increased. Furthermore, the poor economic position had the effect of discouraging 
individuals from seeking employment, resulting in the increase in invalidity benefits 
over this period.
The decline in the relative importance of insurance benefits in the 1990’s has resulted 
from a number of factors. Firstly, demand has fallen because of higher employment 
levels. In addition, the cohort in retirement in the 1990’s is quite small due to migration 
in the 1950’s, hence the fall in survivor’s and elderly insurance benefit expenditure. 
There has also been less generous indexation and a number of structural changes. For 
example, pay-related unemployment and disability benefits were abolished. On the 
assistance side, the peak for expenditure occurred later, as the longest out of work, who 
are more likely to be receiving assistance benefits, were the last to experience the 
impact of the improved economic position of the country. Poor economic conditions in 
the UK also resulted in a large number of unemployed people returning from the UK to 
higher benefits in Ireland, but without sufficient contributions to be entitled to 
unemployment insurance. Government policy also aimed to reduce the difference in the 
rate of payment between different benefits and thus the less generous (mainly 
assistance) benefits were increased at a faster rate. Finally increasing family breakdown 
and extra-marital births has resulted in an increase in the demand for lone parent 
benefits.
On the revenue side, total taxes increased over time from about 15% of GNP in 1955 to 
37% in 1987, falling back in the 1990’s to about 34%. During this period, Ireland 
moved from a system typical of developing countries, where indirect taxes are more
important than direct income-related taxes and contributions, to a European style 
system, where the direct taxes are more prominent. Prior to the 1980’s, indirect taxes 
were more important that direct taxes, moving from two thirds of total taxes15 in 1955, 
to below half of all taxation in the post 1980 period.
The 1955-1987 period, therefore has seen a large expansion in the tax-benefit system 
and thus an increase in the potential for redistribution. Social benefits typically are more 
redistributive either due to targeting through the use of means testing or through the 
categorical nature of the benefits that tend to focus expenditure on groups likely to be 
poor such as the elderly, unemployed or disabled. On the taxation front, the move to 
progressive direct taxation from regressive indirect taxation will also tend to increase 
redistribution, thus levying relatively more taxation on the top of the income 
distribution.
2.3. Changes in the System: Structural Changes 1955-200016
This section describes the structure of the Irish Tax-Benefit system and explains some 
of the main changes between 1955 and the present. Prior to the 1951 Social Welfare 
Act, the benefit system was different, relying on provisions which had existed since 
before the foundation of the state, back to the Poor Law and the reforms at the start of 
the Twentieth century. The structure of the income tax system in the pre-1955 period 
did not change significantly from independence, only rising in value to support 
increased expenditure during the Second World War.
Income Taxation
Since 1955, the Irish income tax system has moved from a highly patriarchal pre-1980 
system to the optional joint income tax system of the 1980’s and 1990’s, to the planned 
move to individualised taxation after 2000. Prior to 1980, a wife’s income was included 
with her husbands for tax purposes. Also the income tax system was characterised by a 
significant number of allowances in respect of dependants. The tax system therefore 
explicitly made a distinction between the principle breadwinner in the family and their 
dependants. In 1980, a High Court judgement which abolished the compulsory taxing of 
women’s income with their husbands, allowing couples to decide whether they are 
taxed individually or jointly (See Kennedy, 1989). Because of the relatively low female,
15 Total taxes here ignore corporate and capital taxation.
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labour-force participation rate in Ireland, many couples continued to have their incomes 
taxed jointly. Recently, there has been a concern that this joint system has led to work
17disincentive effects for secondary earners in a couple (typically the wife), a plan was 
announced in 2000 to move an individual system that makes no distinction as to
1 ftwhether a couple is married.
In this section, we shall discuss in more detail these changes. To aid the discussion, we 
categorise income taxation into the following components: (a) the tax base and 
associated allowances/deductions/credits and (b) the tax schedule and marginal relief.
Tax Base, Allowances, Deductions and Credits
Firstly, the taxbase is determined. Allowances and deductions are deducted from taxable 
income, which consists of gross incomes and most cash benefits. Unlike continental 
systems, there are fewer employment-related deductions. For example, social insurance 
contributions and, travel to work or other professional expenses are not deductible. In 
addition, a number of incomes are exempt from income taxation such as a number of 
social benefits such as child related benefits.
Allowances, deductions and credits are grouped together here because they have similar 
objectives and in the process of reform underway at the moment, many allowances are 
being transformed into tax-credits. The principle distinction is that allowances typically 
have fixed amounts that are deducted from taxable income, effectively operating as a 
tax band of zero per cent. Deductions are also deducted from taxable income. However 
they usually depend on expenditure on a particular item such as rent, mortgage interest, 
health insurance etc. to have a value. While allowances and deductions are deductible 
from the tax base, credits are deductible from income taxes. The distinction has the 
effect that allowances/deductions ceteris paribus result in higher tax reductions for 
those with higher incomes than tax credits. This is because allowances and deductions 
are subtracted from taxable income and thus take a higher value for higher marginal rate 
of taxpayers, while because tax credits are deductible from income taxes, their values 
are the same for all taxpayers.19
16 The sources used for this section are annual reports of the Revenue Commissioners and the Department 
of Social Welfare and Budget Statements of the Minister of Finance over the period 1955-2000.
17 See O’Donoghue and Sutherland (1999).
18 See Callan and Van Soest (1995) for a discussion of the impact of individualising the income tax on 
labour supply.
19 This assumes that taxes paid exceed the value of the credit or allowances.
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Throughout the period of study, a single person allowance has existed. This however 
has decreased from over 60% of the average wage in 1955 to about 40% in 1973 to 20- 
30% in the 1980’s and 1990’s.20 Therefore, the allowance has not kept pace with 
earnings inflation thus increasing the proportion of workers who pay income tax and 
because of the progressive nature of the income tax system, increasing the redistributive 
nature of the income tax system. Over the entire period, allowances have also existed 
for married couples, widows and the elderly. A number of deductions exist for 
particular types of expenditure such as rent, mortgage interest, private medical 
insurance and private pension contributions.
The system has also reduced the number of instruments with horizontal redistributive 
objectives. In 1955, there were allowances for children, working wives, dependent 
relatives and for unmarried tax payer’s who had a female relative caring for their 
relatives. The system was therefore similar to present day income tax systems in 
Southern Europe, that include allowances for dependants of the tax-payer. The system 
therefore followed a “main breadwinner” type model, reflecting the low female labour- 
force participation rate in Ireland at the time and supported the role of the family as a 
social shock absorber. It also reflects “softness” of state institutions, where outside the 
income tax system, the administrative capacity to deliver targeted family support did not 
exist.21 Gradually, these horizontally redistributive instruments were reduced in value 
through inflation and eventually abolished, so that by 1986 all of these instruments were 
eliminated, with horizontal redistribution to families accomplished through the benefit 
system.22
Until the late 1990’s, allowances and deductions were generally allowable at the 
marginal rate of tax. In other words the higher the marginal rate of tax paid, the more 
valuable the allowance. However, in the 1999 budget it was announced that the main tax 
allowances would become tax credits. This act would tend to increase the degree of 
progressivity of the income tax system.
Tax Schedule and Marginal Relief
20 This rate assumes that individuals are at the average wage.
21 Ferrera (1996) uses this argument to rationalise the structure of tax-benefit systems in Southern Europe, 
where targeting of resources is achieved through instruments that have the administrative capacity such as 
income taxation or social insurance.
22 The main exception is a lone parent allowance introduced in 1980.
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Once the tax base has been determined, income tax is levied through the income tax 
schedule or the system of rates and bands.23 In addition, for those on low incomes there 
is a parallel individual/joint system with a separate system of allowances and rates 
known as marginal relief.
Much of the progression in the tax system results from a multi-banded increasing tax 
schedule. This has existed in a permanent form since the Finance Act of 1972. Prior to 
this, a sur-tax was in operation that included graduated bands for high-income earners. 
For most taxpayers, income tax was paid at a flat standard rate with reduced rates for 
those on lower incomes being introduced occasionally. Until 1973, the degree of 
progressivity in the tax system was expanded as the marginal rate of tax for each band 
was increased. Since the top marginal rates have tended to fall. The marginal rates for 
those with lower incomes also fell until 1980, and increased then over the 1980’s until 
the tax reforms of the late 1980’s. Over the course of the 1980’s, the size and 
complexity of system of tax bands and rates was reduced significantly. In 1976 there 
were 6 bands varying from 26 to 77 per cent. The 1990’s has seen a relatively stable tax 
schedule, with tax reduction being focused on increasing the width of the lowest tax 
bands, effectively reducing the marginal rates for those affected.
Until High Court Judgement of 1980, married women’s incomes were taxed with their 
husband’s. Subsequently, as in the case of a number of other European countries such as 
Germany, France and Spain, Ireland uses a system of joint taxation for married couples 
(See O’Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999). This system allows married couples to 
combine their income for income tax purposes. Spouses can transfer unused bands (and 
also some tax allowances) between each other to minimise their income tax liability.
Peculiarly to Ireland, the income tax schedule changes for those with low incomes. The 
objective is to take low earning individuals out of the tax net. Figure 1 outlines the 
difference between tax allowances and tax exemption limits, where the straight line 
indicates the operation of the existing system, the dotted line the operation of the 
exemption limit and the crossed line the operation of marginal relief.24 The exemption 
limit effectively increases the zero rate tax-band. However, in order to avoid the tax 
kink indicated by the dotted line, marginal relief is used to smooth this transition. 
Therefore, tax is paid at the marginal relief rate until it is equal to tax paid under the
23 Capital gains and bequests are taxed separately.
24 Note the tax schedule used here is a hypothetical one, and is not representative of the Irish system. It is 
used simply for illustrative purposes.
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existing system. Tax exemption limits are administratively quite simple and are a 
cheaper way of keeping people out of the tax net than tax allowances. However as we 
shall see they, do so at the cost of increased marginal income tax rates.
Summing up the effect of all these changes, figure 2 highlights the operation of the 
income tax system between 1955 and 1998 for married couples with 2 children as a 
percentage of the average wage. We notice that income tax originally only applied to 
families with relatively high incomes; in 1955, a family had to earn more than 150% of 
the average wage before tax was paid. Gradually then, the tax system was expanded, so 
that by 1973, those at about 50% of the average wage paid tax. We notice also the 
increase in the average tax paid at each income level (here as a proportion of the 
average wage) increasing for all income tax paying levels of income until 1987. Since 
then reforms have been instituted which have resulted in the average tax rate falling 
back until the average income tax levels in 1998 are similar across all incomes to the 
level in 1980. Current stated government policy is to continue to reduce these levels 
towards levels comparable with the United Kingdom.
Social Insurance System
The current Irish social insurance system was established in 1951, combining a number 
of existing systems. In 1955, the only contingencies covered by the social insurance 
system were short-term disability, unemployment and widowhood. Over time, the range 
of contingencies covered has expanded with the addition of maternity (1953), old age 
(1961), retirement (1970), deserted wives (1974), long-term invalidity (1974), male 
survivors (1994) and deserted husbands (1997).
The coverage of the social insurance system has expanded substantially since the 1950’s 
(see table 2). Initially full coverage was limited only to full-time private sector 
employees, with partial coverage of public sector workers. In addition until the 1970’s, 
non-manual workers earning more than the contribution ceiling were excluded from 
membership of the social insurance scheme. This resulted in 1955 in a situation with 
coverage for only about 60 per cent of the work force, with full coverage for just over 
half. Over time, the proportion of the work force in private sector non self-employed 
employment has increased, resulting in a gradual increase in the insured population. By 
1973 73 per cent of the population were coverage. A number of further structural 
reforms have resulted in increased coverage. In 1974, the contribution limit was lifted 
for non-manual workers, increasing total coverage to nearly 85 per cent in 1975. The
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main effect of this reform was to nearly double the coverage for partial benefits within 
the public sector. Recent structural reforms have further increased coverage, including 
the extension of partial cover to the self-employed with earnings over a threshold in 
1988. Part-time workers were included in the system in 1991. New public sector 
workers from 1995 will be covered for all benefits. In recent years, the dominant force 
in the expansion in the numbers covered by the social insurance system has been 
demographic and economic as both the working age population and the labour force has 
increased dramatically in size. This is witnessed by the doubling of the insured 
population in the years, 1980-1998.
Despite these reforms, there are a number of significant gaps in coverage. In 1998, only 
75 per cent of those covered were covered for all benefits, with the rest being made up 
of self-employed, low-wage workers and existing public sector workers. Also there are 
a number of groups completely excluded from coverage. Those within the labour 
market excluded from membership include those earning less than the contributory 
threshold, the self-employed in receipt of unemployment assistance, some participants 
on social employment programs and relatives assisting self-employed. There is also a 
substantial proportion of the population not participating in the labour market, such as 
those in education or with home responsibilities. Unlike in countries such as Britain and 
Germany, they are not credited with contributions during these periods.
Turning to the structure of benefit payments, benefits have generally consisted of a flat 
rate payment (that varies by contingency) and unrelated to previous earnings, with extra 
payments for dependants.25 Long term benefits typically also vary to a small extent by 
the number of contributions paid. Extra payments are also payable for those living 
alone and those aged 80 or more.
Contributions have moved from flat rate payments, which existed until 1978 to firstly a 
partially earnings related system in 1974, to a wholly earnings related contributory 
system in 1979, Pay-Related Social Insurance (PRSI). Total contributions are divided 
between employee and employer contributions that are paid into the social insurance
25 For a period from the late 1970’s to mid 1990’s, there existed a small earnings related component in 
Unemployment and Disability Benefits. Subsequently, a component has been retained so that benefits are 
adjusted to limit the replacement rate of those with very low previous earnings. Maternity benefits 
continue to be earnings related subject to maximum and minimum payments.
26 The relationship between the number of contributions is quite tenuous as, for example, an average of 24 
weeks of contributions per year, entitles a single person to a pension of 94 per cent of the maximum 
retirement pension received for an average 48 contributions per year. Also for no extra contribution, 
additional payments are made in respect of adult and child dependants of the claimant.
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fund and income levies paid into general taxation. PRSI is paid by workers on earnings 
up to a ceiling subject to an allowance that varies for different types of workers. Income 
over the ceiling faces a marginal rate of zero. Employer contributions (ERSIC) for 
employees have a similar structure except for employees with earnings below the 
ERSIC reduced rate limit who face a lower ERSIC rate. Flat rate Health Contribution 
Levies, Education and Training Levies are also paid by individuals who have earnings 
above an exemption limit. This movement from flat rate benefits and contributions to 
flat rate benefits and earnings related bep£fits have resulted in a social insurance 
pension system thus is highly redistributive, reducing the pure insurance element of the 
system.
Figure 3 highlights the trend in the system of social contributions 1955-1998. In 1955, 
1965 and 1973, social contributions were flat rate, not varying by income until the upper 
earnings ceiling was reached. At this, level workers paid no social contributions. This 
ceiling as well as the payment as a percentage of the average wage increased by 1965. 
This ceiling fell back by 1973, so that those on the average wage paid no contributions. 
We notice in 1980 the impact of introducing pay related social insurance (PRSI) over 
the 1970’s. Those on very low pay were excluded, while PRSI was paid proportionally 
to income until the upper earnings limit was reached. At which point, the marginal rate 
drops to zero. The introduction of the income levies, resulted in the highest average 
rates being paid in 1987. By 1994, low wage earners were made exempt from these 
levies and were extended to cover higher earning workers on all incomes. The 
introduction of a PRSI allowance and the reduction of the marginal rate reduced the 
PRSI rates by 1998.
Non-Contributory Benefits
Like social insurance benefits, social assistance benefits in Ireland are contingency 
based, with most contingencies being covered by the system.28 Means-tested benefits in 
Ireland are relatively more important than in most other countries (See Callan and 
Nolan, 1993). Part of the reason is a result of the structure of mainly flat rate social 
insurance benefits. Earnings related insurance benefits will tend to have higher 
payments and thus correspondingly reduce the means tested benefits as a proportion of 
total benefits. This is only part of the story however. Much of importance of social
27 This ceiling existed for non-manual workers.
28 The excluded categories are those who, although capable of work, do not seek employment including 
those in education.
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assistance results from gaps in the coverage of social insurance. In addition to those 
who are not actually covered by social insurance at all, many such as the long term 
unemployed exhaust entitlement to insurance benefits and become reliant on assistance. 
Another source includes contingencies that are not covered by insurance such as lone 
parenthood and low income if in work. Also in the past, the insurance system did not 
cover the contingency of old age and thus due to the relatively late introduction of social 
insurance pensions, many elderly people are reliant on assistance. Another source of 
assistance expenditure is as a farming support, as witnessed by the substantial numbers 
of farmers on low income receives smallholder’s unemployment assistance. Finally, 
relatively high benefit rates (See Callan, 1997 and Eardley et al., 1996) result in the 
higher average expenditure.
Benefits can be classified into five types of cash payments, out of work payments, in 
work benefits, universal child benefits and housing benefits. There are also a number of 
in-kind benefits provided under the social assistance system including butter vouchers, 
fuel allowances and free transport payments for extraordinary expenses.
Out o f Work Benefits
Most contingencies such as unemployment, old age, survivorhood and disability were 
covered by the assistance system at the start of period we are studying. A number of 
other contingencies were added over time including deserted wife’s (1974), lone parents 
(1973), early retirement (1994) and carers (1994). More recently, a number of benefits 
have been introduced to assist in reintroducing the long-term unemployed to work. 
Contingencies not covered by the above payments are met by the Supplementary 
Welfare Allowance.
Like the social insurance system, if an individual is entitled to a means tested benefit 
then they will be entitled to a personal rate for themselves as well as possible additional 
payments for adult and child dependants.30 In addition elderly recipients are entitled to 
extra payments if they live alone or are aged over 80. The total amount of benefit paid 
depends on a means test. In general, the unit of assessment used for means is the nuclear 
family. This unit is narrower than the household and as a result individuals living in
29 Benefits include the Back to Work Allowance, the Part-time Job Incentive Scheme, the Back to Work 
Enterprise Allowance and the Back to Education Allowance.
30 An exception occurs if both individuals are entitled to the Old Age Non-Contributory Pension. In this 
case both will be entitled to the full personal rate, rather than a personal rate payment and an adult 
dependent payment (See Callan et al, 1996).
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households at the top of the income distribution may be eligible for social assistance. 
Therefore, social assistance may be less redistributive at the household level than would 
be expected under a household level means test (See O’Donoghue and Evans, 1999 for 
a discussion). An exception is in the case of unemployed people, where the income of 
people with whom they share accommodation can be counted as means (See Callan et 
al., 1996).
Means tests can be classified into four generic types used in unemployment assistance 
(UA), old age assistance (OANCP), lone parent (LPA), carers allowance (CA) and 
dependent payments means test.31 In general, incomes counted towards means include 
all sources of earnings, imputed income value of assets (See O’Donoghue, 1998 for a 
description). Social welfare incomes do not count as means. The five types are 
described as follows:
• The UA means test depends on income net of taxes and contributions and a small 
earnings disregard.32 Recently the withdrawal rate has been reduced from 100 % to 
60 % on the recipients own income. Recently also the means test applied to spouses 
income has fallen from 100% to 50%, subject to an earnings disregard.
• The Old age means test depends only on gross income. The withdrawal rate is 100% 
while both spouses have a disregard of £6 pw. As both spouses can be eligible in 
their own right for OANCP, if a spouse receives the benefit individually, then their 
means are half the sum of both spouses incomes.
• The lone parent means test has changed in the late 1990’s in an effort to encourage 
increased labour force participation. It moved to a net income basis and from a 
withdrawal rate of 100% to 50%. In addition, the earnings disregard has been 
significantly increased.
• The Carer’s means test is based on net income, has a withdrawal rate of 100% and 
has a small earnings disregard per child.
• A spouse of a benefit recipient can have income up to a limit with the couple still 
receiving an extra payment for the spouse. Until the late 1990’s, if the income 
exceeded this amount then the dependent adult payment and half of any child 
payment was withdrawn. Now, these extra payments are gradually withdrawn.
31 See Callan et al. (1996) and Callan and Nestor (2000) for a description of these means tests.
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The operation of these means tests in 1998 is shown in Figure 4 for families with 2 
children. The graph plots gross earnings as a percentage of the maximum value of 
each particular benefit versus the benefit as percentage of this maximum. Therefore the 
actual value of the X-axis will be higher for higher valued benefits such as Old Age 
Non-Contributory Benefit (OANCP). Also all means tested benefits at zero earnings 
will be 100% of the maximum.
Here, we notice the attempt to reduce the disincentives to work inherent in the system. 
In 1994, the means test for Unemployment assistance was similar to the Carer’s 
allowance (lines with squares), where the benefit was largely withdrawn pound for 
pound with net income. In the intervening period, a lower withdrawal rate of 60% was 
introduced (dotted line), so that the benefit in 1998 is not completely withdrawn until 
income reaches just over 250% of the maximum value of the benefit.
The changes made to the Lone parent benefit means test (dark line) have even been 
greater. Here the test moved from a 100% withdrawal rate based on gross income (like 
the Old age assistance means test (lines with crosses) to a means test based on net 
income with a withdrawal rate of 50%. Also a larger income disregard was included as 
seen by the flat section for those on low benefits. In 1998, one-parent families could 
then earn £6000 per year without their benefit being affected. This combined with the 
more generous taper, means that the benefit would not be fully withdrawn until earnings 
reached over 400% of the original benefit.
Finally, we notice the impact of a spouse of an unemployed person earning in UA 
Spouse (Circled Line). Here, we notice that after a short period where income is 
disregarded, the spouse extra payment (and half the child payment) is rapidly 
withdrawn. By the time the working spouse earns 80 per cent of the UA, the benefit 
received becomes less than UA received if the working spouse had been the one 
claiming the UA (the dotted line) as part-time workers can claim UA, however the 
benefit is assessed for the family. At this point perversely, it would make more sense to 
shift the claim from the “unemployed” spouse to the working spouse.
In-Work Benefits
32 Allowable on a claimant’s own income if no children are present
33 All families except for the lone parent benefit/one parent family benefit are assumed to be a married 
couple.
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The Family Income Supplement is a payment to those who are in work, is similar to 
Family Credit (now Working Families Tax Credit) in the UK and Earned Income Tax 
Credit in the USA, and was introduced in 1984. It is payable to families with children 
who work more than a certain limit. In 1994, this limit was 20 hours per week, reduced 
from 24 hours per week in 1987.34 All gross income (before tax or social insurance 
contributions are subtracted) including earned, unearned and transfer income is counted 
as means.35 Families with income below certain limits, dependent on the number of 
children, are entitled to FIS if they meet the conditions set out above. The amount of 
FIS payable is 60% (up from 50% in 1987) of the difference between the limit and 
family gross income, subject to a minimum payment.
Callan et al (1995) examined the impact on the marginal effective tax rate of the 
interaction of FIS with other instruments such as income tax and social insurance 
contributions. Recommendations resulting from this report resulted in the income base 
for Family Income Supplement moving from pre-tax and contribution income to net 
income in 1996. This is highlighted in figure 5, which takes the FIS in 1994 with 4 
children and simulates a budget constraint for a family with 4 children. In the system 
based on gross income (black line), we notice the severe poverty trap faced by the 
family, caused by the interaction of income taxes, social insurance contributions and 
FIS. Here income after FIS actually fell from around £8500 p.a. to £13000 p.a. Moving 
to a net income base reduces the effect of the poverty trap.
Housing Benefits
The housing benefit scheme in Ireland was introduced in 1977 under the act that 
instituted the supplementary welfare allowance (SWA) (See DSW, 1995). It covers rent, 
mortgage interest and household insurance. According to DSW (1995), “the SWA 
scheme was originally devised so as to provide a residual and support role within the 
overall income maintenance structure by guaranteeing a standard basic minimum 
income and by assisting those confronted with exceptional needs. However the increase 
in the volume o f rent and mortgage supplementation in recent years has affected this 
role.” In 1995, 36,700 people were in receipt of the benefit split 30000 covering rent 
(one-third of the private rented sector) and 6700 for the mortgage interest. As the means 
tests described above there is only limited information available about the actual
34 In the case of two parents living together, their hours worked could be added to reach this limit.
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structure of these housing benefits.36 Firstly, all families regardless of income are 
responsible for part of their housing costs (about 10% of value of SWA). Housing 
allowances cover remaining housing costs up to a limit which depends on the family 
composition and location. Families are allowed disposable income equivalent to the 
SWA, before they have to make any further contribution. Pre-tax income above this 
amount is withdrawn at a 100% withdrawal rate.
2.4. Assumed Need - Implicit Equivalence Scales 1955-1998
In the last section, the rules of the tax-benefit system were described. Here, we examine 
how changes over time influence trends in needs implicit in the tax-benefit system; the 
weight placed by the system on the extra costs resulting from the existence of 
dependants. To do this we consider the concept of implicit equivalence scale within the 
system. In other words, the extra percentage of benefit or tax allowance received 
relative to the amount received if they were single. Except in the case of social 
insurance where both spouses are entitled in their own right, benefits (and taxes until 
1980) apply to the family level. However even in the case of social insurance, if only 
one spouse is eligible then these instruments too apply at the family level. In other 
words a member of the family applies for the benefit or pays tax and they get extra 
payments or allowances for their dependants.
Table 3 presents the trend in the equivalence scale for the main benefits and income 
taxation for adult dependants and the first child dependant, from 1955-1998. With 
regard to benefits, we notice the biggest change between 1955 and 1965, where the ratio 
of benefits given to dependants relative to the claimant rose dramatically. For adult 
dependants, the ratio increased in each case by over 40 per cent from about 0.5 to 0.71- 
0.81.37 Since then, there has been a gradual decline in the adult dependant equivalence 
scale to 0.58-0.68 in 1998. However, in the 2000 budget it was announced that it was 
intended to bring this equivalence scale up to 0.7 again. The child-dependent 
equivalence scale shows a similar movement, with a particularly large fall in the 
equivalence scale 1980-1987. Since 1994, the child dependent amounts have not 
increased in nominal terms, as it has been government policy to increase universal child
35 The principle exceptions are child benefit, carer’s allowance, domiciliary care allowance and rent 
allowance.
36 See Callan and Nestor, (2000) and DSW (1995).
37 Recipients of old age assistance payments are entitled to apply individually in their own right and thus 
the adult dependant equivalence scale has remained constant at 1 over the entire period.
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benefits instead. This is because of the disincentives to work for unemployed persons 
with children.
2.5.Income Replacement
Looking at equivalence scale allows us to examine the need implicit across different 
family types for specific contingencies over time. However, it does not allow us to 
compare between benefits or the value of the instrument relative to the standard of 
living. Also by focusing on only one instrument it ignores the interaction between 
instruments.38 Net Replacement rates, which are the ratio of out-of-work to in-work 
income allow us to do both. With a fixed denominator in a particular year (net average 
earnings), we can compare between benefits. Thus, higher replacement rates indicate 
higher benefits. Meanwhile a falling replacement rate over time indicates that the 
benefit has been falling behind earnings over time.
Table 4, describes the trend in the net replacement rate from 1955-1998. For single 
persons, replacement rates in general are quite low by European standards, with the 
replacement rate never reaching 40%, in most cases never reaching 30%, with the 
lowest replacement rate being 10% in 1955. As the objective of social benefits in 
Ireland has generally been one of poverty alleviation rather than income replacement, 
we see that there is provision for dependants. We notice a very dissimilar trend to that 
observed for equivalence scales. From 1955-1965, we observe a fall in the replacement 
rate, despite an increase in equivalence scales over the period. This is because single 
person benefits in general fell with respect to net average earnings and thus despite the 
increase in the proportion of the benefit relating to dependants replacement rates for 
families with 2 children fell. By contrast, despite falling equivalence scales for 
dependants, the replacement ratio rose from 1965 to 1987. This is partly to do with 
rising benefit levels and partly to do with higher taxation, which reduces the 
denominator, net average earnings.
Since 1987, falling taxation has resulted in higher denominators, pushing replacement 
rates up. The most important effect over the period however has been a shift from very 
variable replacement rates for different contingencies to a more equal distribution of
38 As in general an individual can only apply for one benefit, the only type of interaction possible would 
occur if both spouses in a couple were eligible for separate benefits in their own right. In this case The 
numerator would be higher. At the same time, one might expect that one should consider a higher 
denominator as one would then be looking at the replacement rate of two income replacement rates and 
thus should include two wages in the denominator.
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benefits. Primarily, this has been accomplished by increasing the lowest valued, mainly 
short-term and assistance benefits at a faster rate than the others. In 1985, the 
Commission on Social Welfare (CSW, 1985) recommended a minimum level of benefit 
to achieve a basic standard of living. By 1999, this had been achieved for all benefits. 
However despite this achievement, the level of indexing since 1987 has seen benefits 
over the last decade fall further behind earnings, despite rapid economic growth. This 
has in turn, reduced the ability to meet another target as part of the National Anti- 
Poverty Strategy, that relative poverty (as measured by 60% of average income) fall 
from 15% to 10% by 2007 (Nolan, 1999).
2.6. Social Insurance versus Social Assistance
Section 5 highlights a reduction in the insurance principle within the tax-benefit system. 
Until the 1980’s/early 1990’s, contributory benefits were much more generous than 
assistance benefits. However a deep recession during this period and a concern about 
the adequacy of some benefits, has seen the higher valued insurance benefits increase at 
a slower rate than assistance rates. In addition, increasing numbers of people depend on 
assistance income over long periods. Other changes, which have highlighted the 
reduction of the insurance principle, include the movement from flat rate contributions 
and benefits to earnings related contributions and flat rates benefits.
Another difference between the operation of public schemes and private savings 
mechanisms relates to the link between the amount of contributions and benefits 
received. Social insurance payments for retirement, old age and invalidity depend only 
on the number of contribution.39 However, again this link is quite tenuous, as the 
difference between minimum and maximum benefit levels is very small. Individuals 
with the minimum per year receive pensions of about 95% of those with maximum 
contributions (48 per year).40 Although most recipients get the maximum rate, 
significant numbers receive less than this; in 1995, 38%, 41% and 11% respectively 
received less than the maximum payment of the old age, retirement and survivor’s 
pensions.
This emphasis on poverty reduction rather than income replacement means that for 
higher earning families, the social welfare system does not provide sufficient income for 
retirement and long-term illness. Therefore, private provision of income replacement
39 Payments of invalidity to under 65’s are however at a lower rate.
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mechanisms for retirement and long-term illness is quite important with about half of all 
workers covered for these risks.
2.7. Interacting Instruments in the Tax-Benefit System
Having described the main features of the system, we now pull the strands together to 
consider the system as a whole. We shall firstly describe the interaction of the different 
components before comparing the impact on different types of families, different annual 
systems and the impact of new back-to work incentives.
Figure 6 describes how the different income components of the 1998 system interact to 
produce di: ming married couple with 2 children on the
unemployment benefits, the check pattern, family income supplement, the horizontal 
stripes earnings after taxes and contributions and the black band housing benefits. We 
notice first that as universal benefits, child benefits do not vary with income. 
Unemployment Assistance (UA) is withdrawn until 3 days work (24 hours pw) has been 
reached. At this point the Family Income Supplement (FIS) is received. As the incomes 
are plotted cumulatively, the upper bound of net earnings represent pre-housing benefits 
disposable income. Except for a kink when a family moves from UA to FIS, disposable 
income rises with hours worked. The kink occurs because the value of UA at 24 hours 
of the minimum wage is greater than the equivalent value of FIS. Housing benefits 
being withdrawn pound for pound with disposable income result in a flat profile of final 
income, with a family having to work 70 hours at the minimum wage before disposable 
income exceeds that of a family not working. We shall see however that both these 
issues have been alleviated through the introduction of back-to-work benefits. In 
addition, housing benefits have in the past been relatively unimportant. Recently 
however, housing benefits have become more important and thus the disincentive 
effects have become more important. Currently, therefore the scheme is being examined 
to see if a less severe withdrawal rate could be introduced.
We now consider the treatment of different families. Figure 7 plots gross income versus 
disposable income per annum for 4 different family types (not receiving housing 
benefits), single, lone parent with 2 children, married couple with no children (MOK), 
and married couple with 2 children (M2K). The tax-benefit system is progressive for
40 More generous contribution records are required for the survivor’s pension.
minimum
: i
hourly wage.41 The grey band represents child benefits, the white band
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each type across the whole range of income. Married couples without children have 
higher disposable incomes than single people with the same earnings. For those 
receiving benefits because of the presence of adult dependant additional payments and 
for those higher up the income scale because of the existence of joint taxation, which 
reduces tax liabilities for the couple. Families with children married and unmarried have 
higher disposable incomes than families without children. Initially married couples with 
children have higher disposable income because of higher benefits. However, because 
of the more favourable means test as outlined in section 2, lone parents eventually 
receive more benefits. However married couples (with and without children) eventually 
pass the disposable income of the lone parent at about £25k p.a. because of their lower 
tax liabilities, again because of the existence of joint taxation.
We now turn to the trend in tax-benefit incidence over time. Figure 8 plots the budget 
constraint, a graph of disposable income versus gross income (as a percentage of the 
average wage), faced by married couples with 2 children for the period 1955-1998. At 
the bottom of the income distribution, we notice, the impact of rising benefit levels, 
especially 1955-1973 and 1987-1998. Also, we saw the effect of the change in the 
unemployment assistance means test, with flat disposable income in 1955-1987, as a £1 
of benefit is withdrawn for every £1 of income. In 1998, this poverty trap has been 
eliminated as now disposable income rise with gross income. Above 50% of the average 
wage, we notice the effect of the rising tax-burden 1955-1987, as the budget constraint 
is lower for each year examined. This trend has been reversed by 1998.
As highlighted above, it is not sufficient to focus on a budget constraint at one point on 
time. A number of instruments are time dependent. In particular, the back-to work 
allowance (BWA), which allows individuals to retain some benefits on returning to 
work reduces in value. Figures 6-8 show the situation where individuals receive the out 
of work benefit, unemployment assistance until they work 20 hours per week and an in­
work benefit, the family income supplement thereafter. The budget constraint also 
depends on the average hourly wage. Figure 9 demonstrates the impact of the family 
choosing instead to take-up the back-to work allowance. Here we look at a single 
earning married couple with 2 children. The figure demonstrates the choice facing the 
family currently without employment income if they decide to take up work at the 
minimum hourly wage this year, a year after taking up employment, 2 years after and 3 
years after. If the family choose not to work more than 20 hours, then they will be
41 It is assumed that they pay a private sector rent of £105 pw.
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eligible for some unemployment assistance. However if they choose to work more than 
this then they will be able eligible for both family income supplement and the back to 
work allowance, which falls in value over time. In year 4 we notice the existence of a 
poverty trap. This is because of the interaction of the new unemployment assistance 
(UA) means test and the family income supplement (FIS). For a family on the minimum 
wage working 20 hours per week, they will get more UA than FIS. However after 3 
days work per week (24 hours), the family would no longer be eligible for the benefit. 
Figure 10 highlights the additional impact of housing benefits. Here we see the effect of 
the withdrawal of housing benefits once income reaches £250 per week. In year 1 
therefore there is no incentive to work more than 30 hours per week, in year 2 this shifts 
to 40 hours as the BTWA is reduced and thus housing benefits can be held onto longer. 
However by year 4 there is no incentive to work on the minimum wage, if the 
household is eligible for housing benefits. Of course it is a pre-condition of eligibility 
for benefit to be seeking work. Nevertheless despite recent benefit reform there still 
remains substantial poverty and unemployment traps.
Redistribution over the Lifetime
In addition redistribution between different income groups at one point in time, the 
insurance system for example with earnings related contributions and flat rate benefits, 
redistributes from rich to poor over the lifetime. Therefore those with lower lifetime 
earnings will have higher returns (See Hughes, 1985).42
Figure 11 compares the return of the tax-benefit system over a lifetime relative to a 
private savings instrument. In each case we consider the case of a single male earning 
varying proportions of the average wage. The graph reports the ratio of benefits 
received to taxes and contributions paid if they lived their entire life in a world where a 
particular years system applied.43 Clearly, no individual lives in such a world, however 
the steady state assumption allows one to study the effect of each system in isolation. 
Assuming a growth rate equal to the interest rate, a private savings instrument in the 
absence of management fees would give a return equal to 1. For each of the tax-benefit 
systems examined, we notice the strongly redistributive nature of the system, where 
those who on average have lower incomes receive relatively more benefits than pay 
taxes. We also notice that much of the earnings distribution have returns significantly
42 This effect is reduced because of the existence of an upper earnings limit.
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below 1. In fact, only in the case of 1998 and 1995, do we see returns in excess of unity 
for those with low average wages. For the other years, those with average lifetime 
earnings that vary from 40% to 300% of the average wage have returns below unity. We 
see a trend of falling returns from 1955 to 1973, before rising again to 1998. This effect 
is a result of a mixture of changes in taxes and benefits.
Examining men who remained single their whole life, never having children or 
experiencing spells out of the labour market between leaving education and retiring is 
quite an extreme case. The presence of spells out of work increases the redistributive 
effect even further for those lower down the income distribution. Also, working women 
who tend to have lower average wages, will on average have higher returns for the same 
number of years worked. However many women will not work sufficiently long to be 
eligible for benefits and thus in aggregate may in fact have lower returns. It is necessary 
to look at the distribution of lifetime incomes to consider this issue in more detail. 
Families who work for shorter periods will also have higher returns from the tax-benefit 
system. As noted above, although contribution related, the difference in benefit level for 
families with the maximum contribution record and the minimum contribution record is 
very slight. In any case, assistance benefit levels are not much lower than the lowest 
insurance pension level. Also as Hughes (1985) pointed out, those who were early 
recipients of the insurance pension had higher returns as they were required to have had 
lower contribution records. In addition, married couples and families with children will 
have higher returns due to the existence of adult and child dependent payments in the 
benefits system.
2.8. Conclusions
This chapter outlines the main characteristics of the Irish tax-benefit system and 
describes the main trends in the components since 1955. The main forces driving the 
institutional reforms have been an expansion of social rights (O'Connell and Rottman, 
1992), a greater degree of targeting to focus on poverty reduction culminating in the 
Anti-Poverty Strategy and a concern to improve work-incentives.
Over the period, income taxes have gradually increased in importance, reaching a peak 
in the late 1980's before falling back during the 1990's. The social insurance and 
assistance systems have also expanded both in terms of the coverage of the population,
43 We assume that the system is neutral and so subtract taxes that are used for other non benefit
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the demand for benefits and the value of benefits. Again these trends levelled off in the 
1990's.
One of the main distinguishing features in the Irish Tax-Benefit System relative to other 
European tax-benefit systems is the almost complete absence of an insurance 
component in the benefit system. Although the largest benefit instruments are nominally 
called insurance benefits and depend on the payment of insurance contributions, the 
objective of these instruments are primarily redistributive (in the narrow sense of 
vertical redistribution) rather than income replacement. For aboilt 15 years earnings 
replacement benefits were included for the unemployed and for the disabled. However 
these were gradually reduced in importance and finally abolished by the 1990's. 
However, for longer term contingencies such as old age, the provision for income 
replacement is left to the private sector. The introduction of an earnings related element 
into the state pension system however has been examined periodically over the last 
thirty years. In 1976, the government issued a discussion paper which recommended the 
introduction of an earnings related scheme on the basis that the existing scheme could 
not meet the income needs in retirement of many people (Department of Social Welfare, 
1976). In 1984, the government announced plans to publish a plans for a national 
pension (Ireland, 1984). This was never published due to the establishment of the 
National Pensions Board who subsequently analysed a proposal for such a scheme 
(NPD, 1993). They however recommended that a state income related pension should 
not be established due to the potential impact on competitiveness and employment and 
also due to a lack of research into the adequacy of the existing flat rate pension in 
maintaining in work incomes. However given a recent decline in private pension 
coverage rates and the very strong state of the economy, there may be a case
In this chapter, we have noticed the gradual change in the tax-benefit structure over the 
last 15 years in order to improve work incentives. Firstly the family income supplement 
was introduced to negate the unemployment trap, created by the value of unemployment 
■benefits relative to in work incomes for families with children. This however introduced 
a poverty trap further up the income distribution as families faced a withdrawal rate of 
over 100 per cent (see Callan et al., 1995). As a result, the means test for FIS was made 
dependent upon income after taxes and benefits. This reform was effective in 
eliminating the poverty trap resulting from FIS. However around the same time effort 
was made to reduce the poverty trap faced by those on unemployment assistance who
expenditures.
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faced a 100% withdrawal rate. Moving to a 60% withdrawal rate for this benefit has 
eliminated this poverty trap, which in turn reintroduces the poverty trap for those on FIS 
as a family working 24 hours per week on UA will receive more than a family working 
25 hours per week on FIS. The back to work allowance (BTWA) removes this poverty 
trap for 3 years, but however for families who have to rely on the minimum wage, the 
long term poverty trap. Lastly the increased reliance on housing benefits with its 100% 
withdrawal rate further exacerbates these problems. This process of temporary 
responses to particular problems in the system has resulted in one of the most 
complicated benefit systems in Europe.44 This level of complexity, besides the in built 
poverty traps, causes itself negative behavioural disincentives. At one extreme the 
complex benefits system reduces the likelihood that families will claim the benefits they 
are entitled to. At the other extreme, families will spend so much time claiming the 
benefits they are entitled to that they will not have time to look for work.45 It is therefore 
time, to carry out extensive co-ordinated reform of the entire system. For example, as 
highlighted in O’Donoghue (2000), insurance benefits perform a similar degree of 
redistribution to means tested benefits, but without many of the disincentives of means 
tested benefits.
44 An example of this complexity is that in the Europe-wide Tax-Benefit model partially written by the 
author, the Irish benefits module takes longer to carry out a calculation than any other countries benefit 
system.
4 In Dublin city a family who is unemployed has to sign on the unemployment register at the Department 
of Social Welfare to receive unemployment benefits, go to the health board to claim heating vouchers, 
visit the community welfare officer to receive housing allowances, the city council to deal with social 
housing claims, the training and employment authority to seek work and finally to the post office to 
receive the actual benefits!
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1 Irish Tax-Benefit System: Revenue and Expenditure 1955-1998 (as % of 
GNP).
1955 1965 1973 1980 1987 1994 1998
Universal
Child Benefit 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.9
Insurance
111 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.3 1.0
Unemployment 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.5
Survivor 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9
Old 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.7 2.2 1.8 1.6
Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total 1.4 2.5 3.6 5.4 7.1 5.0 4.3
Assistance
Unemployment 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.9 2.3 2.7 1.5
Survivor 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Old 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.8
Other 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.6
Total 2.4 1.7 2.4 2.9 4.6 5.0 4.1
All Benefits 4.8 5.2 7.2 9.1 12.8 10.8 9.3
Tax and Contribution
PRSI 1.0 1.5 2.1 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.8
Income tax 4.5 5.4 8.2 11.3 14.8 13.0 12.9
Indirect tax 10.2 10.6 14.5 15.2 16.7 15.2 16.4
Total 15.6 17.4 24.8 30.9 36.8 33.5 34.1
Source: Statistical Abstract, Central Statistics Office, various years.
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Figure 2.1 Exemption Limit and Marginal Relief (Married Couple 2 Children)
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Figure 2.2 Income Tax 1955-1998 (Married Couple 2 Children)
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Figure 2.3 Social Insurance Contributions 1955-1998
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Table 2.2 Coverage of Social Insurance: Number of Members1
Year Total Insured Workers Fully Covered Workers Partially Covered
1955 726 639.2 86.8
1965 744 671.2 72.8
1973 815.7 742.9 72.8
1980 1023.4 837.3 186.1
1987 1343.2 1103 240
1994 1769.9 1322 448
1998 2106.8 1574.3 532.5
Sources: Reports of the Department of Social Welfare, various years. Statistical Information on Social 
Welfare Services various years. Hughes (1985)
Note 1. Thousands of workers.
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Figure 2.4 Means Testing of Social Assistance 1998.
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Figure 2.5 Family Income Supplement Reform
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Table 2.3 Equivalence Scales Additions for Dependants
Adult 1st Child
Year 1955 1965 1973 1980 1987 1994 1998 1955 1965 1973 1980 1987 1994 1998
Unemployment Benefits 0.500 0.706 0.649 0.648 0.648 0.600 0.584 0.267 0.306 0.282 0.291 0.229 0.216 0.187
Unemployment Assist. 0.556 0.810 0.729 0.721 0.721 0.621 0.602 0.222 0.345 0.308 0.335 0.239 0.224 0.193
General Assistance (SWA) 0.726 0.621 0.602 0.247 0.224 0.193
Short Term 111 Contrib. 0.500 0.706 0.649 0.648 0.648 0.600 0.584 0.267 0.306 0.282 0.291 0.229 0.216 0.187
Old Age Contrib. 0.000 0.792 0.646 0.639 0.746 0.718 0.686 0.000 0.217 0.257 0.261 0.198 0.183 0.183
Old Age Assistance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.417 0.268 0.271 0.204 0.216 0.182
Long Term 111 Contrib. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.649 0.471 0.600 0.644 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.290 0.167 0.216 0.211
Long Term 111 Assistance 0.600 0.569 0,600 0.660 0.319 0.193 0.216 0.187
Survivor’s Contrib. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.267 0.335 0.326 0.333 0.259 0.264 0.229
Survivor’s Assistance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.311 0.278 0.325 0.329 0.251 0.249 0.216
Lone Parent Assistance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 0.329 0.251 0.249 0.216
Notes: 1. The recipient of the benefit is assumed to be one equivalent adult and has the modal age for that benefit (e.g. does not receive additional payments for very 
old age or lower payments for being < 18). Certain long-term benefits also have additional payments for living alone, which is ignored here. 2. Adult dependants are 
assumed to have the same age as the spouse. The payment for spouse can also vary by age. 3. Child payments may also vary by number of children. 4. All payments 
are assumed to be for households living in urban areas. 5. Unemployment assistance is assumed to be for long-term recipients. Lower rates apply for short-term 
recipients.
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Table 2.4 Out of Work Replacements Rate.(as a percentage of Average Wage)
Family Type Single M2k]
Instrument 1955 1965 1973 1980 1987 1994 1998 1955 1965 1973 1980 1987 1994 1998
Unemployment Benefits 17.6 15.3 23.9 25.5 30.1 31.0 28.4 34.5 31,3 48.3 52.0 57.3 58.6 52.5
Unemployment Assist. LT 10.6 10.4 19.5 21.2 26.9 31.0 28.4 20.9 23.4 42.2 45.8 53.8 58.6 52.5
Unemployment Assist. ST 10.6 10.4 19.5 21.2 24.2 29.9 27.5 20.9 23.4 42.2 45.8 49.4 57.6 51.8
Supplementary Allowance 10.6 10.4 19.5 21.2 24.2 29.9 27.5 20.9 23.4 42.2 45.8 49.4 57.6 51.8
Short Term 111 Contributory 17.6 15.3 23.9 25.5 30.1 31.0 28.4 34.5 31.3 48.3 52.0 57.3 58.6 52.5
Old Age Contributory 0.0 21.6 26.3 30.6 39.2 36.1 33.4 0.0 42.0 51.6 59.9 78.0 75.4 69.0
Old Age Assistance 14.1 17.1 22.5 26.2 33.5 31.0 29.2 27.5 33.3 51.8 60.4 71.7 69.3 64.0
Long Term 111 Contributory 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.5 34.5 31.8 29.1 0.0 0.0 2.9 55.8 64.6 63.1 56.3
Long Term 111 Assistance 0.0 0.0 19.7 25.3 31.7 31.0 28.4 0.0 0.0 42.4 51.2 56.2 58.6 52.5
Survivor’s Contributory 17.6 15.3 24.1 28.1 35.2 32.8 29.8 26.4 23.0 37.1 43.3 48.6 47.3 42.2
Survivor’s Assistance 13.2 12.9 22.5 26.2 32.9 31.0 28.4 21.2 16.9 34.7 40.3 45.7 44.2 39.7
Lone Parent Assistance 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.2 32.9 31.0 28.4 0.0 0.0 2.9 40.3 45.7 44.2 39.7
Gross Average Wage (Male) 7.68 13.8 36.01 112.4 237.1 298.4 353 7.68 13.82 36.01 112.4 237,1 298.4 353
Net Average Wage 6.99 11.7 27.44 80.08 140.5 196.7 248.3 7.56 13.51 30.94 94.8 176.2 233.9 296.2
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes: 1 M2K means married with 2 children, except in the case of single person payments such as lone parent and survivors’ payments where it refers to those with 2 
children. 2. Replacement Rates are net of taxes and other benefits such as child benefits. 3. ST means short-term and LT means long-term.
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Figure 2.6 Interaction of different benefits 1998 (M arried Couple with 2 children)
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Figure 2.8 Irish Tax-Benefit System 1955-1998 (Married Couple, 2 Children)
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Figure 2.9 Back to Work 1998 system for a married couple with 2 children (no HB)
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Figure 2.10 Back to W ork (+Housing Benefits) 1998 System for a married couple 
with 2 children
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Figure 2.11 Lifetime Return from Tax-Benefit System
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Chapter 3. Short-term Redistribution Over the Population
3.1 Introduction
In addition to revenue raising, one of the primary objectives of a tax-benefit system is to 
reduce the inequality of outcomes of a market economy. This can be done using a 
variety of methods such as progressive taxation, income related benefits or benefits tied 
to particular events, (which) This paper assesses the contribution the Irish Tax-Benefit 
System makes to Inequality. The objective of the paper is to decompose total 
disposable income inequality into the impact on inequality of its components, namely, 
pre-tax market incomes, incomes taxes, social insurance contributions and social 
benefits. The paper takes data from 1994 for Ireland and compares the redistributive 
effect of the tax-benefit system for the years, 1987, 1994 and 2000.
The paper is divided into a number of sections. The next section explores the degree of 
progressivity of income taxes and social insurance contributions. Section 3 examines the 
degree of inequality of each instrument in turn. Section 4 decomposes total household 
inequality into components. The next section assesses the contribution household 
composition has on inequality. Section 6 explores the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency.
3.2 Background: Redistribution in Ireland
Bristow (1980) complained about the lack of analysis at the micro level of the impact of 
public expenditure and taxation in Ireland. As Callan and Nolan (1989) pointed out 
however, this situation largely arose because of a lack of micro-data to be able to carry 
out such analyses. This situation has largely been reversed in recent years, with the 
availability of new datasets, namely the 1987 Survey o f Life-style and Usage o f State 
Services, the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey and subsequent waves of the European 
Community Household Panel.
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Early studies relied on tabulations based on the Household Budget Surveys,46 carried out 
in 1973, 1980, 1987.47 Callan and Nolan (1989) studied the effectiveness of social 
welfare expenditure in reducing poverty in 1987. Their first result was that despite the 
existence of a social safety net (the supplementary welfare allowance), a substantial 
proportion of households (12.3%) had disposable incomes below this safety net income. 
Of these about 40 per cent were not eligible for benefits, either because of participation 
in full-time education or employment (a minimum wage did not exist at the time). Of 
the remainder about a third were Farmers who may have been eligible for benefits, 
about a third did not claim benefits and a third received benefits lower than what they 
should have been entitled to. The first two issues relate to a phenomenon known as non­
take-up, the non-claiming of benefits one is entitled to, while the latter effect may be 
due issues such as measurement error in the collection of the data, administrative errors 
in the calculation of benefit or issues relating the time period of information collected in 
the survey. There are a number of reasons for individuals not claiming benefits they are 
entitled to. These include, the stigma of receiving a benefit, but also as Callan and 
Nolan found for the Family Income Supplement, a lack of information of the availability 
of the scheme. They also compare the efficiency and effectiveness of the benefit system 
in reducing poverty (See Beckerman, 1979 for a discussion of these measures). They 
found, using a poverty line of 60% of mean equivalised disposable income, that the 
system was 76% effective in reducing poverty and in terms of efficiency, 33% of 
benefits went to those above the poverty line.48 They also found that in terms of 
targeting, despite not being targeted using a means test, the targeting of non-means 
tested benefits compared quite well with means tested benefits.
Nolan (1978), using tabulations from the 1973 Household Budget Survey examined the 
distributional impact of taxes and benefits using Gross Income for ranking purposes. 
Nolan (1981) meanwhile, using tabulations contained in the CSO, Ireland (1980) 
examined the distributional impact of taxes and benefits on household income. In terms 
of the incidence of taxes and benefits, benefits were concentrated amongst lower 
income households and given the same income, benefits were on average, higher for 
larger households. Direct taxes, rising with income were found to be progressive, but
46 Earlier versions of the survey were carried out in the 1950’s, but only covered urban areas.
47 Recently a number of studies, including the work in the ESRI’s poverty analysis program and Clarke 
and ?? (19??) have had access to the data tapes of the 1973, 1980 and 1987 HBS. More recently the 1993 
Labour Force Survey (Murphy and Walsh) and the 1994 Household Budget Survey (Baldini et al., 2000) 
has been made available to researchers.
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indirect taxes regressive. Given the progressivity of direct taxes and benefits, disposable 
income (market incomes after direct taxes and benefits) as measured by the Gini and 
Theil coefficients was found to be less variable than gross income (market incomes plus 
benefits), which in turn was less variable than market income. In a comparison with 
Australia, Sweden and the UK, Australian and UK market incomes were found to be 
more equal and Sweden less equal, as measured by the Gini coefficient. However in 
each case, taxes and benefits were found also were found to have a stronger 
redistributive effect. Using the Suits progressivity index which measures the measures 
the distance between the cumulative gross income versus cumulative tax-benefit 
instrument curve and the 45° line, somewhat analogous the Gini coefficient, Nolan 
found that income taxes were quite progressive with a Suits index of 0.194, while all 
other taxes (local property taxes and all indirect taxes) were regressive.
O’Connell (1982), using additional tabulations provided by CSO, Ireland, extended 
Nolan’s (1982) analysis to include the income concept, final income. This measure 
includes both indirect taxes and non-cash benefits such as medical services, education, 
housing and non-cash social welfare benefits, postal and transport services.49 The 
impact of adding these instruments was to increase income inequality as measured by 
the Gini coefficient. O’Connell also examined the effect of tax and expenditure 
categories on overall inequality individually and found that social welfare pensions, 
health expenditure had the largest impact, with all benefits (cash and non-cash) benefits 
reducing inequality with the exception of education expenditures. O’Connell was also 
able to calculate a Gini coefficient on income where differential household size was 
taken into account using equivalence scales.50 He found that the Gini coefficient for 
final income fell from 37.9 for unequivalised data to 25.1 for equivalised data.
Murphy (1984) examined the trend of income inequality between 1973 and 1980 and. 
He found that inequality of market incomes rose over this period and that the increasing 
number of households without market incomes, and those headed by unemployed or 
retired made the biggest contribution to this trend. Murphy (1985) using actual HBS 
data for 1973 and 1980, however found that studies using published interval information 
such as Nolan (1981) and O’Connell (1982) slightly underestimated inequality because 
of the existence of within group inequality. However, his broad conclusions were
48 As expected poverty efficiency increased as the poverty line went from 40 to 60 per cent of mean 
income, while poverty effectiveness decreased.
49 Typically non-cash benefits were imputed on the basis of average public expenditure per recipient.
50 O’Connell used the equivalence scale implicit in the Social Welfare system at the time.
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similar in that inequality fell most as a result of benefits, less so for taxation, but 
increased when indirect taxes and the effect of non-cash benefits were included.
Callan and Nolan (1993) examined the trend in inequality over the period 1973-1987. 
They found that the Gini coefficient of gross incomes rose over the entire period. Like 
Murphy (1984), they found that rising numbers of unemployed had a large impact on 
the distribution of gross incomes over this period. The distribution of disposable income 
however, became more equal indicating the effect of increasing progressivity of taxes 
and contributions and the rising average tax rate (See table 1). Callan and Nolan (1999) 
extended this analysis to cover 1994. They found that the income tax and social 
contribution rate fell between 1987 and 1994, but that the progressivity of both 
contributions and income taxes continued to rise. Overall however, although the 
inequality of equivalised disposable income fell slightly (unequivalised rose slightly), 
the redistributive effect of the system as a whole remained fairly constant.
Callan and Nolan (1999a), meanwhile examined the marginal impact of changes 
between 1987 and 1994 while ignoring differences in the underlying population. They 
used the 1994 population and the SWITCH microsimulation model to do this. When 
comparing different years, prices are different as is the relative wealth of the population. 
As result Callan and Nolan compared 1987 with both price indexation and earnings 
indexation. The degree of their results depended on which assumption was made. 
Taking the price indexation assumption, all equivalised disposable income deciles were 
found to gain in terms of their tax-benefit position over the period, with the biggest 
gains at the bottom, less at the top and the lowest gains occurring in the middle of the 
income distribution. However when earnings indexation was used, gains were 
substantially less and with the largest gains occurring at the top of the income 
distribution and the second decile and with deciles 3-6 losing over the period. Thus 
there would appear to be a redistribution from the lower middle part of the distribution 
to the top and bottom. Callan and Nolan argue that utilising price inflation results in a 
non-neutral comparison, because if policy were indexed only to prices, without any 
other structural changes, then the distribution would change. Employing an earnings 
indexation assumption, for the period Callan et al. (1999) found that subsequently in the 
period 1994-1998, policy changes tended to benefit the top of the distribution at the 
expense of the bottom, with the top 6 deciles gaining over the period and the bottom 4 
losing. The 1999 budget was found to benefit the middle the most, but with again the 
very bottom of the distribution losing out.
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These studies therefore have highlighted a system that became more progressive, with 
greater redistribution over the 1980’s, with a slow down of the effect 1987-1994 and 
with a reversal of the effect 1994-1999. In this paper, we shall examine how particular 
components of the tax-benefit system effected this trend.
3.3 Changes in the Irish Tax-Benefit System 1987-2000.
This section describes the main features of the Irish Tax-benefit system and details the 
main changes in the system between 1987 and 2000. For a more extensive discussion of 
the system and the redistributive forces within the system, see chapter 2. The Irish tax- 
benefit system is in many respects typical of the Anglo style of welfare state, with 
relatively insignificant social insurance systems, where means testing and progressive 
income taxes are more important. There are a number of important differences between 
the UK and Irish tax-benefit systems. Firstly means testing tends to be more important 
(See Evans et al., 2000). Social insurance is less well developed than in the UK, with 
benefits flat rate, with no earnings related components. Although flat rate benefits tend 
to be of higher value than in the UK, the absence of an eamings-related old age pension 
means that social insurance contributions are lower. Having a larger self-employed 
population, the coverage of social insurance also tends to be lower. Structurally, means 
tested benefits are designed differently to the UK. Instead of almost universal coverage 
for a common means tested benefit, Income Support, Ireland has a set of categorical 
instruments, with different means tests and eligibility conditions, but similar levels of 
benefit. Together however, the system covers the same set of contingencies as in the 
UK. This reflects the incremental expansion of coverage of social benefits since the 
foundation of the state, largely having no sweeping reforms as in the case of the 
Beveridge and Fowler reforms in the UK. Like the UK, Ireland has a form of in-work 
benefit payable to families with children in work. The benefit is less generous however, 
and does not cover child-care costs. Housing Benefits are less important, but growing in 
importance with the high house price growth currently in the country. Income taxes 
until 1998 differed from the UK in that, couples can optionally have their income taxed 
jointly.51 Another difference is that workers on average wages tend to have higher 
marginal tax rates. Like the UK however the tax base tends to be wider than in other 
countries with less reliefs. For example, social contributions are not deductible from the 
income tax base.
51 This feature is being abolished from the 2000 budget.
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As this paper uses data from 1987 and 1994, we firstly consider principle changes in the 
system between these years. During this period the principle tax reforms were that the 
number of tax bands was reduced from three to two. At the same time the standard tax 
rate was reduced from 35% to 27%, while at the same time increasing the width of this 
band. The top tax band was abolished, and although the main tax allowance kept pace 
with inflation, it fell behind wage inflation. The effect of these reforms will have been 
to reduce the tax rate faced across the whole distribution except for the very bottom who 
are affected by the relative fall in the value of the tax allowance. The biggest fall in the 
average tax rate will be at the top of the distribution due both to 10% fall in the top 
marginal rate from 58% to 48% and the fall in the standard rate and the widening of this 
band. In addition income tax exemption limits were expanded to have additional 
amounts for children. The main changes to social insurance contributions are that 
income levies (2.75% of earnings) have been abolished for those on low earnings and 
the marginal zero rate for high earners have also been abolished. In the social welfare 
system, the main changes as outlined in Callan et al. (1996) that heterogeneity of benefit 
payments both by contingency and family type has been reduced significantly. The 
lowest payments (such as short term unemployment assistance) have risen at more than 
the rate of wage inflation, while the highest payments (such as old age contributory 
pension) have increased the least, although higher that price inflation, lower than the 
rate of increase in wage inflation. The rates of payments for family dependants have 
also converged.
Between 1994 and 2000, there were even more substantial changes to the system. This 
was especially the case in income taxation. The principle change announced in the 2000 
budget to be implemented over the following 3 years was that income tax moves from a 
joint system to individual based system. The objective of this exercise was to allow the 
standard rate band to be substantially increased so that from a situation in 1999 where 
465 of tax payers paid tax at the top marginal rate, after the reform only 17% would. As 
the implementation of the reform had not been completed when this paper was written, 
we assume that the standard rate band will expand to be equal to the one that married 
couples had in 1999. The late 1990’s saw a move from allowances and deductions being 
deductible at the marginal rate of tax to becoming tax credits deductible at the standard 
rate of tax. The size of these allowances were also increased ahead of the rate of 
inflation and by 2000 exceeded the value of the income tax exemption limit, for most 
families. Both the standard and top rates were reduced over this period by 5% and 4%
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respectively. The rate of pay-related social insurance contributions for employees was 
reduced and low wage workers, earning less than £226 pw were made exempt from 
paying them at all. In addition new public sector workers were brought fully into the 
social welfare system. By 2000, the rates of payment for the lowest benefits had reached 
the minima set by the Commission on Social Welfare in 1986. For most benefits, the 
rates of payment converged to a certain degree, although in later years during the 
period, the rates for old age and survivor’s contributory pensions expanded at a faster 
rate to the other benefits.
For the purpose of this analysis, we break the tax-benefit system into a hierarchy of 
levels, described in figure 1. The very top level (0) is the tax-benefit system taken as a 
whole. Level 1, disaggregates this into broad sub-components, social benefits, social 
insurance contributions. In the next level, we break up social benefits into, universal 
benefits such as child benefits, means tested social assistance and social insurance 
benefits. Contributions are broken up into the effect of the lower earnings ceiling, the 
upper earnings ceiling and the rate schedule. Income taxation is divided up into the 
effect of individualised income taxes and the tax reducing effect of joint taxation. At 
Level 3, insurance and assistance benefits are decomposed into the impact of the 
personal rate for the claimant and dependent amounts for their dependants. 
Individualised income taxes are divided into allowances/credits/ deductions, tax 
schedule, exemption limit and additional components of the taxbase not contained in 
market income such as taxable benefits.
3.4 The Data
The data used in this paper come from the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey (LII) made 
available by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin. The 1994 survey is 
described in Callan et al. (1996). It formed the first wave of the Irish component of the 
European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP). It is a household survey, 
collecting information on incomes, labour market status and demographic information, 
with 4048 responding households and a response rate of 57.1%. Although the primary 
income collected in the ECHP is annual income from 1993, additional data was 
collected in the LII, so that current income from 1994, which is used here, is also used. 
The use of a short accounting period such as current income, which is based on income 
in the last week or month, will tend to have a greater degree of variability than income 
measured over longer accounting periods. In this case, the fact that current income is
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likely to be more accurate than the recollected income from the previous year, results in 
the decision being made to use current income in this analysis. The sample has been 
reweighted using the Census of Agriculture (to account for an under-representation of 
small farmers) and the Labour Force Survey. The sampling frame for the survey is the 
electoral register.
In order to look at the impact of sub-components of income taxes, contributions and 
benefits on inequality and redistribution, it is necessary to simulate tax and benefit 
instruments. For this purpose, we use a microsimulation framework constructed by 
Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001). The framework has been used to simulate the Irish 
Tax-Benefit system for 1987, 1994 and 2000 and can take the 1994 dataset as input. The 
instruments simulated include, income taxes, social insurance contributions, social 
insurance, assistance and universal benefits. However because we simulate the tax- 
benefit system for years other than contained in the data, we need to transform the data 
to account for differences over time. In this paper we utilise a method similar to Callan 
et al. (1999) who used the earnings index to uprate data as they regard purely indexing 
to account for price changes does not result in a neutral comparison of policies. In using 
simulated instruments there will be a number of differences between what is simulated 
and observed benefits and taxes. In simulating instruments we do not factor in tax 
evasion or benefit take-up issues. As a result, both benefits and taxes may be over stated 
in the simulation. However these are areas where little research has taken place in 
Ireland and rather than making general assumptions, we ignore the issues.
3.5 Results: Distributional Impact of Policy Change 1987-2000
Before examining the redistributive effect of the Irish tax-benefit system using 
statistical methods, we shall firstly examine graphically the effect of changes to the tax- 
benefit system between 1987 and 2000. We note however that the system considered in 
2000 is not the actual system in 2000, but the set of announced changes to the system 
which were to take place in the years subsequent to this budget. Figure 2 describes the 
proportional change in equivalised, household disposable income, by decile of the same 
income measure for 1987. The grey bars represent the percentage change in equivalised 
income between 1987 and 1994, the black bars, the percentage change between 1994 
and 2000 and the stripped bars the percentage change between 1987 and 2000. In order 
to compare different years, we use growth in average earnings as a deflator. We notice 
that policy changes over time, both between 1987 and 1994 and between 1994 and 2000
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have resulted in a relatively improved position for those with higher incomes. Between 
1994 and 2000 gains have tended to improve the position of those in middle of the 
distribution most. During both periods, the bottom 3 deciles have actually lost out, 
while for higher deciles, there have been proportional gains.
The principal forces, in both periods, driving the redistributional changes have been 
reduced levels of income taxation and social insurance contributions. On the benefit 
side, during the period 1987-1994, the lower benefits such as unemployment assistance 
and supplementary welfare allowance increased more than other benefits and in fact 
more than the rate of increase of earnings. Higher value benefits such as old age means 
tested and contributory benefits fell relative to earnings over the period. Payments in 
respect of dependants also fell back during this period and thus the rise in the relative 
standard of living of families in receipt of benefits was lower than for other categories 
of recipient.
The results reported here differ from those for 1987-1994 described in Callan et al 
(1999a). There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the assessment unit is different. 
Callan et al. compare nuclear families, while this paper compare the position of 
households. In many countries, this is not a major issue in many countries, where the 
distinction between household and family is not important. However, in Ireland the 
average household size is about 60 per cent higher than Germany and other Northern 
European countries. This is a result of both higher numbers of children, but also the 
increased incidence of people living with their grown up children, elderly parents or 
other relatives. As a result when the one examines the distribution of households rather 
than families, one can get quite a different picture. In the Callan et al. work the bottom 
two deciles gain between 1987 and 1994. This is principally because of the existence of 
single unemployed people and couples in these deciles. Their incomes increased during 
this period. Pensioners who receive higher amounts, but who lost out between 1987 and 
1994 are in the next two deciles and therefore relative disposable income for these 
deciles fell in their study. In our analysis, because the elderly are often quite likely to be 
living in households with other people, the average household income tended to fall and 
thus they were more likely to be in the bottom of the distribution and thus here we 
found that bottom deciles lost.
Secondly, the equivalence scale used is different, taking the square root of the number 
of person in the household to be the equivalence scale, places the same weight on
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children as adults and thus in our distribution, these families are more likely to be lower 
down the distribution. Also because the relative gain is lower for these families (and for 
families with 3 or more children, a relative loss), they reduce the gain for the bottom 
deciles.
Results for 1994-2000 however are similar in distribution to those reported for 1994- 
1998 in Callan et al. (1999b), indicating the results are quite robust to differences in 
measurement assumptions. Here the regressive nature of the policy changes is clearer.
3.6 Results: Redistribution and Progressivity
We now consider in more detail using progressivity and redistribution indices, the 
impact of particular policy instruments on the degree of redistribution.
Table jpdescribes the overall measure of inequality as measured by the generalised Gini 
coefficient for the three years examined in this study. The clear result of this table is that 
regardless of what value judgement one makes, the tax-benefit system reduces the level 
of variability of market incomes and that changes in the tax-benefit system over the 
period 1987-2000, have resulted in increasingly higher levels of inequality. Taking the 
parameter of the generalised Gini coefficient, v to be 1.8 or placing a higher weight on 
higher incomes, we see that the inequality of market incomes is measured as 0.520, 
falling to 0.294 after taxes and benefits using the 1987 system, to 0.309 in 1994 and 
0.331 in 2000. As 1994 data is used throughout, the baseline inequality of market 
income does not change. It would be interesting to investigate the joint effect of 
changing market incomes and tax-benefit systems. For each value of v, the degree of 
inequality of post tax and benefit incomes is higher in 1994 than in 1987 and for 2000 
than in 1994. Therefore the Lorenz curves may not cross and that one can say that the 
1987 system dominates from a inequality perspective the 1994 system and the 1994 
system dominates the 1987 system. For each welfare value taken, the biggest rise in 
inequality occurs after 1994. Over the whole period, inequality as a result of changes to 
the tax-benefit system rose by about 14 per cent, confirming the effect seen in figure 2. 
This trend is in sharp contrast to the trend found in other tax-benefit systems over time. 
Atkinson (2000) found that on the contrary the tax-benefit system over the last 20 years 
in industrialised countries has tended to offset rises in the inequality of market incomes. 
In fact as Callan and Nolan in their various studies found, this had tended to be the 
impact of the Irish Tax-Benefit system before 1987. Recent studies of tax-benefit
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reform in Europe in the 1990’s such as Palme (1996) in Sweden, Decoster et al. (2000) 
in Belgium and Immervoll et al. (1999) in the UK have found that tax-benefit reform 
has continued to reduce inequality and favour the poorest. What reasons can one give 
for this opposite process in Ireland? According to Economic theory, the marginal utility 
of income falls with income and as a result, it is optimal to distribute to the poorest. One 
potential reason for reversing this process is if the poor gained relatively more in the 
past. We saw in chapter 2, that the replacement rate for benefits gradually rose over 
time until 1987 and that subsequently only the lowest value benefits rose. Therefore the 
1987-2000 position has seen a reversal of this trend. At the same time tax rates rose. 
Even after nearly 10 years of declining in tax rates Ireland in 1997 still had the second 
highest marginal tax rate and the fourth highest average tax rate faced by someone on 
the average wage (O’Donoghue and Sutherland, 1998).
Level 0 Instruments: the entire tax-benefit system
In Table 3 we consider the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system utilising the 
Reynolds-Smolensky generalised redistributive indices respectively. The table is 
divided into columns signifying the average net tax rate of the system, the redistributive 
effect of the system as a whole and a decomposition of the redistributive effect into 
progressivity and reranking components. We examine these measurements under 
different welfare evaluations. The first effect is that the system has become as a whole 
more generous over time relative to the 1994 population. This is because the system has 
gone from having a negative net tax-benefit rate in 1987 to an increasingly positive one 
in 1994 and 2000. We must remember that this measure has been estimated while 
holding the underlying population constant. Although, we increase incomes at rate of 
income growth, this will not take into consideration, the impact of falling 
unemployment levels and rising employment levels. As a result even allowing for 
earnings indexation, changes in the underlying population during the period may in fact 
have reduced the total demand for benefits and kept the whole system in a deficit. We 
ignore the Kakwani progressivity measure as it is quite sensitive when measuring the 
progressivity of the net tax-benefit system, especially when the net tax-benefit rate, r is 
small. As r tends to zero, the Kakwani index will tend to ±°®. Thus with a low value of r 
as in 1994, then the Kakwani index will be high. Examining the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index, we find unsurprisingly that the redistributive effect of the system as a whole fell 
over time. Decomposing into progressivity and reranking components , we find that
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both components fell over time. The progressivity of the system refers to what we have 
examined so far, that the rich have become gradually better off relative to the poor. The 
reranking component on the other hand relates to the degree to which households move 
in the income distribution relative to each other. A falling reranking effect indicates that 
the system causes households to move less relative to each other and thus horizontal 
equity increases. It is difficult to say what are the reasons for this change in horizontal 
equity. A priori, one would assume that the abolition of joint taxation and the reduction 
in the value of benefit payments for dependants to be important determinants.
Level 1 Instruments
We now try to decompose the total redistributive effect of the system into the effect of 
the sub-components of the system. As the distributive effect has been so clear regardless 
of welfare judgement made, we ignore welfare judgements in the remainder of the 
analysis, using a value of v = 2, so that the generalised indices are the same as the 
standard indices. Table 4 examines the effect of the Level 1 instruments described in 
Figure 1. This level of instruments consists of the aggregated effect of income tax, 
social insurance contributions and benefits separately. We indicate taxes and 
contributions with a negative sign and thus, we see that the average tax and contribution 
rates are negative and the average benefit rate is positive. All three instruments have 
fallen relative to market income over time, with the biggest drop in importance 
occurring in income taxes, which fell from 23.7% to 15% during the period. Employee 
social insurance contributions/income levies and benefits both fell by about 2 
percentage points, leaving the benefit and contribution system broadly unchanged. Thus 
the resources used to change the net tax-benefit rate by 8 percentage points from 
negative in 1987 to positive in 2000, were expended in reducing income taxes. Turning 
to the progressivity of the income tax system, we see that over the period as a whole, the 
income tax system became more progressive, falling slightly to 1994, but then rising. 
This is consistent with attempts increase the size of allowances and the standard rate 
band over time. Despite the increase in the progressivity however, the impact of the fall 
in the average tax rate dominates, so that the degree of redistribution actually falls. Both 
the progressivity and the reranking components fell. Turning to social insurance 
contributions, we see that in 1987, contributions were regressive, having a negative 
Kakwani index. This is as a result of the existence of a marginal contribution rate of 
zero for those on high incomes and flat rate contribution on all incomes below the upper 
earnings limit. However, the introduction of exemptions for low income workers and
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allowances resulted in change from the instrument being regressive to being progressive 
by 1994 and increasingly progressive by 2000. In this case, we note that the 
progressivity effect dominates, so that the redistributive effect, albeit small increases 
over the period. The impact on horizontal equity as measured by the reranking 
component is extremely small as a result of the instrument being individual based. The 
small degree of reranking results from the fact that capital income are not levied social 
contributions. As benefits are typically targeted on the poor, benefits are usually 
regressive and thus we see here that the sign of the Kakwani index is negative. Over the 
period, benefits have become slightly less regressive. As both the average benefit rate 
fell and benefits became less regressive, it is clear that the redistributive power of the 
benefits system fell. Of the three instruments groups, benefits are the most important 
from a redistributive perspective. We notice that in addition to have the largest 
redistributive effect, benefits have the highest reranking effect. The fall in the 
redistributive effect in absolute terms is slightly more than the fall in income taxes and 
has been accompanied by falls in both the progressivity and reranking components of 
benefits.
Level 2 Instruments
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the effect of more detailed changes to 
the system. We now consider level 2 instruments (See Table 4). We divide income taxes 
into the effect of individualised and joint taxation. Here we view the individualised 
taxation as being the taxation, while the effect of joint taxation is regarded as a 
deduction from taxes that would be paid if a individualised system existed. We firstly 
notice that tax reduction resulting from joint taxation fell over time from have a value of 
about of over a quarter of the whole tax liability in 1987 to one sixth in 1994 to being 
completely abolished in the 2000 “announced” system. From a position where the 
progressivity of total income taxes was about the same in 1987 and 1994 in Table 4, we 
see here that progressivity of individualised income taxes rose steadily over the period. 
Despite the average individualised tax rate falling, progressivity compensates and as a 
result the redistributive effect is about the same and in fact rises a bit in 2000. However 
if one looks more closely at the progressivity and reranking components, we see that 
different reranking is the reason for the difference between what was measured for total 
income taxes and what we see here for individualised taxation. Because joint taxation is 
measured as a deduction, the more regressive it is the higher the redistributive effect. 
Between 1987 and 1994, the tax reduction due to joint taxation in fact became more
regressive, but the falling value of joint taxation as a whole resulted in the redistributive 
effect falling. The impact on horizontal equity is surprisingly quite small for joint 
taxation. However we must remember that all amounts considered here are based on 
equivalised income and thus the reranking had already occurred before the redistributive 
effect was examined. The reranking effect is likely to be quite different if unequivalised 
incomes were used.
We decompose social insurance contributions into the effect of the rate, the lower limit 
allowances and exemptions and the upper limit zero rate marginal contribution band. 
We see that the value of the rate falls over time from 5.9% to 5.1% of market income, 
while the value of the lower limit rises and the upper limit stays about the same. We 
also notice that while contributions are progressive, the lower limit and the upper limit 
are respectively regressive and progressive. While the progressivity of the rate increased 
slightly from 1987 to 1994, the lower limit had a big fall in regressivity as income levies 
were eliminated for low wage workers. Therefore between 1987 and 1994, social 
insurance contributions became more progressive as a result of the rate and lower limit. 
There was a similar effect on redistribution. Between 1994 and 2000, meanwhile the 
reduction in the value of the upper limit combined with the introduction of an allowance 
resulted in total progressivity and redistribution increasing despite no change in the 
impact of the rate.
Benefits are now decomposed into the effect of social assistance, social insurance and 
universal child benefits. We notice that social assistance benefits are more important 
than both social insurance and child benefits combined. Total benefits fell as a 
proportion of market income between 1987 and 1994, however the types of benefits 
have been affected in different ways. Until 1994, social assistance benefits actually rose 
as an emphasise was placed on increasing the value of the least valuable benefits. These 
benefits fell back subsequently as benefit indexation failed to keep up with rises in the 
standard of living. Social insurance benefits fell as proportion of market income in both 
periods, while although constant in real terms, child benefits rose relative to market 
income in the later period. The latter effect is partially due to an emphasise on 
successive governments in the late 1990’s to increase universal child benefits instead of 
means tested child additional payments. When we examine level 3 instruments next, we 
will see this effect. Looking at the redistributive effect, we see that the average benefit 
rate dominates the progressivity in driving the redistributive effect.
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Level 3 Instruments
In this last section, we investigate the impact of particular components of instruments 
already examined. Here we decompose individualised taxation into the effect of the rate 
schedule, additional parts of the taxbase not contained in market income, 
allowances/credits/deductions and exemption limits. Of these four sub-components, the 
allowance and tax credits have the highest redistributive effect. This may be regarded as 
surprising given the fact that allowances are valued at the marginal tax rate and thus one 
might expect them to be regressive. In transforming allowances to be tax credits in the 
late 1990’s, this instrument has become more targeted on the bottom of the distribution. 
Nevertheless because of their falling value, the redistributive effect as a whole has 
fallen. While clearly the rate schedule is progressive against the tax base, against market 
incomes the rate schedule is regressive. This is because once allowances have been 
factored out, benefits, which are not part of market income, become taxable and thus 
those at the bottom of the income distribution would pay taxes despite having no market 
income. It is thus the existence of allowances that keeps these people out of the tax 
schedule. Over time, progressivity increased to 1994 and fell again to 2000. The falling 
average rate however dominates in driving down the negative redistributive effect. The 
effect of the exemption limit (described in chapter 2) is also examined. It’s objective is 
to take low income families out of the tax system. The redistributive effect is quite small 
and fell over time. Between 1987 and 1994, the value of the instrument fell, but became 
more targeted, while between 1994 and 1998, the instrument became less targeted as 
mainly only elderly people were eligible, while the average value only decreased a little. 
Turning to the sub components of benefits, we find that the impact of the sub­
components mirrors that of social insurance and assistance in aggregate. We notice 
however that dependent payments are more important for social assistance. This partly a 
function of the fact that individuals can receive insurance benefits even if other 
members of the family have relatively high incomes. In this case the spouse may be 
ineligible for the adult additional payment. This effect is seen by the fact that assistance 
benefits are more regressive and thus more targeted than insurance benefits. We also 
notice the effect of the fall in the child dependent payment, which dominates the fall in 
the redistributive effect of dependent payments for dependent payments in general in the 
insurance system. The rise in the value of adult dependent payments however dominates 
the trend in the impact of dependent payments for assistance benefits.
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3.7 Conclusions
This paper attempts to investigate the impact of the Irish tax-benefit system on 
redistribution over the whole population. In addition the analysis has focused on sub­
components of the system to try to learn more about how the system operates when all 
instruments are integrated together. Also, this paper analysed the impact of the series of 
policy reforms instituted over the last 14 years and in particular how in practice the 
aggregate changes were achieved at the level of detailed policy instruments.
As a whole, the Irish tax-benefit system is quite redistributive, transferring resources 
from rich to poor, however between 1987 and 2000, the primary direction of reforms 
has been to reduce the redistributive effect of the system as a whole. In fact taking the 
underlying population as given, disposable income inequality increased by 14% purely 
on the basis of the policy reforms alone. This trend of these reforms has been in the 
opposite direction of reforms in other countries. In the future this trend will have to 
change if the government hopes to achieve its anti poverty targets outlined in its recent 
National Anti Poverty Strategy (see Nolan, 1999).
Focusing on sub-components, we found that changes to income taxes were the primary 
force in the aggregate impact of the reform. Due to the improved economic position 
between 1987 and 2000, the system has become more generous on average by about 8% 
of market income and thus reforms are not revenue neutral. These increased resources 
have been transferred in the form of reduced personal taxes and social contributions. 
Also because of the indexation polices adopted benefits have fallen as a proportion of 
market income and thus one has effectively seen a transfer of resources from benefits to 
income tax reduction. Although both income taxes and social contributions have 
become more progressive over time, the large cut in the value of these instruments has 
resulted in a lower redistributive effect. The cut in the value of benefits relative to 
incomes has also seen the redistributive effect of benefits fall.
This paper has examined the effect of the reforms on an unchanging population. 
Changes in the structure of the population and the underlying distribution of market 
income may influence the robustness of these results. Further work should be carried 
out once data for 2000 becomes available in comparing these results when one factors in 
the effect of population change. Not only may changes in the population drive changes 
in the tax-benefit system, but also changes in the tax-benefit system may drive changes 
in the distribution of market incomes. Like other static fiscal incidence studies, this
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paper has assumed that market incomes are exogenous. It would be interesting to asses 
the effect of these reforms by applying an optimal tax framework combined with some 
degree of endogeneity of market incomes, to assess the optimality of these reforms. 
Another issue relates to the time period. Because we examine the effect of the 
redistributive effect of the system using a cross-section of the population, this paper 
may overestimate the actual redistributive effect of the system when one examines 
longer term income. Because of income mobility, what appears to be redistribution 
between persons in a cross-section, may in fact have a net effect of income smoothing 
when individuals are examined over time. In later chapters of this thesis we shall study 
these issues.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1 Inequality and Progressivity Measures 1973-1987
1973 1980 1987 1994
Gini (Market Income) 0.4553 0.4764
Gini (Gross income) 0.379 0.385 0.398
Gini (Disposable income) 0.367 0.360 0.352 0.377
Suits (Income Tax) 0.194 0.207 0.275 0.282
Suits (Social Contribution) -0.074 0.056 0.133 0.148
Average Tax/Contribution Rate 0.098 0.151 0.189 0.178
Source: Callan and Nolan (1993,1999) Note 1. The values reported here are unequivalised.
Table 3.2 Generalised Gini Coefficients the Irish Tax-Benefit System 1987, 1994
and 2000, Equivalised Household Market and Disposable Income.
V 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
Market 0.520 0.561 0.608 0.654
Disposable
1987 0.294 0.305 0.326 0.351
1994 0.309 0.321 0.344 0.369
2000 0.331 0.347 0.372 0.399
% change 1987-1994 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.1
% change 1994-2000 7.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
% change 1987-2000 12.6 13.8 14.1 13.7
Source Author’s Calculations. Note 1. Incomes have been equivalised using the square root of household 
size scale.
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Table 3.3 Inequality, Redistribution and Progressivity in the Irish Tax-Benefit
System 1987,1994 and 2000 Level 0 Instruments.
V Average Rate Redistribution
(Reynolds-
Smolensky)
Progressivity
component
Reranking
component
1 . 8
1987 -0.040 0.226 0.238 0.013
1994 0.002 0.211 0.221 0.010
2000 0.042 0.188 0.196 0.007
2.0
1987 -0.040 0.256 0.272 0.015
1994 0.002 0.240 0.252 0.012
2000 0.042 0.215 0.223 0.009
2.2
1987 -0.040 0.282 0.299 0.018
1994 0.002 0.264 0.278 0.014
2000 0.042 0.236 0.247 0.010
2.4
1987 -0.040 0.303 0.323 0.020
1994 0.002 0.284 0.300 0.016
2000 0.042 0.255 0.266 0.012
Source Author’s Calculations.
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Table 3.4 Inequality, Redistribution and Progressivity in the Irish Tax-Benefit 
System 1987,1994 and 2000 Level 1 Instruments (v = 2.0).
Average Progressivity Redistribution Progressivity Reranking
Rate (Kakwani) (Reynolds- component component
________________________________ Smolensky)______________________________
Income Taxes
1987 -0.237 0.099 0.028 0.031 0.003
1994 -0.201 0.097 0.023 0.024 0.002
2000 -0.150 0.112 0.018 0.020 0.001
Social Insurance Contributions
1987 -0.053 -0.021 -0.001 -0.001
1994 -0.041 0.016 0.001 0.001
2000 -0.035 0.022 0.001 0.001
Benefits
1987 0.250 -0.955 0.182 0.191 0.009
1994 0.244 -0.954 0.179 0.187 0.008
2000 0.228 -0.946 0.169 0.175 0.007
0.0001
0.00001
0.0001
Source Author’s Calculations.
Table 3.5 Inequality, Redistribution and Progressivity in the Irish Tax-Benefit
System 1987,1994 and 2000 Level 2 Instruments (v = 2.0).
Average
Rate
Progressivity
(Kakwani)
Redistribution
(Reynolds-
Smolensky)
Progressivity
component
Reranking
component
Income Taxes 
Individualised Taxation 
1987 -0.327 0.049 0.017 0.024 0.007
1994 -0.244 0.061 0.016 0.020 0.003
2000 -0.150 0.112 0.018 0.020 0.001
Joint Taxation
1987 0.090 -0.083 0.006 0.007 0.001
1994 0.043 -0.102 0.003 0.004 0.001
2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Social Insurance Contributions 
Rate
1987 -0.0590 0.0053 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
1994 -0.0536 0.0066 0.0004 0.0004 0.000
2000 -0.051 0.006 0.0004 0.0003 0.000
Lower Limit
1987 0.0003 -0.5343 0.0002 0.0001 0.000
1994 0.008 -0.172 0.001 0.001 0.000
2000 0.011 -0.173 0.002 0.002 0.000002
Upper Limit 
1987 0.005 0.290 -0.002 -0.002 0.0005
1994 0.004 0.287 -0.002 -0.001 0.001
2000 0.005 0.261 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
Source Author’s Calculations.
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Table 3.5 continued.
Average
Rate
Progressivity
(Kakwani)
Redistribution
(Reynolds-
Smolensky)
Progressivity
component
Reranking
component
Benefits
Social Assistance 
1987 0.131 -1.006 0.157 0.117 -0.041
1994 0.135 -1.008 0.161 0.120 -0.041
2000 0.123 -1.013 0.152 0.111 -0.041
Social Insurance
1987 0.104 -0.950 0.125 0.090 -0.036
1994 0.095 -0.942 0.119 0.082 -0.037
2000 0.084 -0.950 0.111 0.074 -0.037
Child Benefits
1987 0.014 -0.523 0.007 0.007 0.001
1994 0.014 -0.524 0.007 0.007 0.000
2000 0.021 -0.528 0.010 0.011 0.001
Source Author’s Calculations.
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Table 3.6. Inequality, Redistribution and Progressivity in the Irish Tax-Benefit
System 1987,1994 and 2000 Level 3 Instruments (v = 2.0).
Average
Rate
Progressivity
(Kakwani)
Redistribution
(Reynolds-
Smolensky)
Progressivity
component
Reranking
component
Individualised Taxes 
Rate
1987 -0.554 -0.099 -0.136 -0.123 0.013
1994 -0.372 -0.090 -0.063 -0.053 0.009
2000 -0.253 -0.097 -0.037 -0.033 0.004
Allowances/Credits
1987 0.182 -0.332 0.049 0.051 0.002
1994 0.119 -0.334 0.034 0.036 0.002
2000 0.097 -0.381 0.032 0.034 0.002
Exemption Limit
1987 0.045 -0.233 0.009 0.010 0.001
1994 0.009 -0.956 0.008 0.009 0.0001
2000 0.006 -0.720 0.004 0.004 0.0001
Social Assistance 
Personal Rate 
1987 0.106 -1.005 0.082 0.096 0.014
1994 0.108 -1.003 0.084 0.097 0.014
2000 0.098 -1.011 0.078 0.090 0.012
Dependent Rate
1987 0.025 -1.009 0.021 0.025 0.004
1994 0.027 -1.028 0.023 0.027 0.004
2000 0.025 -1.019 0.022 0.025 0.003
Source Author’s Calculations.
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Table 3.6 Continued.
Social Insurance Benefit 
Personal Rate
1987 0.089 -0.953 0.065 0.078 0.013
1994 0.084 -0.945 0.061 0.073 0.012
2000 0.080 -0.957 0.059 0.071 0.011
Dependent Rate
1987 0.015 -0.936 0.011 0.014 0.003
1994 0.011 -0.913 0.008 0.010 0.002
2000 0.004 -0.816 0.002 0.003 0.001
Source Author’s Calculations.
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Figure 3.1. Hierarchy of Tax-Benefit System
Level 0 Tax-Benefit System
Universal Assistance
Insurance
Level 2
Level 3 Personal
Dependent
Social Benefits Social Contributions Income Tax
Upper Limit Rates
Lower Limit
Individualised Tax Joint Tax
Personal
Dependent Allowances/
Credits
Schedule
Exemption
limit
Non market components 
of Taxbase
Figure 3.2. Percentage change in Equivalised Disposable Income in Ireland 1987 
2000 by equivalised household disposable income decile.
20
M change 87 - 94
■ change 94 - 00
■ change 87 - 00
-10 J
D ecile
Source Author’s Calculations.
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Chapter 4. Dynamic Microsimulation: A  Methodological Survey
4.1.Introduction
In order to carry out micro level analyses of economic behaviour and of the influence of 
public policy over time such as examining the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit 
system over the life-course, it is necessary to utilise a long panel data set. In general 
such data sets are not available, either because the analysis relates to the future as in the 
case of pension forecasts or because collected data sets do not cover sufficiently long 
time horizons. Instead therefore, analysts use dynamic microsimulation models to 
synthetically generate a hypothetical panel. In this chapter we discuss some of the 
methodological issues related to the construction of a dynamic microsimulation model, 
surveying current practice in the field across the world.
There have been a number of surveys of microsimulation models (Merz, 1991; Mot, 
1992; Sutherland, 1995 and Klevmarken, 1996). None have focused solely on dynamic 
models. This survey article concentrates only on dynamic models, drawing on a wide- 
ranging literature search.
What is a Dynamic Microsimulation Model?
A microsimulation model is a model which uses simulation techniques and which takes 
micro level units as the basic units of analysis when investigating the effects of social 
and economic policies. The method was developed initially by Guy Orcutt (1957, 1961) 
in the USA in the 1960’s but its use has only become widespread in the last 15 years as 
computing power increased and datasets became available. Microsimulation models 
have taken firms as the micro unit of analysis (Eliasson, 1986), however most have 
carried out analysis at the level of individuals or households (See Mot, 1992).
Microsimulation models seek not only to explain the mean E(Y/X) of endogenous 
model generated variables Y, such as disposable income, as macro-economic models 
do, but also their distribution, given exogenous variables X (for example, pre-tax 
incomes, and personal socio-economic characteristics), and institutional policy variables 
P (for example tax rates and means for social assistance etc.). The joint distribution of 
the exogenous variable Y and the endogenous variables X conditional on the policy 
variables P can be described as follows:
f XY( Y , X / P )  = f Y/x( Y I X tPl) - f x ( X I P 2) (1)
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where f YIX ( Y / X ,P,) is essentially the microsimulation describing how the exogenous 
X specify the distribution of Y and f x ( X / P 2) the distribution of exogenously 
specified input variables, given institutional characteristics P2 .
Dynamic microsimulation modelling is a technique whereby agents change their 
characteristics as a result of endogenous factors within the model. f x ( X / P 2) is one 
example of a dynamic process, where the set of variables X  are made endogenous in 
response to institutional characteristics P2 . Examples include models where labour 
supply responds to changes in government policy. Another form of dynamic process is 
where a dynamic model projects a sample over time, modelling life course events such 
as demographic changes like marriage and birth, educational attainment or labour 
market movements. In this case, the dynamics relate to the fact that characteristics in 
time (t), Yt depend on characteristics in time (t-j) Yt.j and exogenous characteristics X  
This model gives estimates of both time dependent cross-sections and estimates of 
mobility over time.
The chapter is divided into sections as follows. Section 2 describes some of the 
principle uses of dynamic microsimulation models. Section 3 assesses some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the methodology. Section 4 discusses the model 
components. Section 5 contains the bulk of the chapter and discusses methodological 
issues related to dynamic modelling such as static versus dynamic ageing, behavioural 
versus statistical simulation, discrete versus continuous time, open versus closed 
models, steady state versus forecasted projections, cohort versus population models and 
validation. Section 6 concludes.
4.2.Uses of Dynamic Microsimulation Models
In this section, we describe some of the main existing and potential uses of dynamic 
microsimulation models. We limit our focus to models that project populations inter- 
temporally. Table 1 summarises the principal uses of the different dynamic 
microsimulation models, which can be classified into a number of headings:
• Projections
• Evaluations of public policy
• Designing policy reform
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• Studies of inter-temporal processes and behaviour
• Investigating Inequality and Redistribution
Dynamic microsimulation models project samples of the population forward in time. If 
a full cross-section of the population is projected, then one can for example, examine 
future income distributions under different economic and demographic scenarios. 
DYNASIM2 (Wertheimer et al, 1986), MOSART (Fredriksen, 1998), the SfB3 
population model (Galler and Wagner, 1986), DYNAMITE (Ando et al., 2000) and 
DESTINIE (Bonnet and Mahieu, 2000) have been used for these purposes. These 
models typically utilise macro-models or forecasts to align their own forecasts. 
However occasionally the opposite has occurred where dynamic microsimulation 
models have been used as input into macro models as in the case of MOSART 
(Andreassen and Solli, 2000), DYNASLM2 and the DARMSTADT models.
In a similar way in which static microsimulation models evaluate current public policy 
using samples of the current population, these projected cross-sections can then be used 
to evaluate the future performance of various governmental long-term programs such as 
pensions, health and long-term care and educational financing. The governmental 
models such as DYNCAN (Morrison, 2000), PENSIM (Curry, 1996), the Sfb3 models 
(Galler and Wagner, 1986), MOSART (Andreassen et al., 1996) and SESIM (Ericson, 
and Hussenius, 1999) have been extensively used for this purpose.
In addition, the existence of baseline projections also allows one to design new public 
policy by simulating the effect of potential reforms. Models such as PRISM (Kennell 
and Sheils, 1990), the Belgian dynamic model (Joyeaux et al., 1996), SfB3 population 
model (Galler and Wagner, 1986), LIFEMOD (Falkingham and Johnson, 1995) and 
DEMOGEN (Wolfson, 1988) have been used to look at pension reform. A number of 
models such as DYNAMOD, the SfB3 cohort model (Hain and Hellberger, 1986) and 
LIFEMOD (Harding, 1993) have been used to examine changes to education finance, 
allowing for education costs to be paid for over the lifetime. Folster (1997) used a 
model to examine reforms to social insurance utilising personal savings accounts.
As inter-temporal models, they can be used to study inter-temporal processes and 
behavioural issues. For example, CORSIM (Keister, 2000), DYNAMOD (Baekgaard, 
1998), and MIDAS (Stroombergen et al., 1995) have been used to look at wealth 
accumulation. FAMSIM (Lutz, 1997) is used to study demographic behaviour of
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women, while MICROHUS (Klevmarken and Olovsson, 1996) examined the impact of 
tax-benefit system on labour market mobility. Another type of inter-temporal analysis is 
to model the transitions into and out of poverty and social exclusion. Models that 
simulate these processes can bejsjiid to design policy to combat these problems. For 
example, DYNASIM was used to study the effect of teenage child-bearing.
Single cohort models have been used to investigate life-course redistribution in tax- 
benefit systems and the degree of redistribution between life-rich and poor versus 
redistribution over one’s life-course in a number of countries such as Australia, Ireland, 
Italy and the UK. (See Harding (1993); Baldini (1997) and Falkingham and Hills
(1995)). Models that simulate the life histories of multiple cohorts have looked at inter- 
generational transfers and equity issues. For example NEDYMAS and CORSIM studied 
the redistributive impact of the social security system on different cohorts in the 
Netherlands and the USA respectively (Nelissen, 1994 and Caldwell et al., 1998). 
LifePaths and DESTINIE have been used to study intergenerational transfers in Canada 
and France respectively (Rowe and Wolfson, (2000), Bonnet and Mahieu, (2000)).
Other uses have been carried out in the spheres of health and spatial mobility. 
LIFEMOD was used to examine health status over the life-course and implications for 
health care financing in the UK (Propper, 1995), while CORSIM has been used to look 
at dental health in the US population (Brown et al., 1992). The SVERIGE models 
spatial mobility to the nearest 100m2 in Sweden (Vencatasawmy et al., 1999), while 
LifePaths modelling framework in Canada has been used to examine time use issues 
(Wolfson and Rowe, 1998b).
4.2.Dynamic Microsimulation: Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages
Policy makers are very interested in inter-temporal and adjustment issues, which only 
dynamic models can examine. Here we address some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the approach. Burtless (1996), Nelissen (1994), Harding (1993), Orcutt 
et al. (1980), Arrow (1980), and Orcutt and Glazer (1980) outline some of the principle 
advantages of dynamic microsimulation. These include the use of a micro unit of 
analysis, use of nationally representative data and the ability the ability to examine 
micro consequences of macro phenomena.
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The micro unit of analysis is the primary advantage of microsimulation. The method is 
intuitively appealing because it simulates on individuals at the level on which they make 
decisions. Modelling at the micro level enables complicated individual decisions such as 
when to work and have children etc to be modelled. Modelling at the micro level can 
enable some of the complex processes and interactions between policy instruments to be 
disentangled. Simulating at the lowest level also gives one the flexibility of altering the 
assumptions of the micro processes quite easily. Micro-level output also allows one to 
consider more detailed analyses than more aggregated methods such as cell based and 
macro-econometric models. While all microsimulation models have the advantage of 
utilising micro units, dynamic inter-temporal models have the advantage that they can 
examine inter-temporal issues and simulate policy that requires historical information 
such as the simulation of pensions. Also dynamic models can be used to look at future 
behavioural adjustments of the population to a policy reform and at the effect of 
different economic, social and demographic scenarios.
Using micro data allows for the widest range of heterogeneity in the population to be 
captured in the model. Representative agent models cannot explain the diversity of 
behaviour in an economy. Simulating the effect of a tax/transfer policy change on 
example families may not address or highlight the more counter-intuitive outcomes of a 
policy. These typical families are simply statistical averages and make up only a very 
small fraction of the population, whereas in reality household income, size, type and 
life-course trajectories vary a great deal.
Using microsimulation, the economic analysis can take place at the micro level, 
incorporating decisions that are made at the micro level. Modelling at the micro level 
allows macro phenomena to be studied without the aggregation bias produced from the 
study at the macro level. For example, a macro model that tracks aggregate changes of 
an economy, will however mask many of transitions going on at the micro level and 
because it simulates only averages, it ignores distributional consequences. Dynamic 
microsimulation models can simulate the effect of changing structural patterns of 
society, such as the effects of changing age, employment and family structures at the 
individual level.
Another important advantage is that dynamic models can be used to pool together data 
from different sources. For example, dynamic microsimulation methods, have been used 
to impute associated expenditures into income surveys (See Baldini et al., 2001).
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Dynamic models also allow one to pool together different econometric models such as 
labour supply marriage and fertility models in one modelling framework.
Disadvantages
We now address some of the difficulties associated with microsimulation modelling 
(dynamic modelling in particular). Nelissen (1994), Hoshka (1986), Klevmarken (1980) 
and Panel on Retirement Income Modeling (PRIM) (1997) present some of these 
difficulties, including, insufficient knowledge and weak economic behavioural 
components, large data requirements, large cost and effort and difficult to validate.
Dynamic microsimulation models if they are to project the characteristics of a 
population over time, require the simulation of very many micro-processes. These 
include demographic, educational, labour market and income processes. A fully 
dynamic model would be able to jointly model how each process interacts with each 
other. Burtless (1996) questions whether the knowledge of micro-behaviour is sufficient 
to be able to reliably simulate population dynamics. The PRIM (1997) highlights a 
number of knowledge gaps of individual and family behaviour such as shortcomings in 
the life-cycle model of savings and consumption and in models of the determinants and 
consequences of marital changes. Also we generally do not understand very well the 
dynamics of labour supply and retirement behaviour. Another issue is that current 
knowledge about micro processes may only be valid for today and in the past. It does 
not necessarily follow that these relationships will apply in the future.
Another criticism due to PRIM (1997) is that dynamic microsimulation models only 
incorporate economic behaviour in a limited way. Typically they are not sufficiently 
flexible to incorporate more detailed behavioural modules because of their limited 
ability to include feedback loops, or link to other models such as overlapping 
generations models.
Microsimulation models incorporate behaviour in a less comprehensive manner, than 
say overlapping generations models (OGM) which have production sectors and models 
of sectoral interactions. However OGM’s lack the detail of microsimulation models and 
so are less able to simulate the detail of tax-benefit systems. Recently, an attempt has 
been made to link OGM’s with DMM’s, but this task is non-trivial, requiring linkages 
between highly complex DMM models and quite stylised OGM’s (See Andreassen and 
Solli, 2000 for a discussion).
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Data necessary to estimate behavioural processes used by dynamic microsimulation 
models is often at present quite limited. For example in most European countries only 4 
waves of the European Community Household Panel are available. Only the USA with 
its Panel Survey o f Income Dynamics, Germany with the German Socio-Economic 
Panel and countries such as the Nordic countries where access to register information is 
available have panel datasets which span 10 years. Short panel datasets will be less able 
to disentangle the impact of age, cohort and period effects. However, panel surveys 
are continuing so that in the near future, panel surveys, which exist for 10 years or more 
will soon exist for many developed countries. A number of Scandinavian countries have 
developed models which have been based on very rich, extensive and detailed register 
information such as the MOSART model in Norway and SESIM in Sweden. However 
access in most countries to administrative records is typically quite limited even within 
government.
Dynamic models require much greater resources to build, maintain and use than static 
models, having much greater data and modelling requirements. They are also much 
slower to use and produce output. They are therefore more suited to long term scientific 
research than immediate policy reactions.
Although popular in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s, when large programs were financed in 
the USA and Germany, development fell back in the mid-late eighties. After this period, 
only less ambitious projects such as the HARDING and PENSIM models were created. 
Caldwell (1996), attributes a number of reasons for this development cycle. He 
attributes the fact that initially perceived benefits outweighed the very high costs at the 
time of development. However even though the costs of development declined over the 
1980's, as computing power and data availability increased, resulting benefits from 
these models did not match what was expected. It is unsurprising given the data and 
computing resources available at the time that results were less useful than policy 
makers would have liked.
52 The Age Effect relates to changes that occur as they age. For example in the case of earnings, an 
individual’s average income tends to rise over time until retirement. The Cohort Effect is the effect 
specific to those who were bom around the same time, so for example earlier cohorts will have lower 
education levels and lower earnings. The Period Effect relates to the conditions of those who lived 
through a certain period of time. For example, individuals can expect higher real wage increases in times 
of economic growth and lower increases during times of recession. We can see the effect of the 
interaction of the different effects in the estimation of age earnings relationships using cross-section data. 
Typically this which exhibits an inverted U shape. This is because of the interaction of cohort and age 
effects. As later cohorts will tend to have higher wages throughout their lifetime than earlier cohorts, 
when examined in a cross-section at one point in time, it will appear that earnings fall at higher ages.
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Even today, dynamic models pose very large demands on the latest computing 
technology. As late as 1997, the Panel on Retirement Income Modeling, in the USA was 
advocating that the construction of a new generation dynamic retirement model should 
be delayed until data, micro-economic knowledge and computing technology had 
improved. Much work is being done to close these gaps. Improved data and 
econometric knowledge has resulted in extensive research programs into improving 
knowledge of micro-behaviour in the fields of labour supply, retirement decisions and 
fertility etc.
However at present, generally available computing power is insufficient to create an 
idealised dynamic microsimulation model that contains a large sample size, detailed 
micro-behaviour, behavioural feedback loops, linkages to other models and the ability 
to have multiple runs to estimate the confidence intervals through the use of multiple 
runs.
Given these limitations it might be argued that one should wait until these deficiencies 
are corrected before embarking on such an ambitious project as creating a 
microsimulation model. However, as Burtless (1996) points out microsimulation 
provides an organising framework. In other words, the existence of a microsimulation 
model, forces model developers to think about the interactions between behavioural 
processes rather than focusing purely on specific issues micro-econometricians 
specifically do. In this way they help to identify knowledge and data gaps and help to 
create an agenda for filling them. Also, although not perfect, dynamic microsimulation 
models are starting to be able to provide cost-effective answers to policy, economic and 
social policy questions. This is witnessed by the rapid expansion in activity in the late 
1990’s where new models have been financed in Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Sweden, in the United Kingdom and in the USA.
4.3.Model Components: Data, Processes and Policy Instruments
The potential uses of a dynamic microsimulation model are limited by a number of 
factors including (a) the initial base dataset, (b) the types of processes simulated and (c) 
the types of policy instruments incorporated in the model.
Data
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There are a number of different types of base data that a dynamic model can use. Table 
2 describes the types of dataset used by different dynamic microsimulation models, 
detailing the data source and sample size.
Firstly initial databases can be divided into single and multiple cohorts. Single cohort 
models limit an analysis to investigations relevant to a single cohort such as the life- 
course redistribution. Multi-cohort models allow one to compare the position of people 
of different ages.
Sample size is another issue. The larger the sample size, the more one can consider 
smaller groups. Sample sizes are more important for inter-temporal analysis because the 
number of dimensions increases. This is because similar individuals in a cross-section, 
may in fact be very different due to a different paths to reach that state. Sample size also 
has an impact on run time of the model. The larger the sample size the longer the run 
speed, resulting in a trade-off. Faster computer power will however reduce the impact of 
this trade-off.
Base data can also be divided into historical and current data. A number of models 
(CORSIM, DYNAMOD and DYNACAN) start with historic data such as census files 
from the I960’s. The reason for this is that in order to simulate pensions, one needs 
information about work-histories. These models therefore start their simulation at a 
point in the past building up a sufficiently long work-history to the present day. Some 
models such as MOSART or PENSIM have base data sets that include work histories, 
so the early start date is not necessary, while other models such as the DESTINIE model 
simulates both forwards as other models do, but also backwards to create a work 
histories.
Data can also be divided into Administrative, Census, Survey Sample and Synthetic 
data. Administrative data often contains the most accurate data as more effort is placed 
in data collection. As the data often is collected for the whole population, sample sizes 
are often much larger than in survey samples. However administrative data typically 
only collect information necessary for administrative purposes for which they are 
collected. So for example, income tax data in a country that uses individual taxation will 
not contain information about an individual’s spouse. For this reason countries that use 
administrative data often supplement information contained in administration data with 
extra survey data as in the case that used by the SESIM and MICROHUS models in 
Sweden. Often however administrative data is not available and so other data have to be
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used. Models such as CORSIM, DYNACAN and DYNAMOD use census data. While 
census data has better coverage than household surveys, they often have less 
information and so often have to be supplemented with imputed information from other 
sources. Household surveys although typically having small sample sizes have 
extensive information. A drawback is that they suffer from differential non-response 
and so have to use non-response weights. The use of weights in a dynamic model adds 
complexity in many areas and can result in individuals have different weights at 
different points of their lives. One solution made by the DYNAMITE and ANAC 
models is to replicate households according to their non-response weights, so that each 
household then has the same weight. The last type of base dataset in this classification 
are synthetic datasets. These are used when either a longitudinal model is used as in the 
case of DEMOGEN, HARDING, LIFEMOD and B ALDINI, or where no data exists as 
in the case of the NEDYMAS model, where a synthetic initial sample representative of 
the Dutch population in 1947 was generated.
Behavioural Processes
Dynamic microsimulation models simulate processes that are relevant for the objectives 
of the model. For example a model such as the PENSIM model in the UK, which 
focuses on the income of pensioners, will simulate processes that are relevant to the 
determination of pensioner income such as income from capital, private and public 
pensions. Any process that is required as an input to one of these processes also needs to 
be simulated. So for example, work histories will have to be simulated to determine 
eligibility for pensions. As these processes themselves may depend upon other 
processes such as an individual’s education, they will also have to be simulated.
Given the very different objectives of different model processes, it is difficult to 
compare behavioural processes used by models in a systematic way. In the O’Donoghue 
(forthcoming), we however describe, for each model, the principle processes used by 
each of the models and the input variables used by each of these processes. This section 
draws on some of the detail described there.
Models even with similar objectives vary extensively in the types of processes they 
include. For example focusing on the labour market, a model like HARDING simulates 
whether an individual works, if they work whether they are employed or self-employed 
and how much hours they work. If they don’t work it simulates whether an individual 
seeks work. At the other extreme, because of budgetary constraints and a narrower
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focus, the MINT model simulates only the earnings per annum. However one must be 
cautious in comparing model processes in this way. Because of the amount of processes 
as well as data and resource limitations, models have often not adopted best 
international practice in the estimation of econometric models. Rarely do model builders 
subject their model estimates to detailed econometric tests of the validity of the 
assumptions made by the methods used. For example OLS models are often used in 
circumstances where one might expect biased results as in the case of estimating models 
with lagged dependent variables. Also, data limitations have often meant that some 
processes included in dynamic models have been estimated solely on cross-section data.
Policy Instruments
The policy instruments included in dynamic models are also quite varied. Policy 
instruments included in models include simple or comprehensive tax-benefit systems, 
educational financing systems, long-term, health and dental care provisioning and 
financing and private savings instruments such as pensions.
Often policy instruments have been included as optional add-ons that can be simulated 
once the behavioural processes have been simulated. However as discussed below, 
models with this structure do not allow for feedback from the policy simulators and the 
actual model processes and thus do not allow changes in retirement pensions to 
influence retirement age etc.
4.4.Methodological Issues
Static versus Dynamic Ageing
An alternative to dynamic ageing is static ageing. Instead of estimating econometric 
models to run simulations, static ageing takes macro-aggregates and then adjusts the 
underlying distribution to produce projections of the population distribution over time. 
It is an ageing procedure that takes a sample whose underlying characteristics X, are 
held constant, while the weights given to different parts of the sample is changed 
through the use of a dynamic reweighting mechanism to produce different weighted 
distributions corresponding to expected characteristics in the future.
Pudney (1992) finds that neither approach should be used in isolation. Dynamic ageing 
by focusing on the individual takes no account of processes at the level of the market
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such as labour demand and has impossible requirements in terms of data and modelling 
to jointly estimate all the required processes.
Static ageing has a number of theoretical objections. Klevmarken (1996) makes the 
point that whereas static ageing may avoid some of the problems of drift in the 
projected cross-section associated with dynamic ageing because of misspecification in 
dynamic equations, it cannot account for mobility between states. Also, he points out 
that from a statistical point of view it is inefficient not to use all available historical 
information to project into the future. A consequence of not modelling the mobility, of 
individuals between points in time is that it reduces the type of analyses one can carry 
out using a microsimulation model. For example, it is not possible to carry out analyses 
that require life event histories such as the simulation of pensions.
Static ageing cannot be used where there are no individuals in the sample in a particular 
state. If there are a small number of cases of a particular household category, a very 
high weight may have to be applied, resulting in unstable predictions. Changing 
demographic and economic trends over time may mean that increasing weight is placed 
on population types with very few cases in the sample.
In order to dynamically-reweight, one needs forecasts of future weights. Macro models 
or other forecasting devices can be used for this. However, macro models may not 
forecast weights at the level of detail required. In an example used by Pudney (1992), 
weights consisted of a table of occupation x age x marital status x pension membership. 
It is necessary that this table of weights be produced for each simulation period. It is 
unlikely that any forecasting device can produce a jointly determined table of this level 
of detail and thus marginal distributions will have to be used.
Static ageing assumes that the characteristics within a weighted group do not change 
over time. Therefore, if large changes occurred in a variable that was not included in the 
macro weights, large errors might occur. For example a weighting scheme where 
weights were applied according to whether a family had children would over-estimate 
the number of children, if the fertility rate fell as a result of less large families rather 
than less families with children.
Static ageing procedures are relatively well suited to short to medium term forecasts, of 
approximately 3-5 years where it can be expected that large changes have not occurred
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in the underlying population. However over longer periods of time, it may be more 
difficult to use static ageing due to changing characteristics of the population.
Dynamic ageing will consistently estimate characteristics of the future income 
distribution, under ideal circumstances in which all transitions probabilities and state 
specific expectations can themselves be estimated consistently. This may be possible in 
a simple model with a small number of processes. However in a fully dynamic model of 
work and life histories, many more processes need to be jointly estimated. This is a 
formidable requirement given the available data. Therefore, it is necessary to assume 
that the marginal distributions of different processes are independent.
Projections over time at the micro-level are particularly susceptible to misspecification 
error as modelling at this level involves more detail than in macro models. In addition, 
our knowledge about micro-behaviour is not good enough to specify a fully dynamic 
model. Therefore, what is more commonly used is to combine dynamic ageing with an 
alignment (calibration) mechanism to keep aggregate outputs in line with predictions 
from macro models.
This procedure combines the best of both static and dynamic ageing. It allows for 
individual transitions to be simulated as well as ensuring that aggregate outputs track 
macro forecasts (See for example Chenard 2000a, 2000b).
Alignment faces a difficulty however if there is a behavioural response to a policy 
change. The existence of an alignment mechanism may constrain model outputs to 
always hit aggregate targets even if there has been an underlying behavioural or 
structural change. An example would be if education levels rose. One would expect this 
to reduce mortality rates and increase female labour force participation. If the alignment 
mechanism for each process did not incorporate the impact of educational achievement 
then an increase in the education level would have no effect on these aggregate.
One potential solution is to examine the average (pre-alignment) event value such as the 
average transition rate or average earnings in the baseline scenario with the aterage in 
the alternative scenario and increase alignment values by proportional difference. This 
is a method utilised in some dynamic models.
This however assumes that all processes are unconstrained. This may be the case for example with the 
mortality rate. One may expect that an exogenous increase in human capital will reduce total mortality 
rates and thus one can shift down in the alignment totals is appropriate.
However some processes face market or other institutional constraints, issues that are only partially 
simulated in the model. For our example in the labour market if education increased the labour force 
participation rate, if labour supply increases, then wages may fall and employment increase. This is
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similar to shifting the alignment probabilities. However one would have to shift earnings as well. 
However due to rigidities in the labour market, this may not necessarily happen. Labour Demand may be 
fixed, in which case we may just simply see that as more women supply labour, they simply replace 
people in the labour market who are less “employable”. This is similar to not shifting alignment at all. In 
cases where there are market interactions such as this, it may be useful to incorporate a model of the 
market that would inform the response of alignment totals to economic and demographic changes.
Behavioural versus Probabilistic models
The next consideration is whether a model will be a behavioural or probabilistic model. 
Behavioural models are grounded in economic theory, in the sense that changes to 
institutional or market characteristics result in a change in the behaviour of agents 
within the model. A probabilistic model on the other hand attempts to reproduce 
observed distributional characteristics in sample surveys without necessarily a 
theoretical underpinning. Depending on how they are constructed, they may or may not 
be able to dynamically respond to external market and institutional characteristics.
Klevmarken (1996) categorises three types of behavioural adjustments in a dynamic 
microsimulation model: imputation of missing data, updating of simulation population 
and behavioural adjustments to policy changes. We shall not deal with the first here 
(See Klevmarken 1983) concentrating only on the latter two.
Updating of the simulation population also known as probabilistic modelling is a 
process used to age a sample. This method refers to the functions used to simulate 
mortality, fertility, family formation, labour market transitions etc. They are not 
necessarily grounded in microeconomic theory, but based on a probability-based 
method and do not depend on the policy parameters in the model. In practice many 
transitions are based on only a small number of factors such as age and sex. Methods 
that can be used include markov processes and survival functions discussed in later 
sections. Equation (2) gives an example of a probabilistic dynamic model. If we stick 
with the labour force participation example given above, the marginal distribution of Yj 
after tax labour income, f Y]lY2,Xi » depends on the marginal distribution of hours worked
f Y2ix2 • Ih this model hours worked does not depend on the tax system and therefore fits
our example of a probabilistic model.
f K (Y, X / P )  = / WiZi f t  /  Y2, X , , P) ■ f Vi,Xi (Y2 / X 2) - f x ( X)  (2)
It might however be expected that changing economic and social policies would have an 
impact on behaviour. Klevmarken*s third approach relates to models of this kind. In a 
behavioural model, where individual behaviour changes as a result of changing policies,
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the policy parameters must have a direct or indirect impact on the model. An example 
includes models of labour supply that respond to changes in the tax-benefit system. This 
is not normally the case in the probabilistic method. Equation (3) expands equation (2) 
and introduces a new decomposition of Y into Yi, the targets of the simulation, 
endogenous variables which impact on Y j ; Y 2  which do not depend on policy 
parameters and Y 3  which are. In our example, Y 3  might still be hours worked, but now 
takes the form of a Hausman (1981) type labour supply model which depends on the net 
wage.
f n i Y . X  /  P) = f rilr2^ Xi(Yl /Y2,Y „ X l,Pl,)- f nlXi (Y2 I X 2)- _
W V  * 3 , ^ 3  ) • / * ( * )
A requirement of behavioural models is of the stability of the parameters. The 
parameters of the behavioural model must not change as a result of a policy change. A 
problem with behavioural models is how to cope with individual heterogeneity. For 
example a reduction in taxes may increase the labour supply of a low-income worker, 
but reduce the labour supply of a high-income worker. A potential way around this 
problem is to make the behavioural response, state dependent.
fyx (Y, X / P )  = (Yi /Y1,Y21X i ,Pu ) - / , ]/Xj (Y2 / X 2)-
fr,ix, ( n  /  , P„,r„,K,o)• / , ( X)
The behavioural part of equation {&) accounts for state dependence by making the 
marginal distribution of the behavioural variable Y 3  dependent on not only the policy 
but also the type of policy system Po, the original states, Y 3  and Y 3 0 .
Klevmarken (1997) outlined three criteria for choosing what types of behavioural 
equations should be included in a microsimulation model.
• They should be relevant for the objectives of the model.
• There should be major behavioural adjustments to the policy changes the model is 
built to analyse.
• Behaviour that influences the fiscal balance should be included.
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Examples of behavioural responses that fit these requirements include labour supply, the 
retirement decision, the effect of income and price changes on consumption, fertility 
and marital decisions and the take-up of social benefits.
Very few dynamic inter-temporal models have incorporated behavioural response in 
their design. The only examples known to the author (See table 3) are the MICROHUS, 
PRISM, and SESIM models that incorporate labour supply behavioural responses to the 
tax-benefit system and the DYNAMITE and ANAC models whose retirement decisions 
depend on the social security system. Why then have behavioural modules not been 
included in MSM’s more often? Incorporating behavioural responses into 
microsimulation models has been found to be very difficult. Estimates of the value of 
the relevant elasticities have varied a great deal in econometric studies to measure them 
(Citro and Hanushek, 1991; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). Pudney and Sutherland
(1996) have found that predictions based on behavioural models have very wide 
confidence intervals. Also, the addition of feedback loops from tax-benefit algorithms 
can substantially increase the time of simulation. For these reasons, builders of 
microsimulation models have often opted not to include behavioural responses in their 
models.
Competing Risks: Discrete versus Continuous time
At any point in time a variety of mutually exclusive transitions are possible for 
individuals in a dynamic model. Different outcomes may be regarded as different events 
competing with each other in order to be observed. For example a single woman can get 
married or have a child at a point in time. Whichever event comes first will influence 
the other. In this case, the probability of having a child is much higher if the woman is 
married. This is the notion of competing risks. Galler, (1995) discusses some of the 
issues relating to the modelling of simultaneous risks in dynamic microsimulation 
models.
Ageing modules in dynamic models are often constructed using annual transition 
probability matrices. Individuals are passed through a collection of transition matrices in 
each time period of the simulation (usually a year) to determine their simulated life 
paths. This method assumes that life events are independent of each other, while in 
reality they can be interdependent as in the example given above. Therefore, the order in 
which the transition matrices are applied is very important. In the example given above, 
if marriage is determined first, the potential fertility rate changes quite a lot. Likewise, a
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pre-marital pregnancy will increase the probability of getting married. Galler (1995) 
discussed a number of options in this situation including the procedure of random 
ordering used by the DARMSTADT (Heike et al., 1987) and Hungarian models 
(Csicsman et al., 1987). In these models the order in which processes take place varies 
randomly.
There are a number of other problems with this type of approach. Firstly transitions are 
assumed to take place at a single point in each time period and the duration of the event 
must last at least one time period (typically a year, but can be of shorter duration). For 
example if the time period is a year, then this approach rules out transitions in and out of 
unemployment over the course of the year. This is unrealistic, as many people will have 
unemployment transitions for periods of less than one year as in the case of seasonal 
workers. Therefore, the discrete time transitions simulate net transitions (See Galler, 
1997) at discrete points in time, ignoring the transition path taken to reach the end state.
Recent dynamic models such as DYNAMOD in Australia and the demographic 
microsimulation model SOCSIM (Hammel, 1990) have begun to use survival analysis 
techniques to model life event transitions. Rather than simulating annual transition 
probabilities, survival functions model the length of time an individual will face in this 
current state. In Antcliff (1993), this method is discussed. Once a referencing event has 
occurred such as marriage, an individual is passed through each survival function that 
given their current state their eligible for. For example once an individual gets married, 
they are then eligible for divorce! The event given their current state with the nearest 
event time is selected. This process then repeats itself until death.
The use of survival functions in microsimulation models poses a lot of possibilities but 
however also a lot of problems. One of the assumptions of using hazard function 
continuous time models is that the probability of two events occurring at one point in 
time is zero (See Galler, 1997). This however is unrealistic in a dynamic model. For 
example when one simulates an individual to enter work, one must als# decide whether 
they become an employee of self-employed and how many hours they work per week. 
Thus a number of processes need to be determined simultaneously. Galler argues that it 
is preferable to regard these types of simultaneous events as a single composite event. 
However in this case it is not possible as someone in work can become self-employed 
from a state of employment or vary their hours etc.
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Another problem relating to the use of continuous time models is that incorporating 
explanatory variables, which vary continuously over time, results in very complex 
econometric models which are difficult to solve (Galler, 1997). In a dynamic model 
with continuous time, then labour market states, durations in these states and the 
resulting labour market incomes will vary continuously and are desirable to have as 
explanatory variables for other processes. One solution is to hold these explanatory 
variables constant for finite periods so that they can be considered within the model as 
discrete time explanatory variables. Galler argues that this results in a transformation of 
the problem into a discrete time problem. Also if flow variables are held constant during 
these intervals, then problems will occur if the state which is kept can actually be 
changed during the interval using the hazard function.
Galler also points out that macro-aggregates, which are typically discrete time variables, 
can be accommodated with ease as explanatory variables in a continuous model. He 
argues that in many respects the incorporation of macro variables is easier in the 
continuous time framework. This is because if the time period of the micro process is 
less than that of the macro process in a discrete time framework, then some 
interpolation may be necessary. However, another use of macro aggregates is in the 
alignment of aggregates from the model. Here one again has the problem of combining 
the continuous time predicted variables into discrete periods to make them compatible 
with macro-aggregates. One has to try to force the number of transitions within the 
discrete interval to match the aggregate totals. Given that the continuous time process 
are rerun every time a dependent variable is changed it becomes very difficult to 
identify the transitions that occur within the interval. Only when the actual interval has 
been reached is the number of transitions known. At this point, it is possible to restrict 
the number of transitions if the predicted number is higher than the macro aggregate. It 
may however be more difficult to maintain the same distribution of durations. The more 
difficult problem occurs if the predicted number of transitions that occur during the 
interval is lower than the macro aggregate. In this case it is not-obvious how to generate 
a higher number of transitions.
Another issue that is related to the alignment question is the interdependence of 
transitions for members of the same household (or in fact other unit such as the firm or 
industry). Each individual’s behaviour may be dependent upon the behaviour of the 
other person in the unit. For example, it is known that the decision (or opportunity) of 
one spouse to work has been found to be related to the behaviour of the other spouse. In
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a continuous time model, when the explanatory variables of one spouse change, the 
dynamic processes have to resimulated. In addition, the dynamic processes of the 
second spouse need to be, which in turn may cause the first spouse’s behaviour to 
change. This will significantly add to processing time. Furthermore, one has the 
problem that units such as this are non-constant, due to births, deaths and separations. 
This however is not greater a problem than the fact that units of analysis are wider than 
the individual and just require further iterations. Multi-individual units of analysis also 
pose problems for discrete time processes, as simultaneous interdependent transitions 
are difficult to model. They are however quite common place now in family models of 
labour supply, using multinomial logit models (See van Soest, 1995). A solution that is 
often used to this problem in dynamic microsimulation models is to simulate the 
transition of one spouse first and base the other spouse’s behaviour on the behaviour of 
the first. Another is to base the behaviour of one spouse on the characteristics of the 
other spouse in the previous time period. While both approaches are less desirable than 
jointly estimating transitions, data constraints often limit the use of joint estimation. 
With regard to the second solution, the shorter the time between transition periods the 
better. It does however add to the time needed for simulation.
In general dynamic models have employed discrete time. Some however have 
incorporated a mixture of discrete and continuous models such as DYNAMSIM, 
DYNAMOD, LifePaths, MICROSHUS, MINT and PENSIM (See Table 3).
Open versus Closed Models
A decision dynamic microsimulation model builders have to consider is whether the 
model should be open, closed or a mixture of the two. A model is defined as closed if, 
except in the case of newly bom children and new migrants, the model only uses a fixed 
set of individuals. Thus if an individual is selected to be married, their spouse is selected 
from within the existing population of the model. An open model on the other hand 
would start with a base population and if spouses are required, new individuals are 
generated. This has the advantage that simulations for individuals (and their immediate 
families) can be run independently of other individuals. It thus allows the model to be 
run in parallel on different computer processors, allowing overall run times to be 
reduced. This is the method used by the DEMO GEN, LifePaths, Melbourne, MINT and 
Sfb3 cohort models (See Table 3). However sometimes it is necessary to interact (in a 
modelling sense) with individuals outside ones immediate family. This is particularly 
true of the alignment process. Although possible, it is a non-trivial task to align a
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varying population with macro-aggregates as the weights would necessarily have to be 
dynamically reweighted constantly. In any case if this is done, most of the benefits of 
running the model in parallel will be lost. As a result most dynamic models in use, 
utilise a closed model method. Despite this, most have to incorporate a degree of 
openness. This is because of migration. While emigration is easy to do,53 immigration 
requires the generation of new individuals. However this is less of a problem for 
alignment purposes than a fully open model, as macro-aggregates are based on a 
partially open population in any case.
Steady State versus Forecasted Projections
Another decision to be made is whether the model should be run in a steady state world 
or whether the model should try to incorporate forecasted projections. In a steady state 
world, because of the uncertainty surrounding such matters as marriage and fertility 
rates and economic growth rates, it is assumed that the world remains the same for each 
member of the sample’s lives. For example, it is assumed that demographic, labour 
force, income and other characteristics of the population and all government policies 
existing in the base year remain the same for the entire modelled period. A model that 
attempts to track trends in the real world, will allow these characteristics to change 
during the simulation. The decision depends on the purpose of the model.
A number of models (e.g. LBFEMOD, HARDING, SfB3 and DEMOGEN) are 
simulated in a steady state world. One criticism of this method however, is that they 
represent no actual cohorts and that tax-benefit systems do not remain the same over an 
entire lifetime.. Nevertheless, steady state models also have a role as varying behaviour 
and systems over time can complicate the causes of various effects. Utilising a steady 
state approach, by focusing on just one system with unchanging behaviour patterns, 
allows one to look at the actual forces within a particular tax-benefit system, for 
example which drive particular results such as the extent of lifetime redistribution 
results without considering potential compensating interactions.
Allowing the model to be state dependent allows one to examine different environments 
and behavioural patterns to be examined. For example, a steady state model would not 
be effective in examining the impact of changing demographic or labour market
53 This is unless one wants to track an individual living overseas, who accumulates pension entitlements 
which are transferable to their original country and then goes home to claim pension rights there. For 
countries like Ireland and Portugal with a lot of mobility within the European Union, it my be necessary 
to consider this issue in a public pensions dynamic model.
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patterns, or changes in the wider economy. For these purposes, models need to 
incorporate information about actual changes in behaviour or to take into account 
projected changes. Some of the major modelling projects such as CORSIM and 
DYNACAN are simulated in non-steady state worlds. Doing this however comes with a 
cost as much more parameters need to be specified in the model and may require the use 
of many more datasets. As a significant component of designing a dynamic model is 
this estimation process, it can result in a much more expensive model to build.
While cohort models often take a steady state assumption, it is not necessarily the case 
(See van de Ven’s (1998) Melbourne model).
Classifying Models: Cohort versus Population Models
Harding (1993) and others have categorised inter-temporal dynamic models into two 
types: cohort/longitudinal models that model a single cohort over their lifetime and 
population/cross-section models that model a population cross-section over a period of 
time. Some models in addition only focus on adults ignoring children and thus although 
the may contain a cross-section of the population, it is not representative of the whole 
age spectrum.
From a model design viewpoint, the distinction between cohort and population model is 
less significant than the use the model is put to. The distinction in the literature had 
more to do with computing power and data constraints until recent times rather than any 
major methodological differences. Cohort models were typically used because the 
computing costs to simulate whole lifetimes for cross-sections with sufficient sample 
sizes to be able to examine specific cohorts were too high. Both types of model can be 
simulated in the same modelling environment. A cohort model is simply a model that 
ages a sample of unrelated individuals aged zero, while a population model ages a 
sample of individuals of different ages, some of whom are related. Both samples are 
then passed through ageing procedures, to produce life event histories over the modelled 
period.
It is logical to model both types in the same computing platform. The potentially larger 
size of the cohort modelled in dynamic cohort models, allows one to look at life time 
income patterns for smaller population groups such as recipients of disability benefits or 
lone parents. Some cross-section models such as MOSART combine the advantages of 
both types of models because of access to a very large dataset. Access to administrative
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datasets that contain detailed labour market and life event histories for 1% of the 
population allows one to run the model over the lifetime of particular cohorts while 
comparing their position with other cohorts.
Population models, should perhaps be classified under two headings:
• Multi-purpose Models
• Special Purpose Models
Large cross-section models which were usually built with large teams with access to 
large and complex datasets. They usually simulate a wide variety of economic and 
demographic processes and can therefore be used for many different applications. These 
are forecasting models and usually incorporate alignment systems in order to keep the 
model in line with external forecasts or are in fact linked to macro-models. Models of 
this type are DYNASIM I and II, CORSIM in the USA, the SfB3 model in Germany, 
the Canadian Pensions Program DYNACAN, the MOSART model in Norway and the 
DYNAMOD model in Australia.
Another group of cross-section models are models built for specific purposes, mainly 
forecasting pension costs and other maintenance costs of the elderly. As forecasting 
models they also usually contain external weights to keep the simulations on track. 
Models of this type include PENSIM in the UK, the Belgian Pensions model and the 
French pensions model. More advanced is the US Pensions and Retirement Income 
Simulation Model (PRISM) which simulate a much wider variety of characteristics.
Validation ^
/
One of the major perceived problems of dynamic models is the fact that insufficient 
effort has been placed on validation matters. PRIM (1997) argues that projection models 
of all types including dynamic microsimulation models should have a number of 
validation goals.
• Firstly they should provide accurate estimates of policy outcomes,
• Secondly provide estimates of the uncertainty associated with projections and
• Thirdly incorporate the most up to date information about underlying behaviour.
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PRIM (1997) advocate that one should use ex-post analyses of previous periods to 
assess the reliability of the model. It is for this reason that a number of the major 
microsimulation projects have taken historic datasets as the starting population base for 
their simulations. For example the CORSIM model takes as its base a sub-sample of the 
1971 US Census, while the DYNACAN model takes as its base a sample of the 1970 
Canadian Census. By running the model forward to the present they can compare the 
model forecasts to what actually happened See for example (Morrison, 2000; Caldwell 
and Morrison, 2000). However invariably these models incorporate historical 
information such as macro-aggregates in the model. As this information would not have 
been known to forecasters, this may produce better forecasts than would have otherwise 
been the case. PRIM (1997) therefore argue that a more effective validation would be to 
take aggregates which would have been available at the time rather than the more 
accurate historical information.
Within these validation approaches, there are alternative types of validation. One 
method is to compare directly generated forecasts with what happened in reality. This is 
for example comparing forecasted labour participation rates with actual rates. Another 
method described in Caldwell (1996) uses an indirect approach, known as a multiple 
module approach. An example he cites is the case of validating the numbers of married 
persons with health insurance, when the directly simulated processes are marriage and 
medical insurance membership. Sources of error may result from errors in either or both 
direct processes or because of misspecified interactions. Some types of dynamic model 
however, may have no comparable source of validation. For example models which 
solely look at a single cohort living in a steady state will have nothing with which to 
validate as the model does not attempt to mimic real, life, but merely a stylised version 
of it. Alternatively, countries which have developed their micro-data resources only 
recently may not have alternative sources of data with which to validate, although this 
problem will become progressively less of a problem with time.
Clearly given the length of projections and the level of detail simulated by dynamic 
microsimulation models one must emphasise the level of uncertainty about results. 
Measuring this uncertainty in the form of confidence intervals has not been carried out 
to any great extent.54 One of the reasons for this is because policy makers typically are 
interested in only point estimates and not the level of confidence, which in any case is
54 Pudney and Sutherland (1996 and 1994) did however consider the confidence intervals associated with 
sampling error and of behavioural response estimates.
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often misunderstood. There are exceptions to this in other fields as for example the 
provision of inflation forecasts, which now typically come with error bounds. Another 
reason is that the cost and time taken to do this is also often very large. However given 
the length of forecasts used in for example public pension forecasts, the need for 
estimates of the level of confidence is apparent.
PRIM (1997) describe 4 sources of variability, sampling variability in the input 
database, in other components such as regressions and alignment totals, errors in the 
base database and misspecification errors. Sample reuse methods as described by Cohen 
(1991) can be used to estimate sources of sample variability. Although it may be 
difficult to put the resulting uncertainty into a probabilistic context, it is quite a useful 
method for assessing the sensitivity of results to for example different specifications of 
behavioural equations. It is also an effective method for assessing the size of the error 
which results from the use of monte carlo processes within the dynamic model itself.55
Because of computing constraints, one faces a trade-off between the complexity of the 
model used and the number of iterations one can use to estimate the sensitivity of the 
model. Some models such as the LifePaths model in Statistics Canada have been 
developed to be able to be run in parallel and with access to large institutional 
computing facilities have been able to measure this kind of variation. However even 
with the access to these resources, a number of simplifications have been necessary.
4.5. Conclusions
This chapter reports some of main issues involved in constructing such a dynamic 
microsimulation model and describes some of the choices made by different models 
world wide. The main issues discussed in this chapter include the decision whether the 
model should simulate a multi-cohort representation of the population or to just focus 
on a single cohort. Other decisions include whether the model should be run in 
continuous time or in discrete time intervals, whether the model should be open or 
closed, whether alignment should be used, whether the model should be run in a steady 
state and whether the model should incorporate behavioural response to policy changes 
or to simply simulate a statistical representation of the population. This issues were
55 By this we mean that for every dynamic process, there is a model which predicts say an average 
probability that a transition will occur and in addition a random number which decides whether for that 
individual the transition will occur.
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considered in the light of available practice amongst model builders around the world, 
drawing on a detailed literature survey of the main models in O’Donoghue (2001).
Although many countries possess models, there is a concentration of models in the 
USA, Germany, Sweden, the UK and Australia. Most models are categorised as open 
cross-section models utilising discrete time. The use of alignment depends on the 
function of the model. Likewise most models attempts to replicate period effects and 
thus are not run in the steady state. Cohort models are typically run in a steady state 
world, with van de Ven (1998) being an exception. Likewise alignment is more 
common for population models, simulating an entire cross-section.
A comparison of models using broad headings as we have done underestimates the 
degree of variability of different types of model in terms of the actual behaviour 
simulated. The complexity modelled very much depends on the primary objective of the 
model. Thus large-scale models such as CORSIM, DYNAMOD and DYNACAN etc. 
have very large sets of detailed behaviour, while some models have been designed for 
limited purposes as in the case of Creedy (1997).
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1. Uses of Dynamic Microsimulation Models
Model Country Uses
DYNAMOD I and H Australia Potential areas such as superannuation, age pensions and education, long-term issues in labour market, health, aged care 
housing policy, broad long-term distributional issues within the population and across generations, asset accumulation 
retirement incomes, future characteristics of the population or the projected impact of policy changes.
HARDING Australia Analysis of lifetime tax-transfer analysis, for analysis of policy concerning the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
redistributive impact of government health outlays over the lifetime.
Melbourne Cohort Model Australia Analysis of income inequality in a lifetime context
FAMSIM Austria Demographic behaviour of young women
Pensions Model Belgium Analyse and forecast the medium term impact of a change in the pension regulations
DYNACAN Canada Models Canada Pension Plan its impact on the Canadian population
LifePaths Canada Health care treatments, student loans, time-use, public pensions and generational accounts
DEMOGEN Canada Distributional and financial impact of proposals to include homemakers in the Canadian pension plan
DESTINE France Public Pensions and Intergenerational Transfers
Sfb3 Germany Analyses of pension reforms, the effect of shortening worker hours, distributional effects of education transfers, inter-persi 
redistribution in the state pension system.
Dynamic Model Ireland Inter-temporal issues relating to the degree of redistribution in the Tax-Benefit System
DYNAMITE Italy Examine household level microeconomic questions and the impact of macroeconomic and institutional changes on 
distribution of resources
ANAC Italy Examine the effect of demographic changes on the Italian saving rate and the reform of the pension system in Italy
Italian Cohort Model Italy Analyse lifetime income distribution issues
Japanese Cohort Model Japan Look at the impact on household savings of changes in the demographic structure
NEDYMAS Netherlands Intergenerational equity and pension reform, the redistributive impact of social security schemes on lifetime labour incc 
Demographic projections, Annual versus lifetime income redistribution by social security, Lifetime income redistribution by 
old-age state pension, Lifetime income distribution and the unit of analysis, modelling of institutional households, Annuali: 
and lifetime income redistribution, Vertical and horizontal lifetime redistribution, Annual versus lifetime income redistribu 
by social security. Mortality differences related to socioeconomic status and the progressivity of old-age pensions and he 
insurance, Pension Reform.
MIDAS New Zealand Wealth accumulation and distribution
MOSART Norway Modelling the future cost of pensions, carrying out micro level projections of population, education, labour supply and pu 
pensions and incorporating overlapping-generations modelling in a dynamic microsimulation framework.
MICROHUS Sweden Study the Dynamic effects of changes in the tax-benefit system on the income distribution
SESIM Sweden Modelling budget estimates of student grants and loans,, analyses of other inter-temporal policy issues such as labour sup 
savings decisions and pensions
SVERIGE Sweden Human ecodynamics (the impact of human cultural and economic systems on the environment)
Swedish Cohort Model Sweden Examining the replacement of social insurance by personal savings accounts and the distribution of lifetime marginal effec
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tax rates
LIFEMOD UK Modelling the lifetime impact of a welfare state
Long Term Care Model UK Modelling Long Term Care Reform Options
PENSIM UK The treatment of pensioners by the social security system, the regulations and coverage of private pension schemes and 
performance of pension funds investment portfolios, projected demographic movements and movements in aggregate varia 
such as unemployment and interest rates.
CORSIM USA Changes occurring in kinship networks, wealth accumulation, patterns of intergenerational mobility and whether individual 
paths depend on aggregate conditions in society, the progressivity and the life course of the current Social Security syster 
well as potential reforms, Household Wealth accumulation, Socioeconomic Mobility, Health status, Interstate Migration, 1 
and Income Allocation, and International Collaborations
DYNASIMI & n USA Forecasts of the population to 2030 employing different assumptions about demographic and economic scenarios, An anal 
of the cost of teenage childbearing to the public sector under alternative policy scenarios and linking with a macro model
MINT USA Forecasts of the distribution of income of the 1931-1960 birth cohort in retirement
PENSIM/2 USA Analyses lifetime coverage and adequacy issues related to employer-sponsored pension plans in the USA.
PRISM USA Evaluation of Public and Private Pensions
Sources: Antcliff et al., (1996), Harding (1993), Van de Ven (1998), Lutz (1997), Joyeaux et al. (1996), Morrison (1998), Osberg and Lethbridge (1996), Rowe and 
Wolfson (2000), Wolfson (1988), Bonnet, C. and R. Mahieu, (2000), INSEE, (1999), Galler and Wagner, 1986 and Hain Hellberger, 1986, O’Donoghue (2001), Ando 
et al. (2000), Ando and Nicoletti Altimari (1999), Baldini (1997), Ando (1996), Nelissen (1996), Stroombergen, Rose and Miller (1995), Fredriksen (1998), 
Klevmarken and Olovsson (1996), Ericson and Hussenius (1999), Pylkkanen (2000), Vencatasawmy et al. (1999), Winder and Zhou (1999), Folster (1997), Pudney 
(1992), Hancock, Mallender and Pudney (1992), Falkingham J. and C. Lessof, (1991),Hancock (2000), Toder et al. (1999), Panis and Lillard (1999), Holmer et al. 
(2001), Citro and Hanushek (1991b), Citro and Hanushek (1991b), Caldwell et al. (2000).
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Table 4.2. Base Data Sets of Dynamic Microsimulation Models
Model Country Base Data Sample Size
DYNAMOD I and II Australia 1 % sample of the 1986 Census 150000 individuals
HARDING Australia Synthetic Cohort Aged 0 4000 individuals
Melbourne Cohort Model Australia Synthetic Sample of 20 year olds in 1970 50000 Males and families
FAMSIM Austria 1995-96 Family and Fertility Survey (Austria) 4500 women
Pensions Model Belgium Synthetic Cross-section based on Survey Data
212000 individualsDYNACAN Canada 1971 Census Public Use File (1% sample)
LifePaths Canada Synthetic Cross-section Varies
DEMOGEN Canada Synthetic Cohort Aged 0 1000-5000 individuals
DESTINE France 1991 Financial Assets Survey 37000 individuals
Sfb3 Population/Cohort 
Dynamic Model
Germany
Ireland
1969 Integrated Micro Data File (Pop.), Synthetic Cohort Aged 0 (Cohort) 
1994 Living in Ireland Survey (Pop.), Synthetic Cohort Aged 0 (Cohort)
69000 hh/ 7300 ind. 
4500 hh/variable ind.
DYNAMITE Italy 1993 of Household Income and Wealth 67000 households
ANAC Italy 1993 of Household Income and Wealth 67000 households
Italian Cohort Model Italy Synthetic Cohort Aged 0 4000 individuals
Japanese Cohort Model Japan Synthetic Multiple Cohorts (single representative of each cohort type) 4000 individuals
NEDYMAS Netherlands Synthetic Cross-section based on 1947 Census 10000 individuals
MIDAS New Zealand Synthetic Cross-section based on 1991 Census 10000 individuals
MOSART Norway 1989 administrative data (1 % Sample) 40000 individuals
MICROHUS Sweden 1984 HUS income distribution database
SESIM Sweden 1992 HINK survey 30000 individuals
SVERIGE Sweden 1 % Sample drawn from administrative data in 1985-1995 9 million ind.
Swedish Cohort Model Sweden Synthetic Cohort Aged 20 1000 individuals
LIFEMOD UK Synthetic Cohort Aged 0 4000 individuals
Long Term Care Model UK 1993-1996 Family Expenditure Surveys 1770 individuals
PENSIM UK 1988 Retirement Survey, 1986 Social Change and Economic Life Initiative Survey and 1988 
Family Expenditure Survey
5000 benefit units
CORSIM USA 1960 Census (0.1% sample) 180000 individuals
DYNASIMI & II USA 1973 Current Population Survey (CPS) matched to Social Security Administration (SSA) data
MINT USA 1990-93 Survey of Income and Program Participation, matched to SSA data 85000 individuals
PENSIM/2 USA Synthetic Cohort Aged 0
PRISM USA March 1978, March and May 1979 CPS matched, to SSA data 28,000 adults
Sources: See Table 1.
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Table 4.3. Dynamic Model Principle Features
Name Country Base Pop. Time (C/D) Open/ Closed Alignment Steady State Behaviour
d y n a m o d  y n Australia Cross C/D C Y N N
HARDING Australia Cohort D C N Y N
Melbourne Model Australia Cohort D 0 N N
FAMSIM Austria Cross D c N N N
Belgian Pension Model Belgium Cross D c N N
DEMOGEN Canada Cohort D 0 N Y N
DYNACAN Canada Cross D c Y N N
LifePaths Canada Cross C 0 N N
DESTINE France Cross D c Y N N
SfB3 Cohort Germany Cohort D 0 N N N
SfB3 Population Germany Cross D c Y N N
Irish DMM Ireland Both D c Y Y/N Y
DYNAMITE Italy Cross D c Y N N
ANAC Italy Cross D c Y N N
Italian DMM Italy Cohort D c N Y N
Japanese Model Japan Cohort D c Y N Y
NEDYMAS Netherlands Cross D c Y N Y
MIDAS NZ Cross D c N N
MOSART Norway Cross D c Y N N
MICROHUS Sweden Cross C c N N Y
SESIM Sweden Cross D c N N Y
SVERIGE Sweden Cross D c Y N N
Swedish Cohort Model Sweden Cohort D c N Y N
LIFEMOD UK Cohort D c N Y N
Long term care UK Cross D c Y Y N
PENSIM UK Cross C c Y N N
CORSIM USA Cross D c Y N N
DYNASIMI/II USA Cross C/D c Y N N
MINT USA Cross C/D 0 Y N N
PENSIM/2 USA Cohort C o N Y N
PRISM USA Cross D c Y N Y
Sources: See Table 1
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Chapter 5. A Dynamic Microsimulation Model for Ireland
(A Study of a Flexible Dynamic Modelling Computing Framework) 
5.1.Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to describe a general method for constructing a dynamic 
microsimulation model. The computing framework that is described is the basis for the 
dynamic microsimulation model used in this thesis.
Microsimulation models, which take micro household datasets and simulate government 
policy have been used for about a decade in Ireland starting with the construction of the 
SWITCH model at the Economic and Social Research Institute in Dublin (Callan et al., 
1996). Work has focused on examining the impact of potential and actual policy 
reforms on a cross-section of the population (Callan et al., 1995), a comparison of Irish 
policy with that of European neighbours (O’Donoghue and Utili, 2000), examining 
policies to reduce pollution (O’Donoghue, 1997) amongst others. These studies have 
employed a static methodology, which means that policies and reforms are examined on 
a cross-section at one point in time and with no behavioural response. More recently 
there has been a desire to explore the dynamics of policy reform. For example work has 
been done on modelling labour supply in Ireland (Callan and Van Soest, 1996).
The objective of the computing framework described here is to incorporate the time 
dimension into policy analysis. Using models based on cross-section data simply allows 
one to look at the effect of policy at one point in time. Using cross-sectional data one is 
limited in the simulation of policy instruments that depend on inter-temporal factors 
such as pensions. A dynamic microsimulation life cycle model allows one to examine 
policy over time; for example life course redistribution, forecasts of cross-sectional 
redistribution and the simulation of pensions. In chapter 4, a number of decisions were 
described that need to be made in constructing a dynamic microsimulation model. In 
this chapter, we describe the decisions made and why. We also describe an innovative 
computing framework used to create the model.
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5.2. Objectives
The construction of a dynamic model is an enormous task, both in terms of grasping the 
types and forms of behaviour that take place over a lifetime and the effort in 
programming 1000’s of lines of code.
Despite dynamic microsimulation modelling (DMM) as a science having existed since 
the 1970’s (see Orcutt et al.), the field has progressed only slightly. Part of the reason 
has been the huge resources necessary. When DMM’s were first developed, they were in 
fact advances in Computer Science as well as being advances in Social Science 
methodology. Likewise in many countries, data limitations have prevented the 
development.
However in recent years, both difficulties have been overcome as computers have 
increased in speed and thus allowing for very powerful models to be constructed on 
PC’s. The establishment of household panel datasets in many countries, for example the 
European Community Household Panel Survey, the British Household Panel Survey 
and the German Socio-Economic Panel has removed the barrier to the estimation of 
dynamic behavioural processes.
However despite these advances, the spread of the DMM technology has been quite 
slow. A large potential reason is the apparent benefit to cost ratio. Many institutions 
when faced with the large cost of developing a dynamic model felt the money better 
spent on other techniques.
One significant contributor to the cost of development is the cost in actually producing 
the computing environment of the model. Because the computing necessary to produce 
a computing framework is so complicated, computing development has often taken 
precedence over developing better behavioural equations. It is therefore important to 
focus on ways of reducing the cost of building this initial framework. Clearly the most 
obvious way is to use reusable code. There were some efforts in the 1970’s to write 
actual microsimulation computer software packages. However because of the 
complexity of the system to be simulated, users are likely to demand much greater 
access to the actual program code than software packages allow. A more successful 
method of reusable code has been the use of the CORSIM model as a template for the 
construction of models in Canada, Sweden and the US Social Security Administration.
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This model is designed to achieve a similar purpose, aiming to be able to be used for 
different research purposes of the author in the future.
In constructing this dynamic model, the author had a number of constraints not 
necessarily experienced by other builders of dynamic microsimulation models. Dynamic 
models are typically constructed by governmental institutions (MOSART, SESIM, 
DYNACAN) or by major research grants (SVERIGE, DYNASIM), although a number 
of models have been constructed as part of PhDs (Harding, Baldini). Not being funded 
by a major research grant or by a government institution this model falls into the latter 
category. As a result, the model has necessarily to be less ambitious at the outset. A 
number of examples where limitations were imposed on the construction of the model 
include use of a small dataset (just under 2000), simplified behavioural equations and 
focusing solely on a single cohort. However despite these shortcomings, it is hoped that 
with improved data and funding availability that the model can be improved in the 
future. Therefore the objective of the model is to construct a program which although 
relatively basic initially is not constrained from adapted for future uses. Future potential 
improvements of the model include:
■ Inter - cohort redistribution of the tax-benefit system.
■ Demographic Ageing and the Income Distribution
■ Comparisons of welfare state life course redistribution across countries
■ Improve behavioural equations
■ Improve data
■ Savings processes
■ Life-course labour supply
■ Medium Term Forecasts
■ Add graphical front end
It is not possible to foresee the problems involved in developments in these areas in 
advance. However in order not to allow current limitations to inhibit future 
developments of the program, careful thought is necessary in the design of a flexible
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modelling framework. There are a number of features that would be desirable in such a 
model to be able to meet these objectives in the future.
■ In order to be able to deal with new datasets with ease, using different sets of
variables should not be a problem.
■ It should be easy to incorporate new behavioural information in the model.
■ Need to be able to run on a Personal Computer using standard “inexpensive”
software.
■ It should be straightforward to make changes to the model even if the model has not 
been used for a period of time. This implies transparency in the operation of the 
model and also flexibility in the way in which behaviour can be incorporated in the 
model.
i - a
■ These points also imply that the model should^obust to changes desired.
h
■ Speed at the present is not considered a priority as it is expected that computing time 
will decrease with the availability of cheaper and faster computers.
■ The objective of this model is to allow the user to focus more on the estimation of 
behavioural equations rather than computing issues.
■ The model should also allow feedback effects of policy reforms to be examined.
A dynamic microsimulation model is essentially a model that takes individuals and 
simulates the probabilities of various events occurring at various points in time.56 Figure 
1 describes the main operations of the ageing component of dynamic microsimulation 
model. Here the operation of one particular ageing module at one point in time is 
examined. In the model itself this process would occur on a number of occasions as all 
the individuals in the database would pass through many ageing modules at each point 
in time.
Data for each person are firstly taken from the database and transformed into the model 
data-structure, which is described in more detail below. The individual is then passed 
through each ageing module in turn. The ageing modules to be used are specified as part 
of a parameter list, which allows the order and the types of the transition processes to be
56 Dynamic events may of course occur at the same point in time as other events
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varied. Input parameters for each ageing module are stored in Microsoft EXCEL 
spreadsheets (XL). Output from each ageing module is stored in alignment storage 
matrices in memory. If the ageing module is a transition between states, then the output 
will be a probability, otherwise if the ageing module is a transition between continuous 
amounts like for example incomes, the output is a real variable. When all individuals 
have been passed through the particular ageing module, alignment occurs. This ensures 
that aggregates from the micro model match macro aggregates. Finally if a variable for 
any individual changes then this change is registered in the database . The rest of the 
chapter will describe in more detail the operations of each of the components described 
here.
5.3.Model Features
Data and Model Data Structure
In this section we describe how data is handled in the model. We describe the database 
used, how data is stored within the model and how it is transferred between database 
and model. Turning first to data storage, we adopt a relational database (Microsoft 
Access 97) due to organisation and memory handling advantages.
Figure 2 describes the data-structure used by this modelling framework. Structurally the
c o
data is stored in a hierarchy of object types such as person, household, firm etc. Each 
of these object types themselves consists of a number of objects such as the actual 
incidence of a person or household. Events such as births, tenure status or even 
identification number then occur to objects.
We exploit the hierarchical nature of relational databases making data storage event 
driven. Storing model output as consecutive cross-sections would result in severe 
inefficiencies, as each variable would be stored for each output period, so for example 
the gender would be stored for each point in time. Making data storage event driven, 
new data is stored only when a new event occurs and thus the data changes. Gender is 
therefore only stored at birth. One can make significant savings in memory as a result. 
Each individual variable however requires more information than in the case of the
57 Note by the term database, we refer to both the physical relational database, Microsoft Access 97 and 
the virtual database we create in memory.
58 In cross-sectional data structures, persons are considered at a sub-level to households. However because 
persons can be members of a number of different households over time, this relationship breaks down. In
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cross-section data structure. For each event it is necessary to know what event occurred, 
when it occurred, who the event occurred to and the value of the event.59
The initial database depends on the purpose of the simulation. In the literature, models 
have been classified as either cohort or population models. However, as chapter 4 points 
out, this distinction is now largely redundant due to advances in computing power. 
From a computing perspective, a cohort can simply be seen as a an initial sample of 
unrelated individuals aged 0, while the population contains a sample of individuals of 
different ages, some of whom are related. As a result, a decision about this does not 
have to be made about this, as the computing framework has been developed to handle 
both types of analysis. Running the model as a dynamic population model requires that 
the initial cross-section is stored in the required manner, while running the model as a 
dynamic cohort model requires the model to first generate an initial cohort.
There are a number of ways in which data can be stored within the model itself during 
the simulation. If the model were open as in the case of the DEMOGEN or LifePaths 
models in Canada where new spouses are generated synthetically when needed, then all 
of each individual’s transitions could be simulated independently of other individuals. 
Thus each individual could be read from the database, simulate their life course and 
store in the database one at a time. This framework however uses a closed methodology 
where individual behaviour can be dependent on the characteristics and behaviour of 
other members of the sample. Utilising a closed model means that except for new births 
or immigrants, no new individuals are generated. Marriages for example link 
individuals already in the database. This method is more straightforward to interpret as 
it mirrors the actual population. The model is not individual based as many operations 
in the model depend on other individuals such as the marriage market, processes which 
depend on spousal information and alignment routines (see below for a description). A 
side effect of this is that it is necessary to store all individuals in memory during the 
simulation. The virtual database stored in memory during the operation of the program 
mimics the structure of the Relational Database.
Once the data has been read from the database into memory, the model runs through 
each household in turn simulating the life course events desired. Firstly however the
the data-structure persons are considered one set of objects and households another, where the ID’s of the 
member individuals of a household are events that can occur to households.
59 Another means of reduce storage space is to store variables as integers rather than as real numbers. 
Therefore when storing output, variables are first multiplied by 100 and then truncated.
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data is read into household data structures. Typically variables which are components of 
the household data structure are declared in long lists within a dynamic model. They 
may be initialised elsewhere and have other operations carried out in other parts of the 
program. As the model is so large and complicated, it may be difficult to keep track of 
all the places in the model which need to be altered when a new variable is included. 
Therefore, in order to keep the model flexible and yet maintain the robustness, it is 
desirable that the number of alterations necessary is kept to a minimum. As a result 
instead of declaring variables within the model, we declare the list of variables to be 
used separately in a parameter sheet. The model then creates space for the variable, 
initialises the data and carries out all necessary transformations and operations 
automatically and therefore is entirely flexible with regard to the set of variables used 
within the model. Thus if the user wishes to introduce a new instrument with an output 
variable such as health status, then the user simply needs to introduce the variable into 
the parameter sheet and the model will do the necessary steps, without having to recode 
the model. Another advantage of the flexible declaration of variables described is that 
because variables are stored in vectors, new composite variables can be produced easily.
Another important advantage of the hierarchical method of data storage is the ease in 
which duration information can be accessed. As the date and value of each event is 
stored it is possible to determine such information as duration, duration in the last 12 
months, date an event first occurred, date an event ended, and so on. Information of this 
kind is frequently required be tax-benefit systems. Additionally it is easy to access 
previous values of an event such as previous earnings etc.
Modularisation
The use of modularisation is an important technique that helps achieve the objectives of 
flexibility, transparency and robustness that the modelling framework requires. 
Modularisation means that components within the model are designed to be as 
autonomous as possible. Modules are the components where calculations take place, 
each with its own parameters, variable definitions and self contained structure with 
fixed inputs and outputs. The result is a set of independent components that do not 
interact with each other directly, allowing the model to operate as a collection of 
independent building blocks. Because each process module is entirely self contained, 
each can be run independently, left out or new modules included. Constructing a 
program in this way allows for the model to be easily expanded to deal with new 
behavioural equations or functions. Also because it allows the user to focus on
128
individual components one at a time, without interaction with the rest of the program, 
the model becomes more robust.
Parameterisation
In order that modules and other components of the model framework can be changed 
with ease, it is necessary to store model parameters externally. Where possible no 
parameters are hard coded within the model. Figure 3 details the set of parameters used 
by the modelling framework. The sets of parameters, representing the flow  o f control in 
the model, are hierarchical.
At the top level we have the “Process Spine”, that consists of a list of the number and 
order in which processes occur in the simulation. This feature exploits the 
modularisation, where because each process is seen as a separate building block, the 
number, type and order of processes can vary. The process spine contains the list of 
modules to be run in the dynamic model, so that by varying the order of the modules 
and varying the content of the list, one can vary the types of processes that can be run in 
the model.
Each process or module has a corresponding parameter sheet in the parameter file 
“Processes”. These parameter files tell the model the output variables of each process, 
what type of process (described in the next section), whether a process needs to be 
aligned and the actual process parameters themselves such as the transition rates, 
regression equation and policy rules etc.
If a particular process is to be aligned, then the model framework will look for an 
appropriate parameter sheet containing alignment parameters. These are contained in 
the “Alignment” parameter file.
All variables used in the model are declared in the “Dyvardesc” or variable description 
file. This file contains information on whether a variable is
■ to be outputted at the end of a simulation,
■ an income variable,
■ a categorical variables (if so how many categories),
■ is to be updated during the simulation (to account for inflation)
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In order for the model to use a variable, it needs either to be read in from external data 
or generated in some way. The process modules described above describe ways in 
which variables can be generated either through statistical models or models describing 
public policy rules. Sometimes however variables are generated as a simple 
transformation from other existing variables. For example an age variable can be 
generated as the duration since birth. The Transformation parameter file describes a set 
of transformations such as this.
5.4.Process Modules
This section describes the main process types that can be used by the model framework. 
This refers to the collection of operations that are simulated on individuals during a 
lifetime. These include demographic processes such as birth, marriage, having children 
and death, education, labour market processes such as employment and unemployment, 
the simulation of incomes and interactions with the tax-benefit system.
In order to aid flexibility, we classify processes under a number of headings. In this 
way, instead of programming each module separately, we only need to program the 
module type once. In order to run a module, we then only need a module name (which 
is included in the process spine), a module type to determine what program to run and a 
set of parameters which is fixed for every process type. At present there are 4 module 
types:
■ transition matrices, in the form of a log linear model
■ regressions, both with continuous and limited dependent variable
■ marriage market
■ tax-benefit system60
The first component of a parameter file contains details about what conditions need to 
hold for the process to be run. At each point in time, each individual is passed through 
the module. If the conditions hold, then the module calculations are carried out and the 
output passed to the alignment component of the module. The output for each individual 
is stored until all individuals have passed through the module. The alignment 
component then ensures that the aggregates correspond with external control totals.
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Transition Matrices
One of the most important processes in a dynamic model is the transition between 
different discrete states. Transition Matrices are often used to perform these operations. 
They specify the probability for an individual of particular circumstances to move from 
state A to state B. In this framework, transition matrices can be stored as log-linear 
models (See Dobson, 1990). In this way transition rates are decomposed into average 
and relative transition rates. In this way extra-relative transition rates can be added with 
ease. For example, if a mortality rate on average fell by 0.1% every 10 years, then a 
relative probability time dependent parameter Of 0.999 could be added. Similarly it also 
allows the model builder to combine information from different sources. So for example 
we combine actual age-gender specific mortality rates for 1991 taken from life-tables 
and use relative mortality rates taken from (Nolan, 1990) that incorporate socio­
economic relative mortality rates.
Regressions
The second type of transition process used are those based upon standard regression 
models. At present, this type of module allows four types of dependent variable
■ standard continuous dependent variable
■ log dependent variable, allowing for use of the log normal distribution.
■ logit discrete choice dependent variable
■ probit discrete choice dependent variable
Any variable in the model can be used as a dependent variable and any variable can be 
used as an explanatory variable. The error term can also vary. The default error term 
takes a normal distribution with independent disturbances. The model also allows for 
the error term to be decomposed into individual specific (un) random effects and general 
error components (vnt) (See Pudney 1992). This allows some degree of heterogeneity to 
be assigned specifically to individuals. So for example in determining earnings, the 
individual specific error may represent some difference in innate ability, while the 
general error term represents random variation over time. Breaking up the variation in 
this manner will tend to reduce within lifetime variation and prevent to some degree the 
existence of very unusual life paths.
60 The tax-benefit system is in fact a collection of modules.
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In this model, transitions occur at discrete time intervals because of the weakness of the 
data and because of the desire to be able to align the data.61 As Galler points out some 
statistical difficulties relating to the use of discrete time models, it is desirable to use 
short term discrete time periods such as a month. However running monthly transitions 
requires significant computing power. Therefore annual transitions are used. However, 
the framework is sufficiently flexible to simulate monthly transitions if the computing 
power is available.
Marriage Market
If an individual is selected to marry then, a process is needed to determine which spouse 
they will take. The process used here is to take the characteristics of the individual 
chosen to marry and the characteristics of each possible spouse and determine the 
likelihood of a match. Similar to the method used in other models such as the CORSIM 
model, this is done using a logit model that estimates the probability of marriage 
between pairs of individuals. The parameter file therefore is identical to that used in the 
regression process type. The module itself forms a matrix of the characteristics of the n 
men and n women selected to marry. Estimates a probability for each pair and assigns a 
match to the couples with the highest probability of marrying. Chapter 6 describes this 
process in more detail.
Policy Processes
The fourth process type is the core analytical component, the simulation of the tax- 
benefit system. The Irish tax-benefit system that is simulated is described in more detail 
in chapter 2. Here we describe how it is implemented in the program. Again, to re­
emphasise the desire to reuse code wherever possible and to avoid duplication, the 
dynamic framework is flexible enough to link with other specialist programs such as 
tax-benefit models. Tax-benefit routines from the model EUROMOD can be seamlessly 
accessed by this model and thus can be used as module components of the dynamic 
model. Immervoll and ODonoghue, (2001) describe the EUROMOD tax-benefit 
framework in detail. A high degree of modularisation is used, which allows the entire 
tax-benefit system to be built up from building blocks of calculation modules.
Tax-benefit systems are defined as being composed of policy types, composed of 
policies, which are in turn composed of modules. For example, we define income taxes,
61 Chapter 4 describes some of the advantages and disadvantages of continuous time versus discrete time.
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social benefits and social insurance contributions (SIC) as separate policy types. Policy 
types are programmed in the same manner and contain the same set of modules as each 
other. So for example, in our example here Unemployment Assistance (UNA), 
Unemployment Benefits (UNB), Old Age Contributory Pensions (OCP) and Survivor 
Contributory Pensions (SCP) all use the same code; they simply differ by the 
parameters specified. Each policy type has the same set of modules. These are the real 
building blocks of the tax benefit system, where the calculations take place. In our 
example we consider Eligibility, Equivalence Scale and Means Tests as some of the 
core modules within a social benefit policy.
Behavioural Response
A desirable feature often ignored in dynamic microsimulation models is the ability to 
include feedback loops so that behaviour can respond to changes in public policy. This 
is a criticism made by PRIM (1997), is that dynamic models are insufficiently flexible 
to incorporate the demands of behavioural response. While we do not attempt to model 
in detail, changes to behaviour as a result of policy change in this model, the software 
framework has been designed to be able to incorporate feedback loops. The degree of 
modularisation that exists in the framework allows any number or order of modules to 
be run and for modules to be able to be run a number of times. Thus for example in 
order to have labour supply depend on tax-benefit policy, the tax-benefit system will 
need to be run once as an input into the labour supply module and again once labour 
supply has been determined, taxes and benefits need to be calculated again on the 
resulting behavioural decision. Currently the model uses the tax-benefit system as an 
input into decisions to work, decisions to seek part-time employment versus full-time 
employment and to become self-employed. The tax-benefit system therefore needs to be 
run 5 times to examine the impact of the system on the choice faced by an individual. 
When there are more that 1 adult in the household, because behaviour of spouses can 
depend on each other, the tax-benefit system needs to be simulated 17 times (4 
decisions for each, plus one run on the basis of resulting behaviour). As a result 
incorporating behavioural response can be computationally expensive. Utilising the 
behavioural component doubles the length of a simulation. As a result other behaviour 
such as retirement decisions, consumption and benefit take-up have been ignored for the 
time being. However the important thing is that the framework is sufficiently flexible 
should the user require and the computing power becomes available.
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5.5. Transformations
Often variables depend indirectly on other transition processes and thus are not directly 
simulated, but change in response to changes in other variables. Examples include age 
that depends on the date of birth, widowhood, which depends on the death of a spouse 
and so on. Likewise if an individual moves from year 6 in education to year 7, years of 
education increase by 1. This component has also been parameterised. In this model 
when an indirect variable like this is required, a calculation is carried out to derive the 
variable from previously simulated variables. This procedure too has been 
parameterised. The parameterisation first declares the variable to be transformed, 
Var[k]. A transformation occurs if a condition is true. The function can compare any 
two variables of any two individuals in a household, using the operators >, <, >, < or =. 
Two types of transformation are allowed. Type 1 sets Var[k] equal to a value A. For 
example if a spouse dies then the marital status of the other spouse becomes widowed. 
In type 2 Var[k] is set equal to a value a particular variable of a specified person in the 
household.
5.6.Alignment
The section describes the alignment function contained in the model framework. The 
objective of alignment is to ensure that output aggregates match external control totals. 
The reason this is done is that micro behaviour (both social and economic) is extremely 
complex and micro-theory being limited, cannot predict accurately all the variability of 
the system (in this case the life paths of individuals). In addition, a household model 
only makes forecast about a small part of the economy and largely ignores interactions 
with the rest of the world economy. Also, data taken from relatively short periods of 
time may not fully reflect the dynamics within the household sector over time. As a 
result dynamic micro-models may not be able forecast aggregate characteristics of the 
population well. Alignment is therefore used to achieve this.
In the discrete choice models, the output for each individual is a probability. In order to 
use these models for predictive purposes, a decision rule is necessary. In other words, 
what forecasted probability or higher will produce an event. In order to predict a state 
with a logit (or probit model), one draws a random number uniformly distributed 
number ut . When w, < logit'1 ( a +pX {) (or ui < probit'1 { a + ) ,  then a state is 
predicted to occur.
134
Another use of alignment is in correcting for predictive failures of econometric models. 
For example when using discrete choice models such as logit or probit models, often,
the predictive power is poor. Duncan and Weeks, (2000) highlight that “even in
functionally well-specified models, the predictive performance is poor, particularly
62where some states are relatively densely or sparsely represented in the data”. Thus 
the further the probability of an event occurring is from 0.5, the less effective these 
decision rules are at producing the desired result. As a result models may under or over 
predict the number of events. So for example if 5% of individuals of individuals should 
have the event, then the logit model may not necessarily produce 5% of events. 
Alignment will however constrain the event to occur to 5% of individuals. This is 
effectively a calibration mechanism and will produce the correct proportion of events. 
Care must be however taken in its use as it may disguise errors in the model 
specification.
The types of control totals that would be used to align to include:
• The aggregate proportion/number in a state.
• The aggregate proportion/number moving between states.
• The average event value.
• The distribution of values.
• The average growth rate in the value of an event.
A simple analogy about the relationship between alignment and the process modules is 
that the process modules such as logit models produce a ranking variable, while the 
alignment mechanism selects the number of transitions. Table 1 highlights an example 
of age-gender-occupation specific mortality rates. In our econometric model we may 
have an equation of the probability of dying as described below, that depends on age, 
gender and whether an individual is disabled or not. Assuming that disabled people have 
a higher mortality rate, then given the same age and gender and distribution, as 
expressed by the stochastic component et , the mortality distribution for disabled people 
will be higher.
62 The reason for this according to Greene (1997) is that “the maximum likelihood estimator is not chosen 
to maximise a fitting criterion based on prediction of y, as it is in the classical regression (which 
maximises R2). It is chosen to maximise the joint density of the observed dependent variable.
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lo g is tic {p i) = a  + P , x D isa b led i + f$2 x A get + (3)
/?3 x Gender{ + /?4 x D isa b led . x y4gef. +
The deterministic component of the model will result in those with a higher risk, having 
a better chance of the event occurring, while the stochastic part will ensure that there is 
some variability (so that not only those with high risk are selected). This model 
therefore produces the risk of dying.
In order to select the number of people that die, we use the alignment probabilities. 
Firstly individuals are grouped into the appropriate age and gender groups. As everyone 
in the relevant group will have the same age, gender and occupation, they only differ by 
the deterministic component for disabled people /?, x D isab led , +/?4 x D isa b led , x A gei and
the stochastic component e . . The object then is to select to die, the people in the group 
with the highest probabilities of dying. As /?, is positive, proportionally more disabled 
will die than non-disabled. As a result we see that the output of the model equation is 
used to rank the individuals to whom the event occurs, but to leave the decision to the 
alignment process.
Macro Alignment.
There are a number of levels at which alignment can occur. At the lowest level, 
alignment refers to the decision rule used in a logit/probit or some other discrete choice 
model. At the next level, described above in our mortality example, which is called the 
meso-level, concerns the idea that the aggregates for particular groups (in this case 
gender, age and occupation) should match the external totals. Meso-level alignment and 
the use of alignment as a decision rule can however be combined into one stage.
Sometimes the desired targets are narrower than the alignment targets we use. An 
example is in our mortality alignment example. Here we align mortality by age, gender 
and occupation. We include occupation in the alignment because the occupational 
structure is very important for other characteristics in the model. However if say one of 
the core targets in the model is to achieve the mortality distribution supplied by external 
sources such as official population projections, which may only be by age and gender, 
then our meso-alignment may produce different aggregates. This will happen if our 
underlying occupation distribution is different to the one implicit in the official 
forecasts. It may therefore be desirable to adjust the results again to achieve these 
targets. This process is known as macro alignment. In the application of the framework
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used in this thesis, an example of meso alignment is the simulation of transitions 
between employment states. Macro alignment is then used to constrain total 
employment rates.
Behavioural Change,
Handling behavioural interactions in the model resulting from alternative scenarios is 
therefore another issue one needs to consider when deciding on an alignment strategy.
One potential solution is to examine the average (pre-alignment) event value such as the 
average transition rate or average earnings in the baseline scenario with the average in 
the alternative scenario. One potential method is increase alignment values by 
proportional difference. This is a method utilised in some dynamic models.
This however assumes that all processes are unconstrained. This may be the case for 
example with the mortality rate. One may expect that an exogenous increase in human 
capital will reduce total mortality rates and thus one can shift down in the alignment 
totals is appropriate.
As described in chapter 4, some processes face market or other institutional constraints, 
issues that are only partially simulated in the model. An example is in the labour market 
such as the case where there is a behavioural change in labour participation in response 
to a tax change. If labour supply increases, then wages would fall and employment 
increase. This is similar to shifting the alignment probabilities. However one would 
have to shift earnings as well. However due to rigidities in the labour market, this may 
not necessarily happen. Labour Demand may be fixed, in which ca^e we may just 
simply see that as more women supply labour, they simply replace people in the labour 
market who are less “employable”. This is similar to not shifting alignment at all. In 
cases where there are market interactions such as this, it may be useful to incorporate a 
model of the market that would inform the response of alignment totals to economic and 
demographic totals.
Implementation
So far in this framework alignment has only been implemented for the rates of 
transitions for logit models. In this section we describe a practical method for ranking 
individuals for alignment. We take as our reference point a logistic model:
Pi = lOgit1 ((a  + flXj + £; ) (4)
Utilising the model logistic(p*i) = a  + will result in those with the highest risk 
always being selected for the event. So for example in our example given above, the
At?
disabled, all other things being equal would be selected to have In reality those 
with the highest risk will on average be selected more than those with lower risk, rather 
than simply selected those with the highest risk. As a result some variability needs to be 
introduced.
Models based on the CORSIM framework such as the DYNACAN model (See 
Chenard, 2000) utilise a method of incorporating variability that shall be discussed here. 
Firstly, predicted probability is produced using our econometric model: 
p*i = logit'1 ( a + pX. f) . Next, a random number m,, is drawn taken from a uniform 
distribution, is subtracted from the predicted probability, p*., to produce a ranking 
variable, rt; = p  *• - u . . This value is then used to rank individuals so that the top x% of 
values are selected. Mathematically, we can define this ranking variable as follows:
r, = lo g * ’ ( a + pX , ) -  u, = - eM a  + ^ —  u (5)
1 + exp (a+ pX j)
A concern about this method is that the range of possible ranking values is not the same 
for each point. In other words, because the random number m( e  [0,1] is subtracted from
the deterministically predicted, p*., then the ranking value takes the range r. e  [-1,1]. 
However the ranking value for each individual will only take a possible range 
rt e  [Mf-l,Mf ] . So for example if p*. is small say = 0.1, the range of possible ranking
values is [-0.9, 0.1]. At the other extreme if p*. is large say = 0.9, then the range of
possible ranking values is [-0.1, 0.9]. Thus because there is only a small over lap for 
these extreme points, even if a very low random variable is selected, then an individual 
with a small p  *. will have a very low chance of being selected.
Ideally the range of possible ranking values should be the same, so that for each 
individual, r{ e[a ,b], with individuals with a low p* t being clustered towards the
bottom and those with a high p  *. being clustered towards the top.
We now consider an alternative method. This method takes a predicted logistic variable: 
logit ( p ^  -CC+pXr  Next, a random number is drawn taken from the logistic
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distribution £.. This is added to the prediction of the logit{pi ) = a  + p X i to produce 
logit(pi) + ej . The resulting inverse logit, p, = logit'1 ( a + +£,) is then used to rank
individuals and similarly the top x% of households are selected. The ranking variable 
can therefore be described as follows:
r,=to^(g+/g ,+g<)= + (6)
1+exp { a + pX t + £t)
Utilising the uniform random number, wf, to produce the logistic random number,
£; = -logit(ui) = -ln(M. /(I -  Uj)) or ut = exp^. g^  . (7)
l + exp(-£(.)
As a result,
i • -;/ x exp(a + /R ,)  exp(-£f)/ogzr 7(a  + / R , ) - n ,  = -----—----- -----------------—— ^  *
1 + exp (a+ pK .)  l+ ex p (-e f)
eXp(Or+ZR; +£;) , •-!/ / h ,  x ^ ^ —  — = logit n a+ Z R f+ e,.)
l+exp(ar+ /» ,+ £ ,)
The rank produced by the two methods is not the same. The second method will be 
more likely to select cases at extreme points than the first, while first method will select 
more points with central values of p  * .
5.7. Conclusions
To conclude we discuss some of the Methodological innovations of this Computing
Framework.
■ Cohort and Cross-section in one Framework. Although not discussed in detail in the 
chapter, the model allows both cohort and cross-section type dynamic models to be 
used in the same framework.
■ Parameterisation: parameterisation has been used extensively throughout the model. 
This aids flexibility as code does not need to be reprogrammed when parameters 
change. This in turn improves the durability of the model as it allows new 
parameters to be included when better information becomes available.
■ Defining the data structure outside the model improves the transparency and the 
robustness of the model. When adding new variables to the model, alterations need
only to be made in one place, in a parameter file. It therefore reduces the possibility 
of error and makes the model easier to change.
■ Modularisation: All modules work independently of others which means that new 
modules can be added without affecting the integrity of the model. It therefore adds 
to the robustness of the model. Also, by allowing the user to focus on small sections 
of code at time, improves the transparency of the model.
■ Generalisation of main features of the dynamic model: The code which runs 
transitions, alignment and transformations can all be reused under different names 
and different parameter files.
These building blocks can be classified into four types. Taking these as templates, one 
can declare a new module in the parameterisation of an existing type and simply change 
the parameters in order to produce a new process module. Also because the number 
order and type of module is parameterised, the model can handle any number of 
modules of each type and in any order without any need for extra programming. This is 
perhaps the most important feature of the model as it allows the model to be used for a 
wide variety of purposes. It thus allows for ease of expansion as improved data and 
micro-behaviour become available. Allow this not an attempt at writing a 
microsimulation programming language, it should allow for a variety of different 
applications to be constructed without the need for extensive recoding. In addition it 
may be possible to use this framework as a template for other dynamic models because 
the model itself is entirely independent of data and behavioural equations to be used.
■ Finally in order to avoid robustness problems due to modules being incorrectly 
specified, the model contains a debug device which ensures that all inputs required 
by a module are actually available (i.e. have either been generated in the model or 
read from the database) before each module can be run.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 5.1. Description of a Dynamic Module
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Figure 5.2. Model Data Structure
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Figure 5.3. Parameter Sheet Hierarchy
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Figure 5.4. Distributions of Probit Participation Equation Probability for High and 
Low Education
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Figure 5.5. Aligning Averages (Correct Distribution)
Figure 5.6. Aligning Distributions (Correct Means)
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Table 5.1. Mortality Rates for Males and Females by Age and Occupation
Age Male Female
Occupation = 1
20 .001 .001
21 .001 .001
65 .09 .075
66 .095 .078
Occupation = 2
20 .0015 .0014
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Chapter 6. Modelling Demographic and Education Behaviour
6.1.Introduction
This chapter describes some of the characteristics of micro-level behavioural processes 
of individuals in Ireland. In this chapter, processes are broken up into demographic and 
education behaviour. Chapter 7 describes how labour market behaviour and capital 
income is modelled. The processes are dynamic in the sense that the processes are 
endogenous within the model and also can vary over time. They form the components 
of an ageing model within a new dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland. In 
addition to behavioural equations, alignment processes are described, which allow 
transitions within the dynamic model to match macro-level aggregates.
Estimation of dynamic processes in Ireland is quite strongly constrained by data 
limitations. Few micro-data sets are available for Ireland before the 1970’s and since 
then household surveys have typically been collected in seven-year intervals. Ireland 
has been a country that has experienced massive economic and social transformations 
over the last three decades of the twentieth century. During this period the country has 
moved from a poor agricultural country, with traditional family structures to the celtic 
tiger with the highest growth rates in Europe, an economy where although agriculture is 
still important has been superseded by high technology and financial service industries. 
Family structures have changed enormously with falling birth rates, early marriage rates 
and the legalisation of divorce. From being a country with high emigration rates, it has 
become a country of net immigration. Education attainment rates have climbed from 
being relatively low by European standards, to a situation where the education 
participation rates are above average. Because of the data gaps it is quite difficult to 
disentangle these processes and to design models which explain these trends. Perhaps 
there is no single underlying model for particular processes and maybe what we have 
witnessed is a changed paradigm due to the opening up of the economy to outside 
influences. This is not the place to examine such trends. Instead we shall focus in this 
chapter on the micro-behaviour of individuals in Ireland in the mid-1990’s, independent 
of wider trends.
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Summary
As the purpose of this chapter and the next is to describe the behavioural processes 
included in a new dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland, we are in particular 
interested in dynamic relationships between these processes. Figure 1 outlines the broad 
relationship between these processes. Starting at birth individuals have a number of 
characteristics which strongly influence future life events, including gender, parental 
education level and family occupation group or social class. As we shall show below, 
parental education level, together with one’s own education level (also influenced by 
background variables such as parental occupational group) are important determinants 
of ones career occupational group. As this variable is an important driving force for 
many lifetime outcomes such as mortality, marriage, earnings and , parental education 
level and occupational group though their influence on their children’s education level 
are thus important influences on intergenerational mobility. These demographic 
processes then have strong influences on the labour market processes that in turn 
influence the level of income from savings.
This chapter attempts to describe in more detail the actual processes both from a cross- 
sectional and inter-temporal point of view. Section 2 describes the main data source 
used, section 3 the principle demographic process and section 4 educational attainment.
6.2.Data
The primary source of data used in the model is 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, 
collected by the Economic and Social Research Institute as the Irish leg of the European 
Community household panel survey. In some cases especially for education and 
demographic processes, official statistics are used to specify the processes.
The Living in Ireland Survey is a cross-section survey of the Irish households and is 
described in Callan et al. (1996). It collects information on incomes, labour market 
status and demographic information, with 4048 responding households and a response 
rate of 57.1%. Although the income collected in the ECHP is primarily annual income 
from 1993, additional data was collected in the LD, so that current income from 1994 
can be used. Therefore the data has current information for 1994 for both incomes and 
labour market characteristics as well as recall data for 1993. In addition to previous
63 In this model we do not simulate wealth accumulation and thus do not take into consideration issues 
such as bequests or portfolio decisions.
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states, the data collects information on the duration in the current labour market state. It 
also collects life time duration information for employment, unemployment, illness, 
education, retirement and not participating. The sample has been reweighted using the 
Census of Agriculture (to account for an under-representation of small farmers) and the 
Labour Force Survey. The sampling frame for both surveys is the electoral register.
Summary Statistics for men and women are described in table 1, for sample members 
aged over 16. Averaging over all people, men have higher incomes than women. 
Although women have slightly higher education levels, men are twice as likely to be in 
work. This is particularly noticeable for self-employment (especially agricultural self- 
employment), where men are over 6 times more likely to be self-employed. 
Employment status is recorded for each month of 1993 and 1994. In the employment 
status variables used in this chapter, we take the employment status during the month of 
interview and for the month 12 months previously. We notice that the proportion of the 
adult population in work rose over the period 1993-1994, with the proportion of males 
in work increasing from 0.55 to 0.59 and women from 0.27 to 0.31. Proportionally this 
is a larger increase for women. This highlights a particular drawback of the short panel 
surveys; period effects may influence the data. So as we see here there are higher exit 
probabilities from out-of work than entry probabilities as the labour market increased in 
size. The period 1993-1994 was at the start of the Irish economic boom. However the 
numbers in employment have risen quite a lot more in subsequent years. Women 
despite having a lower probability of being in work are more likely to work part-time, 
while men are more likely to be in management positions or work in the public sector. 
Women are more likely to have white collar jobs, and men blue collar jobs. Men are 
also more likely to be unemployed, although this is likely to be as a result of the 
structure of the benefits system, where only one spouse claims unemployment 
assistance. As a result of the factors discussed so far, using the lifetime duration 
information, men are more likely to have worked for more years and have been 
unemployed for longer. Women despite having longer life spans are likely to have 
shorter periods spent in retirement. This is likely to be compensated by the variable 
years in home duties.
6.3.Demographic Behaviour
In this section, the main demographic transitions used in the model will be detailed. The 
demographic decisions modelled consist of mortality, fertility, marital status(marriage,
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remarriage, cohabitation and separation) and disability. Although not modelled there are 
short descriptions of migration and leaving home decisions.
Mortality
In this section we consider mortality. As Figure 2 demonstrates, life expectancy has 
risen gradually since the independence of the country in the 1920’s. Gains for women 
have surpassed that for men. The biggest improvements occurred just after the Second 
World War due to an increased interest in public health provision, immunisation and 
maternity services. The biggest health service related impact was due to post-natal care 
as the infant mortality rates dropped significantly during this period from 6.5% of births 
in 1946 to 4.6% in 1951, falling to 0.7% by the 1980’s. In recent limes most of the 
improvement in life-expectancy has been a result of improved living conditions and 
medical care for the elderly. Looking internationally, there seems to have been a 
converging trend in mortality rates over time. Table 2 which outlines life expectancies 
at birth in different countries shows that from very different starting positions, life 
expectancy has converged to a very similar level across countries. Nevertheless life- 
expectancies in Ireland in 1992 were still low by international standards, especially in 
the case of women.
As life-expectancy Jen  over time, where have the improvements occurred? One 
possibility is that there is a phenomenon known as orthogonalisation, which means that 
except for the oldest age groups, one sees a fall in the age specific mortality rate and 
with the maximum lifetime duration not moving much. The other possibility is that the 
shape of mortality rates remains constant with an increasing maximum lifetime 
duration. Figure 3 demonstrates that in Ireland, the former phenomenon has been the 
driving force in the falling average mortality rate. We notice that between 1921 and 
1992, especially for women, mortality rates fell for younger age groups, with the very 
oldest age groups having an increased mortality rate. Thus age at death has become less 
variable and more concentrated amongst older ages.
Besides, age and sex, research has shown that mortality is related to a number of 
different socio-economic factors such as income, occupation and education level etc.64 
Kitagawa and Hauser (1973) looked at the relationship between mortality and education 
in the USA in 1960 and found that those with lower years of schooling had higher 
mortality rates. This relationship was found to be more pronounced amongst women
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than amongst men. In the UK Townsend and Davidson (1982), found that mortality 
rates for both men and women and for different age groups were higher for lower socio­
economic groups. They found that this trend had worsened over time. Also men tended 
to have greater differential mortality than women.
In Ireland, Nolan (1989) has carried out some research on the socio-economic impact on 
mortality using data collected in the death certificate. Age specific mortality rates 
broken down by socio-economic group have been outlined in table 3. Nolan found that 
low skilled workers had higher mortality rates and that professionals, managers, farmers 
and salaried employees had lower mortality rates. A number of factors which may 
contribute towards this differential mortality include occupational hazards, poverty 
(both directly and indirectly), lifestyle and health care. O’Shea (1999) found that within 
a falling mortality rate, for men with observed occupations, mortality differentials 
narrowed between 1981 and 1991. However the mortality rates for those with unknown 
occupation (approx. 7% of population) increased substantially. On the whole however 
between group variation in mortality fell over this period.
One however must be cautious about results of these exercises because measurement of 
occupational related mortality differentials are faced with data problems. In both 
Nolan’s and O’Shea’s papers children were ignored because of the low numbers of 
cases and because of the high numbers of parental occupations classified as unknown65. 
Retired people are also not included as often the deceased's last job is classified rather 
their principle occupation during their lifetime. Retired people may therefore be 
categorised in the wrong group or not at all. Women were also left out because in many 
cases their husband’s occupation is a better indicator of social class of a family. Also 
death certificate data is however not totally reliable as often the person who fills out the 
form may not know precisely what occupation the deceased had.
In our model of mortality, we use the 1990-1992 life-tables as the basis for our age 
differential mortality. Differential mortality is based on socio-economic group for those 
aged sixteen or over. For those aged over 65, we assume that the differential mortality 
rate of the 60-65 age group is maintained. For women, although the UK results quoted 
above indicate a slightly lower variability in mortality rates between occupational
64 See also Goldblatt (1990), Townsend et al. (1988), Illsley (1986) and Wilkinson (1986)
65 The Dept, of Health (1984) however have looked at mortality amongst children and socio-economic 
group.
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groups, in the absence of data, we assume the same relative differential as men in 
Ireland. This age-occupational group differentiation can be applied to trends and 
forecasts in average mortality rates to produce differential mortality rates for different 
years.
Fertility
Traditionally Ireland has been characterised by quite a high fertility rate by European 
standards. In 1960, the total fertility rate (TFR), a measure of the average number of 
children per women in Ireland was about 4 compared with a European Average of less 
than 3. In the last number of decades, like in most other countries, the birth rate has 
fallen. Ireland has been no exception, as witnessed by Figure 4, the crude birth rate over 
the century. This decline was clearly evident from 1980-1995. Birth rates are now close 
to European averages, thus this 15 year period witnessed a huge transformation in 
fertility behaviour. The trend in the end of the nineties however was reversed as the 
number of women of child-bearing age increased and as families who had delayed 
having children during the earlier recession started to have children and thus the birth 
rate increased.
In designing a model of fertility, there are a number of characteristics we would like to 
include. Firstly despite rising number of births outside marriage, fertility is still highly 
related to marital status. Age is also an important determinant. Table 4, describes the 
age specific fertility rates for married and unmarried women. For married women the 
peak fertility occurs in the 25-29 age group and for unmarried women in the 20-24 age 
group. Other demographic factors that influence fertility include the number of previous 
children, duration since last birth and the duration of marriage. Unfortunately detailed 
information is not available for Ireland to incorporate all these characteristics. Although 
the number of births is reported by age and duration of marriage, the corresponding 
population totals of women with these characteristics are not available. However by 
carrying out an iterative simulation procedure, it was possible to find relative fertility 
rates which would produce the distribution of births by parity using the age specific 
fertility rates reported in table 4. In order to approximately hit the control targets it 
would be necessary for married women without children to have 0.55 of the average age 
specific fertility rate and other married women to have twice the rate. Pregnancies are 
more likely to result in male children, with just over half of all children being bom as 
boys.
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Becker (1960) argued that the fertility decision should be viewed as an economic one, 
where the costs of having a child include foregone earnings due to caring for the child. 
Di Tommaso et al. (2000) in summarising the literature highlight that fertility and 
labour participation are lifetime utility maximising processes and as a result should be 
estimated jointly. Empirically, census reports in the USA have shown that families with 
higher incomes have less children. Also, higher social groups and those with higher 
education levels have been found to have less children. Klevmarken and Olovsson 
(1996) found that in Sweden the wage rate had a negative effect on fertility and that 
women who have long periods in schooling typically postpone having children, but then 
have a second child shortly later. Di Tommaso et al. found in an endogenous model of 
labour supply and fertility, that the participation and fertility decisions were negatively 
correlated, so that those with children were less likely to work. Hannan and O’Riain 
(1993) found that poorly educated women with poorly educated parents had high 
chances of having children at a young age.
In Ireland, there exist some limited life event history data in the Living in Ireland 
Survey, however the sample size is small to look at fertility issues in detail. Also another 
problem related to using cross-sectional survey information is disentangling the period 
effects. Due to the rapid fall in fertility in recent times, most births in the survey will 
have occurred during periods of higher fertility. For this reason I have chosen to rely 
chiefly on recent administrative statistics, using the survey only for supplementary 
information on the variation of fertility by education level. Table 5 describes the relative 
probability of having children by education level. We notice that women with lower 
education levels are less likely to have children. For married women, this feature is less 
strong. These results confirm the findings of Hannan and O’Riain. Instead however, it is 
the number of children rather than actually having children which is important. Here we 
see that more educated married women are in general less likely to have more than two 
children than less educated women.
Family Formation and Dissolution
There are a number of processes under the heading of family formation and dissolution. 
These include marriage, divorce and separation, cohabitation and dehabitation, 
remarriage and widowhood.
Marriage rates in Ireland have tended to be low. Table 6 describes this trend. Starting 
from a very low base, marriage gradually rose from a low of 4.8 marriages per 1000 in
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the 1920’s to a high of 7.5 in 1973. Since then marriage rates have fallen. Part of the 
reason for this low marriage rate has been on average very late marriage ages. For 
example, the average age for males at marriage in the 1920’s was 35 and 29 for women. 
As in other European countries, although at a later state, this rate has fallen over the 
decades, before rising again during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Nevertheless the average rate 
of marriage is higher than average, still remaining about 2 years higher than the average 
in England (Coleman, 1992).
Like the other demographic phenomena, modelling marriage in Ireland is beset by data 
problems. Published information exist for age and gender specific marital status as 
outlined in table 7. Marriage rates for both men and women are bell-shaped with 
concentrations around the modal age group 25-30. For women however, higher 
marriage rates tend to be skewed towards lower age groups as a result of the lower 
average age. Economic and social factors also play a role in marriage rates. Economic 
pressures were some of the main reasons for the previously mentioned low marital rates 
in Ireland. Kennedy (1989) argued that the trend in Irish marriage rates have tended to 
follow economic circumstances, that marriage rates increased during the 1960’s and 
1970’s during the economic expansion of the period and fell back again during the 
recession of the 1980’s. Meenan (1970) noted that the possession of land in rural areas 
strongly influenced the chances of marriage. Lack of land resulted in a situation 
whereby people either did not marry or migrated. Walsh (1970) in a study of inter­
county marriage rates in Ireland found that marriage rates were positively related to the 
income per head of the county and to labour force participation rates of single women in 
that county. Hannan and O’Riain (1993) found that those with lower occupational 
position and lower education levels were more likely to marry. Coming from larger 
families also was found to influence early marriage.
Marital status by occupational group are published in Ireland. Table 8 describes the 
situation in 1991. Those in lower socio-economic groups and from farming background 
were more likely to marry early, with non-manual workers and professionals in general 
more likely marry later. The 1994 Living in Ireland Survey contains information in 
duration of marriage and some duration variables. However, it is difficult to match 
labour market data to this marital information. As cross-section data, period effects also 
influence it. To get round these problems, we look at a sample of those who married in 
the 4 years before the survey was undertaken. Comparing the population Who got
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married with population available for marriage, it was found that those in work were 
more likely to get married (See Table 9).
The second component of a marriage model is the matching spouses. In other words, 
given the population of those available for marriage, what personal characteristics result 
in men and women selecting each other for marriage? These issues have been the 
subject of research in many different disciplines from psychology to sociology to 
genetics to economics. Becker (1973 and 1974) argues that people marry to increase 
their utility and that there is a competitive process between members of the same sex to 
find a partner; the marriage market. In designing an empirical model of the marriage 
market, one is again limited by the availability of data. Very many of the personal 
characteristics which relate to the utility of actually marrying are not available in 
nationally representative datasets.
Official statistics produce information about mating characteristics only on the basis of 
age and occupational group. In our model we use information contained in the Living in 
Ireland Survey to estimate a model of this marriage market. Using the survey, we can 
observe a number of characteristics of individuals who marry each other. As mentioned 
above, because the survey is a cross-sectional survey, we have the problem of period 
effects. Age effects are captured by cross-section data. Cohort effects are less important 
because of the narrow range of ages over which marriage takes place. If the data-set was 
large enough, then we could look at those who married in the data year. This would give 
us access to the wide variety of information contained in the survey. Unfortunately, the 
sample size is too small for this purpose. Instead we take individuals who married in the 
period 1990-1994. This group is likely to avoid problems associated with period effects 
and supply a sufficient sample size for our purposes. Unfortunately looking at this 
group reduces the characteristics known when they married and thus cuts down on the 
level of complexity which can be included in the model.
The main characteristics of this model are that we take the group of people married in 
1990-1994 as our population of people who wish to marry. All other people, married 
and unmarried are assumed to be not participating in the marriage market. Examining 
characteristics of actual partners versus their choice of other partners from the marriage 
market, we can observe preferences of people in their selection of mates. From a 
practical point of view, the first step to select from the sample the set of individuals who 
married during the period in question (448 people, 224 couples). Our objective is to
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examine why individuals selected their spouse rather than the other potential 223 
partners. We therefore have 224 x 224 matrix of information, where the diagonal is an 
example of a successful match and the off diagonal values unsuccessful matches. A 
logit model is a suitable device for modelling a bivariate process like this. A number of 
variables are available concerning the characteristics of particular spouses. These 
include employment status at marriage, education status at marriage and parental 
background variables. Another observable characteristic is their earning ability. 
Although this is only available for 1994, it can be used as a proxy for ability. Table 10 
details the estimated coefficients of our marriage market. The first component looks at 
difference in age at marriage and the square of this variable. The combination of the two 
variables produces a preference curve as outlined in table 7, where the maximum 
preference occurs when the male is about 2 years older than the female. The difference 
in the number of years of education achieved is a proxy for many characteristics, 
including personal affinity and similarity of background. The coefficient is significantly 
negative indicating that people prefer partners with similar characteristics. Education 
difference and differences in the educational attainment of parents were not found to be 
significant determinants. Inclusion of the male’s education level was found to be 
positively significant. Thus the higher education level of the male, the greater the 
preference for marriage. The next category of variables relates to the labour market 
position of the partners. In this case, an out of work person is more likely to have an out 
of work person as a spouse. This may not necessarily be their preference, but may be 
more to do with competitive component of the marriage market. Meanwhile, in-work 
persons are more likely to select an in work person as a spouse. Also given the age 
preference, females have higher preferences for males with higher employment 
histories. Lastly, we look at the squared difference in current market incomes, 0-4 years 
after marriage. The coefficient is significantly negative indicating that the greater the 
difference in income, the less likely are two people to marry. Utilising Becker’s theory 
although individuals may prefer to marry to increase their utility and thus marry people 
with higher incomes, this is counterbalanced by the competitive nature of the market 
and thus people will end up marrying individuals with similar income capabilities.
The other family formation and dissolution phenomena are widowhood, remarriage, 
separation and cohabitation. Before 1997, there was no divorce in Ireland. The first, 
widowhood is an indirect component of the dynamic model, depending on the mortality 
rate of spouses. The remaining categories however have very limited information
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available. The only data available is on the stock of people with these marital statuses 
rather than flows necessary for our dynamic model. We therefore impute a series of 
plausible flows which could produce the stock information contained in the data. As we 
have discovered for other demographic characteristics, the use of cross-section 
information results in period effects. Marriage dissolution has been very uncommon for 
older generations and thus the numbers in the data who are separated is very low. 
Likewise remarriage rates were low. We therefore make educated guesses for the older 
age groups. In the case of cohabitation rates, very little study has taken place in Ireland. 
In order to construct the flows, we assume that cohabitation lasts 5 years and that half of 
the cohabitees marry. Table 11 describes the results for women. We assume that female 
rates drive the three phenomena. Although the rates of cohabitation increase with age, 
the numbers actually fall because the denominator falls faster.
Migration
Emigration in the past has been one of the defining components of population change in 
Ireland, resulting in large populations of people with Irish antescendents around the 
world, and a resulting fall in the population of the island in 1960 to half what it was 
before the Irish Famine in the 1840’s. However migration is not constant being 
typically related to economic circumstance in Ireland, but also importantly in Britain, 
the principle destination in recent times of Irish migration. The most recent period of 
high emigration was in the late 1980’s during a period of economic recession. However 
despite the poor economic state in the early 199CTs this trend slowed down substantially 
as a result of large numbers returning to Ireland during the UK's economic slowdown. 
Because of the high variability in the migration rate Irish population projections have 
tended to be very poor. As recently as 1996, the Central Statistics Office forecasted net 
emigration net per annum during the period 1996-2006. However these figures were 
very far out. Punch and Finneran (1999) in examining more recent trends found that 
rather than net emigration, there has been significant net immigration for the period 
1995-1998. As a result of this variability, we assume a constant migration rate of zero in 
this model.
Leaving Home and forming a new Household
Leaving home decisions are important as they determine the requirement of additional 
housing and have impacts on the way individuals are treated within the benefit system. 
Simulating leaving home decisions requires panel data recording this transition and the
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specification of a statistical model. In the absence of such data, we have chosen not to 
model this decision. Instead we assume that people leave home on completion of full­
time education. This has implications for modelling Unemployment Assistance for 
individuals who might be living with their parents. UA also depends on the net income 
of the claimants parents if living at home. This is however a relatively minor aspect of 
the tax/benefit system. Other implications of this assumption are however more 
significant; the treatment of state housing expenditures, whether through subsidised 
state housing, rent assistance or help with mortgage through the tax system. However 
again as we do not consider housing costs, this problem can be postponed for now.
Location Mobility
Location is another important issue determining lifestyle choices and income. For 
example, in the 1987 ESRI survey earnings were 45 per cent higher in the Dublin, the 
Capital City and its suburbs than the rest of the country. Unemployment Rates are also 
different as will labour force statuses. Hannan and O’Riain (1993) carried out some 
work on migration patterns between 1982 and 1987 using the School Leavers Cohort 
Study. Migration tended to be higher amongst those with higher education levels and 
amongst those from more remote regions. However the study occurred during a period 
of widespread emigration; Over 20 per cent of respondents, regardless of original area 
emigrated in the 5 years after school. In addition about 15 per cent of respondents in the 
5 years after school migrated within Ireland, mainly to Dublin. However there is little 
other information about internal migration patterns within the country. In the absence of 
panel data outlining movements within regions, we are faced with a number of choices. 
(1) Assume no regional dimension, (2) assume an initial regional pattern with no 
subsequent movement or (3) Attempt to model transitions using very limited data. For 
now choice 1 is assumed.
Disability
An individual’s disability status affects a number of other processes in a dynamic model 
and therefore needs to be modelled implicitly in the model. Disability is likely to lead to 
longer periods outside the labour market and as a result lead to lower human capital 
levels and thus lower wages. Also disability status is required to receive certain 
disability benefits and are also likely to result in higher state health expenditures. In 
some cases the fact that someone is classified as disabled does not mean that they are 
incapable of work. During recent years in many European countries, the numbers in
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receipt of disability benefits rose dramatically (See Blondal and Pearson, 1995). This is 
despite no diminishing in the qualifications needed for these benefits. As one can rule 
out an increase in illness levels across the population, this would tend to indicate that 
increased numbers of disabled actually indicates a discouraged worker effect. Ideally 
therefore one should attempt to model the economic incentives of becoming disabled. 
Relevant variables may include local labour market conditions and the cost of being 
disabled (the loss of income). Another relevant incentive is the decision to declare 
oneself as disabled to the authorities rather than claim unemployment benefits. This will 
depend on the relative level of benefits and the strictness of work tests employed by the 
unemployment benefits authority. In addition in a similar way to the numbers declaring 
themselves as unemployed, chronic illness is likely to be under-reported in data for 
spouses of people who are either working or receiving benefit as in real life it has no 
impact on their income position. Klevmarken and Olovsson (1996) found that the 
marginal income loss due to sickness loss of short-term illness was negatively related to 
the duration of sickness. However given the small sample size available in this study, 
the lack of a panel element and the low numbers of disabled in the data, we ignore 
economic incentives.
A number of sources are used to produce a disability status variable. Firstly, we include 
those who have declared themselves ill in the employment status variable and secondly 
we can identify those who are receiving disability benefits in the data. Disability status 
can be divided into long term and short term on the basis of the length of time in current 
status and on the basis of the type of benefit received. Although information is 
contained in the data, for disability status in both the current month and 12 months 
previously, not enough transitions occur due to the small sample size to adequately 
simulate disability transitions in detail. We therefore utilise the cross-section 
information contained in the dataset. We can use the longitudinal information to look at 
aggregate recovery rates, which we find to be 5.4% per annum and transitions between 
short term and long-term disability 3.7%. For other transitions into states of disability, 
we generate a transition matrix which takes account of recovery rates to generate the 
cross-sectional distribution of disabled by education status and age. These transitions 
are described in table 12.
6.4.Educational Attainment
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We now discuss behaviour that relates to educational attainment. The model of 
educational attainment at present does not take into consideration any economic 
incentives of staying in education. As wages are likely to be higher for those who chose 
to stay on education longer, individuals must weigh up the future benefits of staying in 
education against the cost of not earning during this period. Other factors that may 
influence this decision include the condition of the labour market at the time. During 
periods of high unemployment, individuals may prefer to undertake further education 
than be unemployed. Klevmarken and Olovsson (1996) found however for Sweden that 
labour market conditions were not an important determinant. Recent studies for Ireland 
indicate however a degree of qualification inflation which would tend to indicate that 
this hypothesis is true (See Hannan et al, 1998). Again however, a model of this 
sophistication is beyond the scope of this study. Instead the model of educational 
attainment is a purely a probabilistic model, which models the probability of continuing 
through the education system on the basis of recent trends.
For each year of education, the probability of repeating, continuing, dropping out or 
returning is simulated. Entry to third level education has been modelled as has the 
successful completion. Different categories of third level education are modelled, 
including university and regional technical college, full-time and part-time and degree 
subject.
Only the public education system is modelled as the private system currently plays only 
an insignificant role. The Irish educational system is divided into three levels, primary, 
secondary and tertiary. There is currently no state provision for pre-school. Education is 
compulsory for children between the years of 5 and 15.
Primary Level
Primary school is sub-divided into two types of schooling, the infant cycle which 
comprises the first two or three years, followed by the six grades of primary cycle 
proper. Table 14 outlines the probability of a child of a particular age starting school. 
We notice that very few children start at age 3, with 55% of 4 year olds who have not 
already started school starting at age 4 and with the remainder starting at 5. As most 
children progress through school year by year, until the end of lower secondary 
education, we only focus on the proportion who repeat each year, reported in Table 15, 
with about 2% of children repeating each year.
159
Secondary Level
Second level schooling consists of 3 years of compulsory education and 2 or 3 years of 
post compulsory education. As there is no data on repeating years, each student is 
assumed to continue until the end of third year that corresponds with the end of 
compulsory schooling. The student then has three choices. They can leave school, go on 
to Leaving Certificate (LC1), take an applied course (SCI), a vocational course (VPT1) 
or take a transition year. Table 16 describes the transition probabilities for Males and 
Females moving from lower secondary (Junior 3) to Upper Secondary. For males, more 
than half go straight into Leaving Certificate studies, with over a quarter taking a 
transition year and 6.5% taking other courses and about 7% leaving school. As no data 
exists, we assume that most transition year students continue directly into Leaving 
Certificate 1 with a 7% drop-out rate, the same as from Lower Secondary to Upper 
Secondary. A greater proportion of females (35%) go into the transition year. Less drop 
out at this stage however.
Hannan and O’Riain (1993) examined the relationship between family background and 
the likelihood of continuing to post-compulsory education. They found that father’s 
occupational class and mother’s education level were very significant contributory 
factors to educational attainment. Coming from a farming background was also an 
important determinant. Although we do not consider the division between different 
types of schooling here, they found that students in vocational schooling whether 
through selection or allocation tended to drop out earlier. Examining the micro-data 
available to us in the Living in Ireland Survey, we found a similar relationship, with the 
children of higher educated parents being much more likely to continue past post- 
compulsory education (See table 16). As one of the primary determinants of future life 
chances, incorporating socio-economic factors in the staying on decision has the 
potential to use education as a vehicle for modelling intergenerational mobility. From a 
policy perspective it also lends support to the argument to target more resources at those 
from less educated backgrounds to try to break these cycles.
Virtually all students who start the Leaving Certificate cycle continue onto the second 
year. Lower proportions continue onto the second year of the vocational and applied 
courses. Those who finish their leaving certificate (LC2) have the option of going on to 
third level repeating their leaving certificate or going into the labour market or other non 
labour market statuses such as non-working lone parent or disabled etc. About 15%
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repeat the exam, while 11 % of males and 30% of females undertake further second level 
vocational courses.
Third Level
There are two levels of third level simulated here, regional technical colleges and 
university. The data available for the university sector is better, with detailed data on 
numbers entering by socio-economic group (SEG), age and subject undertaken and also 
numbers completing their degrees. University sector transitions shall be considered first. 
Data are published on the numbers entering university for the first time as full-time 
undergraduates by age, sex and SEG. By assuming a constant age distribution of new 
entrants by socio-economic group, a table of new entrants by age by sex by SEG can be 
constructed. The equivalent numbers of people in the population as a whole are known, 
so that the conditional probabilities can found of attending University as a full-time 
undergraduate given age, sex and occupational background can be found. Table 18 
details the probability of entering University for those who have finished their leaving 
certificate, and for those who have not already entered University. We assume due to 
data constraints that individuals do not take two undergraduate degrees. Once a student 
enters University, the subject undertaken is decided upon by using the distribution of 
students entering as full-time undergraduates for the first time. Data are published on 
probability of being awarded a degree at the end a course by subject. Only those who 
actually graduate from their degree can be considered for moving on to post-graduate.
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Tables and Figures
Table 6.1. Summary Statistics
Variable Male Female
Number of Observations 5190 5141
Employment Income 578.71 251.86
Investment Income 8.36 2.97
Irregular Income 0.05 0.05
Maintanence Income 2.35 12.79
Maternity Income 0.00 0.97
Other Income 8.43 3.47
Pension Controbutions 20.14 6.12
Property Income Income 6.56 2.24
Private Pension 18.55 6.66
Private Transfers 1.07 0.53
Self-Employment Income 180.02 13.74
Primary Educated 0.11 0.11
Lower Secondary Educated 0.34 0.31
Upper Secondary Educated 0.23 0.31
University Educated 0.13 0.11
Years in Education 11.02 11.20
Retired 0.15 0.06
In work 0.59 0.31
In work, last period 0.55 0.27
Non-agricultural self-employed 0.08 0.02
Non-agricultural self-employed, last period 0.07 0.02
Farmer 0.07 0.003
Farmer, last period 0.07 0.003
Employee 0.44 0.29
Employee, last period 0.41 0.25
Early Retirement 0.04 0.01
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Long Term Disabled 0.04 0.03
Short Term Disabled 0.01 0.01
Works Part-time 0.02 0.05
Unemployed 0.17 0.06
Manager 0.17 0.07
Average Hours 16.78 9.11
Agricultural Worker 0.11 0.01
Higher Professional 0.07 0.09
Lower Professionals 0.06 0.06
Employers & Managers 0.09 0.03
Salaried Employees 0.05 0.16
Non-manual wage earners white collar 0.07 0.19
Skilled manual workers 0.14 0.03
Semi-skilled manual workers 0.11 0.10
Unskilled manual workers 0.16 0.13
Unknown Occupation 0.14 0.21
Member of a privat pension scheme 0.28 0.12
Public sector worker 0.85 0.91
Has Property Income 0.02 0.01
Has Investment Income 0.21 0.13
Father primary educated 0.79 0.79
Father lower secondary educated 0.10 0.10
Father upper seconddary educated 0.058 0.057
Father other tertiary educated 0.021 0.018
Father university (undergraduate) educated 0.021 0.023
Father university (postgraduate) educated 0.016 0.017
Number of children 1.18 1.33
Years worked 21.41 10.82
Years Unemployed 1.95 0.91
Years 111 1.00 0.80
Years Home Duties 0.51 14.96
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Years Retired 1.69 0.96
Source: Living in Ireland Survey, 1994.
Table 6.2. Life Expectancy at Birth 1950-1992
Country 1950 1992 1950 1992
Women Men
France 69.7 81.4 63.9 73.2
Germany 68.3 79.1 64.4 72.6
Ireland 67.1 77.9 64.5 72.3
Italy 67.9 80.3 64.3 73.6
Japan 60.8 81.7 57.5 79.9
Spain 64.3 80.5 59.8 73.3
Switzerland 71.3 81.3 66.9 74.5
UK 71.3 81.3 66.9 74.5
Source: Kessler, (1995), CSO (1995).
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Table 6.3. Age specific death rates by socio-economic groups for men age 15-65,
1991.
Age 15 20 25 35 45 55 All
Farmers 0.42 1.25 1.81 1.41 5.65 14.82 5.96
Farm Labourers 2.11 1.20 1.26 3.09 4.57 15.17 4.92
Higher Professional 0.00 0.18 0.28 0.84 3.47 12.77 2.42
Lower Professionals 1.50 1.52 0.46 1.39 5.30 13.95 2.42
Employers & Managers 2.41 0.62 0.49 1.25 4.50 11.65 3.15
Salaried Employees 1.23 0.92 0.58 1.50 3.57 15.18 3.29
Non-manual wage earners white collar 0.86 1.07 1.07 2.39 7.78 20.23 3.99
non-manual wage earners other 1.74 1.76 1.19 2.03 6.18 20.13 5.06
skilled manual workers 0.77 1.05 0.69 1.87 6.21 18.70 3.35
Semi-skilled manual workers 1.72 1.61 1.08 3.01 7.19 22.10 4.89
Unskilled manual workers 2.26 1.81 1.50 3.42 10.69 31.59 8.05
Unknown 3.77 2.78 6.83 6.76 13.37 25.94 11.80
Total 1.26 1.33 1.08 2.14 6.62 18.91 4.91
Source: Nolan 1990.
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Table 6.4. Age Specific Fertility Rates 1991
Age Group Married Unmarried
16- 19 0.00244 0.02126
2 0 -2 4 0.041425 0.056791
2 5 -2 9 0.129422 0.051133
3 0 -3 4 0.11871 0.041902
3 5 -3 9 0.058809 0.030258
4 0 -4 4 0.01426 0.009464
4 5 - 0.001039 0.000119
Source: CSO Statistical Bulletin 1992.
Table 6.5. Relative Fertility Rates by Education Level (Ratio of Fertility Rate to 
Average Rate)
Education Level 3+ children, Married 1+ Children, Unmarried
None 6.937 3.887
Primary 8.682 3.704
Lower Secondary 4.497 0.874
Upper Secondary 0.272 2.119
Tertiary 0.524 0.206
Average 1.000 1.000
Source: Living in Ireland Survey, 1994.
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Table 6.6. Marriage rate and age at marriagel921-1985
Year Marriage Rate per 1000 Average Age at Marriage, Average Age at Marriage,
Male Female
1921-30 4.8 34.9 29.1
1931-40 4.9
1941-50 5.6 33.1 28.0
1951-60 5.4 31.3 27.3
1961-70 6.0 29.2 26.0
1971-80 6.8 27.3 24.5
1985 5.2 27.5 25.4
1990 5.1 28.0 25.9
Source Kennedy (19889) and Author’s Calculations from Register Information 
Table 6.7. Age Specific Marriage Rate 1991.
Age Female Male
15 3.7 1.1
20 59.9 33.0
25 139.4 118.7
30 78.2 91.4
35 36.5 44.6
40 14.0 19.0
45 9.3 9.8
50 5.6 5.1
55 2.9 3.8
Source: CSO Statistical Bulletin, Vital Statistics.
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Table 6.8. Relative Marriage Rates by Occupational Group
Age-group 15 20 25 30 35 40
Male
Farmers 2.12 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.98 1.37
Other Agricultural 2.90 0.70 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.59
Higher Professional 0.00 0.84 1.24 1.65 1.84 1.57
Lower Professional 0.00 0.87 0.88 1.23 1.77 2.19
Employers and Managers 5.17 2.24 1.67 1.86 2.39 2.78
Salaried Employees 0.00 0.78 1.05 1.50 1.99 1.13
Inter, non-manual 1.40 0.89 1.05 0.97 1.14 1.13
Other non-manual 2.72 1.24 0.83 0.78 0.85 0.78
Skilled manual 2.62 1.79 1.61 1.56 1.36 1.49
Semi-skilled 1.94 0.97 0.60 0.52 0.48 0.45
Unskilled 1.94 0.97 0.60 0.52 0.48 0.45
Unknown 11.29 1.55 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.49
Female
Farmers 0.02 0.34 0.66 0.06 0.24 1.00
Other Agricultural 0.52 0.53 0.24 0.09 0.21 0.00
Higher Professional 0.06 0.49 1.03 1.19 0.78 0.22
Lower Professional 0.33 0.92 1.25 4.55 1.43 0.88
Employers and Managers 0.10 0.89 1.02 1.35 0.81 1.15
Salaried Employees 0.00 0.54 0.93 0.74 2.04 1.97
Inter. Non-manual 1.16 1.07 1.07 3.49 1.04 0.96
Other non-manual 1.36 1.15 1.03 1.31 1.33 2.74
Skilled manual 0.29 1.21 1.44 0.21 0.94 1.04
Semi-skilled 1.05 1.11 0.76 0.48 0.50 0.84
Unskilled 1.05 1.11 0.76 0.48 0.50 0.84
Unknown 3.29 0.87 0.62 0.58 0.91 0.51
Source: CSO Statistical Bulletin.
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Table 6.9. Employment Rate by Marital Status (Employment Rate in year of 
marriage as a proportion of Average Employment Rate for those eligible for 
marriage).
Age Female Male
Did Not Marry 0.929 0.967
Did Marry 1.227 1.091
Source: Authors Calculations
Table 6.10. Logit Model of Assortative Mating
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev.
Age Difference (Male -  Female) 0.085 0.024
Age Difference2 -0.019 0.003
Years in Education difference2 -0.034 0.036
Years in Education (Male) 0.072 0.036
Female in Work -2.133 0.520
Male in Work -2.061 0.409
Both in Work 2.071 0.565
Years in Employment(Male) 0.038 0.020
Market Income difference2/10000 -0.0012 0.0006
Constant -3.443 0.363
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Living in Ireland Survey, 1994..
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Table 6.11. Separation Rate, Remarriage Rate and Cohabitation Rate
Age Group Separation Rate Remarriage Rate Cohabitation Rate
15 0.47 1.68 1.39
20 0.71 0.42 3.86
25 0.66 0.66 6.34
30 0.45 0.71 12.03
35 0.22 0.46 10.34
40 0.04 0.21 5.28
45 0.04 0.21 8.40
50 0.04 0.11 8.47
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Living in Ireland Survey, 1994..
Note: The denominator for separation rate is the number of people married, for the remarriage rate the 
number of people widowed and separated and for the cohabitation rate the number of single people.
170
Table 6.12. Proportion of Entering disability
Male Female
Age
Group
Primary Lower
Second.
Upper
Second.
Tertiary Primary Lower
Second.
Upper
Second
Tertiary
Short
Term
25 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006
30 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020
35 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.046 0.012 0.012
40 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.006
45 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.017
50 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
55 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.021
60 0.036 0.036 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.000
Long
Term
20 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001
25 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001
30 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
35 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
40 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
45 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
50 0.018 0.021 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
55 0.018 0.021 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
60 0.018 0.021 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Living in Ireland Survey, 1994..
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Table 6.13. Proportion of Age Group starting Primary School
Age Proportion
3 0.012
4 0.55
5 1
Source: Department of Education Statistical Report, 1994.
Table 6.14. Primary and Lower Secondary Repeat Proportions
Year Group Boys Girls
Infants 1 0 0
Infants 2 0.021 0.016
Class 1 0.022 0.018
Class 2 0.015 0.017
Class 3 0.015 0.015
Class 4 0.017 0.018
Class 5 0.024 0.018
Class 6 0 0
Junior 1 -  Junior3 0 0
Source: Department of Education Statistical Report, 1994.
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Table 6.15. Upper Secondary School Transitions
Year t
Year t-1 Transition LC1 VPT1 SCI VPT2 SC2 LC2
Male
Junior 3 0.277 0.590 0.058 0.007 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transition 0.0 0.930 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LC1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.981
VPT1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.784 0.0 0.0
SCI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.784 0.0
VPT2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SC2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LC2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Female
Junior 3 0.345 0.577 0.064 0.008 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transition 0.0 0.995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LC1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000
VPT1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.862 0.0 0.0
SCI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.862 0.0
VPT2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SC2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LC2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Department of Education Statistical Report, 1994.
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Table 6.16. Relative likelihood of continuing beyond compulsory schooling by
Father’s education level
Father’s Education Level Male Female
Not finished 0.805 0.886
Finished primary 0.805 0.886
Finished inter 1.277 1.175
Non-advanced secondary 1.390 1.305
Finished leaving 1.422 1.206
Finished Undergraduate 1.441 1.385
Finished Postgraduate 1.464 1.276
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Living in Ireland Survey, 1994..
Table 6.17. Probability of Entering University if completed secondary school and 
not already started University/Technical College
Age Male Female
17 0.040 0.057
18 0.117 0.155
19 0.065 0.067
20 0.016 0.012
21 0.006 0.006
22 0.004 0.004
23 0.002 0.003
24 0.002 0.002
25-30 0.001 0.001
Technical College 0.152 0.241
Source: Higher Education Authority Statistics 1996
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Table 6,18. Relative Likelihood of Entering University by Age and Parental Socio-Economic Group
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Male
Farmers 0.95 0.95 0.94 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 0.73
Ag. Workers 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50
Higher prof. 4.33 5.04 15.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lower prof. 2.52 2.70 3.47 4.62 4.91 5.02 5.09 5.14 3.73 3.73 3.73 3.73 3.73 4.75
Employers & managers 2.00 2.08 2.43 2.99 3.09 3.13 3.15 3.17 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 2.89
Salaried Employees 3.46 3.85 6.19 10.09 11.82 12.60 13.14 13.47 9.82 9.82 9.82 9.82 9.82 11.94
Inter. Non-manual 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.90
Other non-manual 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0,32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33
Skilled manual 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.57
Semi-skilled manual 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.57
Unskilled Manual 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19
Unknown 2.21 2.33 2.83 3.24 3.36 3.40 3.43 3.45 8.82 8.82 8.82 8.82 8.82 8.02
Female
Farmers 1.28 1.30 1.37 1.68 1.69 1.70 1.70 1.71 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 1.64
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Ag. Workers 0.85 0.84 0,81 0.96 0.96
Higher professional 3.90 4.73 15.01 0.00 0.00
Lower professional 2.14 2.29 3.01 4.18 4.35
Employers & managers 1.90 2.02 2.48 3.30 3.39
Salaried Employees 3.18 3.67 7.18 15.31 18.41
Inter, non-manual 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.55
Other non-manual 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.28
Skilled manual 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.87 0.87
Semi-skilled manual 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31
Unskilled Manual 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12
Unknown 2.36 2.57 3.62 4.45 4.64
Source: Higher Education Authority Statistics 1996
0.96 0.96 0.96
0.00 0.00 0.00
4.44 4.50 4.54
3.44 3.47 3.49
20.69 22.28 23.55
0.54 0.54 0.54
0.28 0.28 0.28
0.87 0.87 0.87
0.31 0.31 0.30
0.12 0.12 0.12
4.74 4.81 4.86
1.21 1.21 1.21
0.00 0.00 0.00
1.78 1.78 1.78
4.85 4.85 4.85
35.93 35.93 35,93
0.27 0.27 0.27
0.33 0.33 0.33
1.43 1.43 1.43
0.23 0.23 0.23
0.20 0.20 0.20
9.93 9.93 9.93
1.21 1.21 0.99
0.00 0.00 0.00
1.78 1.78 2.41
4.85 4.85 3.99
35.93 35.93 32.15
0.27 0.27 0.53
0.33 0.33 0.33
1.43 1.43 1.12
0.23 0.23 0.35
0.20 0.20 0.13
9.93 9.93 4.54
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Table 6.19. University Subject (Distribution, Length, Finish Probability and Post­
graduate Study Proportion)
Proportion 
taking subject
Length of 
Course
Probability of 
finishing 
degree
Probability of Doing Further Study 
on Completion of Undergraduate
Arts and Social 
Science
0.377 3 0.69 0.523
Science 0.163 3 0.75 0.659
Commerce 0.153 3 0.74 0.607
Law 0.023 3 1.00 0.67
Food 0.012 3 1.00 0.629
Engineering 0.201 4 0.84 0.556
Agriculture 0.019 4 0.99 0.7
Veterinary Science 0.008 4 0.96 0.743
Architecture 0.005 5 0.61 0.51
Medicine 0.039 6 0.85 0.743
Technical College N/a 31 0.8 0
Source: Department of Education Statistics and Patterns of First Destination of Graduates
Note: 1. 80% do 2 or more years, and 51 % do 3 years.
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Figure 6.1. Overview of Dynamic Processes
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Figure 6.3. Age Specific Mortality Rates 1921 - 1990
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Figure 6.4. Crude Birth Rate (Number of Births per 1000 in Population 1911-1996)
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Figure 6.5. Preference Curve for Age Difference at M arriage (Male -  Female)
-15 -13 -11
Age Difference
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Chapter 7. Modelling Labour Market Behaviour and Capital
Income
7.1. Introduction
This chapter describes some of the characteristics of micro-level behavioural processes 
relating to the simulation of labour market behaviour and capital income. Figure 1 
describes the main labour market processes that are themselves hierarchical. We classify 
two broad states in the labour market, working and not-working. There are a number of 
reasons for non-participation. Firstly, we assume that those who are out of the labour 
market for “demographic” reasons such as disability or being in education are not 
eligible for work. For the remaining population (the heading “Other”), some will decide 
to retire. Those who do not retire can work or not. People not in work can choose to 
look for work or not to look for work. The latter group, because they do not seek work 
may not be eligible for social benefits. In-work categories are further split into part-time 
and full-time employment and agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment.
So far we have just considered cross-sectional dynamics, how processes influence each 
other at one point in time. Inter-temporal dynamics are also important. The duration in 
particular labour market states for example, influence the probability of remaining in 
that state and the probability of entering other states. Earnings are likely to be higher for 
those in long-term stable employment than for those who move in and out of 
employment frequently. This chapter attempts to describe in more detail the actual 
processes both from a cross-sectional and inter-temporal point of view. Section 2 
describes labour market processes and section 3 income from savings.
7.2.Labour Market Processes
The labour market processes we are interested in are the transitions between in-work 
and out-of work, the sub-components of employment income, part-time work, self- 
employment, unemployment, retirement and non-participation and the incomes which 
result from participation.
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Traditionally dynamic microsimulation models have estimated labour supply decisions 
by utilising transition matrices that model transitions between different states such as 
employment, unemployment and non-participation in the labour market. The numbers 
of hours worked are then simulated using statistical equations imputing an estimate of 
hours worked depending on characteristics such as age, education, gender, the presence 
of children, marital status and other socio-economic factors. However as Klevmarken
(1997) points out that a “Microsimulation Model has a relative advantage in 
computing...incentives from taxes and benefits”. As some microsimulation models 
simulate detailed estimates of taxes and benefits, they have a strong advantage in 
simulating the behavioural response to changes in these policies in addition to changes 
in behaviour related to other socio-economic transitions. Although specifying a fully 
structural model of the labour market is beyond this study at the moment, and beyond 
the capacity of the data on which the estimation is based, it is intended to make some of 
the components of the model responsive to changes in the tax-benefit system.
This section is organised as follows. The principle transition driving the labour market 
is the decision (or opportunity) to work or not to work in a particular period. The 
decision to retire is described next. We assume that once someone retires, they have left 
the labour market for good, so therefore like education and disability, this labour market 
status means that individuals are ineligible to be considered for employment. As the 
decision to enter employment from education is different to that from other non- 
working states, this is modelled separately. Although most people in work are 
employees, self-employment is quite significant in Ireland, with over 25% of males in 
work being self-employed. As the treatment in the tax-benefit system is different for 
this group relative to employees, it is important to model this. Although part-time work 
is not very important in Ireland, nearly one fifth of female employees work part-time. 
This dynamic process is described next. The final two sections describe the models of 
earnings and general work characteristics such as occupation, sector and status.
Labour Market Participation: The Transition into/out o f Work
The principle transitions that drive the labour market model are the decisions about 
whether an individual works or not. When we observe in the data, the existence of 
whether an individual is employed or not, we are observing the interaction between 
labour supply, the decision of an individual to participate in the labour market and 
labour demand, the labour requirements of employers. In our model, we assume, labour 
demand is exogenous and therefore focus instead on the employability ranking of
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individuals. By this we mean the likelihood, given a fixed labour demand that an 
individual will be employed. Thus if employers demand x% of the labour market, the 
top x% of individuals, ranked by their employability will be selected to work. This 
measure therefore combines the decision to actually participate in the first place and the 
desirability of the individual to employers or their ability to be entrepreneurs.
The literature describes a number of features such a model should have. From a labour 
supply point of view, individuals will decide to enter employment if their utility of 
working is higher than that of non-working. According to economic theory, individuals 
with higher average tax rates will choose to work more while those with higher 
marginal tax rates will choose to work less. As a result one produces a backward 
bending labour supply curve. In the presence of non-convex, non-linear budget 
constraints, it can be prohibitively difficult to estimate continuous labour supply models 
where continuous hours are the model outcome. In addition, in many countries because 
of institutional constraints, it is not possible to choose any number of hours of work. 
Typically, employees can choose only from a specific set of hours and thus distributions 
of hours worked per week will tend to be multi-modal rather than a continuous 
distribution of hours worked. As a result, recently, papers such as Van Soest et al.
(1991) have estimated labour supply model with a discrete hour’s choice set.
Because of the degree of income sharing within a household, the decision to enter the 
labour market is likely to depend to a certain extent on the decision of their spouse if 
they are married or cohabiting. Van Soest (1995) and Callan and Van Soest (1997) 
estimate labour supply models for the Netherlands and Ireland respectively, where the 
labour supply decision of both spouses is jointly determined.
We now focus on the dynamics of labour supply. There are a number of factors that 
drive movements between in work and out of work. For those in steady jobs, work 
patterns and conditions should have some time dependence. In other words, the number 
of hours worked and the wage rate should relate to previous years. However workers in 
more marginal employment are likely to have more movement between jobs. Marginal 
workers can be classified with longer unemployment spells, education levels and 
occupational groups.
The duration in work or out of work is also likely to be an important determinant on 
transitions. Those who have spent longer out of work are much more likely to remain 
out of work or become out of work, if already in work. The chances of working for
someone who is already working is likely to be different quite different to someone 
looking for a job. Nickell (1979) outlines a number of reasons why a firm will prefer not 
to offer a job to an individual like this rather than offering the job at a workers marginal 
product. Reasons include, equity, custom, internal labour markets, union bargaining 
agreements, legal constraints, morale factors and difficulties in measuring individual 
productivity. Nickell (1979) also found a positive relationship between the replacement 
rate and the duration of unemployment in the UK. Narendranathan et al. (1985) found 
that generally the higher the income the lower the probability of leaving unemployment. 
This effect was strongest for younger people and for those with lower durations of 
unemployment. The effect lessened with age, while for those with unemployment 
durations of greater than six months the impact of out-of work income on exit from 
unemployment was not significant.
Because of the structure of the unemployment assistance system, spouses of 
unemployed workers are less likely to participate in the labour market. For example, 
Callan et al. (1998) found that between 1987 and 1994, despite a large increase in the 
participation rate for women, the participation rate of women married to unemployed 
men did not rise significantly. Doris (1998) found that in addition to the effect of the 
benefit system, selection characteristics are likely to play a role as well.
The fixed costs associated with working, such as child care, transportation and job 
search can also create non-convexities in the budget set. As Hausman (1981) points out 
this can have important implications for the labour supply of women given that they 
usually have lower earnings, lower hours worked and more transitions out of the labour 
market than men.
A number of studies in Ireland have examined labour supply. Recently some studies 
have used the 1987 of Survey on Income Distribution, Poverty and the Usage o f State 
Services. Dex et al. (1995) estimated a model of labour participation for married women 
in order to examine the influence on female participation rates of women married to 
unemployed men due to the benefits systems. They found that the presence of 
unemployment benefits created an negative incentive on the part of the woman to work. 
Own wage was found to have a positive influence on the participation decision. 
Unearned income unexpectedly was found to also have a positive effect. The presence 
of young children also had a strong negative effect on participation. Callan and van 
Soest (1996) developed a discrete choice model of family labour supply where not only
participation is modelled, but also the numbers of hours worked per week. The labour 
supply model and the wage equation were estimated separately due to computational 
constraints. They also incorporated involuntary unemployment into the model. Callan et 
al. (1999) estimated a simpler model for use in a cross-country comparison, using a 
bivariate normal model of participation and full-time work given participation. The 
budget set was represented by household disposable income, the marginal effect per 
hour on disposable income of working part-time and the marginal effect per hour of 
working full-time. Like in the Dex et al. paper, the coefficients on unearned income and 
on the marginal effects were positive in the participation model. Thus the higher the 
wage, the greater the likelihood of participation, but also the higher the family income, 
the higher the participation rate.
In the model employed here, the (a) income and (b) substitution effect of income is 
takep into account through the use of (a) disposable income when working full-time 
^143Ihours pm) and disposable income when working part-time (65 hours pm) and (b) 
household disposable income if the individual does not work. In order^to_do this, the , 
tax-benefit system is calculated when the person is working 0, 65 and^l73jiours per 
month. Household disposable is calculated by summing the market incomes, taxes and 
benefits of all individuals in the household. Net wages however are calculated by 
allocating family taxes and benefits between the adults in the household. Although it is 
desirable to jointly simulate the labour participation of men and women together, this is 
beyond the current study. Instead, the husband’s decision is made first. He makes this 
decision on the basis that his wife will make the same decision in this period as she 
made in the previous period and receives the same wage. On the basis of the husband’s 
decision the wife then makes her decision. Clearly this is a simplification of the fact that 
spouses are likely jointly decide their labour supply and therefore participation should 
be jointly estimated as in the case of Van Soest and Callan (1997). This is a potential 
direction of future development of the model. As an individual who is not in work in the 
data has no observed wage, we estimate a potential hourly wage for whole the sample 
(see below). In order to take dynamic information into account, we firstly estimate 
different labour supply equations for those who were in work in the previous period and 
those who were not in work. Lifetime durations in-work and out of work 
(unemployment, disability, home duties) are also used. As we do not know the cost of 
working, we include variables which classify the number of children aged 0-5, 6-18 in 
the household. The sample unfortunately is not big enough to look at lone parents
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separately and we therefore cannot estimate the equations separately for this group. 
Lone parents are likely to have a different decision process as they face particular 
circumstances that will influence their decision to work.
The other component of the in-work model is the distinction between marginal workers 
with greater mobility and higher chances of unemployment. Duration information plays 
a part in this as do the inclusion of occupational status and education variables. In 
addition, in Ireland those out of work are very unlikely (7%) to ever have been members 
of pension schemes (Hughes and Whelan, 1996). As over 50% of workers are members 
of pension schemes, we can infer that individuals with jobs which have occupational 
pension schemes are more likely to be regular as opposed to marginal employment and 
thus are less likely to become unemployed. Another category that indicates regular 
employment is being a public sector worker, who has permanent contracts.66 Rather 
than including these variables in the regression model, we include them in the alignment 
component of the model, thereby reducing the probability of individuals with these 
characteristics of becoming out of work. By this we mean that the employment chances 
of these individuals are driven by control totals.
Unobserved wage rates were replaced by predicted wages outlined below, without 
taking account of the error term. As the rho term in the Heckman selection model was 
not significant, we used OLS to estimate the wage equation. A tax-benefit model (see 
Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001) was used to estimate the resulting disposable 
incomes of individuals receiving these wage rates at 0, 18 and 40 hours per week, V
holding the rest of the household constant. r"~
This model of labour supply was found however not to sufficiently model inter temporal 
mobility. Although predicted average years in work were reasonable, too many people 
spent a proportion of their career out of work. This is because of the fact that the panel 
data used to estimate inter-temporal labour supply covers only two years. It would be 
preferable to utilise data with more waves. Although, at present such data is not 
available to the author, it is hoped in the future to utilise other waves of the European 
Community Household Panel (presently 7 waves have been collected). Therefore we 
have to use cruder method to prevent too much mobility. To do this, we identify a group 
of people who do not spend any part of their working lives out of work. This model was
66 An example of the permanence of these jobs is that public sector workers have a special category of 
social insurance contributions which does not cover workers for unemployment.
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estimated by utilising duration data contained in the LII survey. We generated a binary 
variable for those who never spent any time out of work. We found that for men 
regardless of age, the proportion of those who worked their entire lifetime until 
retirement was reasonably constant when disaggregated by education level with about 
H 80% of graduates and 50-55%/never having a spell out of work. For women however
’ the proportion of women whenever had a spell out of work drops significantly as one
moves from young women to older women. Much of the reason for this trend is that 
labour force participation rates for women have risen rapidly over time. As a result 
rather it is more appropriate to utilise rates for women under 35. Here we use a logit 
model based on education level, occupation, parental education and employment sector 
to estimate the probability of working an entire career. Alignment is based on aggregate 
rates decomposed by education level according to the rates for men aged 55+ and for 
women aged under 35.
Table 1 describes the logit model of the probability of an individual working in a year. 
Four equations are described, for males and females and whether they worked in the 
previous period or not. It would have been desirable to include a single parent equation, 
but the number of cases was too small. These models have been estimated on the set of 
individuals who did not work their entire career. Except for men who worked the 
previous year, the effect of unearned income was negative for all equation types, while 
the marginal income effect of working had a positive effect on the probability of 
working. In most cases the occupation status other than the base status of unknown are 
more likely to become or stay out of work. Likewise higher educational attainments 
result in higher in-work probabilities. However for men who were in work in the 
previous period, occupations and education statuses which indicate higher human 
capital stocks have negative coefficients. This is not because these groups are more 
likely to become out of work if already in-work. Rather these groups are likely to have 
higher disposable income if in work and thus confounding the coefficients of the human 
capital variables. Periods spent in work are likely to result in higher probabilities of 
staying/remaining in work, while periods spent out of work result in lower probabilities. 
Exceptions include the years of work for men who were out of work last year. This 
would seem to go against labour market theory. However if one examines these 
individuals one will see that men out of work of working age can be classified into two 
groups. The first group is in marginal employment and move in and out of work 
regularly. The second group will have worked for a long period as regular workers and
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then have left the labour market for good for reasons such as redundancy or early 
retirement or illness. These would seem to be the bigger group as the average years 
worked for those who were out of work last year and this year is higher than for those 
who were out of work last year and in work this year.
Turning to family influences, except for men in work in the previous period, the 
presence of children below school going age has a significantly negative impact on 
participation. Also being a female lone parent or married person reduces the probability. 
For those in work the previous period, the presence of an out of work spouse has a 
positive effect on working this period. The effect is mixed however for people out of 
work the previous period.
The equations described in table 1 are used to produce employability rankings. Labour 
demand is determined exogenously through the alignment mechanism. Table 2 
describes the labour demand for individuals of different types. Labour demand is 
described by age, gender and previous employment status. Therefore 88.9 per cent of 
male third level graduates in their twenties who worked in the previous year will work 
in the current year. This increases to over 95 per cent for ages up to 60. While there is 
not much of an education differential for those who were in work in the previous year 
for men, it is much stronger for those who did not work in the previous year, where out 
of work University graduates are much more likely to find work than those with lower 
qualifications. The education differential is greater for women than for men. However 
the employment rates for women who worked in the previous year is not that much less 
than for males for all age groups. The employment rate for women who did not work is 
much lower. As a result once women leave the labour market, they are much less likely 
to return.
Retirement and Early Retirement
Labour force participation rates for men in the 50-65 age-band has fallen a great deal 
over the past decades. This has been a trend in many countries, as described by Tanner
(1998) for the UK and Hurd (1990) for the USA. The literature attributes the decision to 
retire to various reasons. Unsurprisingly, those with the means to do so, in terms of 
personal wealth or access to other income streams such as benefits and occupational 
pensions, tend to retire earlier. Hurd (1990) describes a number of studies for the USA 
which found that those with occupational pensions were more likely to retire earlier. 
Available research however is not strong enough to explain the large drop in
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participation over the last number of decades. Tanner (1998) finds similar results for the 
UK, that although those with occupational pensions were more likely to retire, changes 
in the coverage of occupational pensions between the late 1980’s and the mid-1990’s 
did not have a corresponding effect on the retirement age. In terms of non-monetary 
factors, Tanner found that health status and unemployment were major determinants of 
retirement decisions. In Ireland, Whelan and Whelan (1988) also found that health and 
redundancy were important factors, especially for lower socio-economic groups.
A detailed analysis of retirement behaviour is beyond the scope of this analysis, so in 
this model, we use a relatively simple process. Examining the Living in Ireland Survey, 
we also find that occupational pension scheme membership results in a higher 
probability of early retirement, with 28% of people between 55 and 64 retired as 
compared with 10% of non scheme members. Examining transitions however must be 
done with caution as the numbers of transitions into retirement in the data, is very small 
in data. A priori there are a number of potential types of persons in Ireland who early 
retire. Firstly there are those who become disabled and give up work for good. In this 
model, they are classified in two separate categories, those with and without 
occupational pension rights. We assume that those who have pension rights will not 
return to employment. Nextly, there are those who are long term unemployed who give 
seeking work in middle age, opting instead for early retirement. The existence of a pre­
retirement allowance means that those who are not pension members can retire early 
and receive an income. Of those in this category, 10% take early retirement. The last 
group we consider in this analysis are members of pension schemes who choose to 
retire neither on health or unemployment grounds. We find that 12.5% of men and 
10.3% of women choose this option per annum. Clearly further work is necessary in this 
and it would be interesting to develop an econometric model of the decisions. It may 
however be necessary to wait until more waves of data are available to do this. 
Although, it is also possible to retire later than the retirement age at 66, we ignore this 
issue for the time being.
Transition from Education
Modelling transitions from third level education to other states is done separately to the 
rest of the population. Individuals moving from education should be treated separately 
from other types of out of work, as they are much more likely to enter the labour 
market. There are a number of sources of information on labour market transitions for 
education leaves. Breen, (1984) utilising the National Manpower Service Survey o f
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School Leavers for 1980-1982, found that school leavers with lower secondary 
education (At the time Intermediate or Group Certificates) were twice as likely to be 
unemployed or seeking their first job a year after finishing school as those with upper 
secondary education (Leaving Certificate), while those leaving without any 
qualifications were 3 times as likely. Breen (1991) examined a panel study of those who 
left school in 1982. This enabled him to examine the transition path of school leavers. 
Six months after leaving school, upper secondary school leavers (male /female) were 
28/14 % more likely to be in work and 50/50% less likely to be unemployed than those 
without qualifications. Those with Upper Secondary were however more likely to do 
further training or state employment rather than become unemployed. However 5 years 
later, those with upper secondary levels of education were 46/86% more likely to be 
working than those without qualifications. The chances of being unemployed were 
28/29% of those without qualifications. Higher educated women were also far less 
likely to move out of the labour force entirely than those without qualifications. By the 
1995, the situation for school leavers without qualifications had worsened with over 
60% unemployed as compared with 45% in the early 1980’s. For those who leave 
University, there is an annual Higher Education Authority Survey of First Destinations 
of Graduates.
For the purposes of our analysis, we have the choice between using the analyses 
described above or using the Living in Ireland Survey. A number of studies cited are
quite dated now, especially the panel component of the school leavers study described
(JL,
by the Breen (1991). However the are recent school leaver studies that can be used
Ir
without the panel element. This is what will be used for the destination of those leaving 
secondary school. These results are described in table 3. For graduates, we use the 
HEA’s First Destination o f Graduates Survey, described in table 4 for those who left 
University in 1993. Employment rates varied from as low as 60% for food graduates to 
over 90% for Medicine, Veterinary and Architecture.67 As the educational attainment 
model incorporates subject, the impact of subject choice on initial employment 
prospects will have an immediate labour market effect and thus improve the explanation 
of the variability. One problem with the model however is that social background is 
only used to determine who attends University and not what courses they take. This 
may therefore bias intergenerational mobility analyses. Table 5 describes the
67 The low employment rate for food science graduates is masked by the fact that only a very small 
proportion of this students actually leave after undergraduate studies. The majority go onto postgraduate 
study.
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probabilities of education leavers of becoming employed (versus self-employed) if they 
move into employment and unemployed versus inactive if not-working.
Employment versus Self-employment
Once an individual has decided to work they must then decide whether to become self- 
employed or become an employee. The literature is relatively scarce on this decision, 
remaining more in the realm of sociology. As presumably there is greater risk in 
becoming self-employed than being an employee, individuals will expect a risk 
premium to make this decision. On the other hand individuals who cannot get a job as 
an employee may be forced to become self-employed and thus may expect a lower wage 
premium. There are other factors involved as well. Taylor (1996) considers in addition 
to earnings, the degree of independence, labour demand and family background. He 
found that in a model of self-employment in the UK that as might be expected, 
individuals who were likely to earn more in self-employment than employment became 
self-employed. In addition, individuals whose parents were self-employed were more 
likely as were those with greater wealth, those who favoured independence and those 
who were less concerned about job security. Areas of high labour demand were also 
more likely to produce entrepreneurs. Harding (1993) meanwhile found that women in 
general were very unlikely to be self-employed in Australia. Having a spouse who was 
self-employed was however found to be significant factor.
We employ a model similar to that used to Taylor. However, we also take into 
consideration the tax-benefit system. Self-employed workers are treated differently to 
employees in a number of respects. Social Insurance Contributions rates are different as 
are resulting entitlements to benefits. It is questionable whether the potentially self- 
employed take the lower value of social insurance contributions (relative to employee 
and employer contributions) in their decision or whether they also factor in the resulting 
lower entitlement to contributory benefits. The self-employed are also more likely to be 
able to set more of their income off against taxes as Callan (1991) found when 
designing a static tax -benefit model for Ireland. Also, in Ireland, only employees are 
eligible for an in-work benefit known as the Family Income Supplement, while farmers 
on low incomes are eligible for unemployment assistance.
The first step in the process is to estimate hypothetical self-employment and 
employment monthly earnings. In the comparison we compare full-time employment 
with self-employment as we assume montonicity of preferences and thus if employment
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is preferred to self-employment and part-time employment is preferred to self- 
employment, part-time is preferred to self-employment. For everyone of working age, 
we simulate their resulting net employment (self-employment earnings), if they decided 
to be employed (self-employed). As a joint simulation of male and female decisions 
would result in large computing time costs, we assume instead that in making a decision 
as to whether to be self-employed in a particular period, the person only has information 
about what the other spouse did in the previous period.
Other variables that we consider are whether a person was in employment in the 
previous period. We however only do this if the person was in work during the previous 
period. As a result two models of employment/self-employment are estimated for men 
and women. In the first the sample used is all those who were in work in the previous 
period and in the second those who were out of work. In both cases we only focus on 
those who have decided to work in this period on the basis of the labour market 
participation model described above. Occupational categories, education levels and 
duration variables are also included.
In table 6, model estimates are described. The model is a logit model with, dependent 
variable, employment. The signs and relative sizes of net employment and self- 
employment income is as expected in the model where individual worked in the 
previous period. As a result individuals who have higher employment income net of 
taxes and benefits will be more likely to go into to self-employment. For those who 
were not in work in the previous period, the signs were the opposite of what was 
expected, however for men the coefficients were not significantly different from zero. 
We must however be cautious about the results for women moving into work as very 
few of this group become self-employed. Amongst the other variables, being employed 
in the previous period as well as occupational status of employer and manager had a 
strong impact on whether to continue to be self-employed. As in the labour participation 
model, the logit model here is used to rank individuals, the totals in employment versus 
self-employment are determined exogenously. Table 7 describes the totals used to 
determine aggregate transitions. Transitions are based on gender, age work status the 
previous period and if in work whether an individual was in self-employment (SE) or in 
employment (E). Persistence rates are quite high for those who remain in work. For 
those making a transition from out of work to in-work, men are more likely to enter 
self-employment than women.
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Labour Supply: Part-time versus Full-time Work
In this model, we do not allow individuals to decide to vary their hours worked 
continuously. Instead as individuals are likely to only be able to select from a finite 
number of hours combinations, we model only a discrete choice. Because of the 
relatively small number of workers, working less than full-time wages, we only focus 
on two hours categories, part-time and full-time.
In this process we employ a similar model that used by the decision to work and the 
secondary decision to seek employment. In this case we employ a logit model based on 
the sample of those who have decided to be in employment. Although the decision to 
work part-time in reality is probably jointly determined with the decision to work in the 
first place, the decision to be an employee, we employee a set of individually specified 
models. The reason is partly to do with the fact that in Callan et al. (1999) the 
correlation of the error terms in a jointly estimated model was not significant and also 
partially because of the computational costs. Also the joint estimation of so many 
processes in a multinomial logit or probit model is unlikely to be supported by the 
available data.
Like the labour market participation model, we incorporate the marginal impact of part- 
time working versus not working and the marginal impact of full-time working over 
part-time working in terms of income after taxes and benefits. These results are reported 
in table 8. For both men and women the coefficients on these variables had the 
expected signs (positive for marginal net disposable income from part-time work and 
negative for disposable income if not working and the marginal effect of full-time 
work). For both men and women, being in employment during the previous period was 
negatively associated with working part-time. However those who worked for a longer 
number of years had higher probability of working part-time. Therefore in the short 
term part-time work may be due to being a way for unemployed people into work, while 
in the longer term, those with longer working careers are more likely to move to part- 
time work. This reinforced by the fact that unemployment and disability durations are 
positively related to the probability of working part-time. For men the presence of 
children is not significant, while for women the probability increases with the number 
of children. Also women, whose husbands are unemployed, are more likely to work 
part-time. Higher educated women are less likely to work part-time, but for men the 
opposite holds. However as very few men work part-time this effect is not that 
important. Table 9 details the aggregates transition rates.
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Work Characteristics Occupation, Management, Sector
Occupation may have an impact on employment conditions that may in part influence 
options available. As many of the demand side aspects of our labour market module 
depend on occupation and industrial sector, it is an important aspect of the model. For 
example as outlined above, earnings vary a great deal across occupational group (See 
Callan and Harmon, 1997) and sector. Pension coverage also varies significantly by 
industrial sector (Hughes and Whelan, 1997) and occupational group (Keogh and 
Whelan, 1985 and Hughes and Nolan, 1996). Dex and Taylor (1995) define a number of 
ways of categorising employment mobility. These include mobility between jobs, 
employer’s and occupations. Using the 1990/91 wave of the British Household Panel 
Survey, the authors examined the extent of employment mobility in the UK. Category 
of Job had the highest degree of mobility in the year with 21 per cent of the employed 
moving jobs at least once, while less than 15 per cent of employees changed employer. 
Finally occupational status had the highest degree of stability, with less than 9 per cent 
of employees changing occupation. Women were more likely to be more mobile in each 
category than men. Occupational change is more likely to occur at younger age groups, 
with fewer than 6 per cent of workers changing occupation each year in the over 35 age 
group. Younger people are also more likely to change jobs and employers. Cohabiting 
and single people also have higher mobility rates, which is likely to be confounded with 
the age relationship. Interestingly the presence of children does not seem to influence 
mobility rates. It is not an unreasonable assumption therefore to assume as Pudney
(1992) did constant occupational status over time for each individual. Pudney varied the 
occupational structure through dynamic re-weighting. Other models such as CORSIM 
and HARDING do not incorporate occupational structures.
Breen and Whelan (1996) describe transition matrices of the mobility of men and 
women from occupational class of origin (parental occupational class) to entry class 
(occupation of first job) and the mobility between entry class and destination class. 
There are a number of difficulties in using this information however. Firstly, there is no 
information on women’s transitions from entry to the labour market to final occupation. 
This is because of the difficulties in measuring this due to the very low participation rate 
of married women. Secondly, the classification used is slightly different to that used in 
this chapter. As a result, the route taken here is to model parental occupation using 
Census information. Occupational mobility between parental occupation, entry class 
and destination class is more difficult. This is because of the limitations imposed by
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having information only about two period data. With a large number of occupational 
categories (12 used here), and the low number of transitions as witnessed by the UK 
data, the cell sizes in a 12 x 12 transition matrix, except in the diagonal elements are 
likely to be very small and therefore not a good basis for modelling transitions. Instead 
we utilise a indirect method to model occupation group. As outlined above, parental 
background is used to partially determine educational attainment. This in turn as 
described by Breen and Whelan is a large determinant on the occupation undertaken by 
an individual. Therefore we employ data contained in the LII to chart the relationship 
between educational attainment, parental education level and occupation in 1994 .
Individuals who have management roles typically have higher earnings as outlined 
above. Table 10 details the model used here. For men, the probability of being a 
manager increases with experience, but at a declining rate. Simultaneously, the 
probability falls with age, resulting with the highest probability of becoming a manager 
in middle age. For women, the opposite largely applies, but the resulting effect is a 
similar age relationship rising to a peak and then falling. For men there is a strong 
education link, while for women, once other characteristics have been taken into 
consideration the link is insignificant. As expected, there is a strong occupation 
relationship, with the higher occupational groups being more likely to-be managers. The 
declining value of human capital with periods out of work is highlighted by the negative 
relationship between periods of out of work and the probability of being a manager. 
Background especially for men is an important determinant, with higher parental 
education levels having a positive influence on the probability of becoming a manager. 
Table 11 describes the aggregate age distribution of managers by age group for men and 
women.
We use employment sector (private/public) as a determinant of regular employment. 
Determining a model of public employment is beyond the scope of this study, so we 
simply classify decisions to enter the public service by education level. We notice in 
table 12 that those at the extremes of education distribution for both men and women 
are more likely to become civil servants. This is a result of (a) the role public 
employment in reducing unemployment and thus providing jobs for poorly educated 
people and (b) the highly competitive nature of entrance to the more senior permanent 
pensionable jobs in the sector, which attract a disproportionate number of highly 
educated people.
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Unemployment
The status of unemployment or in other words, the decision to seek work when out of 
work is an important component of our model. This is because of the use of the model 
to examine issues related to the tax-benefit system. Normally social benefits are only 
available to those of working age if they are seeking work or are otherwise excused 
from working due to illness or parenthood. This variable therefore is an important 
determinant.
It is realistic therefore that the decision to seek employment should depend on the 
decision of the other spouse in a couple. If both decide not to seek work if they are out 
of work, then they may not be eligible for benefits. To get around this, we include in the 
model the value of disposable income if they are unemployed and their spouse’s market 
income and dummy variables of the spouse’s decision not to participate or to seek 
employment. Lone parents can also be expected to be less likely to register as 
unemployed as they are entitled to benefits as a result of having children.
Three models are employed for men and women, one for those who were in 
employment in the previous period, one for those seeking work in the previous period 
and one for those out of work but not seeking work in the last period. Results are 
described in table 13. In most cases the coefficient on disposable income if unemployed 
is negative. Thus the higher the out of work income the less likely to seek work. For 
men the same is true for spouses original income, while for women the opposite is true. 
Thus the higher the spouses market income, the more likely they are to seek work. A 
number of factors explain this. Firstly higher education and income men are more likely 
to be in work and thus if not working more likely to seek work. This partially also 
related to the fact that they are likely to have had longer working durations and thus 
more likely to be eligible for social insurance benefits that do not depend on their 
spouses income. Table 14 describes the aggregate transition probabilities into and out of 
the state of unemployment. Probabilities are divided between whether an individual was 
in-work in the previous year or not. If an individual was out-of work the previous year, 
separate transition rates are given based on whether they were seeking work during the 
previous period or inactive.
Earnings
A number of different earnings variables are modelled, employment hourly earnings 
(table 15), employee income from secondary employment (table 16), non-agricultural
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self-employment earnings (table 17) and farm earnings (table 18). In each case standard 
human capital models are employed. There are however a number of possible other 
requirements. Firstly, as a dynamic model, it is desirable to include a dynamic 
component so that current earnings depend in some way on previous earnings. Because 
predicted earnings are to be used as part of the labour market participation, self- 
employment and part-time decisions, there may be selection bias. In other words the 
population who are in work may be different in some respects to the population out of 
work and as a result may have different earnings. Thirdly employee hours and wages 
should be jointly specified. Empirical studies in the USA have found that hours and 
wages should be jointly determined (Moffitt, 1986). The higher the number of hours the 
higher the wage rates all other things considered as over time more productive workers 
are more likely to get higher incomes.
Examining the first issue, dynamic earnings, ideally we should employ a structural 
wage equation for each earnings variable. Unfortunately however, at present the author 
only has access to cross-sectional earnings data. Therefore we can only explain cross- 
sectional variation. We therefore adopt a method adopted by Pudney (1992) who faced 
the same problem. A dynamic mode of earnings can be described as follows
y„ = +£„ where e„ = u„ + v„,,
a decomposition of individual and general error components. u„ describes an 
individual’s unobserved characteristics not included in the model. One however might 
expect the error terms to be correlated over time, in other words, cov(vnt,vnt-slXn) = 
ps.av2 (See Lilliard and Willis, 1978). However as in the case of Pudney, we cannot
• 0 9estimate the value of p, Gv or g u . We follow his approach and use estimates produced
by Lillard and Willis (1978) from US panel data to produce the following estimates, p = 
2 20.40 Gv =0.22 and Gu = 0.08. However, rather than using the cross-sectional variability 
implicit in the US earnings data, we use Irish specific total variation, utilising the 
assumption of independence of the u and v terms to produce alternative values of a v2 
and Gu2.
Turning to the second issue, selection bias can incorporated into earnings equations 
through the use of the Heckman procedure of estimating the effect of selection bias 
through the use of a jointly estimated earnings and participation model. This method 
was tried for each earnings equation, but was found to be not significant; a similar
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finding to that of Callan et al. (1999). Rather than jointly estimate hours and wage rates, 
we deal with the relationship by incorporating as Harding (1993) does hours worked as 
an explanatory variable.
In each case, we employ a human capital approach. Results are described in tables 15- 
18. Earnings are examined in relation to the individuals human capital variables, 
including directly observable education variables and implicit measures of skill levels, 
measures of the durations in work and out of work. Recent literature has found that 
endogenising the process of schooling, increases the rate of return observed to higher 
levels of schooling. Although we do not endogenise schooling in this model, family 
background characteristics and period when education was undertaken are included in 
the model of educational attainment.
Occupation is also included as explanatory variables. Nickell (1982) describes a number 
of reasons why occupation can influence an individuals wage. Reasons include, the 
costly training necessary for high level occupations and also the entry restrictions which 
result from ability family connections, type of schooling and access to capital markets. 
Other occupational characteristics such as being employed in the public sector or having 
a management position. Intergenerational mobility is incorporated through the inclusion 
of father’s education level as an explanatory variable.
As discussed earlier, it is important to distinguish between those in stable and those in 
marginal employment. Firms are liable to offer similar conditions year on year adjusted 
for productivity. This is especially the case for those with stable jobs. In other words 
wage rates and hours offered are likely to be related. Those in the less stable sector are 
likely to have lower wages. This is partially taken into consideration by incorporating 
experience and duration out of the labour market into the model. To incorporate these 
characteristics, we include a variable that accounts for pension membership and also 
whether an individual was in the labour market in the previous period. In addition to 
having lower wages, marginal workers are also likely to have more variable wages. 
Ideally again it would be useful to examine panel data to get estimates of the variability 
of p by age, by hours-worked etc. However instead we simply vary total variability by 
measures that are likely to be related to being in marginal employment, education 
occupation levels.
7.3. Capital Income
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Under the heading of capital income, we include investment income, property income 
and private pension income. Although income from savings is relatively unimportant 
for the population as a whole, they are quite important for the elderly. We describe 
models for each type of income.
In describing a model of savings income one should have a life-cycle model of savings 
and consumption, together with the ensuing impact on wealth accumulation, through the 
portfolio choice. Income from savings as a result is a combination of capital gains, 
returns on investments in the form of rent, interest or dividends or the realisation of 
long-term savings instruments such as private/occupational pensions plans.
Although there is potential to' produce a savings model through the use of expenditure 
data, the 1994 Household Budget Survey. This data is cross-sectional only. In this 
dataset, due to transitional factors those on low incomes are likely to spend much more 
than they receive in income. Thus for this income group there is substantial dissaving. 
However in the absence of both panel information and information on the extent of 
personal wealth, it is not possible to use this data to produce a dynamic savings model. 
Wealth information exists independently in the 1987 Survey o f Life-style and Usage o f 
State Services. Although the data is poor, it may be possible to statistically match this 
data with 1987 expenditure information, utilising common variables. Another problem 
relates to the general under-reporting of income relative expenditure in this data source; 
only in the top two deciles of gross income is there observed net saving. As a result, 
micro data is likely to under-report net savings. The approach we take here is to 
simulate private pension income deterministically on the basis of a stochastic model of 
pension membership and do as Harding (1993) did, estimate income equations for 
investment and property income.
Private Pensions
Some other models such as Harding (1993) treat the pension savings process as 
exogenous and simply assign pension income to pensioners on the basis of individual 
characteristics using an econometric equation. The second option is to simulate the 
accumulation process, whereby membership of a pension scheme is simulated and 
subsequently pension contributions and resulting benefits are simulated. This process 
has the advantage of being able to carry out experiments on pensions behaviour and its 
tax treatment. This latter approach is that taken by models which have studied pensions 
behaviour including CORSIM, DYNAMOD, PENSIM and PRISM.
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Our choice is difficult as we would like to be able to simulate private pensions. 
However without detailed longitudinal data, relating to pensions behaviour, this is 
difficult to do. The only data currently available is aggregate information from a special 
sample of employers, from the 1995 Labour Force Study and a special 1995 Survey of 
Pension coverage. At the micro level, all we have is knowledge about current scheme 
membership.
Simulating membership of a pension scheme involves a number of steps. Firstly we 
estimate a logit model of pension membership. Different models are estimated for 
employees and for the self-employed who are less likely to have pensions. Public sector 
workers are assumed to be members of their pension scheme These models take 
occupation, hours worked, experience, the size of employment income and other socio­
economic characteristics into account. Without panel data, simply using a model based 
on cross-section data would produce too much mobility. For now we assume that once 
someone becomes a member of a pension plane, they continue as a member once joined, 
unless they lose their job. Transition probabilities are generated to create the same 
cross-section membership rates. This method it should be noted ignores a number of 
features. Firstly it ignores period effects. Hughes and Whelan (1995) noted that pension 
coverage rates pension coverage increased between the 1970’s and the 1980’s, but then 
decreased again between the 80’s and 90’s. Secondly it ignores the fact that individuals 
who move between jobs do not necessarily continue as a pension member. An issue that 
is an important influence on this process is the transferability rules of the pension 
scheme. It is hoped that with access to the 1995 wave which has detailed pension plan 
membership variables, plus the added panel dimension that the pension membership 
model can be improved.
Membership is only simulated for those in work. Although there are cases of individuals 
not in work who contribute to their pension scheme, this percentage is very low at 1.5% 
(Hughes and Whelan, 1996).
Once membership of a pension plan is estimated, we need to determine what type of 
pension plan an individual is a member of. Decisions which need to be made include 
whether a plan is a defined benefit or defined contribution plan, the benefit entitlements 
and the contributory requirements needed to fund these benefits. There are a number of 
approaches used, including the generation of hypothetical plans on the basis of average 
provisions or secondly to assign individuals characteristics of an actual plan. The former
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approach is that which has typically been employed in Dynamic models, including 
PENSIM and DYNASIM. Here individuals are assigned average characteristics of 
pension schemes. More innovatively, the PRISM model in the USA assigns members to 
actual pension plans on the basis of a database it holds of pension plan rules. In the 
future it may be possible to use the latter approach, as Hughes and Whelan collected a 
database. However for now we take a relatively simple approach. In a funded pension 
scheme, there are three sources of income to the fund: employee contributions, 
employer contributions and fund earnings. There are also a number of withdrawals 
including taxation, administration costs and payments to the member. As we are only 
interested in disposable income, we take the funding of the pension plan as being 
exogenous, assuming that individuals pay an average pension contribution rate, that 
pensioners receive pension benefits equal to the number of years worked/60 times their 
final pensionable income. Thus all pension members are assumed to be in defined 
benefit plan. All fund short falls are deemed to be made out of employer contributions. 
In the case of the self-employed higher contribution rates are assumed. Clearly this is 
simplistic, ignoring much of the heterogeneity of plan membership. This however has 
been postponed for future research.
Investment and Property Income
In this section we discuss the simulation of other incomes which result from the 
accumulation of assets. Ownership of assets can supply both cash income and resources 
that can be used in the future. Capital income can also be broken up into the types of 
income provided such as rent, cash income in the form of interest (both positive in the 
form of investments and negative in the form of loans), cash income in the form of 
dividends, cash income in the form of capital gains and non-cash incomes in the form of 
benefits in kind resulting from the ownership of durable assets such as housing and 
household appliances.
The accumulation of wealth and its usage is an important determination of current and 
potential.living standards. In constructing a dynamic microsimulation model, we ideally 
therefore would like to simulate this process in a similar manner to the accumulation 
processes outlined above for pension income. (However there is a slight difference 
between pensions and other investments in that often individual specific funds may not 
be accumulated, in the case of company defined benefit funds and PAYG systems.) We 
can also draw an analogy to the modelling of labour market earnings which are partially 
accounted for as returns to human capital accumulation, for which we use experience
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and education as proxies. The processes that result in the accumulation of wealth 
include savings behaviour which relates to the individuals contribution to their wealth 
accumulation and inheritances.
Savings behaviour is the main way in which individuals can influence their own capital 
accumulation and thus the size of their capital income. Ideally a model of savings 
behaviour should incorporate the main aspects of theory of savings. Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1980) outline a number of theories which influence savings decisions including 
the life-cycle motive, the precautionary motive and the bequest motive. The life-cycle 
motive revolves around the transfer of income across the lifecycle to when income does 
not match consumption. Examples include saving for retirement, financing education or 
house purchase. The second motive refers to savings for a rainy day, savings which can 
insure individuals against unexpected income or consumption shocks such as medical 
problems or unemployment. The final theory of savings refers to the desire of 
individuals to save in order to make bequest to later generations.
68As outlined above we intend to ignore the capital accumulation process at present. 
Ignoring wealth accumulation, we also ignore bequests. Instead we estimate for 
investment and property income, we estimate a two step model. Firstly we, estimate a 
logit model derived from cross-section data which depends on the size of income, 
labour market experience, age, education and other characteristics to model the 
probability of having the income (See Tables 19 and 21). In order to avoid excessive 
fluctuations in the possession of capital incomes, we constrain the variability of holding 
these assets using the alignment process. OLS regressions are then used to predict 
average capital incomes (See Tables 20 and 21). Harding (1993) highlights that the log­
normal distribution may not adequately explain the distribution of capital incomes of 
those who actually have capital incomes. In this model, this feature needs further work.
68 Little published information exists about income resulting from household wealth in Ireland. A number 
of studies have looked at the concentration of wealth amongst households such as Lyons (1972 and 1975) 
who used estate tax information, Sandford and Morrissey (1985) who used data published relating to the 
wealth tax of the 1970’s and Nolan (1991 and 1997) and Honohan and Nolan (1993) who used a special 
household survey collected as part of the 1987 ESRI household survey.
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Table 7.1. Logit Model of Entry to work
Gender Male Male Female Female
Previous State In Work Out of Work In Work Out of Work
Farmer 3.155152** 2.462763** 5.818126** 4.806795**
Higher Professional -0.980 2.204623** 4.643494** 1.426053**
Lower Professional -0.413 0.686 4.035565** 1.283574**
Employers and Managers -1.168 1.823813** 4.460384** 1.994215**
Salaried Employees 0.170 1.396931** 5.546879** 1.071947**
Inter. Non-manual 0.028 1.452729** 6.297756** 1.963413**
Skilled manual 0.085 1.704272** 5.855839** 0.004
Semi-skilled -0.268 1.920689** 6.307966** 1.198978**
Unskilled -0.412 0.8081526** 4.599791** 2.908722**
Disposable 0 hours 0.000 -0.0000801* -0.00001 -0.00002
Marginal Disposable PT 0.0463169** -0.09992** 0.1315265** 0.008
Marginal Disposable FT 0.2737619** 0.0288636* 0.2529828** 0.031312**
Age -0.2863877** 0.2969358** -0.3427628** 0.2302391**
Age2 0.001 -0.0034442** 0.000 -0.0024182**
Married -0.230 2.184209** -0.9536416** -1.181522**
Lower Secondary Educated -0.268 0.071 1.077538** 0.067
Upper Secondary Educated -0.331 0.443286* 1.408424** 0.5121019**
Tertiary Educated -0.9389031* 0.6612704* 0.734 0.7868909**
Years in Work 0.1416991* -0.1066456** 0.2475233** -0.1037943**
Years Unemployed -0.071 -0.5935624** -0.168 -0.4841042**
Years Disabled -0.074 -0.112 0.973 -0.263
Years Inactive -0.316 -1.061621** 0.3160017** -0.1055354**
Years in Work2 -0.000487 0.000039 0.000 -0.00017
Years Unemployed2 0.0037296* 0.0186892** 0.012 0.0094854**
Father Ed. 2 (Low Sec) 0.064 -0.4531982* 0.065 0.3619669*
Father Ed. 3 (Up Sec) -0.057 0.078 0.189 0.236
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Father Ed. 4 (Other Tert.) 3.537258** 1.306095* 0.030 0.441
Father Ed. 5 (Under Grad.) 1.095 -1.652036* -0.9831641* 0.360
Father Ed. 6 (Postgrad.) -0.117 -0.412 -0.065 -0.758
Lone Parent -0.227 0.828 -0.410 -1.825754**
Number of Children age 0-5 0.5813782** -0.3455962* -0.3569691* -0.9314574**
Number of Children (6-20) 0.123 -0.091 0.309** -0.069
Spouse Unemployed 1.199516** 0.404 0.330 -0.242
Spouse Inactive 4.974478** -1.175731** 2.697329** 0.3857665*
Constant 4.799297** -5.273911** -0.511 -5.119761**
Proportion at Zero 0.927 0.34962406 0.87 0.15908142
Number of Observations 2832 1064 1458 2395
Log-Likelihood -414.7 -454 -335.7 -761
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.34 0.41 0.27
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.2. Probabilities of Working by Educational Status, Gender, and Work 
Status in the Previous Year.
Male Female
Out o f Work in Previous Period
Education Lower Upper Third Lower Upper Third
Level Secondary Secondary Level Secondary Secondary Level
15 0.175 0.412 0.000 0.139 0.329 0.000
20 0.232 0.554 0.696 0.131 0.262 0.584
30 0.263 0.380 0.285 0.122 0.142 0.244
40 0.214 0.327 0.780 0.107 0.203 0.332
50 0.278 0.168 0.526 0.077 0.185 0.147
60 0.084 0.142 0.338 0.045 0.024 0.097
In Work in Previous period
Education Lower Upper Third Lower Upper Third
Level Secondary Secondary Level Secondary Secondary Level
15 0.857 0.863 0.000 0.761 0.830 0.000
20 0.851 0.925 0.889 0.859 0.896 0.918
30 0.946 0.951 0.988 0.742 0.863 0.905
40 0.942 0.986 0.995 0.907 0.940 0.933
50 0.932 0.955 0.988 0.728 0.925 0.929
60 0.856 0.842 0.809 0.732 0.636 0.951
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 7.3. Probability of Entering Work after Education by highest education level 
achieved.
Employment/Total Unemployment/ Out of Work
Male Female Male Female
Primary 0.30 0.24 0.89 0.81
Lower Secondary 0.72 0.61 0.96 0.78
Upper Secondary 0.79 0.74 0.85 0.64
Upper Secondary plus Vocational 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.76
Source 1996 School Leavers Survey
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Table 7.4. First Destinations of University Leavers (1993). (As a proportion of 
those who entered the labour market)
Undergraduate In-work Not In Work
Undergraduate
Arts and Social Science 81.9 18.1
Science 72.1 27.9
Commerce 84.7 15.3
Medicine 95.9 4.1
Engineering 75.1 24.9
Law 80.3 19.7
Agriculture 65.7 34.3
Veterinary Science 100.0 0.0
Architecture 92.5 7.5
Food Science 60.5 39.5
Postgraduate 87.4 12.6
Source: Higher Education Authority First Destinations of Graduates 1993.
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Table 7.5. Probability of Entering Employment on entering work or 
unemployment if not in work after finishing education
Employment Unemployment
Male Female Male Female
17 0.33 0.82 0.667 0.6667
18 1.00 0.85 0.808 0.619
19 1.00 0.93 0.741 0.5455
20 0.94 0.84 0.870 0.6129
21 0.96 0.92 0.786 0.5
22 0.95 0.88 0.962 0.381
23 0.89 0.89 0.800 0.5429
24 0.91 0.82 0.862 0.24
25 1.00 0.88 0.864 0.3636
26 0.96 0.95 0.800 0.1739
27 0.94 0.75 0.857 0.1875
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
207
Table 7.6. Logit Model of Transition into Employment
Previous Employment Status In Work Out of Work
Gender Male Female Male Female
Previous Employment E/NE E/NE NE NE
Farmer -0.9148349* o** -4.622964** 0**
Higher Professional -1.290697* -3.79246 -2.026616* 0**
Lower Professional -0.11238 -1.07111 -3.25537** 0**
Employers and Managers -3.071644** -7.135977** -2.82397** 0**
Salaried Employees 1.66709 9.040285** o** 0**
Inter. Non-manual 2.112046** -2.09522 o** 0**
Skilled -1.195832** -1.73922 0.52102 0**
Unskilled 0.35178 o** 1.36651 0**
Disposable Income if Self- 
employed
-0.0014231** -0.0031864* 0.00095 0.0015647*
Disposable Income if 
Employed Full-time
0.0016973** 0.0036285** -0.00086 -0.0014951*
Employee last period 7.253409** 13.96386** -0.16691 0**
Age 0.3273023* -0.33978 0.00086 -0.03956
Age2 -0.0034131* 0.00366 -0.51201 -0.00038
Married -0.06111 -2.212259* -0.68322 -0.77110
Lower Secondary Educated 0.55862 0.64013 -0.40090 -0.31172
Upper Secondary Educated 0.15601 1.45533 0.65375 0.07365
University Educated 0.61192 4.34570 -0.06073 -0.08248
Years in Work -0.11742 0.51008 -0.11816 -0.01785
Years Unemployed -0.3729091** -0.41360 0.158093* 0.00335
Years Disabled 0.44655 o** O** -0.06323
Years Inactive -1.064696* 0.23054 0.00205 0**
Years in Work2 0.00129 -0.00819 0.00491 0.00021
Years Unemployed2 0.0098526** 0.15792 -0.04335 -0.00029
Number of Children (0-5) -0.03914 -0.19987 -0.03233 0.05136
Number of Children (6-20) 0.17496 1.995099* Q** -0.29763
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Spouse Unemployed -2.335672** 2.62466 0.43913 0**
Spouse Inactive 0.09858 -1.29174 7.480918** 0.20668
Constant -8.112857** -5.03313 7.465671** 4.189831**
Proportion at Zero 0.944667201 0.944667201
/ \  
1247
0.18
Number of Observations 1247 362
Log-Likelihood -31.5 -31.5 -93.8
Pseudo R2 0.88 0.88 0.44
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Note . E means formerly in Employment, NE means Formerly not in employment
tf
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Table 7.7. Transition Probabilities of Entering/Leaving Employment
Previous Work Status In Work Out of Work
Current Period SE E SE E SE E
Last Period SE SE E E
Age Female
16 0.50 0.50 0.02 0.98 0.06 0.94
20 0.89 0.11 0.02 0.98 0.13 0.87
25 0.87 0.13 0.01 0.99 0.26 0.74
30 0.95 0.05 0.01 0.99 0.18 0.82
35 0.93 0.07 0.01 0.99 0.21 0.79
40 0.95 0.05 0.01 0.99 0.29 0.71
45 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.99 0.13 0.88
50 0.97 0.03 0.02 0.98 0.67 0.33
55 0.95 0.05 0.03 0.98 0.20 0.80
60 0.90 0.10 0.06 0.94 0.20 0.80
Age Male
16 0.86 0.14 0.01 0.99 0.19 0.81
20 0.94 0.06 0.01 0.99 0.19 0.81
25 0.98 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.24 0.76
30 0.97 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42
35 0.99 0.01 0.02 0.98 0.69 0.31
40 0.99 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.57
45 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.33 0.67
50 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.89 0.11
55 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.29 0.71
60 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 1.00
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.8. Logit Model of Probability of Entering Part-time Employment
Male Female
c  . , . • . -1.000857** Employee last period -2.385227**
Disposable 0 hours -0.00003 
Marginal Disposable PT 0.081722** 
Marginal Disposable FT -0.1225501**
. -0.3481652** Age
-0.00007
0.0249404**
-0.065752**
-0.1268077*
A 2 0.0033538** Age 0.00059
. . -1.007461* Marned 0.36113
0 41799Lower Secondary Educated -0.37598
Upper Secondary Educated 0*9^3652 -0.27165
1 668912**University Educated -0.08477
v  . . . .  ,0.1371762* Years m Work 0.0923687**
v  TT . , 0.4960619** Years Unemployed -0.15299
Years Disabled °*2817998* 0.14993
Years Inactive ° '21175 0.1731985**
,2-0.00094 Years in Work 0.00091
v  -0.009952** Years Unemployed -0.00312
Number of Children (0-5) ®-®2^88 0.2170689**
017564Number of Children (6-20) 0.6961717**
2 774805**Spouse Unemployed 0.9641812**
c . . 1.185883** Spouse Inactive -0.49011
Constant239864 1.17442
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.9. Transition Probabilities of Entering/Leaving Part-Time Employment
Previous Work Status 
Current Period 
Last Period
In Work 
FT 
FT
PT
FT
FT
PT
PT
PT
Out of Work 
FT P T
Age Group Female
16 1.000 0.000 0.278 0.722 0.766 0.234
20 0.990 0.010 0.571 0.429 0.880 0.120
25 0.990 0.010 0.571 0.429 0.880 0.120
30 0.977 0.023 0.400 0.600 0.724 0.276
35 0.977 0.023 0.400 0.600 0.724 0.276
40 0.938 0.062 0.293 0.707 0.739 0.261
45 0.938 0.062 0.293 0.707 0.739 0.261
50 0.919 0.081 0.320 0.680 0.423 0.577
55 0.919 0.081 0.320 0.680 0.423 0.577
60 1.000 0.000 0.429 0.571 0.600 0.400
Age Group Male
16 0.940 0.060 0.700 0.300 0.853 0.147
20 0.992 0.008 0.800 0.200 0.935 0.065
25 0.992 0.008 0.800 0.200 0.935 0.065
30 0.996 0.004 0.857 0.143 0.929 0.071
35 0.996 0.004 0.857 0.143 0.929 0.071
40 0.998 0.002 0.333 0.667 0.926 0.074
45 0.998 0.002 0.333 0.667 0.926 0.074
50 0.995 0.005 0.300 0.700 0.938 0.063
55 0.995 0.005 0.300 0.700 0.938 0.063
60 0.981 0.019 0.600 0.400 0.692 0.308
65 0.981 0.019 0.600 0.400 0.692 0.308
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 7.10. Logit Model of Probability of Becoming a Manager
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Male Female
Age -0.01 0.39
Farmer 1.38 0.00
Higher Professional 1.54 2.01
Lower Professional 1.20 1.73
Employers and Managers 3.91 4.12
Salaried Employees 0.81 0.97
Inter. Non-manual 1.04 1.14
Other non-manual 1.04 1.14
Skilled manual 1.04 0.72
Semi-skilled 0.15 0.41
Unknown occupation 1.57 0.00
Worked in Previous Period 0.89 1.57
Married 0.39 -0.10
Years in Education 0.08 -0.39
Years in Work 0.12 -0.33
Years Unemployed -0.15 -0.83
Years Disabled -0.35 0.01
Years Inactive -0.14 -0.40
Years in Education2 0.00 0.00
Years in Work2 0.00 0.00
Years Unemployed2 0.01 0.02
Father Ed. 2 (Low Sec) 0.32 -0.05
Father Ed. 3 (Up Sec) 0.60 0.04
Father Ed. 4 (Other Tert.) 0.49 -0.11
Father Ed. 5 (Under Grad.) 0.69 -0.17
Father Ed. 6 (Postgrad.) 0.85 1.12
Constant -4.58 -8.42
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 7.11. Aggregate Probabilities of becoming a Manager if an Employee
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Manager: 0 1 0 1
Age Group Male Female
16 0.941 0.059 0.935 0.065
20 0.836 0.164 0.828 0.172
25 0.730 0.270 0.752 0.248
30 0.738 0.262 0.678 0.322
35 0.685 0.315 0.575 0.425
40 0.682 0.318 0.552 0.448
45 0.716 0.284 0.548 0.452
50 0.655 0.345 0.589 0.411
55 0.651 0.349 0.590 0.410
60 0.500 0.500 0.646 0.354
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 7.12. Probability of working in Public Service if an Employee
Male Female
Less than Primary 0.34 0.18
Primary 0.41 0.38
Lower Secondary 0.28 0.17
Upper Secondary 0.35 0.32
Tertiary 0.44 0.55
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.13. Logit Model of seeking work and thus becoming Unemployed if Out of
Work
Last Work Status Out of Work In Work
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female
Last Unemployment State U NU U NU NU NU
Spouse’s market income 0.009 0.072 -.00838* 0.037 -0.001 0.004
Household Market Income -0.011 -0.072 -0.001 -0.037 0.001 -0.004
Disposable Income if Unemployed -0.001** -0.0012** -0.0001** 0.000 -0.00027* 0.000
Age 0.086 -0.187 0.4193** 0.042 0.262 -0.032
Age2 0.000 0.000 -0.006** -0.002 -0.007** -0.004
Married 0.356 -1.467 5.06534* -1.8248** 0.210 -1.195
Lower Secondary Educated 0.189 3.0339** 0.365 0.196 0.86729* -1.929*
Upper Secondary Educated -0.591 2.89618* 0.440 0.334 0.270 -1.893
University Educated -1.176 3.57024* 1.34773* 0.104 0.998 -1.828
Years in Work -0.122 -0.228 -0.419** 0.097 -0.009 0.297
Years Unemployed -0.006 0.3878* 0.209 -0.076 0.21879* 0.273
Years Disabled 0.105 -0.134 o** -0.034 0** 0**
Years Inactive o** -0.240 0** -0.024 0** 0.175
Years in Work2 0.001 0.022 0.0081** -0.001 0.005** -0.005
Father Ed. 2 (Low Sec) 0.926 -2.2376** 0.550 0.245 0.095 0.364
Father Ed. 3 (Up Sec) -0.225 2.011 0.472 0.027 0.619 -0.130
Father Ed. 4 (Other Tert.) -1.682 o** 0.995 1.334 0** 0**
Father Ed. 5 (Under Grad.) o** o** 1.148 0.180 1.863 0.089
Father Ed. 6 (Postgrad.) o** -1.935 Q * * Q * * 0** 0**
Lone Parent -2.2119* -2.3736* 3.02423* -4.0784** 0** -0.908
Number of Children (0-5) 0.24565* 1.19338* 0.055 -0.107 0.009 -0.689**
Number of Children (6-20) 0.363 -0.109 0.047 -0.293 0.293 -0.505
Spouse Inactive -1.147 o** -3.985* -1.726* 2.1081** 2.045
Constant 1.562 4.245 -4.9354** 0.425 -2.706 4.738
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.14. Transition Probabilities of seeking work and thus becoming
Unemployed if Out of Work
Previous Work Status 
Current Period 
Last Period
Out of Work 
NU 
NU
U
NU
NU
U
U
u
In Work 
NU U
Age Group Female
16 0.43 0.57 0.35 0.65 0.58 0.42
20 0.76 0.24 0.36 0.64 0.31 0.69
25 0.96 0.04 0.32 0.68 0.35 0.65
30 0.93 0.07 0.36 0.64 0.57 0.43
35 0.97 0.03 0.60 0.40 0.85 0.15
40 0.98 0.02 0.50 0.50 0.71 0.29
45 0.99 0.01 0.68 0.32 0.95 0.05
50 0.99 0.01 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25
55 0.99 0.01 0.63 0.37 0.98 0.02
60 1.00 0.00 0.93 0.07 1.00 0.00
Age Group Male
16 0.45 0.55 0.04 0.96 0.35 0.65
20 0.22 0.78 0.06 0.94 0.36 0.64
25 0.60 0.40 0.02 0.98 0.32 0.68
30 0.97 0.03 0.03 0.97 0.36 0.64
35 0.75 0.25 0.02 0.98 0.60 0.40
40 0.97 0.03 0.09 0.91 0.50 0.50
45 0.91 0.09 0.07 0.93 0.68 0.32
50 0.50 0.50 0.03 0.97 0.75 0.25
55 0.91 0.09 0.12 0.88 0.63 0.37
60 0.97 0.03 0.17 0.83 0.93 0.07
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Note U: Out of work and seeking work (Unemployed),, NU Not Unemployed
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Table 7.15. Hourly Logged Employee Earnings Equation
Variable Male Male Female Female
Age Group 16-22 23-65 16-22 23-65
Age 0.094 -0.0340771** 0.485 0.0190886*
Age2 -0.001 0.0003053* -0.011 0.000
Farmer 0.028 -0.9974675** -0.186 0**
Higher Professional 0.8002734** 0.5290941** 0.8800166** 3.205381**
Lower Professional 0.250 0.3321084** 0.7080922** 3.110241**
Employers and Managers 0.273 0.3584554** 0.479 2.95765**
Salaried Employees 0.233 0.2511267** 0.6573541** 2.923909**
Inter. Non-manual 0.138 0.107 0.337 2.622433**
Skilled manual 0.256 0.216747** 0.5298952* 2.808247**
Sem-skilled manual 0.4406093** 0.2231642** 0.7229319** 2.891422**
Unskilled 0.094 -0.033 0.431336* 2.679291**
Part-time work 0.2735025** 0.2648407** 0.1741177** 0.1191961**
Married 0.291 0.1187239** -0.099 0.0580057*
Number of Children aged 0-5 O** 0.012 0** -0.014
Number of Children aged 6-20 -0.130 -0.006 -0.014 0.015
Lower Secondary Educated -0.016 0.042 0** -0.031
Upper Secondary Educated -0.071 0.1710451** -0.045 0.0953867*
Tertiary Educated -0.068 0.2859277** 0.066 0.2976244**
Years in Work 0.0699847* 0.055794** 0.0703003* 0.0161707**
Years Unemployed 0.000 -0.005 -0.1809213** -0.011
Years Disabled 0** -0.0827146** -0.7914316* -0.036
Years Inactive -0.124 0.046 0.093 -0.0083938**
Years in Work2 -0.009 -0.0008518** -0.005 -0.0003072**
Years Unemployed! -0.015 0.0007653** 0.0303937** 0.0006948*
Public sector Worker -0.0882752** -0.0686455** -0.040 0.1648158**
Member of a Pension Scheme 0.4490786** 0.377767** 0.4903651** 0.2178539**
Manager 0.1953843** 0.1301084** 0.1397548* 0.006
217
Father Ed. 2 (Low Sec) -0.014 0.038 0.056 0.021
Father Ed. 3 (Up Sec) 0.078 0.158994** 0.1249265* -0.048
Father Ed. 4 (Other Tert.) -0.2417633** 0.005 -0.076 0.058
Father Ed. 5 (Under Grad.) 0.085 0.1457359** 0.017 0.179362**
Father Ed. 6 (Postgrad.) -0.4000061** -0.068 -0.064 0.032
Constant -0.788 1.337581** -5.003 -2.035481**
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.16. Logged Monthly Earnings Equation for Secondary Job
Variable Male Female
Age 0.031 0.011
Years in Work -0.017 0.012
Years Disabled -0.162 -0.016
Years Inactive -0.162 -0.016
Years in Education2 0.002 0.000
Private Sector 0.707 1.298
Manager -0.487 0.000
Farmer 0.154 0.000
Unemployed -0.024 0.159
Constant 4.231 4.607
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.17. Logged Monthly Earnings Equation from Non-Agricultural Self-
Employment
Variable Male Female
Age -0.089 0.000
Age2 0.000 0.000
Farmed in Last Period -1.075 0.000
Married 0.225 0.000
Years in Education 0.006 0.075
Years in Work 0.108 0.000
Years Unemployed -0.025 0.000
Years Disabled 0.333 0.000
Years Inactive -0.078 0.000
Years in Education2 0.011 0.000
Years in Work2 -0.001 0.000
Years Unemployed2 0.004 0.000
Father Ed. 2 (Low Sec) 0.211 0.000
Father Ed. 3 (Up Sec) -0.089 0.646
Father Ed. 4 (Other Tert.) 0.245 0.000
Father Ed. 5 (Under Grad.) 0.298 0.984
Father Ed. 6 (Postgrad.) -0.332 0.000
Constant 6.051 5.314
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.18. Logged Monthly Earnings Equation from Agricultural Self-
Employment
Variables Male Female
Farming Occupational Group 13.255 0.000
Age -1.165 0.364
Age2 0.002 0.003
Married -4.327 2.870
Years in Education 2.725 1.226
Years in Work 0.905 -0.713
Years Unemployed -1.155 -1.665
Years Disabled -0.417 -0.204
Years Inactive 6.463 -0.647
Years in Education2 -0.136 -0.124
Years in Work2 0.002 0.008
Years Unemployed2 0.054 -0.021
Number of Children 0.453 -0.101
Constant 10.049 -9.382
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 7.19. Logit Model of decision to be an investor
Variable Male Female
Employment Income 0.000506 0.022351
Self Employment Income 0.001489
Married 0.000183
Years in Education 0.171011 0.418299
Years in Work 0.034833 0.212557
Years in Not Participating 0.211289
Years in Education2 -0.00176 0.271554
Years in Work2 0.175724
Number of children -0.15667 0.172063
Spouse Unemployed -0.22579 0.172063
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Father Ed. 2 (Low Sec) 0.416254 0.311134
Father Ed. 3 (Up Sec) 0.787978 0.210626
Father Ed. 4 (Other Tert.) 0.212846
Father Ed. 5 (Under Grad.) 0.887609 9.05E-05
Father Ed. 6 (Postgrad.) 0.000836
Constant -3.41676 0.115555
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.20. Investment income
Variable Male Female
Age 0.06182 -0.11217
Age2 -0.00103 0.001597
Number of Children -0.03905
Married 5.62E-01 0.251925
Employment Income -0.00052
Private Sector 0.105226 0.527315
Manager 0.6979 0.659004
Years in Education 0.017587 -0.69184
Years in Work 0.042227
Years Unemployed 0.240242
Years Retired 0.10046
Years in Education2 0 0.032444
Years in Work2 0.008987
Years Unemployed2 -0.01278 -0.02582
Constant -0.58292 6.067734
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
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Table 7.21. Model of decision to be a property investor
Variable Male Female
Age 0.395219
Age2 -0.00312 0.000383
Investment Income 0.379912 0.00625
Employment Income -0.05872 -0.00019
Manager -0.35505
Private Sector 0.295618
Years in Education -1.91485 0.021564
Years Unemployed -0.6996
Years in Not Participating -0.92182
Constant -1.09487 -5.82818
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 7.22. Property income
Variable Male Female
Age 0.447597 0.021077
Age2 -0.00462
Married 0.592516
Self-Employment Income 0.000175
Years in Work 0
Years Retired 0.147412 -0.07808
Years in Education2 -0.00611 -0.00582
Years Unemployed -0.87787
Constant -5.35096 4.513248
Source: Author’s Calculations based on 1994 Living in Ireland Survey.
224
Figure 7.1. Overview of Labour M arket Processes
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Chapter 8. Life-Course Redistribution
8.1.Introduction
In chapter 3, we examined the extent of distribution of current income and the 
redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system, taking current monthly income as our 
accounting unit. In this part of the thesis, we consider inter-temporal aspects of 
redistribution. The dynamic microsimulation model described in chapters 4-7 has been 
used to generate a set of synthetic life-histories for a single cohort in Ireland. Behaviour 
is simulated according to a steady state world, assuming that all behaviour occurred as if 
individuals had been alive in the mid 1990’s.
This chapter considers the characteristics of the population over the life-course and the 
degree of redistribution at each point. The chapter is divided into a number of sections. 
Section 2 gives some background to redistribution over the life-course. It looks at a 
cross-section of the population in 1994 and considers the incidence of taxes and benefits 
for different groups. It also considers a number of outcome measures such as average 
income, the variation of income and the poverty rate for individuals at different parts of 
the life-course. Section 3 assesses the characteristics of the simulated population at each 
point of the life-course. Section 4 discusses some methodological issues related to the 
measurement of income. Section 5 considers how individuals interact with the tax- 
benefit system at different points of the life-cycle. In addition to considering the 
incidence of taxes and benefits, it also looks at the variability of income and how much 
the tax-benefit system reduces this variability. Section 6 decomposes the life-course to 
examine life-course redistribution for individuals with different education levels.
8.2.Background: Life-course Redistribution at a Point in Time
As background to this chapter we report the degree of redistribution and the 
characteristics of individuals at different points of the life-course at one point in time. In 
this we use a survey collected by the Economic and Social Research Institute, the 1994 
“Living in Ireland Survey”. It is a large-scale household survey conducted on the Irish
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population and contain information on income, labour market and demographic 
characteristics.
There are a number of methodological difficulties in measuring the incidence. Firstly 
payments targeted on children are paid to their parents. In this study, we assume that 
child and orphans’ benefits are incident on children, but that the child components of 
income replacement benefits such as unemployment assistance are incident on their 
parents. Secondly, the joint taxation of income may result in a lower taxation for 
married couples than for two singles. It may therefore be more appropriate to assign the 
full tax rate on the main earner with the tax reduction seen as a tax expenditure on the 
dependent spouse.
Table 1 outlines the average tax payments (including income tax and employee social 
insurance contributions) and average benefit receipts per month per person by age band 
in 1994. We notice that the average benefit per person increases with age. Average 
benefits are lowest for children because child benefits, although universal are relatively 
lower than income replacement benefits. Those of working age receive about the 
average payment per person. Although benefits are higher, coverage is lower as most 
people in these age groups are at work. Average benefits rise for older age groups with 
the very oldest least likely to have other sources of income. Taxes on the other hand 
peak for those of prime working age, between 30-50, with those in their 20's and 50's 
having on average relatively less due to lower earnings and lower participation rates 
respectively. Combining the taxes and benefits, we find the typical U-shape curve with 
the young and old being net beneficiaries and those of working ages being net 
contributors. In this section incidence of taxes and benefits by age is examined. A 
previous study in Ireland, Rottman et al. (1982) has examined the incidence by the 10 
stages as they define it of the family life cycle. They too find a similar conclusion that 
redistribution in the Irish tax-benefit system tends to shift resources towards families 
during the child rearing stages and in retirement from families at other stages.
The first part of table 1 details the average payment per person in each age band. 
Combining this with the distribution of the population, we get the distribution of taxes 
and benefits across the age band. In the data the population peaks in the teenage age- 
band, with the youngest cohort exhibiting the reduction in fertility over the last decade. 
The relatively smaller size of the older cohorts results in a much more even spread of 
expenditure across the age cohorts. As taxation is concentrated in the working age
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groups, the effect is similar to the age incidence distribution. We note however, the 
impact of the smaller cohort size of those in their fifties, who although paying more per 
capita, pay in total less than 80 per cent of that paid by the 20 's cohort and receive less 
than 70 per cent of benefits despite on average receiving more than twice as much per 
capita.
Given this distribution how does this affect the lifestyle outcomes of people of different 
ages. In table 2, we focus on an outcome measure, the numbers of different age groups 
in relative poverty, the standard of living of households with individuals from different 
age groups and the distribution of incomes for households of these types. Again the U I  
Survey of 1994 is used. The definition of poverty used is a percentage of median 
equivalised disposable income, where the square root of household size is the
equivalence scale, with individual weighting. Because the numbers in poverty are quite
& •
sensitive to the method us^, we describe poverty rates using 3 different percentages of 
median income, 50%, 60% and 70%. We notice one thing clearly that regardless of the 
poverty line used, children and elderly are most likely to be in poverty. This 
corresponds with Rottman et al.s (1982) conclusion based on data from the 1970’s that 
redistribution was not sufficient in relation to either dependency or low income. When 
one focuses on the 50% line, where we notice the concentration in poverty of the 25-44 
age group. This however features relates to the presence of children in their households. 
These results are confirmed in Callan et al. (1996) who find that poverty rates rose for 
children and elderly since the previous survey was carried out in 1987. This indicates 
that despite the distribution of public expenditure that is targeted particularly at children 
and the elderly, these groups are still relatively disadvantaged relative to the rest of the 
population.
Examining average incomes, we find again that families with children and especially 
elderly have below average standards of living as measured by the mean equivalised 
household disposable income. The reason for this is that although benefits do exist for 
children, they are not sufficient to maintain living standards at a level of those of 
families without children. For the elderly, the reason is because they are reliant on 
savings or benefits, which will tend to be lower than market labour incomes. The final 
column of table 2 reports the Gini inequality measure for households with individuals in 
the various age groups. The higher the value of the Gini measure the higher the income 
inequality. Here we see that inequality is greater at the extremes of the age distribution. 
Inequality is lowest for the 20-24 group, the group with the highest standard of living.
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This is because at the start of ones career there is less differentiation in earnings and 
people in this group will be less likely to have children. In the 20-55 age groups, 
inequality increases to about 0.32, due to the fact that some households will have 
children and some not. We also see the impact of children as the average standard of 
living falls for these groups, to a low for the 35-44 age group, before increasing again 
for the 45-54 age group. Inequality levels are low for children aged 5-14, but higher for 
children younger and older than this. However the average standard of living is low for 
the households with children in the 5-14 age group, even though this below average 
income is more evenly spread. Inequality is higher for other children because families 
with children in these age groups will have less children than families with children in 
the middle age groups. This is as a result of the fact that with young children some 
families will just have started to have children and for older children, children will start 
to leave home. For the 55-65 age group, the average standard of living although above 
average because of the existence of market incomes, falls. This is due to the fact that 
people will start to early retire in this age group and hence one sees income inequality 
rise significantly. Once most individuals have retired at the age of 65 household 
standard of living falls to the lowest amount and inequality also falls to the lowest level. 
Interestingly for the oldest pensioners, the standard of living rises. Although benefit 
levels increase slightly, the higher average income is a result of the fact that the over 
75’s once their spouse dies, may often move in with working age relatives and hence we 
see that inequality rises to the highest amount.
8.3. Life-Cycle patterns of behaviour.
In the previous section we examined the tax-benefit position of the population across 
the age spectrum. The population examined consists of different cohorts that lived 
through very different times and as a result are of very different sizes. In the rest of the 
chapter we utilise output from the dynamic microsimulation model described in chapter 
4-7 to look redistribution over the life-course for a synthetic simulated cohort.
Before discussing the trend in living standards over the lifecycle and the redistributive 
effect of the tax-benefit system, we shall firstly try to explain some of the main 
characteristics of life-cycle behaviour.
Table 3 describes the average characteristics of the males and females at different points 
of the life-course. Characteristics are classified under a number of headings,
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employment, family characteristics, education, occupation and parental background. 
The table reports only the adult population that has completed full-time education. 
Those currently in full-time education are excluded.
The employment rate of males is higher than that of females at each point of the life­
cycle. Over the main working years about 85% of males are in work, while for females 
only about 65% are in work. In both cases the employment rate over the lifecycle takes 
an inverted U shape, rising from the 20s to a peak and then falling as retirement 
approaches. The peak for females occurs at an earlier point than for males. For females 
the employment rate peaks in the 20-30 age group, while for males it occurs later in the 
30-50 age group. For both males and females, the employment rate falls over the 50s 
and 60s. In this model although early retirement is allowed, we do not simulate work 
during the post retirement period and so employment falls to zero at 66.
Unemployment in this context means that an individual is out of work and seeking 
work. Again for males the unemployment rate is higher than for females over the course 
of the life-cycle. The seeking work condition is primarily simulated because it is 
required for benefit eligibility purposes. Because most unemployment related benefits 
take a family based assessment unit, only one partner needs to seek work. This partially 
explains the difference in the unemployment rate. In the case of both genders, 
unemployment is higher during the earlier part of the life-cycle. Gradually as most of 
the cohorts get jobs or get married and thus have spouses who either have work or 
themselves claiming benefit, the percentage seeking work falls. For males however this 
trend reverses when the cohort reaches their fifties. At this point the employment rate 
falls. It seems much of this group seek work for a while, increasing the unemployment 
rate again. Over the age of 55, where individuals can avail of early retirement provisions 
in private and public pension schemes the proportion of this age group seeking work 
falls.
The family related variables highlight life-cycle changes. We see that the marriage rate 
rises rapidly over the twenties average 0.33 during this period to an average 0.8 in the 
thirties to a peak of 0.85 in the 40-50 age group. Although we are looking at a single 
cohort the marriage rates are different. This is as a result of slight difference in the 
distribution of males and females. In the Irish population there are slightly more males 
in a cohort than females. In a similar fashion the average number of children per person 
rises with age to a peak in the 40-50 age group. The biggest increase is between the 20-
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30 and 30-40 age bands due to the highest fertility rates for this age group. The unit of 
analysis is the nuclear family in this model. When children finish schooling or reach the 
age of 18 they are assumed to leave home.
Although educational, occupational and parental background characteristics do not 
change once full-time schooling is finished, we notice for these sets of variables that the 
composition for the different age bands varies a great deal. This is as a result of 
differential mortality. Mortality in this model is simulated on the basis of gender, age 
and occupation. Higher occupational groups such as the professional classes have lower 
mortality. Because education levels are related to parental background and own 
occupation is related to the education level achieved, we see differential mortality by 
these characteristics as well. Because of relatively low mortality during the main 
working ages, the percentage with these characteristics remains the same. However in 
retirement, we see that the proportion of university educated individuals rises, as they 
are more likely to live longer. For example the proportion of university educated males 
increases from 40% at age 66-70 to 50% for the over 80 age group. Similarly the 
percentage of professionals and employers/managers also rises, while lower education 
and occupational groups diminish. The relationship between parental education and 
mortality is modelled only indirectly and in fact we find that the percentage of 
individuals with parents with below upper secondary education levels actually 
increases.
8.4.Methodology
A number of income definitions are used in this analysis. The first definition is 
disposable, which is market income after taxes, contributions and benefits. We do not 
consider here, social insurance contributions paid by employers, as it is not clear on 
whom they are actually incident. Contributions paid employees in the public and private 
sector and by the self-employed are included in the analysis. Market income is the sum 
of employment earnings, self-employment earnings, farm income, income from a 
secondary job, investment income, property income and private pension income. In this 
study, we do not subtract housing costs from disposable income. A question raised by 
Bjorklund (1993) is whether capital income should be included in a measure of lifetime 
income. If capital income was solely the result of life-cycle savings, then one should 
more appropriately deduct savings from disposable income if one includes returns from 
savings as part of the lifetime income measure. This clearly the case for occupational
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pension provision. Therefore as pension contributions are accumulated to produce a 
pension in retirement, we subtract these contributions from disposable income. For the 
other sources of capital income, because we do not simulate wealth accumulation, we 
are not aware of the source of the wealth that results in capital income. It may be that 
this income results from bequests. Because capital income is relatively small, but 
important for some groups such as the elderly, we have decided to make the same 
assumptions as Bjorklund and leave investment and property income included in the 
definition of disposable income. We must note therefore that our estimates of lifetime 
welfare may therefore be an overestimate.
Disposable income is broken up into a further six components, market income, means 
tested social assistance benefits, social insurance benefits, income taxes, social 
contributions and income levies. All figures are for 1998 and the 1998 Irish tax-benefit 
system is simulated. These instruments are simulated by linking the dynamic model that 
produces a synthetic panel of the whole life-cycle of a single cohort with the 
EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model that was used to measure the level of 
redistribution over a cross-section of the Irish population.
To account for within household sharing, we make the assumption that individuals share 
resources equally within the household and that the household contains economies of 
scale resulting from living together. We utilise the equivalence scale of 1, 0.7 for adult 
dependants and 0.5 for child dependants aged 18 or under and in education.
8.5.Redistribution and the Life-Cycle
In this section we consider the distribution of income and the impact of redistribution 
over the life-cycle. In this analysis, we report separately the situation for men and 
women. In particular we focus on the inequality-reducing effect of the tax and benefit 
system.
Tables 4 describe average income components for males and females grouped by age 
band. We consider only the situation of those who have left schooling as we do not 
simulate income characteristics of the cohort’s parents and thus cannot estimate the 
standard of living of students.
We notice for both men and women that the trend of market income over the life-cycle 
has the familiar hump-backed shape. Although an actual cohort will tend to have rising
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market income until retirement, setting the discount rate equal to the average growth 
rate of incomes will result in this shape which is similar to what one would find in a 
cross-section. The ratio between female and male incomes is quite high initially, falling 
again in the thirties before rising in middle age due to the falling labour market 
participation rates of women relative to men. For women and especially men, average 
incomes rise after the age of 70. This is a result of differential mortality observed in 
table 3, where those with higher educational levels and occupations live longer. 
Consequently, the average income of the survivors increases.
In table 4, two measures of market and disposable income are described, individualised 
income that refers to income realised directly by the individual concerned and the 
second measure assumes that there is equal sharing of resources between spouses. 
Comparing individualised income and shared income we can see the effect of the 
assumption of sharing. We see the discrepancy between male and female income over 
the life-cycle, especially for the older ages.
We now return to look at the equalising effect of the tax-benefit system over the life­
cycle. We examine where in the life-course most redistribution occurs. We notice in 
table 4 the strong life-cycle related redistribution in the tax-benefit system due to the 
fact that equivalised disposable income is distributed across the life-course more equally 
than market incomes. The points of the life-cycle with the lowest disposable incomes 
(early working lives and retirement) are much closer to the periods with the highest 
incomes than is the case for market income.
This equalising effect is highlighted in figure 1, which plots the net benefit-tax rate 
(benefits minus taxes divided by market income) for both men and women over the life- 
course. Two measures are used, one where we consider the individual benefit-tax rate, 
where no sharing is assumed within the household. In the second measure, we assume 
that all components of disposable income, are shared equally within the household. We 
see that the points during the life-cycle with the highest market incomes ages 40-60, 
coincide with the highest benefit-tax rate.
We also notice here the degree of redistribution that takes place between men and 
women using both sharing assumptions. At every point on the age distribution the net 
benefit-tax rate for women is higher than for men. During the working ages the 
difference is quite small. Using the no sharing assumption, we see that the distinction 
between women and men is greater.
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The age distribution of the net benefit-tax rate for both men and women, except for the 
very top of the age distribution, has the expected U shape redistributing income to older 
and younger people from the working ages. Again returning to table 4 we find that, as 
one would expect from figure 1, income taxes are concentrated in the middle of the age 
distribution from 30-65. Income taxes due to progressivity, rise at a faster rate than 
market income. Part of the reason also for this is that the tax-base is wider than simply 
market income, including some benefits. Thus as benefits rise, the tax base widens as 
well. Income taxes for both genders fall initially in retirement, however at the end of the 
life-cycle, due to the differential mortality noted above, average tax rates increase again. 
This effect is stronger for men than for women. Also factors which influence life length 
also influence decisions to have a private pension and therefore men who survive into 
their 80’s are relatively better off than those who die in their 70’s or earlier, hence the 
rise in the average tax rate.
Turning to benefits, we find that social assistance rates tend to be focused on the 
youngest. This is partially due to the fact that as we see in table 3 that employment rates 
are lowest for the under 30’s. As they will often not have built up sufficient social 
insurance contributions to be entitled to social insurance benefits, they will primarily be 
reliant on means tested benefits. It must be noted that a single cohort model such as this 
ignores interactions with household members outside the core benefit unit. For example 
in Ireland, many young unemployed people live at home rather than by themselves. If 
this were the case then their means tested benefits would be reduced to take account of 
their parents income. We find that social insurance benefits are concentrated in the post 
retirement period due to the importance of the old age and retirement pensions. Child 
Benefits meanwhile follow the life-cycle effect of children.
Overall we find that the most important instruments for reducing life-cycle income 
variability are social assistance during the early working lives, income tax during the 
main working years and social insurance in retirement.
Table 4 described the pattern of average disposable income over the life-course as well 
as the impact of its components. In table 5, we describe the variability of income 
amongst individuals at various points of the life-course. We also consider the 
redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system in reducing the variability of market 
incomes at each point in the life-cycle. Here we take as a measure of the redistributive
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effect of taxes and benefits, a measure described in chapter 1, the Reynolds-Smolensky 
(R-S) Index. The higher the value of the index the more redistribution.
Here we see that for both disposable income and gross income, income variability is 
highest for the youngest and oldest age groups. This pattern corresponds with that 
reported in table 2 for the actual 1994 population. It appears however that the variability 
reported here is of an order of magnitude greater than that reported in table 2. The 
primary reason for this, as mentioned above, is that our simulation model ignores 
interactions with other household members. In Ireland the average household size is 3.4, 
one of the highest in Europe. This is partially because of a relatively higher birth rate, 
but mainly because young people often live with their parents and older people with 
their children. Because of the paucity of data, we are unable to model the process of 
household formation (as distinct to family formation) and as a result we focus solely on 
nuclear families in the simulated cohort. If one compares the Gini of the 1994 
population where the unit of analysis is the nuclear family, equal to 0.43, we see that it 
is quite similar to the variability found here.69 The differences highlight the important 
role the wider family plays as a means of financial support in Ireland.
In addition to reducing variability of incomes for the population on average over the 
life-course, the tax-benefit system also substantially reduces variability of incomes 
within these age bands. We notice the Reynolds-Smolensky Index, or the degree of 
redistribution within the age group is highest for the age groups with the highest 
variability of incomes, so that the variability of incomes after taxes and benefits is much 
more similar over the whole life-course of the cohort. Again we see the importance of 
income taxes during the working ages and social insurance in retirement. Although less 
important in terms of total expenditure, because of the degree of targeting, means-tested 
benefits are quite important sources of redistribution at each point of the life-cycle.
8.6.Decomposing Life-Course Behaviour and Redistribution
In the previous sections we described how behaviour, income sources and redistribution 
varies over life-course on average. In this section we consider how these characteristics 
and incomes differ for individuals with different education qualifications.
69 This based upon calculations made by the author using the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation 
model, where the 1998 tax-benefit system is simulated on the same data used to estimate this model.
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Table 6 describes the employment rate for individuals with different educational 
qualifications over the life-course. In order to validate outcomes simulated by the 
model, we compare life-cycle employment rates simulated by the dynamic 
microsimulation model with actual employment rates for the population as a whole 
taken from the a cross-section in 1994, the Living in Ireland Survey. When we compare 
simple average employment rates, we find that employment rates are much higher for 
the cohort for each age group than for the total population in 1994.
At first glance one may question the validity of the model. However when one 
decomposes by the employment rates for different educational attainment groups, we 
find that employment rates are much closer.70 The upward shift in the overall 
employment rates result from the compositional shift in the distribution of education 
levels in the population. The 1980’s and 1990’s saw a very large increase in the 
proportion of the population going on to post compulsory schooling and university. 
Thus there will be significant differences in the proportion with higher educational 
levels for older people. Correspondingly, employment rates are relatively higher for 
older age groups. This is especially true for women as the employment differential for 
women is more highly related to educational attainment. The upward shift in the 
educational attainment for women results in a much higher employment rate for women. 
Even for the 20-30 age group, the employment rate is slightly higher for the simulated 
cohort than for the 1994 population. Graduate employment rates improved dramatically 
over the mid 1990’s. Therefore, the 1994 population will reflect the poorer employment 
rate that had existed from the late 1980’s, while the simulated cohort will encompass the 
effect of the improved employment prospects.
Lastly the employment rate of women aged 50 or older even when decomposed by 
education level is higher in the simulated cohort than in the population. This is because 
of an observation made that there has been a behavioural shift, even when accounting 
for educational attainment between the participation rates of women between later 
generations and younger generations. We make the assumption in these simulations that 
women take the behaviour of younger women (aged under 35). By this we assume that a 
higher proportion of women will work continuously from when the leave education 
until they retire.
70 One must be caution about conclusions drawn for the population whose highest education level is lower 
secondary as the numbers involved are very small.
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Even when we compare employment rates by education level, we would still expect 
overall employment rates to be different. Firstly other characteristics that influence 
labour market behaviour such as the marital and fertility behaviour are different. 
Secondly the model primarily simulates the flow into and out of work rather than the 
stock in employment.
Table 7 describes these transition rates into work for men and women by their 
educational qualifications achieved and also by their work status during the previous 
year as estimated in 1993/1994 data. These numbers are based on the population of 
individuals who are not in education or retired in either year and so do not reflect 
transitions from education or retirement transitions. We see the high degree of 
persistence observed. For both men and women and for most age groups, for those in 
work, over 90 percent of individuals who worked in the previous period, work in the 
following period. For those who were not in work in the previous period the situation is 
very different. Here we observe that the transition rate into work is quite low. It is 
however higher for younger age groups. Out of work younger people are much more 
likely to move into employment. We especially notice that the more highly educated 
have higher transition rates. We see that 62 and 75 percent respectively of university 
educated 20-30 year old females and males who were out of work in one period move 
into work in the next. Only 20 per cent or less of upper secondary move into work.
We also decompose the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system over the lifecycle 
be educational attainment. Tables 8 and 9 report the distribution of disposable income 
and its components over the life-course decomposed by education level for males and 
females respectively.
We first notice that for each education level, the life-course distribution of average 
disposable income and its components follows a similar pattern to the population as a 
whole, rising to a peak in middle age, falling in retirement and then rising again in the 
older age groups due to differential mortality. We see that average income at all points 
of the life cycle for both males and females are positively related to education levels.
Turning to the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system, we see that the tax-benefit 
system reduces the variability of incomes across the life-cycle for all education groups. 
Figure 2 reports the tax-benefit rate for each education group for males and females 
separately. We again see the U-shape we saw for the population as a whole. Again we 
see the effect of differential mortality as the tax-benefit rate falls for those aged over 70.
237
For university graduates however, this fall in the benefit tax rate is less than that 
exhibited by the cohort as a whole. This gives further evidence to the fact that it is the 
increasing weight of the more highly educated in the population that leads to the fall in 
the benefit-tax rate. Differential mortality within the lower education groups is visible 
as those who had better life chances are more likely to live longer and thus the benefit- 
tax rate falls for these groups.
Life-cycle variability is reduced to a greater extent for lower education groups than for 
University educated. This reflects the progressive nature of the tax-benefit system, 
where groups with higher average incomes such University educated face higher 
average net tax rates. Again reflecting the progressive nature of the system, this effect is 
stronger for females than it is for males.
Turning to the driving forces of this redistribution, we find that for the university 
educated income taxes are more important as a proportion of income than for the less 
well educated. This effect is stronger for males than for females. Due to the regressivity 
of social insurance contributions, less well educated face a relatively higher rate. Private 
pension membership is more important for the better educated. While both social 
assistance and insurance benefits are more important instruments at all points in the life­
cycle for less well educated individuals, because of the need for work-based 
contribution histories, social insurance benefits are more evenly distributed across the 
life-cycle.
8.7.Conclusions
This chapter examined the degree of redistribution over the life-cycle. As background 
we considered the position of people at different parts of the life-cycle in 1994. The age 
incidence of taxes and benefits follows a familiar U-shape pattern, where benefits 
exceed taxes early in life and in retirement, while taxes exceed benefits in the main 
working years. As part of this analysis, we also considered some outcome measures. We 
considered the average equivalised household income for different age groups. Children 
and elderly were found to live in households with a lower standard of living than 
working age people. Poverty rates were also found to be higher for these groups.
This analysis however does not look at the life-course of a single cohort. Rather each 
part of the life-cycle here is based on different cohorts having lived through different
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periods. It must be noted that the results of the cross-section and simulated cohort are 
not directly comparable for a number of reasons.
• As noted above in the data based examples, the unit of analysis is the household, 
while here we can only examine the family unit of analysis.
• In 1994, the social insurance system had not fully matured and therefore many elder 
pensioners were recipients of social assistance in 1994. Social Assistance therefore 
plays a more important role than in our simulated population, where the whole 
cohort is assumed to spend their lives paying contributions for social insurance 
pensions and then receiving them in retirement.
• A similar point can be made about the coverage of occupational pensions, where 
coverage in this cohort is higher than in the population as a whole in 1994.
• Another important difference that we will come back to later is that the average 
education level in this cohort is much higher than for the population as a whole. 
This will result in correspondingly higher employment rates.
• Lastly as a steady state model based on transition rates that applied at the start of an 
economic boom will produce higher stocks of employment than the stock that 
existed as a result of flows in the pre-boom period.
In later sections we utilise the dynamic microsimulation model described in chapters 4 -  
7 to simulate the life-course of a synthetic cohort. We first considered individual 
demographic and labour market behaviour over the life-cycle. Comparing employment 
rates of the simulated life-course with individuals with different life-courses in the 
1994, we find that total employment rates are higher in the simulated cohort. This is a 
result of the different education attainment of the simulated cohort and the population. 
Given the huge social and economic changes that have occurred in Ireland in the last 20 
years, a cohort of the population living their lives under mid 1990’s behaviour than the 
population that have lived their lives in the period to 1990. When one decomposes by 
education level, we find that employment rates across the life-cycle are quite similar to 
those experienced by the population in 1994.
The pattern of redistribution over the life-course is similar to that of the population, 
where the points during the life-cycle with the highest market incomes ages 40-60, 
coincide with the highest benefit-tax rate. The exception is the tax-benefit position of
the elderly. While the current elderly have relatively low education levels and low 
pension entitlement, the simulated cohort will have a much higher education level and 
much higher accumulated pension rights and savings. As a result income in retirement 
is much higher. We find also, that because the poorest people die earliest, that the 
benefit -  tax rate falls as the cohort ages through retirement as the oldest are richer on 
average than younger retired people.
In addition, at every point on the age distribution, especially in retirement, the net 
benefit-tax rate for women is higher than for men, indicating redistribution from males 
to females at each point of the lifecycle. This redistribution takes place both through the 
tax-benefit system as women on average receive more benefits than taxes relative to 
men and through the family. If one makes the assumption that there are equal sharing of 
resources within the household, then the net- tax-benefit position is even closer.
Overall we find that tax-benefit system substantially reduces life-course income 
variability. The most important instruments for reducing life-cycle income variability 
are social assistance during the early working lives, income tax during the main 
working years and social insurance in retirement.
Decomposing by education level, we see that the tax-benefit system reduces the 
variability of incomes across the life-cycle for all education groups. Life-cycle 
variability is reduced to a greater extent for lower education groups than for University 
educated. This reflects the progressive nature of the tax-benefit system, where groups 
with higher average incomes such University educated face higher average net tax rates. 
Again reflecting the progressive nature of the system, this effect is stronger for females 
than it is for males.
240
Tables and Figures
Table 8.1. Age Incidence of Benefits and Taxes in Ireland 1994
Age Group 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Total
Average per person
Benefit pp 20.2 25.5 75.9 84.9 83.9 81.2 169.0 237.8 263.7 78.2
Tax pp 0.0 4.0 118.2 180.2 187.2 138.8 34.1 4.1 0.3 79.6
Net Gain pp 20.2 21.5 -42.4 -95.2 -103.3 -57.6 134.9 233.7 263.3 -1.5
Distribution across population
Population 16.7 20.2 14.1 13.3 12.4 8.9 7.2 5.4 2.0 100
Benefits 4.3 6.6 13.7 14.4 13.3 9.2 15.5 16.4 6.6 100
Taxes 0.0 1.0 20.9 30.0 29.2 15.5 3.1 0.3 0.0 100
Source: LII (1994)
Table 8.2. Percentage of Age Group living in Households in Poverty, 1994
Age Group Poverty Line (M50) Poverty Line (M60) Poverty Line (M70) Average
Income
Gini
0-4 14.1 19.4 26.8 91.2 0.324
5-9 13.8 21.1 30.3 83.9 0.306
10-14 11.4 18.1 24.4 86.5 0.305
15-19 8.5 15.8 22.8 98.2 0.326
20-24 3.3 7.5 13.5 119.9 0.300
25-34 9.1 13.7 18.4 117.1 0.319
35-44 9.6 15.2 22.5 101.9 0.320
45-54 5.9 11.0 16.8 118.0 0.319
55-64 11.2 18.4 26.3 106.7 0.343
65-74 17.1 36.6 47.0 72.9 0.294
75- 14.3 35.4 48.9 77.0 0.348
Total 10.3 17.7 25.0 100.0 0.335
Source: Living in Ireland Survey, 1994.
Notes: 1. Definition of Poverty Line of MXX, as XX % of Median Equivalised Household Disposable 
Income, using Square Root of Household Size as the Equivalence Scale and weighted by the number of 
people.
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Table 8.3. Personal Characteristics by Age Group
Employment Family Education Occupation Parental Educ.
Age Group In work Unemp Marr LP Child UpSec Univ. Prof. Employers/
managers
Inter. Non­
man.
Other non­
man.
Skilled
man.
Losec Upsec Univ.
Males
18 0.69 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.61 0.22 0.18
20 0.76 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.60 0.34 0.15 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.64 0.19 0.17
30 0.85 0.13 0.80 0.00 1.17 0.55 0.40 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.65 0.18 0.17
40 0.86 0.09 0.85 0.00 1.25 0.55 0.40 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.64 0.19 0.17
50 0.83 0.12 0.84 0.00 0.32 0.55 0.40 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.64 0.19 0.17
60 0.70 0.08 0.79 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.41 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.63 0.19 0.18
66 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.40 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.63 0.19 0.18
70 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.42 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.65 0.19 0.16
80 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.50 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.28 0.69 0.16 0.15
Females
18 0.58 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.83 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.31 0.16 0.12 0.60 0.22 0.18
20 0.68 0.07 0.33 0.15 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.32 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.62 0.22 0.16
30 0.66 0.04 0,81 0.07 1.28 0.46 0.49 0.34 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.63 0.21 0.16
40 0.65 0.01 0.84 0.04 1.30 0.45 0.49 0.34 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.63 0.21 0.16
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50 0.60 0.01 0.81 0.02 0.32 0.45 0.50
60 0.50 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.51
66 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.51
70 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.51
80 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.58
Source: Author’s Calculations.
0.34 0.10 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.63 0.21 0.16
0.34 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.63 0.21 0.16
0.34 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.62 0.20 0.17
0.36 0.10 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.62 0.20 0.17
0.43 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.64 0.21 0.16
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Table 8.4. Average Equivalised Monthly Income by Age Group
Age
Group
Disposable
Income
Market
Income
Income
Tax
Social Insurance 
Contributions
Pension
Contributions
Income
Levy
Social
Assistance
Benefits
Social
Insurance
Benefits
Child
Benefits
Individualised Individualised 
Market Disposable 
Income Income
Males
18 642 773 184 28 4 13 84 14 0 774 643
20 676 896 231 28 17 17 65 6 1 1120 840
30 608 876 226 25 29 18 23 1 6 1640 1146
40 670 1002 274 26 39 20 20 2 6 1982 1331
50 754 1126 302 30 45 22 19 6 1 1896 1267
60 707 999 266 23 40 19 34 21 0 1529 1071
66 702 659 221 0 0 12 19 256 0 968 1029
70 768 751 258 0 0 14 21 269 0 1036 1068
80 1067 1197 454 0 0 24 13 335 0 1376 1123
Females
18 480 433 79 12 0 4 131 10 2 453 511
20 552 654 147 19 3 12 67 8 4 838 714
30 435 598 156 18 14 12 26 5 8 1120 821
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40 432 621 176 17 19
50 489 697 201 19 21
60 508 642 181 15 17
66 451 323 107 0 0
70 578 474 166 0 0
80 783 693 254 0 0
Source: Author’s Calculations.
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12 21 7 7 1179 821
13 23 21 1 1090 757
10 33 56 0 906 696
5 17 223 0 410 573
8 16 262 0 527 657
11 12 344 0 714 813
Table 8.5. Redistribution Outcome Measures by Age Group
Age Group Gini(Disp) Gini (Gross) R-S (System) R-S (SIB) R-S (SAB) R-S (CB) R-S (Tax) R-S (SIC) R-S(Levy) R-S(Pension
Contributions)
18 0.34 0.58 0.24 0.02 0.15 0.001 0.04 -0.034 0.003 0.001
20 0.38 0.54 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.003 0.03 0.001 0.002 0.002
30 0.41 0.48 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.006 0.02 -0.001 0.000 0.003
40 0.42 0.49 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.005 0.02 -0.001 0.000 0.003
50 0.43 0.49 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.001 0.02 -0.001 0.000 0.003
60 0.44 0.60 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.000 0.003
70 0.43 0.67 0.24 0.15 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.001 0.000
80 0.48 0.63 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.001 0.000
Source: Author’s Calculations. Note 1: Annualised income in £ per annum. 2. SIC means Social Insurance Contributions.
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Table 8.6. Employment Rate by Education Level
Age Group 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
Simulated Life-Course
Males
Lower Secondary 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.58 0.49
Upper Secondary 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.56
University 1.00 0.89 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.92
Total 0.69 0.76 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.70
Females
Lower Secondary 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.55 0.41 0.19
Upper Secondary 0.60 0.61 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.47
University 1.00 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.57
Total 0.58 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.50
Cross-Section Data
Males
Lower Secondary 0.47 0.60 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.49
Upper Secondary 0.43 0.72 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.40
University 0.58 0.75 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.87
Total 0.43 0.65 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.53
Females
Lower Secondary 0.22 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.24 0.18
Upper Secondary 0.39 0.67 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.13
University 0.59 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.39
Total 0.35 0.59 0.44 0.38 0.28 0.14
Source: Author’s Calculations.
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Table 8.7. Employment Rate by Education Level and previous Status
Age Group 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
In-work in previous period
Males
Lower Secondary 0.77 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.88
Upper Secondary 0.72 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.93
University 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97
Females
Lower Secondary 0.57 0.99 0.74 0.99 0.91 0.77
Upper Secondary 0.65 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.96
University 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94
Out of work in previous period
Males
Lower Secondary 0.53 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.09
Upper Secondary 0.67 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.02
University 0.75 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.31
Females
Lower Secondary 0.21 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.04
Upper Secondary 0.57 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03
University 0.62 0.31 0.17 0.11 0.01
Source: Author’s Calculations.
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Table 8.8. Life-course Incomes and Redistribution by Education Level for Males
Age Group Disposable 
Income
Market
Income
Income Social Insurance 
Tax Contributions
Pension
Contributions
Income
Levy
Social
Assistance
Benefits
Social
Insurance
Benefits
Child Individualised 
Benefits Market Income
Lower Secondary
18 475 450 72 17 2 5 115 7 0 450
20 383 364 63 12 6 5 101 3 2 536
30 325 380 79 12 11 8 43 1 10 895
40 371 466 109 14 15 9 42 0 9 1131
50 456 592 136 18 20 12 48 1 1 1028
60 435 520 109 13 15 11 63 0 0 828
66 409 241 74 0 0 5 94 152 0 359
71 479 286 91 0 0 6 91 199 0 392
80 686 517 179 0 0 11 57 303 0 580
Upper Secondary 
18 630 747 172 28 3 12 84 15 0 748
20 544 632 138 21 7 11 83 4 1 795
30 492 657 153 20 16 13 31 1 6 1223
40 538 753 192 22 23 15 28 2 6 1507
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50
60
66
71
80
584
494
511
564
786
817
612
370
450
762
200
148
115
147
276
24
15
0
0
0
26 16 27 5 1 1395
20 11 51 25 0 954
0 6 23 238 0 567
0 8 25 245 0 640
0 15 14 302 0 909
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Table 8.8 contd.
Age Group Disposable Market Income Social Insurance Pension Income Social Social Child Individualised
Income Income Tax Contributions Contributions Levy Assistance
Benefits
Insurance
Benefits
Benefits Market Income
University
20 963 1461 425 44 35 30 25 10 1 1803
30 808 1248 348 34 49 26 9 1 6 2320
40 890 1411 407 34 64 29 5 2 6 2739
50 1024 1614 460 39 73 32 5 9 1 2687
60 1025 1574 444 33 70 29 9 19 0 2382
66 ‘ 999 . 1106 385 0 0 22 5 294 0 1589
71 1062 1190 421 0 0 . 23 7 309 0 1638
80 1358 1657 642 0 0 33 8 368 0 1879
. Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 8.9. Life-course Incomes and Redistribution by Education Level for Females
Age Group Disposable
Income
Market
Income
Income
Tax
Social
Insurance
Contributio
ns
Pension
Contributions
Income Levy Social
Assistance
Benefits
Social
Insurance
Benefits
Child Benefits Individualised 
Market 
Income
Lower Secondary
18 346 140 21 3 0 0 223 0 7 159
20 270 133 16 3 1 1 143 0 15 240
30 182 101 15 3 0 2 84 2 15 244
i 40 260 262 51 6 4 4 54 0
9 506
50 248 253 49 6 4 5 55 1
2 404
60 251 188 39 4 2 2 77 32 0 226
66 240 78 19 0 0 0 60 121 0 97
71 316 90 22 0 0 0 42 205 0 90
80 432 95 24 0 0 0 8 353 0 95
Upper Secondary
-
18 486 447 81 13 0 4 124 12 1467
20 452 463 88 12 2 7 87 9 3 588
30 293 351 80 10 7 7 32 6 8 655
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40
50
60
66
71
80
264
302
381
345
460
655
327
372
419
167
296
486
81
94
105
49
96
167
10
10
10
0
0
0
8 6 26 9 8 660
9 6 25 24 2 603
10 6 29 63 0 579
0 1 19 209 0 212
0 3 18 245 0 333
0 5 17 324 0 492
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Table 8.9 contd.
Age Group Disposable
Income
Market
Income
Income
Tax
Social
Insurance
Contributio
ns
Pension
Contributions
Income Levy Social
Assistance
Benefits
Social
Insurance
Benefits
Child Benefits Individualised 
Market 
Income
18
University
702 937 231 29 4 19 35 9 4 938
20 597 884 242 27 22 19 13 3 7 1197
30 605 930 276 26 30 19 13 7 5 1653
40 683 1038 313 28 33 19 17 21 1 1730
50 645 883 261 21 25 15 33 52 0 1602
60 563 481 164 0 0 9 11 245 0 1260
66 706 666 240 0 0 13 12 282 0 627
71 887 863 325 0 0 16 8 356 0 757
80 844 836 307 2 1 16 8 326 0 896
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Figure 8.1. Net Benefit-Tax Rate by Age Group for Males and Females as 
measured by Equivalised Income components with sharing
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Figure 8.2. Net Tax-Benefit Rate by Education Level across the life-course
Males
Lower Secondary 
■Upper Secondary 
■University_______
0.90
0.70
0.50
0.30
•  0.10
6 0 '
-0.10
-0.30
-0.50
Age Group
Females
Lower Secondary 
■Upper Secondary 
■University_______
0.90
0.70
0.50
0.30
|  0.10
70 80
-0.10
-0.30
-0.50
Age Group
256
Chapter 9. Redistribution over the Lifetime
9.1.Introduction
Drawing on the life-course trajectories described in chapter 8, in this chapter, we 
aggregate over these trajectories to produce estimates of lifetime income. In chapter 3, 
we examined the degree of redistribution using short accounting periods. Here we 
examine the distribution of lifetime income and the level of redistribution over the 
lifetime.
The primary reasons for studying lifetime income is that income measures that cover 
short periods, a year for example, depend too much on chance. Short accounting periods 
will tend to increase the degree of income inequality measured within a population. This 
is because of the nature of short-term income volatility, life-cycle effects and different 
career trajectories. Empirically, panel studies have shown that there is considerable 
income mobility over time. For example Jarvis and Jenkins (1996) found that in Britain 
only 37% of the poorest decile group were still in the bottom decile after 4 years, 1991- 
1994. Bjorklund (1993), found in a study of market incomes in Sweden, that lifetime 
income dispersion was about 40% lower than that of annual income.
The first point relates to the impact of short-term mobility. For example, an individual, 
who becomes short-term unemployed from high paid employment, will be classified as 
poor in a snapshot at this time. However over their lifetime, they may be classified as 
rich. Friedman (1957) argued that potentially as much as 30% of the variation of annual 
incomes over a lifetime was due to transitory incomes. Nelissen (1998) felt that this 
percentage had probably increased over time due to greater mobility.
Turning to life-cycle effects, students may be classified as currently poor but in fact 
have been rich over the entire lifetime. At the other end of the life-cycle, pensioners will 
tend to be lower down the income distribution, but yet during their working lives, may 
have been higher up the distribution. Likewise child rearing periods are also likely to 
result in lower standards of living.
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Nelissen (1998) has highlighted the importance of career trajectories on lifetime 
income. Individuals who invest more in education are likely to have lower income 
earlier in their lifetimes, but will tend to have career trajectories, so that income levels 
generally pass out those with lower levels of income. Characteristics that result in 
higher education levels of education are also likely to be related to effects such as 
higher life expectancies. Annual information will not be able to incorporate this 
information.
For these reasons a number of writers have advocated that long-term income measures 
are better measures of welfare. Friedman (1957) advocated the use of a permanent 
income concept which ignored the effect of temporary income changes and life-cycle 
effects. Lifetime income therefore more fully explains an individuals potential standard 
of living.
Layard (1979) describes some of the methodological issues related to the measurement 
of lifetime income. The first issue he considers is the question of what discount rate to 
use. Because income is preferred earlier in ones life than later (interest can be earned on 
accumulated wealth), it is commonplace to use a discount rate when comparing incomes 
at different points in a lifecycle. Layard argues that if ability and interest rates are 
independent, then lower discount rates should be used. Harding (1993) however 
abstracts completely from discounting. She argues that as income growth tends to 
follow economic growth rates and because it is reasonable to set discount rates equal to 
the economic growth rates, discount rate and growth rates are equal to each other and 
thus cancel each other out. In this chapter, as in the case of similar studies for the 
Canada (Wolfson, 1988) and the UK, Falkingham and Hills, 1995) assume that discount 
rates and economic growth rates are equal. One problem highlighted by Falkingham and 
Hills (1995) is that not all income sources rise at the rate of economic growth. For 
example, in the UK, benefits and income tax thresholds tend to increase at the rate of 
prices rather than economic growth. Likewise, occupational pensions will tend to rise at 
a lower rate than growth. However, because their objective is to focus on the lifetime 
redistributive effect of a particular system, rather than the long term effect of 
government policy, they continue with Harding’s assumption. In Ireland, where, at least 
in the past 15 years, benefits and tax thresholds have tended to rise at a faster rate than 
prices, it is less of an issue.
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Another issue raised by Layard is the significance of lifetime length. He highlights the 
fact that those with same lifetime income but different lifetime lengths, will have 
different annual incomes. The person living longer will have lower welfare levels for 
each year of life. Annualising lifetime income by dividing by the years of life (or by the 
years of post schooling lifetime) may therefore be a better measure of lifetime average 
welfare. Another impact of annualising is that those with shorter lifetimes will tend to 
have higher annualised lifetime income. This is because, they will have proportionally 
less of their lifetimes in retirement, that tends to be a period of lower income and 
therefore proportionally more of their lifetime in work. Also having a longer lifetime, 
may result in higher transfers from the state, through pension payments for longer. In 
Caldwell et al. (1998), it was found that the longer length of life of those in higher 
social classes resulted in a much less progressive tax-benefit system over the lifetime.
Fiscal policy instruments that depend on income also tend to use short accounting 
periods (i.e. of a year or less). For example benefits and social insurance contributions 
depend on weekly income and income taxes, annual income. As a result during poor 
periods of the life-cycle individuals will tend to be net beneficiaries from redistributive 
polices and net losers at other times. For example, Callan and Nolan (1993 and 1999), 
using short accounting periods, found that taxes and benefits had a significant 
redistributive effect that became more important over time. However when one factors 
in the points about life-cycle income mobility, the redistributive effect of taxes and 
benefits may be less strong if a longer accounting period were used. Pensioners are one 
of the largest net beneficiaries from the tax-benefit system in any one period. As most 
pensioners receive contributory benefits, receipt of benefit represents a return on 
contributions made during the lifetime rather than as a pure distribution from rich to 
poor. Similarly short term unemployed may end up paying more back into the system 
when in work than they received out of work. Finally there are also life-cycle effects on 
earnings, with those with more experience receiving higher earnings. Because of the 
progressive nature of the income tax system, they will tend to pay a higher average tax 
rate during periods of their lifetime when in receipt of higher earnings. Harding (1993) 
quotes a number of other studies, including, Layard(1977), who finds that using short 
accounting periods “exaggerates the basic inequality of incomes and then it exaggerates 
the amount of redistribution” and
The chapter is designed as follows. Some initial results of the lifetime incidence of the 
tax-benefit system are shown in section 2. Section 3 investigates the distribution of
lifetime income in Ireland. The redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system, using 
lifetime income as a basis is also considered. The characteristics that influence lifetime 
income and redistribution are examined in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
9.2.Characteristics of the Population over the Lifetime
This section attempts to summarise average characteristics of the population over the 
lifetime. We consider family, demographic and labour market characteristics separately 
for males and females and by the level of education achieved.
Table 1 describes a summary measure of labour market activity over the lifetime. It 
reports the distribution of number of years not worked between leaving education and 
entering retirement, classifying individuals by gender and education level. In order to 
assess the validity of the simulated life-courses, we compare the proportion of 
individuals with no years out of work in the simulated population with that actually 
reported in the population in 1994.
Looking first at the proportion of the population who worked the entire period between 
finishing education and entering retirement (those with zero years out of work), we see 
that the rate is highly related to thie level of education achieved. 44 per cent of lower 
secondary educated males worked their entire lives, compared with 52 per cent of upper 
secondary educated and 75 per cent of university educated. Females typically have 
lower years in work regardless of education level. In addition to the level being different 
to males, the relative education related differential is greater for females than for males. 
While only 11 per cent of lower secondary educated females work their entire career, 
the ratio for upper secondary and university educated females is 35 and 52 per cent 
respectively.
For the remainder of the population, who spend part of their lives out of work, we find 
that regardless of gender or education level, the distribution of years not worked takes a 
bell shape around a mode. For males this mode tends to be 5 years lower than for 
females. For lower educated individuals, the mode occurs in the 10-20 years out of 
work range for men and in the 15-25 years out of work for women. For upper secondary 
the mode is in the 15-25 years range for men and 20-25 for women. Finally for 
university educated the mode is in the 15-20 range for men and 20-25 for women. 
Caution needs to be taken when drawing conclusions from this information. Although 
labour market transitions depend upon the duration in various employment states,
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labour market transitions are still based upon data from a two year period at a time of 
large changes in behaviour.
Finally comparing the simulated percentage of individuals with zero years out of work 
with the actual distribution in the 1994 data broken down by education level achieved, 
we see that this proportion is very similar in both cases. For males we look at the 
proportion of those aged 55-65 who spent none of their lifetime out of work. For 
women however because of a large step-change in the behaviour of women older and 
younger than 35, we look at the proportion of women in the younger age range who did 
not have any years out of work. Another note of caution relates to measurement error. 
The duration data contained in the data that is both used for validation and for the 
estimation of the labour market models is based on recollections. Individuals are likely 
not recall perfectly their careers by say ignoring short periods out of work or 
underestimate in general the proportion of their lives spent in secondary employment 
states (unemployment for those who predominantly worked and employment for those 
who predominantly were out of work). It is possible therefore that this recall data will 
over-estimate the amount of people who worked their entire careers.
In table 2, we consider some other personal characteristics. Personal characteristics 
considered include measures related to the family, labour market, occupation, and 
parental background and life length.
The first heading considered is the proportion of males and females contained in each of 
the education groups. We see that for females the education level is on average higher 
for females with nearly 50 per cent with university level qualifications compared with 
40 percent for males. As highlighted in the previous chapter, this reflects the huge 
expansion in tertiary education during the 1990s. Only about 5 per cent of males and 
females are simulated to leave school after the compulsory schooling period.
In general the more highly educated are more likely to marry. The education level 
differential however is not that strong for the proportion ever married. While 88 per cent 
of males with university education ever marry, 85 per cent of lower secondary educated 
marry. For females the differential is higher between lower and upper secondary at 82 
and 90 per cent respectively.
We now consider the lifetime labour market experience of different individuals. The 
labour market characteristics we consider are the average years spent in work, the
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average years when out of work spent unemployed and seeking work, the average 
number of years spent in employment as opposed to self-employment and the average 
number of years spent in part-time work. We see that males work more years than 
females. Females however spend a higher proportion of their time in work in 
employment. Males are much more likely to be self-employed. This reflects the 
importance of farming and small businesses in Ireland. In total about 20 per cent of 
male work years are spent in self-employment. Part-time work in general is less 
important in Ireland than in other countries. However as in other countries, part-time 
work is more important for females than it is for males. Males when out of work are 
more likely to seek work than women.
As we have seen in section 3 in this chapter and in the previous chapter, lifetime labour 
market outcomes are highly related to the education level achieved. Higher educated 
people are more likely to spend longer in work than less well-educated. As we have 
seen, this differential is stronger for women than it is for men. Because the lower 
educated spend longer out of work, they are also more likely to spend time seeking 
work. For males, those with upper secondary education spend a greater proportion of 
years in self-employment than for other education levels. For women however the self- 
employment rate increases with education level. Finally, while for females, part-time 
work is inversely related to education level, for males the opposite relation applies. One 
needs however be to be cautious about this result due to the small number of males 
actually simulated to be in part-time work.
Table 2 reports that females are more likely to be in the higher occupations such as 
professional and white collar non-manual occupations than males. We see a strong link 
between education and occupation. While historically women were more likely to 
undertake white collar jobs such as clerical positions, the greater proportion of females 
with university education results in a higher proportion of higher professionals. Males 
are more likely to be employers or managers or have lower non-manual and manual 
occupations.
Because of the relatively low levels of education amongst parents of the current 
generation, parental education is a less important determinant of educational outcomes. 
While children of university educated parents are more likely to go to university than 
children of less educated parents, the link is not very strong. Finally again while average 
life-length is related to education level, the relationship also is not very strong, with life-
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expectancy for males university educated males being 73.2 compared with 71.7 for 
upper educated males. For females the ratio is 81.7 to 78.7.
9.3.Lifetime Income
This section summarises the level of lifetime income and the characteristics that 
influence it. We decompose average lifetime disposable income into its components to 
indicate the relevant importance of different income sources. We also consider the 
influence of family, demographic and labour market characteristics. In measuring 
lifetime income we utilise the same income definitions that are described in chapter 8.
Table 3 describes the ratio of lifetime disposable income and its components for males 
and females. In column (1), we make the assumptions about the incidence of taxes and 
benefits described above, but assume no sharing. Thus the measures examined here are 
essentially individual incomes irrespective of the incomes of other people in the 
household. We notice that disposable income for males is 1.3 times that for females. For 
market income the ratio is 1.5. Thus over the lifetime there is redistribution from men to 
women.
We now consider the instruments that drive this redistribution. The higher the ratio of 
taxes and contributions relative to the ratio for market income, the more the 
redistribution. For benefits the lower the ratio is, the more the redistribution from males 
to females. We see that without sharing the ratio of income tax of males to females is 
lower than for market income, implying a relatively lower tax rate for men compared 
with their incomes. Part of the reason for this is that benefits are also included in the 
taxbase. Because females receive more benefits, their taxbase would increase relative to 
males. In addition, working men are more likely to have non-working spouses than 
working women. As a result of joint taxation, men will face lower tax rates. While the 
ratio of employee social insurance contributions is higher for men it is of the same order 
as for gross income and so there is little redistribution from men to women relative to 
their market income. Males are however far more likely to be members of occupational 
pension schemes and so the ratio of pension contributions is higher. For each of the 
benefits, women are more likely to be recipients than men. The ratio is closer for social 
assistance than social insurance benefits. As we saw in chapter 8, this is because social 
assistance is more important during the working life than insurance. Because of higher 
mortality rates for men than for women, less men survive during the years of retirement.
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The working years as a proportion of their whole lives are therefore relatively more 
important for males than females. Thus even though men have higher social insurance 
benefits per survivor in retirement, insurance benefits taken over their whole life are less 
on average than for women.
The previous paragraph relates more to the power over resources in households, rather 
than average living standards. This is because there is likely to be some degree of 
sharing within a household. In a cross-section, one can account for this by pooling 
income between members of the same unit and applying an equivalence scale to take 
account of economies of scale of living together. However over time the units do not 
remain constant. There is variation in the composition of household units due to 
marriage, dissolution, death and leaving home and thus there are particular problems in 
defining lifetime welfare measures of individuals. To account for actual living standards 
faced by individuals when members of multi-individual households, we assume some 
degree of sharing of resources within households and economies of scale. In assumption 
(2), we assume equal sharing of resources within the family. We also assume that there 
are economies of scale in having more than one person in the household, assuming an 
equivalence scale where a value of 1 is given for the first adult, .7 for other adults and .5 
for children under 18 and in education. The living standard of individuals in a 
household at a point in time is the equivalised household disposable income and 
summed over their lifetime to produce a lifetime welfare level. We do the same to the 
sub-components of disposable income to see how they impact on the standard of living.
The impact of our assumptions about sharing and economies of scale is that although 
men are still on average richer, average the ratio of male to female lifetime disposable 
and market incomes is closer. The average disposable income of males is 24 per cent 
more than females’. However the ratio of market income is still higher than the ratio for 
disposable income, indicating that the conclusion of a transfer of resources between 
gender over the lifetime is robust to assumptions about sharing.
So far we have examining only differences in average lifetime incomes and have 
ignored the influence of average life length. In assumption (3) we factor in the effect of 
life-length considering average standard of living for the years individuals were alive.
^  Because men live longer than women, we find that although we use the same income
^  11 1
concept as assumption (2), the average living standard gap between for women and men
widens.
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In table 4 we examine the relative lifetime incomes of males and females with different 
education levels. Again we decompose total lifetime disposable income into its 
constituent components. Here we take assumption 3, that life length adjusted income is 
shared equally within the household and that 1/0.7/0.5 equivalence scale is used. As one 
would expect, for both males and females, the higher educated have higher disposable 
income than the less well educated. Males, in terms of both market and disposable 
income, have a higher premium for university education relative to the average than for 
females. However, for females, the differential of university and upper secondary is 
greater. Turning to the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system we find that 
redistribution is greatest for females. For each education level, the gap between the 
relative disposable and gross incomes is greater for females than for males.
So far we have considered the relative welfare of men and women and the effect of 
educational qualifications. We are also interested in quantifying the effect of other 
characteristics on lifetime income and their components. In order to do this, we employ 
a regression method, taking the relevant equivalised market income or disposable 
income as regressor and various demographic, human capital and labour market 
characteristics as explanatory variables. We do not annualise income in this instance, so 
that we can determine the influence of life length on lifetime income.
Table 5 reports the impact of personal characteristics on lifetime disposable and market 
income. We note that in both cases signs and relative values of coefficients are similar. 
Life-length and years worked are important positive influences on lifetime income. We 
also see that occupation has an important influence, with as expected, being employers 
and managers or professionals, having the highest influence on income, with non- 
manual workers having the lowest. The relationship with education is as expected, with 
higher education levels as we saw in table 4 being positively correlated with both 
market and disposable income. We also notice that being married has a negative 
influence on equivalised income. Although those in work are more likely to marry, as 
are those in the relatively higher earning occupations, these characteristics are likely to 
be correlated with other factors. Having children, because public transfers are 
proportionally less than the equivalence scale used, results in a lower standard of living 
than if the families did not have children.
Comparing the coefficients between market and disposable income, we can measure 
how the influence of different characteristics changes when the redistributive effect of
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the tax-benefit is included. Disposable income in this model is 20 per cent less on 
average than market income. As a result if these characteristics had the same absolute 
effect on both types of income, then coefficients would remain the same, with the 
coefficient on the constant adjusting by 20 per cent. This does not happen. The 
coefficient on the constant adjusts by the amount expected, but the relative contribution 
of the other characteristics changes. The impact of characteristics such as the labour 
market, human capital and gender fall in absolute terms as does the impact of children. 
All of these characteristics are important influences on income. The progressive nature 
of the tax-benefit system, will result in individuals with characteristics that positively 
influence income having their income reduced to a greater extent. Characteristics that 
are more likely to have lower incomes, will be more likely to receive benefits. The 
coefficient on life length and marriage increase however. The longer an individual lives 
the longer they will spend in retirement and hence the longer they will receive state 
benefits. Thus disposable income will increase relative to market income the longer they 
live. The equivalence scale used in this analysis assumes less economies of scale than 
that used for the tax-benefit system. As a result we see that the impact on marriage 
becomes even more negative.
9.4.The Distribution of Lifetime Income
In this section we examine the distribution of lifetime income and its composition. In 
this way, we can examine the lifetime redistributive effect of taxes and benefits.
Table 6 describes the distribution in quintiles of disposable income decomposed by 
income sub-components, income tax, social contributions, child, social assistance and 
insurance benefits. Individuals are ranked by annualised equivalent disposable and 
market incomes, where income is assumed to be shared equally between spouses in a 
family, and with the equivalence scale described in the previous section. Table 8 is 
equivalent, where we see that the tax-benefit system is quite equalising, when we 
contrast the distribution of market incomes and disposable incomes. While average 
annualised market incomes of the bottom disposable income quintile are only about 4% 
of average for the top quintile, disposable incomes are 13% of the top quintile.
Women are more likely, even under the assumption of shared incomes within a 
household, to be in the bottom of the income distribution. While two thirds of the
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bottom disposable income quintile are female, two thirds of the bottom quintile are 
males.
To examine the redistributive impact of tax benefit instruments, we consider incomes 
ranked by market incomes. Income tax is the most important instrument in the tax 
benefit system. We notice the progressivity of the income tax system, where income tax 
as a percentage of market income rises by market income quintile. The next most 
important instrument is social insurance benefits. Because eligibility for social 
insurance benefits depends upon having a work history, those in higher quintiles, 
receive on average more social insurance benefits. However taken as a percentage of 
market income we find that social insurance is quite targeted, where the relative amount 
falls with lifetime income. This is due to the lack of an earnings related component to 
the social insurance benefit system. Social insurance contributions themselves are 
largely flat rate across the income distribution. Because the social insurance system is 
not self-financing additional transfers are made from general progressive income 
taxation. Thus the social insurance system as a whole is quite redistributive. As one 
would expect means tested social assistance benefits are also targeted at the bottom of 
the income distribution. Although less important, child benefits too are proportionally 
more important to people at the bottom of the income distribution than at the top.
9.5.Redistribution: Lifetime versus Annual
We now consider the progressivity of lifetime taxes and benefits. As we saw in table 6, 
income taxes are quite highly targeted on the top of the income distribution, while social 
assistance benefits are more targeted on the bottom of the distribution. Table 7 uses 
statistical measures to quantify the progressivity and redistribution of the tax-benefit 
system. We use the Kakwani index, the difference between the Lorenz curve for market 
income and the concentration curve of the instrument to be examined to measure 
progressivity. We use the Reynolds-Smolensky index, which is the difference between 
the Lorenz curve for market income and the concentration curve of the sum of the 
instrument and market income taken together to measure the redistributive effect.71
Table 7 measures the redistributive effect of different instruments using two measures 
of income, annualised lifetime equivalent income and annual income. While chapter 3 
measures the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system on the 1994 population, it is
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not directly compatible with the measures described here. As highlighted in the chapter 
8, structure of the simulated population is very different from the 1994 cross-section. 
Higher levels of education and improved economic circumstances result in more of the 
population in work in the simulated cohort than in the population cross-section. 
Secondly the simulated cohort considers individuals grouped into a narrower family 
unit, ignoring other household members. The results in chapter 3 meanwhile consider 
the wider household as the unit of a analysis. As household sizes in Ireland are the 
largest in Europe due to the presence of other non-dependent individuals72, it is likely to 
have a strong effect on the Gini-based measures used here. Instead therefore we utilise a 
similar method to Harding (1993) and Falkingham and Hills (1995) to measure annual 
income. In a steady state the distribution of the annual incomes over the lifetime of a 
single cohort will be comparable to the distribution of incomes of a cross-section. 
Therefore we use the distribution of annual incomes over the lifetime of our cohort as 
our measure of the distribution of annual income.
Although the same equivalence scale is used, because income components are adjusted 
for life length, the rate of each instrument as a proportion of market income are not the 
same for the annual data and the lifetime data. The tax-benefit system taken as a whole 
has taxes and contributions greater than benefits. The net tax-benefit rate is about 20%. 
This compares to a largely revenue neutral system in chapter 3. While this may appear 
to be erroneous, if one considers what actually happened in the period since 1994 in 
Ireland, our figures are not so far from reality. During this period, employment rates and 
tax returns did increase substantially and benefit expenditure fell, resulting in very large 
current budget surpluses. The next chapter discusses these issues in more detail.
Overall, the entire tax-benefit system is less redistributive when one considers the entire 
lifetime compared with a point in time. This is consistent with the influence of mobility 
within the lifetime that results in individuals who pay taxes at one point and receive 
benefits at another point in the lifecycle. The system is more progressive when the 
annual accounting period is used than the lifetime.
We can decompose the overall redistributive effect into the impact of income taxes, 
social contributions, social assistance benefits and social insurance benefits. The 
redistributive effect of the income tax system is marginally lower over the lifetime,
71 Because reranking over lifetime income is less important than across a cross-section, we ignore 
horizontal equity here.
72 Individuals that are not married to the head of household or dependent children.
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again consistent with life-course mobility and because of the inclusion of income levies, 
which are less progressive. Overall income taxes are less redistributive over the cohort 
than over the population.
Turning to benefits, we find that average social assistance rates are slightly lower than 
for the population as a whole because of the higher incomes of the cohort. Progressivity 
and the redistributive effect of the assistance benefits are also slightly lower than the 
annual distribution. Social insurance benefits have about the same average benefit rate 
as for the population as a whole, however insurance benefits are less concentrated than 
for the population. This is best example of the influence of life-course mobility on the 
incidence of benefits. Because individuals are required to have a work record to receive 
insurance benefits, long term income for this group will be higher than for individuals 
who receive assistance benefits. Meanwhile if one focuses on a snapshot picture of the 
population as a cross-sectional analysis does, because benefits are flat rate benefits and 
less than average income, these individuals will appear to be in the lower portion of the 
income distribution. The converse of this explanation gives the reason for the lack of 
difference between cohort and cross-section for assistance benefits.
9.6.Decomposition of Lifetime Income by Personal Characteristics
This section considers the impact of personal characteristics on the distribution of 
lifetime income and the redistribution of taxes and benefits over the lifetime. 
Characteristics considered include Gender, Lifetime Labour Market Experience, Family 
Composition and Lifetime duration. We use the method due to Morduch and Sicular 
(1998), described in chapter 1 to do this.
We first consider the distribution of personal characteristics by annualised equivalent 
disposable income quintile in table 8. We notice that because of the equivalence scale 
and relatively low benefits, those with children are more likely to be in the bottom of 
the income distribution. Average years worked and time spent in unemployment are as 
expected, with work being concentrated in the top two quintiles. Average years worked 
in thisjjuintile is only about 6 year over the lifetime, and hence illustrating why social 
assistance payments are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution.
Interestingly, despite having taken life length into consideration, life length tends to 
increase with income. This is due to the impact of differential mortality. When we look 
at the bottom of the distribution for men, we notice that the average life-length is higher
than in the second quintile. This is due to the fact that benefits and pensions tend to be 
lower than working age incomes. Therefore those who live a long life will tend to have 
relatively lower annualised disposable income. This is a result found in other studies. In 
fact a number have found the relationship to reverse completely. However this may be 
due to the fact that decisions to take out private pensions have not been related to the 
factors which drive mortality such as socio-economic background which were found to 
be important factors.
Some of these characteristics may themselves be related to each other. For example life- 
length and social background are related. Here we utilise the approach due to Morduch 
and Sicular (1998) to examine the joint effect of these characteristics on the distribution 
of income. In this part of the discussion we examine non-annualised incomes as we 
would like to investigate the influence of life length on redistribution. In the USA, it 
was found that because richer people lived longer and because the worked less due to 
schooling and early retirement, the redistributive effect of the social security system was 
reversed (See Caldwell et al. 1998). The regressions described in section 3 have been 
used as the basis of this method. Table 9 describes the contribution different categories 
make to overall inequality. We notice that for market income, differences in labour 
market characteristics such as the number of years worked, the number of years 
unemployed and occupation etc are the most important factors driving the variability in 
market income. Human capital is the next most important characteristics. Family 
characteristics such as the number of children account only for about 6 per cent of total 
variability. Interestingly, we notice that when one examines disposable income we find 
that labour market characteristics have much less of an impact. This illustrates the 
impact the tax-benefit system has on reducing market inequalities. The contribution life 
length makes to this distribution is relatively limited at 5 per cent. This percentage 
remains the same for both measures. The impact of family on the variability of incomes 
falls.
9.7.Conclusions
This chapter assesses the redistributive effect of the Irish tax-benefit system over the 
lifetime. In order to generate a synthetic cohort to be used in this analysis, a dynamic 
microsimulation model is used. The principle conclusions are that broadly speaking the 
tax-benefit system over the lifetime redistributes from men to women, largely because
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of the income disparity between men and women in Ireland. This result is robust to 
assumptions about sharing between spouses within the household.
Overall the system redistributes from rich to poor, but the overall degree of 
redistribution is less than that exists from rich to poor when income is based on shorter 
accounting periods. The principle reason for this is because social insurance benefits are 
much less redistributive over the lifetime than at particular points in time. Because they 
are an insurance benefit, their object is to act as an income replacement mechanism 
during periods of low income. However because they are dependent on previous 
income, individuals who become eligible for these benefits must have had sufficient 
previous contributions and by extension income to be eligible. As a result, especially for 
long term instruments such as state pensions, these individuals will tend to be wealthier 
over the lifetime than individuals who do not meet these eligibility criteria, even though 
at one point in time when actually in receipt of these benefits they will be classified as 
poor.
In the final section we decomposed the inequality of incomes into the effect of personal 
income characteristics using a method due to Morduch and Sicular (1998). The most 
significant result was the impact of the tax-benefit system in reducing the inequality due 
to the effect labour market history and human capital have on incomes.
Our findings therefore confirm that the Irish tax-benefit system operates in a similar 
way to other countries that have applied this method (such as the UK, Australia and 
Italy) when redistribution is measured over the lifetime. The chapter has also 
highlighted the existence of intra-personal redistribution, a topic that will be examined 
in the next chapter.
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Tables and Figures
Table 9.1. Distribution of Years Not Worked between Leaving Education and
Retirement by Education Level
Simulated: 0 1 3 5 10 15 20 25 30+ 0
(Data)
Males
Lower
Secondary
44.4 3.7 0.0 3.7 18.5 22.2 3.7 0.0 3.7 49.9
Upper
Secondary
52.0 0.7 0.4 6.5 5.7 14.3 14.7 3.9 1.8 52.0
University
Females
74.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 7.0 11.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 74.1
Lower
Secondary
11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 44.4 40.7 0.0 0.0 10.3
Upper
Secondary
35.3 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.7 11.6 42.0 5.8 0.9 34.4
University 52.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.6 6.6 34.6 2.1 2.1 55.4
Source: Author’s Calculations and Living in Ireland Survey 1994.
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Table 9.2. Personal Characteristics by Level of Education Achieved
Male Female
Lower Sec. Upper Sec University Total Lower Sec. Upper Sec University Total
Percentage of Population 5.4 55.2 39.5 100.0 5.5 45.2 49.3 100.0
Ever Married 85.2 85.6 87.9 86.5 81.5 89.7 87.2 88.0
Number of children 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.1 2.0 1.4 1.8
Average Years Worked 25.1 33.0 39.4 35.1 16.2 24.4 33.0 28.2
Average Years Unemployed 13.7 8.1 1.2 5.7 0.6 1.8 0.9 1.3
Average Years as Employee 20.4 25.4 31.8 27.6 15.6 22.0 30.8 26.0
Average Years Part-time Work 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 2.9 2.4 1.9 2.2
Higher professional 0.0 0.0 23.6 9.3 0.0 0.0 24.3 12.0
Lower professional 0.0 0.0 19.6 7.7 0.0 11.7 33.7 21.9
Employers & managers 0.0 0.0 19.6 7.7 0.0 8.5 11.5 9.5
Salaried Employees 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 0.0 5.8 4.5 4.9
Intermediate non-manual 7.4 24.5 11.1 18.3 40.7 29.1 11.9 21.3
Other non-manual 14.8 32.0 15.1 24.4 14.8 17.9 9.1 13.4
Skilled manual 55.6 27.7 4.0 19.8 11.1 13.0 2.1 7.5
Semi-Skilled Manual 3.7 2.9 1.0 2.2 18.5 3.6 1.2 3.2
Other Occupations 18.5 12.9 4.0 9.7 14.8 10.3 1.6 6.3
Father Lower Secondary 66.7 64.4 65.3 64.9 48.1 64.1 63.4 62.9
273
Father Upper Secondary 18.5 20.1
Father University 14.8 15.5
Average Life length 71.8 71.7
Source: Author’s Calculations
16.1 18.5 22.2 20.2 21.8 21.1
18.6 16.7 29.6 15.7 14.8 16.0
73.2 72.3 78.9 78.7 81.7 80.2
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Table 9.3. Ratio of Lifetime Income for Males to Females
(1) No 
sharing
(2) Sharing/ 
EqSc
(3) Annualised/ 
Sharing/EqSC1
(4) Annualised/ No 
Sharing/EqSC1
Disposable 1.31 1.24 1.31 1.44
Market 1.46 1.41 1.50 1.61
Income Tax 1.43 1.37 1.45 1.57
Social Insurance 
Contributions
1.48 1.48 1.62 1.65
Income Levy 1.52 1.48 1.58 1.67
Pension Contrib. 2.27 2.21 2.42 2.49
Social 0.81 0.87 0.97 0.89
Assistance
Social Insurance 0.65 0.59 0.57 0.67
Child Benefit 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.87
Employment
Income
1.48 1.46 1.58 1.63
Source: Author’s Calculations
Note 1: Annualised income is £ per annum.
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Table 9.4. Ratio of Lifetime Income for each Education Level Achieved to the
Average by Male and Female
Male Female
LoSec UpSec Univ Total LoSec UpSec Univ Total
Disposable 57.3 80.4 133.2 100.0 53.5 74.2 128.8 100.0
Market 45.0 73.0 145.1 100.0 28.9 62.3 142.5 100.0
Income Tax 35.9 65.6 156.8 100.0 19.1 54.2 151.0 100.0
Social Insurance 
Contributions
51.1 82.2 131.5 100.0 27.0 61.9 143.1 100.0
Income Levy 43.4 70.1 149.4 100.0 20.4 52.3 152.6 100.0
Pension Contrib. 37.1 56.3 169.6 100.0 15.0 50.1 155.2 100.0
Social 195.9 140.4 30.5 100.0 258.5 128.2 56.5 100.0
Assistance
Social Insurance 67.8 87.7 121.6 100.0 64.9 91.6 111.6 100.0
Child Benefit 157.4 97.9 95.1 100.0 218.3 104.0 83.2 100.0
Employment
Income
45.7 75.5 141.7 100.0 31.6 63.1 141.5 100.0
Source: Author’s Calculations
Note 1: Annualised income is £ per annum. 2. SIC means Social Insurance Contributions.
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Table 9.5. Characteristics that influence equivalised lifetime Income
Independent Variable Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Dependent variable Disposable Market
Explanatory Variables
Life Length 590 34 581 59
Years Worked 572 83 846 142
Years Unemployed -102 57 -189 98
Years in Employment 55 84 177 144
Years Farming 295 113 410 194
Years in Part-Time Work -503 163 -875 281
Private Sector -69 17 -130 30
Upper Professional 10442 1902 19612 3270
Lower Professional 9231 1737 17033 2986
Employer and Manager 9116 2090 15569 3593
Salaried Employees -451 2636 -1744 4532
Intermediate non-manual -3475 1506 -5905 2589
Other non-manual -3155 1493 -6218 2567
Skilled manual 2258 1624 4257 2793
Married -7897 1253 -5948 2155
Number of Children -1938 260 -2844 447
Upper Secondary Educated 1258 1812 2315 3116
University Educated 6771 1999 13524 3437
Father Upper Secondary Educated -492 994 -671 1708
Father University Educated 4411 1076 8290 1849
Male 8421 1169 13616 2011
Constant -29721 3409 -39790 5861
R2 71.7 68.2
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 9.6. Average Annualised Equivalent Disposable income and its components 
over the income distribution
Annualised Equivalent Disposable Income Quntile 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Disposable 
Market 
Income Tax
Social Insurance Contributions 
Income Levy 
Pension Contributions 
Social Assistance Benefits 
Social Insurance Benefits 
Child Benefits 
Employment Income 
Distribution of Males
Annualised Equivalent Market Income Quntile
Disposable
Market
Income Tax
Social Insurance Contributions 
Income Levy 
Pension Contributions 
Social Assistance Benefits 
Social Insurance Benefits 
Child Benefits 
Employment Income 
Distribution of Males
111.3 269.8 405.7 544.7 832.1 433.1
48.6 253.9 500.7 730.4 1239.4 555.2
10.4 54.9 120.9 193.2 390.3 154.1
1.0 6.4 13.7 18.7 25.4 13.1
0.5 3.8 9.2 14.1 25.0 10.5
0.5 3.3 9.8 18.5 36.3 13.7
47.5 42.1 12.7 6.6 4.2 22.6
24.9 39.7 43.5 50.2 64.3 44.5
2.7 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.2 2.2
38.2 228.4 440.2 625.9 966.9 460.4
31.2 45.7 55.5 55.3 65.0 50.6
1 2 3 4 5 Total
123.2 264.7 408.7 542.5 824.6 433.1
27.6 265.2 493.5 734.7 1252.0 555.2
5.1 56.3 114.4 194.3 399.6 154.1
0.5 6.5 13.3 19.3 25.8 13.1
0.2 3.8 8.8 14.3 25.5 10.5
0.2 3.6 8.1 18.9 37.7 13.7
69.5 23.5 10.5 5.7 3.9 22.6
29.5 43.4 46.7 46.9 56.1 44.5
2.5 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.3 2.2
20.6 233.7 430.0 628.3 987.0 460.4
30.7 44.7 53.5 54.8 69.0 50.6
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 9.7. Progressivity and Redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system lifetime 
versus annualised income.
Rate Progressivity Redistribution
Lifetime Annualised
Disposable -0.201 0.349 0.097
Income Tax -0.273 0.061 0.021
Social Insurance Contributions -0.024 -0.046 -0.001
Income Levy -0.019 0.039 0.001
Pension Contributions -0.027 0.128 0.003
Social Assistance 0.048 -0.773 0.034
Social Insurance 0.087 -0.274 0.019
Child Benefit 0.007 -0.468 0.003
Annual
Disposable -0.199 0.586 0.124
Income Tax -0.280 0.062 0.022
Social Insurance Contributions -0.023 -0.021 -0.001
Income Levy -0.019 0.036 0.001
Pension Contributions -0.024 0.088 0.002
Social Assistance 0.056 -0.805 0.037
Social Insurance 0.087 -0.520 0.034
Child Benefit 0.004 -0.655 0.002
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 9.8. Distribution of Annualised Lifetime Income by Personal Characteristics
Annualised Equivalent Disposable Income 
Quntile
Ever Married
Average Number of children 
Average Years Worked 
Average Years Unemployed 
Male
Higher professional 
Lower professional 
Employers & managers 
Salaried Employees 
Intermediate non-manual 
Other non-manual 
Skilled manual 
Upper Secondary Educated 
University Educated 
Father Lower Secondary Educated 
Father Upper Secondary Educated 
Father University Educated 
Average Life length (women)
Average Life length (men)
1 2 3 4 5 Total
97.5 85.9 90.5 84.9 77.5 87.3
2.2 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.7
5.7 27.0 39.9 42.2 43.5 31.7
10.8 4.7 1.1 0.7 0.3 3.5
31.2 45.7 55.5 55.3 65.0 50.6
2.0 3.0 8.5 11.1 28.5 10.6
8.0 6.5 13.5 19.1 26.5 14.7
6.5 5.0 5.5 10.1 16.0 8.6
2.5 2.5 3.0 5.0 1.0 2.8
18.6 29.6 26.5 19.1 5.0 19.8
31.2 24.6 20.0 14.6 4.5 19.0
18.6 15.1 11.5 12.1 11.5 13.7
68.3 66.3 54.0 42.7 20.0 50.3
19.6 25.6 40.5 56.8 79.0 44.3
70.4 72.9 64.5 56.3 55.5 63.9
17.6 16.6 19.0 23.6 22.0 19.8
12.1 10.6 16.5 20.1 22.5 16.3
77.2 79.3 81.3 81.3 84.7 80.2
70.0 67.1 71.5 72.9 77.1 72.3
Source: Author’s Calculations
Table 9.9. Decomposition of income variability into personal characteristics
Market Income Disposable Income
Life Length 5.1 5.1
Human capital 21.5 11.3
Labour market 35.6 21.9
Family 6.4 4.4
Residual 31.5 57.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Author’s Calculations
281
Table 10. Intra-Personal Redistribution
10.1.Introduction
In chapter 8 we saw that the tax-benefit system reduces life-course variability of 
incomes, while in chapter 9, we saw that the tax-benefit system was more redistributive 
at points in time than over the lifetime. The income smoothing that these results exhibit 
indicate that there is intra-personal redistribution, or redistribution over different parts 
of individuals’ lifetimes. When examined over the lifetime, income smoothing and 
horizontal transfers may not in fact have any vertical redistribution. Therefore, when 
considering the effect of life-cycle redistribution, the redistributive impact of the tax- 
benefit system between persons may be less. This chapter focuses on the extent to 
which tax-benefit systems redistribute between individuals as opposed to over 
individual lifetimes.
As tax-benefit systems are largely, progressive, those with variable incomes are likely 
to have greater intra-personal redistribution. Those with consistently low lifetime 
incomes are likely to have more inter-personal redistribution. The extent of intra- 
personal versus intra-personal redistribution is likely to increase with income. In 
addition to lifetime earnings, a number of other factors also affect the level of 
redistribution. Because transfers are more concentrated on the elderly, those who spend 
longer in retirement are more likely to receive more transfers. Although this affects both 
inter and intra-personal redistribution, because those with higher incomes are likely to 
live longer, this phenomenon is likely to increase intra-personal redistribution.
A number of papers calculate the extent of intra-personal redistribution within tax-
cA nJ~
benefit systems. Falkingham and Harding (1995) found-feat a system with a more 
important social insurance component such as in the UK found that intra-personal 
redistribution was more important than inter-personal redistribution. On the other-hand 
they found that in a more means tested system as in Australia, inter-personal 
redistribution was more important. Bjorklund and Palme, (1997) found that the degree 
to which taxes and benefits reduced inter-personal as opposed to intra-personal 
variability to some extent depended upon the inequality measure used. In the USA
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Caldwell et al. (1998) meanwhile found that intra-personal redistribution has fallen over 
time largely due to the fact that earlier generations had higher returns from the tax- 
benefit system.
The chapter is designed as follows. The next section describes the modelling approach 
used to generate the lifetime panel dataset. Section 2 describes the methodology used to 
measure the intra-personal redistribution in the tax-benefit system. Section 3 looks at 
life-cycle redistribution for individuals with different education levels. Section 4 
examines the extent of lifetime mobility. Section 5 utilises a decomposition method to 
decompose redistribution into inter personal and intra-personal components and 
measures the degree of income smoothing in the tax-benefit system versus inter 
personal transfers.
10.2.Methodology
In this section, we discuss the methods to be used to measure the level of intra-personal 
redistribution in the tax-benefit system. Five income definitions are used in this 
analysis. The first definition is disposable income, which is market income after taxes, 
contributions and benefits. We do not consider here, social insurance contributions paid 
by employers, as it is not clear on whom they are actually incident. Contributions paid 
by employees in the public and private sector and by the self-employed are included in 
the analysis.
Disposable income is broken up into a further four components market income, self- 
financed benefits, net benefits and net taxes/contributions as done by Falkingham and 
Hills (1995). Market income is the sum of employment earnings, self-employment 
earnings, farm income, income from a secondary job, investment income, property 
income and private pension income. In this study, we do not subtract housing costs from 
disposable income. However because pension contributions are accumulated to produce 
a pension in retirement, we subtract this from disposable income.
The reason for the decomposition into net taxes, benefits and self-financed benefits, is 
to highlight our chief area of interest in this chapter, the extent of intra-personal 
redistribution in a tax-benefit system. Self-financed benefits are defined as the 
proportion of taxes in any particular accounting period that are used to finance benefits 
received by the individual. So for example, in the case where taxation is greater than 
benefits self-financed benefits are equal in value to all benefits received. Remaining
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taxes here are net taxes/contributions. Where benefits exceed taxes all taxes are 
compensated by benefits received and thus self-financed benefits are equal in value to 
the taxes paid. The remaining benefits are net benefits. Because the personal tax-benefit 
system is not neutral as personal taxes exceed benefits by about 20%, we focus only on 
the taxation required to finance the benefit system to make the system neutral.
10.3.The Life-course and Lifetime Income
One of the main reasons for intra-personal redistribution found in other studies is the 
life-course (See Harding, 1993 and Falkingham and Hills, 1995). In chapter 8, we 
looked at redistribution over the life-course by considering the net tax-benefit position 
for average life-course trajectories, while in chapter 9 we considered the distribution of 
lifetime incomes. Life-cycles considered so far have been average life-cycles for all 
individuals. It would be expected that those with the highest lifetime incomes would 
have very different life-cycles to those in the bottom of the income distribution. In this 
section we use the output of both chapters compare the level of redistribution over the 
life-course for individuals with different lifetime incomes.
In figure 1, we plot separately for males and females average benefits minus taxes over 
the life-course by annualised equivalent disposable income quintiles. We see that there 
is clear ranking between average net benefit-taxes, except for very old people, where 
because of longer employment histories, individuals are more likely to receive state 
insurance pensions, which are more valuable than assistance pensions on which the 
bottom quintile depend. The bottom quintiles consistently receive more in benefits than 
the pay in taxes and contributions, while the top quintile consistently pays more taxes. 
The other quintiles are more representative of the population as a whole, pay more taxes 
during their working lives and receiving more benefits in retirement.
10.4.Lifetime Income and Mobility
In this section we compare the volatility of incomes over the lifetime with overall 
lifetime income. In table 1 we explore a simple measure of income volatility, classifying 
for each lifetime income quintile, the proportion of years spent in different annual 
income quintiles. To do this, we pool the annual income information of all individuals 
in the study to produce annual income quintiles. This is analogous to the approach taken 
by Harding (1993) and Falkingham and Hills (1995) who used this pseudo cross-section 
approach to compare annual versus lifetime income distributions. In a steady state,
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pooling the annual incomes of the lifetimes of a cohort will be equivalent to the 
distribution of income taken from a cross-section for one year.
We notice that there is quite a degree of immobility at the top and the bottom with 
people in the bottom lifetime equivalised disposable income quintile spending 69.7% of 
their lives in the bottom quintile, while the top quintile spend 58.5% of their lives in the 
top quintile. Results shown are quite similar to other studies, with the majority of 
individuals staying plus or minus one quintile over the lifetime away from their annual 
position. One might expect however for mobility to be higher over the lifetime. Other 
studies such as Harding (1993) used artificial methods to hit desired levels of mobility, 
while in this study we utilise information about the duration of time spent out of work to 
limit the amount of lifetime mobility. Without incorporating this feature there is too 
much mobility as too few people would work from education completion to retirement 
without break. Retrospective information is however likely to be affected by 
measurement error, with one imagining that individuals would be likely to 
underestimate the time out of work. It would be interesting therefore to test the 
sensitivity of the model to different assumptions about mobility. However due to 
computing constraints this is presently beyond the scope of this study. It would also be 
interesting to look at longer-term mobility once later waves of the European Household 
Panel are released.
In other studies such as Bjorklund (1993), annual incomes of middle aged people (30- 
65) in Sweden were found to be highly correlated to that of lifetime income. Greater 
volatility however was found for younger people. In table 1 we divide up the proportion 
of time spent in different annual quintiles into three age groups, 20-35, 36-65, 65+. The 
lowest age group will tend to overestimate the proportions of those in the bottom 
quintile, primarily due to the fact that we do not simulate information about the parental 
incomes of those in education. Nor are educational transfers simulated, which in any 
case are so low as to keep students in the bottom quintile.
This table also shows the proportion of their lives, quintile members spent in annual 
quintiles when aged in one of the three age bands. It confirms Bjorklund’s finding that 
mobility is greater for younger age groups. Except for the second quintile, there is more 
mobility for all lifetime quintiles for the under 35 age group than for the 35-65 age 
group as less spend all their lives in the same quintile as their lifetime quintile.
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Comparing the 35-65 age group with the other two age groups, we find that mobility is 
least for quintiles 1, 3, 4 and 5 thus we see that this age group drives lifetime incomes. 
Those in lifetime income quintile 2 however are least mobile only in old age when their 
lifetime quintile is also the dominant annual quintile. We notice therefore that those in 
the top three lifetime quintiles have very little labour mobility, as most of their lifetime 
mobility comes from periods in education or in retirement when incomes were 
relatively lower.
At the other end, those in the bottom quintile also experienced some mobility in the 
under 35 age group. However due to the influence of the cumulative duration spent out 
of work, this group became more likely to stay virtually permanently in low incomes in 
the period aged 35-65. Once they reach retirement age this group enter a more mobile 
phase as some become eligible for higher valued insurance benefits.
In retirement, we see that quintiles 3 and 4 have quite a lot of downward mobility. This 
is largely a life-cycle effect as their incomes fall in retirement relative to their working 
lives. Much of the top quintile remains in the top quintile in retirement having saved 
sufficiently to maintain their income position.
It is the quintile 2 where most of the mobility occurs. This re-emphasises the point made 
in chapter 7, where we noticed that these two quintiles spent moderate amounts of time 
unemployed and employed, compared to high employment for the top two and the low 
employment bottom quintile. The story one therefore gleans from this picture is that at 
the bottom of lifetime income distribution are the long term out of work, in the next 
quintile, we have primarily individuals engaged in as Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1990) define marginal workers, who spend periods in and out of employment and with 
lower incomes due to lower on the job human capital, while in the top three quintiles, 
we have those who are in reasonably well paid regular jobs.
10.5.Inter-Personal versus Intra-Personal Redistribution and Lifetime Income
Having considered the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system and the degree of 
life-time mobility for different lifetime income groups, we now consider the degree to 
which the tax-benefit system redistributes within individual’s lifetimes (intra-personal 
redistribution) or between individuals (inter-personal redistribution). Two measures 
shall be used to compare these two measures of redistribution, decomposing an 
inequality measure and by looking at the distribution of intra-personal redistribution.
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Firstly we shall use a standard decomposition method for income inequality indices into 
between and within group components person described in chapter 1. Instead of viewing 
groups as collections of different individuals, we\the groups as being the individuals, 
while the within group component are the years that make up each individual’s lifetime.
Table 2 breaks up total variability in incomes as measure by the h  measure (half the 
square of the coefficient of variation). Two measures of income are compared, market 
and disposable income. Considering the population as a whole, we notice that total 
disposable income is less variable than market income. The ratio of within person to 
between person variability is less than 1 for both income types. We therefore see that 
between person lifetime variability is greater than within person variability across their 
lifetime. The lack of lifetime variability in incomes, highlighted in table 1, is evidence 
of this. The ratio for disposable income is greater than market income indicating that the 
tax-benefit system reduces between person lifetime variability more than within person 
variability as a result of the progressive nature of the tax-benefit system.
We now consider the intra versus inter personal redistribution over the lifetime using 
our second measure, self-financed benefits. We decompose taxes and benefits over the 
lifetime into self-financed components and net gains/losses, described above. Measured 
over the lifetime as a whole, self-financed benefits will be more important. We noticed 
in figure 1 that the top quintile on average were net tax payers and that the bottom 
quintile were net benefit recipients, thus on average benefits received by the former 
groups and taxes paid by the latter group will be self-financing.
In table 3, we report the distribution of self-financed benefits, net taxes and net benefits. 
We see that average annualised equivalent self-financed benefits increase with income. 
While only 6 per cent of benefits in the bottom quintile are self-financed, 97 per cent of 
the top quintile are self financed. This compares well with Falkingham and Hills (1995) 
finding for the UK. Overall we find that redistribution within a persons lifetime as 
measured by the proportion of benefits that are self-financed, is slightly more important 
than between persons as self-financed benefits represent about 54% of all benefits. 
While this conclusion is at odds with the conclusion of table 2, we note that in both 
cases intra-personal and inter-personal redistribution are quite similar. In addition 
different assumptions are made in the two calculations. In order to measure self- 
financed benefits, we make the assumption of revenue neutrality, focusing solely on 
taxes that are required to finance benefits. In Decomposing the I2 inequality measure
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into within person and between person components, we considered the entire tax-benefit 
system. The difference in assumptions will tend to place more weight on the reduction 
of between person inequality.
Self-financed benefits are more important for men than for women. Looking at net taxes 
and benefits, we naturally find that they are more redistributive than gross components.
Table 4 describes the proportion of self-financed benefits in different countries. 
Falkingham and Harding (1995) found that in a system with a more important social 
insurance component such as in the UK found that intra-personal redistribution was 
more important than inter-personal redistribution. On the other-hand they found that in a 
more means tested system as in Australia, inter-personal redistribution was more 
important. In Italy, Baldini (2001) found that self-financed benefits comprised 76% of 
all benefits due to the strong link between benefits and previous employment in a 
mainly social insurance based system. Comparing these results with the position in 
Ireland, we find that overall the level of intra-personal redistribution is somewhere 
between Australia and the UK, illustrating the targeted nature of the Irish tax-benefit 
system.
The results obtained however are quite dependent on the level of life-course mobility 
within the population. It would be interesting to examine the sensitivity of the model to 
mobility assumptions.
10.6.Conclusions
This chapter focuses on the degree of redistribution across an individuals life-cycle 
relative to the amount of redistribution between individuals. We now describe the 
principle conclusions.
Examining the life-course for different lifetime income groups, we notice that the top 
quintile are on average net losers at each point of the life-cycle, while the bottom 
quintile are on average net gainers, with the remaining quintiles following the average 
trend. This confirms that those with higher incomes will tend to have more intra 
personal redistribution.
Given that we are looking at the impact of redistribution over individual’s life-cycles 
due to mobility or life-cycle effects, the first issue to examine is the degree of mobility. 
Here we notice quite a degree of immobility for those at the very top and the bottom of
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the income distribution. The lifetime can be characterised as permanently poor at the 
bottom, those in regular well paid employment in top three quintiles, with those in 
quintile 2 being characterised as being in lower paid marginal employment, moving 
regularly in and out of work. Most mobility tended to occur in individuals earlier years.
Between person variability was found to be more important than intra-lifetime income 
variability. The first evidence that inter-person redistribution is more important is 
illustrated when we find that the tax-benefit system as a whole reduces inter person 
variability more than intra personal variability over the life-course.
In the final section intra-personal redistribution is measured in terms of self-financed 
benefits over the whole lifetime. It was found that these benefits were more important 
than inter-personal transfers. Although this conclusion is at odds with the conclusion 
that the tax-benefit system reduces between person variability by more than within 
person variability incomes, the result is sensitive to the assumption made about which 
proportion of the system one considers. Overall intra-personal redistribution was found 
to be less important than for the UK and Italy, but more important than Australia, 
highlighting the targeted nature of the Irish tax-benefit system.
On a note of caution however, the degree of intra-personal redistribution found in a tax- 
benefit system is quite sensitive to the degree of mobility within the population as a 
whole. Because the panel data on which models like the one used here, have typically 
been poor, assumptions have to be made about the degree of mobility. This assumption 
may have a strong bearing on the results. It would be useful therefore to extend this 
analysis to measure the sensitivity of the results to different mobility assumptions.
Another area for analysis would be to examine the impact of a policy reform that 
extended income replacement in retirement as at present Ireland has no earnings related 
pension, nor any compulsory savings for retirement. This coupled with an increasingly 
flexible labour market, means that social assistance must be used more extensively in 
Ireland for retirees than in other countries. The existence of such a model as this will 
allow issues such as these to be examined.
Finally, because the model links a dynamic model that generates a synthetic panel to a 
tax-benefit microsimulation model that contains the rules for each tax-benefit system in 
the European Union, it would be possible to examine the inter and intra-personal 
redistribution in different European countries. As we have seen most redistribution in
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the system is inter-personal and therefore inter-generational redistribution may be 
important. Unfortunately at present the dynamic model focuses only on a single cohort. 
Although the software itself can simulate a multi-cohort panel, specifying the 
behavioural equation to this are beyond this study. Instead we use simpler aggregate 
methods in the next chapter to examine this issue.
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Tables and Figures
Table 10.1. Percentage of Life spent in different quintiles annually relative to 
lifetime income
Annual Equivalised Disposable Income Quintile
Lifetime Equivalised 
Disposable income Quintile
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 69.7 23.1 4.4 1.9 0.8 100
2 23.5 41.3 23.8 9.0 2.5 100
3 9.3 22.7 35.6 24.5 7.9 100
4 4.2 11.9 26.0 35.6 22.3 100
5 1.4 4.5 10.0 25.6 58.5 100
Aged under 35
1 45.0 40.1 8.9 5.2 0.8 100
2 13.6 40.4 24.9 17.0 4.1 100
3 5.5 23.1 32.5 29.1 9.8 100
4 2.8 13.1 26.8 35.4 21.9 100
5 1.0 5.4 13.4 28.3 51.9 100
Aged 35-65
1 86.2 11.0 2.5 0.3 0.0 100
2 31.0 36.2 25.8 6.3 0.8 100
3 10.8 18.7 37.5 26.0 7.0 100
4 4.9 8.1 24.7 38.4 23.9 100
5 1.8 2.8 9.5 27.8 58.1 100
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Table 10.1.
Aged Over 65 
1 63.6 29.7 2.5 1.1 3.2 100
2 16.7 59.0 15.4 3.9 5.0 100
3 10.3 33.5 34.6 13.7 7.9 100
4 4.1 20.2 28.3 28.5 18.9 100
5 0.9 6.8 8.3 19.6 64.4 100
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 10.2. Intra Personal (across lifecycle) and Inter person Income Variability
Market Disposable
Total 0.541 0.306
Between 0.333 0.181
Within 0.208 0.125
Ratio (within/between) 0.626 0.692
Source: Author’s Calculations
Table 10.3. Intra-personal versus inter personal redistribution
Disposable Self Financed Net Net Benefits Self-financed as a % of
Income Benefits Taxes all Benefits
Annualised Equivalent Disposable Income Quintile
1 111 4 0 65 6.0
2 270 22 5 63 25.4
3 406 40 19 21 65.7
4 545 51 39 12 81.2
5 832 74 96 2 96.9
Gender
Male 490 40 44 25 61
Female 375 36 20 40 47.4
Education Level
Low. Secondary 241 18 4 68 21.1
Upp. Secondary 342 30 15 44 40.9
University 559 49 55 16 76.1
Total 433 38 32 33 53.9
Source: Author’s Calculations ^ y
Table 10.4. Intra-personal versus inter personal redistribution, in Different 
Countries (Self-Financed Benefits as % of Total Benefits)
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Average Rate
Australia 38%
Ireland 55%
Italy 76%
UK 62%
Source: Author’s Calculations, Harding and Falkingham (1996), Baldini (2001).
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Chapter 11. Intergenerational Redistribution
ll.l.Introduction
In previous chapters we have measured the degree of redistribution between persons 
based on current and lifetime income, redistribution over the life-course and intra- 
personal redistribution. In this chapter we attempt to quantify the degree of 
intergenerational redistribution in the Irish Welfare State.
The motivation for this chapter comes from a number of sources. Firstly the 
development of a large public debt in the space of two decades, together with the 
forecasted elimination of this debt over the next two decades (Department of Finance, 
1998) will clearly result in an intergenerational transfer of resources; from those who 
pay for the public debt to those who consumed it. Secondly, the rapid ageing of the Irish 
population during the next century is expected to result in further deficits.
Whereas the development of the public debt in the late 20th Century was largely driven 
by economic factors, this century’s deficit will be driven by demographic factors. In 
Ireland as in other countries, as population age, the ratio of those of non-working ages 
to those of working ages rises and thus increases the pressure on the public finances, 
increasing in turn the degree of intergenerational redistribution. The Budget Strategy of 
Ageing Group of the Department of Finance (DOF) find that the cost of ageing is set to 
rise by 7% of GNP over the next half-century (DOF, 1999).
Because of the desire to look at the distribution of public expenditure between 
generations, one needs to look at the net gains of generations from the State over the 
entire lifetime. In order to do this, forecasts of public finances and demographic 
projections over the next 100 years are necessary. Without question, one needs to take 
extreme caution in the interpretation of the results. Instead they should be seen as a 
"dim light trying to pierce the impenetrable fog o f the future. This light may help us 
perceive the hazy outlines o f an iceberg, but will certainly not be able to discern detail 
with any reliability” (Wolfson and Rowe, 1998).
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This chapter is broken up into a number of sections. The next section quantifies the 
extent of intergenerational redistribution between generations alive in the 1990’s. 
Drawing on chapter 8, this section measures the age-incidence of social welfare 
expenditure, health care, education and taxation and social contributions. Section 3 
using a database of public expenditure and taxation in the Irish State documents the 
evolution of public expenditure and taxation by type since the 1920’s. Using age 
incidence assumptions, section 4 assigns each year’s public expenditure to across cohort 
alive at the time.
In order to measure the redistribution between generations, one needs to estimate in 
addition to past net gains, future net gains from public expenditure and taxation. The 
first step is to consider future demographic trends. Section 5 using assumptions made by 
the Central Statistics Office (CSO), describes this trend. The next step is to examine the 
effect these demographic changes on the public finances. Section 6 looks at the future 
evolution of the public finances under a number of different scenarios. Having 
generated demographic and public finance trajectories, we decompose this by 
generation to look in section 7 at the degree of intergenerational redistribution in 2025, 
2050 and 2075. Section 8 looks at the net gain over the lifetime of each cohort alive in 
1998. Section 9 drawing upon other work of the author examines the degree of fiscal 
sustainability currently within the system, using the method of generational accounts.
11.2.Age Incidence of Public Expenditure and Taxation
Changing demographic patterns combined with the age incidence of tax receipts and 
public expenditure drives the demographic and generational imbalances. This section 
examines the age incidence rates of public expenditure and tax receipts. This chapter 
however only considers the incidence of a proportion of total public expenditure and 
receipts. In this respect, we are limited by the availability of data, but also by the 
ambiguity as to the distribution of benefits of public goods such as the justice system, 
defence and the environmental protection. In addition the incidence of public transfers 
are often difficult to determine. For example are government subsidies/taxes on the 
corporate sector incident on shareholders, customers or even employees? In this respect 
the incidence may not even be on the national population. Therefore in this section we 
only focus on welfare expenditure and taxation on the household sector.
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In this study, spending is only allocated to those on whom it is spent. Therefore 
education is targeted only at younger cohorts. However this does not account for returns 
to education, whereby an increase in the level of education in an economy may lead to 
positive externalities in the whole economy. This is also relevant to Buiter’s (1995) 
criticisms of the approach for ignoring general equilibrium responses. Similarly children 
may spend less on parents because of the existence of pensions. Another issue relates to 
the cost of services to be provided. We take the cost to be that incurred by the state, 
even where this may be below the market value as in the case of health expenditures.
The tax and benefit age incidence is drawn from 1994 cross-sectional data in table 1 in 
chapter 8. The incidence of education expenditure is on a per capita basis rather than a 
per student basis. In terms of health expenditure we take figures from Nolan (1991) 
which indicate a ratio of 12.8 : 1.0 : 18.0 : 131.5 for the ages <5, <25, 25-64 and >=65 
respectively. All other expenditure was assigned equally amongst all persons.
This study does not simply focus on the intergenerational distribution in 1994, but 
rather between generations over time, for which one needs to know the age incidence of 
these instruments over the period of this study from 1921 to 2100. Unfortunately data is 
limited and assumptions have to be made. Hills (1995) in his study made a “high” 
variation assumption and “low” variation assumption about health care expenditure, 
while income taxes were allocated equally across age groups. Auerbach et al. (1993) 
assumed that later distributions of taxes and benefits applied in the past. Although it 
would be useful to investigate the age incidence of taxes and benefits using historic 
micro datasets such as the 1955, 1973, 1980 and 1987 Household Budget Surveys, this 
is beyond the current study. Here we follow the Auerbach et al. approach and use the 
current distribution applied to historic and projected toteil expenditures.
11.3.The Evolution Public Expenditure 1921-1998
This section details the patterns in public spending and taxation since independence and 
measures the distribution of past spending and taxation across cohorts, following the 
method of Hills (1996), by tracking the average spending and taxation as a percentage 
of GNP per capita for each cohort over time. Although typical redistribution studies 
focus on the welfare state or simply the tax-benefit system, when comparing across 
generations and over time it is important to look at all public expenditure. This is 
because of the changing relative importance of different forms of expenditure. Direct
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taxes and social benefits are currently very important, however like many in developing 
countries at present, in the early years of the state, public expenditure was primarily 
focused on non-cash benefits and the means of collecting revenue was primarily through 
expenditure and property taxes. Also as local government expenditure was historically 
an important expenditure and revenue source, we include both state and local 
expenditure in the analysis.73
Discount Rate
In order to be able to compare incomes at different points in time, Economists use a 
concept known as a discount rate. We need to discount future net benefits as economic 
theory suggests that income received earlier is worth more than received later. As 
interest rates can vary substantially over time and even go negative, Hills uses the GDP 
per capita deflator to combine the effect of interest rates and inflation. This is a 
reasonable assumption to make as a measure of the average rate of return in an economy 
over time. Future income streams are not known however with the same certainty as 
past income streams. One should therefore incorporate the riskiness of these incomes 
when calculating the discount rate. Future income should be discounted by a value 
higher than the growth rate assumed. This assumption is also necessary in order to be 
able to calculate the net present value. Therefore, in this study we assume a discount 
rate of the growth rate in GNP for historical values and for future values a discount rate 
of GNP growth plus 2 per cent per annum.
Measuring Costs and Benefits o f Public Expenditure
The budget deficit is a typical method for tracking public expenditure. However, ter 
Rele (1997) highlights that it is not a good measure for comparing the costs and benefits 
of public expenditure over time. Here a measure known as the net-benefit concept is 
used instead. The reason for this is that in comparing net benefits of generations, one 
needs to take account of when individuals received the benefit of public expenditure. 
For example in the case of capital expenditure, all the benefits do not occur during the 
year of the expenditure, but rather until the asset purchased has depreciated to zero 
value. Another problem with the deficit as an indicator of the strength of the public 
finances is that it does not include the cost of unfunded future pension liabilities. This 
can be quite severe as witnessed by the recent concern in Ireland about both state 
pension liabilities and the occupational pension liabilities of jleifsion sector workers,
73 Local expenditure since 1977 has been primarily financed out of transfers from central
which are funded out of future revenue streams. Another issue relates to debt interest. If 
debt interest paid each year, although a component of public expenditure, is included in 
the net benefit concept, then financing current expenditure with debt will result in 
higher benefits for the generations financing the benefits for an earlier generation. 
Rather, the benefits result from the original net expenditures and should be apportioned 
to the generations alive at the time of the expenditure. Profits of the Central Bank 
should be regarded as a private commercial transaction and not included in our 
incidence analysis.
Instead of using actual capital and interest expenditures in the annual net benefit 
concept, we instead incorporate measures that more accurately indicate where the 
benefit of these expenditures accrues. In the case of capital expenditure, gross physical 
capital formation (GPCF), we transform this expenditure into an imputed income stream 
of depreciation and rate of return, spreading the benefits over the generations that use 
the assets. Depreciation is estimated at 1.4 per cent of the value of net physical assets 
per annum74 and the rate of return equivalent to imputed rent from the holding of assets, 
assumed to be equal to the long run growth rate in the economy, 2 per cent. The value 
of the asset base used is a combination of annual public sector GPCF and a value for the 
initial public sector capital stock based on an estimate for 1950 in Henry (1989) and 
public sector capital formation 1921-1950. Turning to debt interest, we ignore previous 
debt interest in the calculation of the benefit concept. This allows us to measure net 
benefits as the difference between total benefits and total receipts. Total accumulated 
debt is however a liability for the future and as such reduces potential future 
consumption relative to future taxes. With regard to future debt or savings, we assume 
that the interest rate is equal to the discount rate used and therefore firstly the 
discounted value of current accumulated debt remains constant, and secondly future 
debt (savings) is simply the sum of future net benefits (costs).
Figure 1 describes the trend of costs and benefits of public expenditure from 
independence until 1998 as a percentage of GNP. By costs to the population we include 
taxes and contributions. Benefits cover a wider term than simply social welfare benefits
government due to the abolition of local property taxes.
74 The depreciation rate is estimated as the average rate across the whole capital stock of Ireland as 
defined in the study of Henry (1989) over the period 1950-1989.
75 It must be remembered that if actual interest rates fall below the discount rate, then discounted debts 
will fall over time. This has occurred during a number of times in Irish history, when real interest rates 
went negative.
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but include all current public expenditures, depreciation and imputed rent. The dotted 
line signifies the more conventional method of total expenditures, containing debt 
interest and capital expenditures. We notice that benefits to the population from public 
expenditure exceed costs in terms of taxation for almost the whole period. The 
difference between benefits to the population and costs narrows dramatically with the 
fiscal contraction of the late 1980’s/early 1990’s. With costs exceeding benefits by the 
late 1990’s. We notice that the benefit and expenditure lines do not coincide. Benefits 
are initially higher than expenditures and cross about in 1960. The reason for this is that 
latter does contains debt interest payments which are more heavily weighted towards the 
end of the period, while the benefit of public capital infrastructures was proportionally 
higher during the early years of the state.
Table 1 breaks the trend of public expenditure into components. Before 1965, we notice 
a relatively insignificant welfare state, where with the exception of health expenditures, 
social welfare and education expenditures largely keep track with economic growth at 
about 3.5-5% and 2.5-3.5% of GNP respectively. Public health expenditure sees a 
gradual rise from 0.4% in 1921 to 1.7% in 1960. From 1960 to 1985, we see a large 
expansion in the welfare state with social welfare, education trebling and health 
expenditure increasing by a factor of 5 as a proportion of GNP. Benefits from capital 
expenditure (depreciation and imputed rent) fall over entire the period due to a 
diminishing public sector fixed capital stock as a percentage of GNP over time (See 
Henry, 1989). The fiscal contraction post 1985 saw a fall particularly in other and social 
welfare expenditure, but also to some extent education and health expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP.
11.4.Inter-Generational Expenditure
In this section, we apply the incidence assumptions to the trend in costs and benefits to 
decompose net benefits into actual cohorts. The benefits and the costs described in 
section 2 are allocated year on year to the cohorts alive during that period. Then the 
totals for each cohort are found by summing over each cohort’s yearly total. Figures 2 
to 6 present this decomposition over the lifetimes of individual cohorts. Each line 
represents the cumulative gain or loss per survivor of the instrument being described in 
the graphic from birth until the cohort’s age in 1998. Therefore, for those bom in 1921, 
the cumulative sum of 80 years is described, while for the cohort bom in 1998 only the 
gain of the first year of life is described.
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In Figure 2 we describe education spending over the lifetime of 9 cohorts. We notice 
that education spending is zero for the first years of each cohort, rises from school entry 
age until university leaving age and then levels out into a plateau as education spending 
diminishes to very low amounts to cover those in adult education and mature students. 
In terms of between cohort variation, we notice the trend of increasing education 
expenditure per cohort member. Although there was little difference between the 
cohorts bom in 1921 and 1931, each cohort from 1931 to 1971 experienced higher 
average spending. This is a product of two factors, increasing expenditure per student 
and rising student numbers. Although those bom in 1981 had not in general reached the 
end of their education, it seems likely that trend will be reversed for this generation. We 
must remember here that spending reported has been discounted using GNP per capita 
growth rates. So although expenditure per student may have increased in real terms, 
education expenditure fell during this cohort’s school going period because education 
expenditure did not increase in line with GNP.
Figure 3 describes the trend in social welfare expenditure over these cohorts’ lifetimes. 
Here the trend is towards higher expenditure later in life, highlighting the importance of 
pension expenditures in the social welfare system, which accounted for nearly 40% of 
social welfare spending in 1998. We must remember however that the results reported 
relate only the average amount per survivor. Therefore in terms of total expenditure one 
should place more weight on expenditures going to younger ages of each cohort than for 
the older ages as the latter group will have decreased in size due to emigration and 
mortality. We notice the effect of the expanding welfare state in that each succeeding 
cohort has a higher spend than the previous generation. The expanding welfare state had 
different stages. In particular looking at younger ages, we notice the effect of the 
introduction of Child Benefits in the late 1940’s so that the cohort who were children 
before this period, have little child related transfers until about 1951 when child related 
transfers reached a steady state. Subsequent transfers to the under 18’s remained 
relatively constant. The next effect we notice, is the increasing generosity and coverage 
of social welfare transfers to the working age population from the early 1960s until the 
late 1990s. This expansion is related to increased generosity of payments, but also 
mainly due to the expansion in client groups such as the unemployed, the sick and lone 
parents. Transfers to older people expanded for some of the earlier cohorts as social 
insurance pensions were introduced in 1960 and as a result, total pension payments rose 
ahead of economic growth until the late-1980’s.
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Figure 4 describes the trend in average health expenditure over the lifetimes of cohort 
members. We notice two trends. Firstly the age incidence of health care is significantly 
skewed towards the elderly and secondly the rising proportion of expenditure for each 
successive cohort. Health care expenditure rose particularly quickly between 1969 to 
1975 from 2% of GNP to 6%. This represents a major change in health care provision. 
Therefore the longer a cohort lived after this change, the higher the health expenditure 
on the cohort. Before this period, expenditure as a percentage of GNP had been fairly 
constant, and as a result the pre-1971 cohorts had similar levels of spending while 
young. The 1971 cohort represents a transition cohort as the young received health care 
during the expansion of the health care system and thus have higher expenditure than 
the earlier cohorts, but less than the later cohorts, who were bom after the reforms and 
thus had similar levels of health expenditure.
The expansion of the tax system occurred over a longer period. There was a gradual rise 
until 1965 and then quite a rapid expansion until a peak in the mid-1980’s, before 
falling back over the remainder of the century. As a result, later cohorts will pay 
successively higher taxes (see figure 5). For the cohorts who have reached middle age 
and retirement in 1998, the effect of the reversal in the trend will not have been enough 
to reduce cumulative average tax rates below that of earlier cohorts. However later 
cohorts if current trends continue, will pay less tax relative to their income than will 
earlier cohorts.
Figure 6 draws the results of each of the components of benefit and cost of public 
expenditure together. The effect of aggregating costs and benefits is that we get the 
familiar N shape found by Hills (1995) for the UK. Initially the effect of increased 
education and health expenditures for young people is most noticeable as later cohorts 
have higher net benefits. Once cohorts leave education and enter the workforce the 
impact of the tax system dominates as public expenditure tends to be focused on early 
and late in life. As result, for this part of cohort’s lives, cumulative net benefits fall. 
However, later expansions of the welfare state and corresponding rise in the tax rate 
benefited earlier cohorts to a relatively greater extent. This is because they paid 
relatively little tax during earlier low tax periods, but benefited later and in retirement 
from increased expenditure levels. Therefore, cumulative net benefits fall to a lesser 
extent for earlier cohorts over their working years and thus around the age of 20 the 
cumulative net benefit curves cross. For the cohorts who were older than 30 in 1998, the 
position the cohorts had in terms of early years cumulative net benefit is completely
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reversed. In fact for the 1921 cohort, they hardly reach a point of average cumulative 
net loss at any point during their lifetime. Other cohorts go substantially negative before 
the end of the working age, when the trend reverses again due to retirement benefits, 
increased expenditure and lower taxes.
11.5.Demographic Pressures
The motivation behind the interest in intergenerational equity is in the changing 
demographic picture. Ireland unlike many other countries in Western Europe currently 
still has a relatively young population, with about 50 per cent of the population aged 
under 25 and only about 10 per cent of the population aged 65 or over. The proportion 
of elderly has remained relatively constant at about 10 per cent over the whole 20th 
century. Despite historically high birth rates, migration has tended to offset this inflow 
to keep the population constant or in fact falling over the period.
Underlying the analysis of this chapter is a forecast of the potential demographic 
situation in Ireland over the next century. However it must be noted that Irish 
demographic forecasts are notoriously poor. This is a result of volatile cycles of 
migration and the unpredictable nature of fertility. Caution therefore needs to be taken 
with any long term forecast.
A number of assumptions need to be made. The mortality assumption is based on that 
made by CSO (1996), assuming a gradual reduction in the mortality rate over time, 
increasing the life expectancy at birth in 1992 from 72.3 to 77.2 in 2027 for men and 
from 77.9 to 83.2 for females. Thereafter life expectancy is assumed to be constant. We 
do not follow the birth rate assumptions made by the CSO as their prediction scenarios 
assumed a long-term fall in the birth rates. However in the years following this 
projection, the birth rate increased from 13.4 per 1000 in 1994 to 14.5 in 1998. Part of 
this recovery in the birth rate results from a rise in the number of women of 
childbearing age, however nevertheless the total fertility rate has increased over the 
period. Although little research exists on the topic, it may be no coincidence that the 
birth rate fell the most during the low growth years of the 1980’s and has risen again 
during the second half of the 1990s, a period of high economic growth. We make the 
assumption that Age Specific Fertility Rates remain constant over the forecast period. 
Migration forecasts too have been fraught with difficulty. Both projection scenarios of 
CSO (1996) assume net emigration during the period 1996-2006. However Punch and
304
Finneran (1999) report rising net immigration in the period 1995-1998. In our forecast 
we assume a continuation of the net immigration rate of 1998 through 2007, a period of 
expected continued growth, with no net migration during the rest of the forecast.
The result of these assumptions is that the population will gradually rise by nearly 25% 
between 1991 and 2025, declining afterwards. Although fertility rates are below the 
long-term replacement rate, the number of births will rise as the large birth cohorts of 
the 1970’s and 1980’s have children. Forecasted immigration levels will also increase 
the population. However after this period the population will fall due to the lower 
fertility rate. Unless behaviour changes, the projected population will fall to less than 
75% of the peak level by the end of the century. One however must be very cautious 
about such long-term projects. Given the problems forecasting 10 years in the future 
which Irish demographers have had recently, future trends could be very different.
Figure 7 describes the distribution of the Irish population by age group for 1961, 1991 
and forecasts for 2050 and 2100. The large dip in the 20-30 age group in 1961 deviating 
what one would expect to be a relatively concave curve reflects the very high 
emigration levels of the 1950’s. In contrast to today, this gave Ireland the highest old 
age dependency ratio in Europe in 1960. The following generations were not greatly 
affected by emigration and in addition continued to have the high birth rates. In 
addition, Fahey and Fitzgerald (1997) point out that although significant improvements 
have been made in the child and young adult mortality rates, improvements in mortality 
amongst the elderly has not matched that in other countries and thus longevity has not 
had much of an impact on the demographic structure.
Over the short term the elderly dependency ratio looks very positive (See Figure 8). 
This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, large-scale emigration in the 1950’s from the 
cohort bom in the 1920/30’s, means that the generation currently entering retirement 
will be small. Over the next 50 years however, the picture is expected to change, with 
the proportion of 65+ expected to double and the proportion of the very old (80+) 
expecting to treble. The reasons for this lie in factors that influence short-term trends 
and also due to the rapid drop in fertility since 1980. The numbers retiring will naturally 
rise as a result of larger cohorts reaching retirement; both 20-year cohorts who 
succeeded the current retirement cohort bom in the 1920’s/30’s are much larger. In 
addition this is coupled, with a dramatic reduction in birth rates since the 1970’s. Since 
1971, the total fertility rate has dropped about 4 to 1.8 in 1994 and it is unlikely that
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birth rates will return to the levels of the 1960’s and early 70’s again. If this pattern of 
low birth rates does in fact continue, then large retiring cohorts will be accompanied by 
small and decreasing working cohorts. In addition, increased education levels may 
through improvements in public health improve elderly mortality rates.
In order to reverse this process of long-term population decrease and short-term 
increased elderly dependency ratios, we have considered what changes in future fertility 
rates would be necessary. To ensure the long-term stability of the population, fertility 
levels would have to increase by 17%, not too large an increase given recent changes, 
only twice the increase which occurred between 1994 and 1998. However, even with 
this rise in fertility elderly dependency ratios would increase by a third by 2060, before 
levelling out. In order to maintain elderly dependency rates at the present level, fertility 
rates would have to rise by a third, resulting in a fast growing population, increasing by 
over 200% in 2100. Nevertheless because of the very low starting position, even the 
forecasted rise is likely to produce dependency rates that are lower than many European 
countries have today.
11.6.Demographic Ageing and Intergenerational Redistribution
Given the expected change in the demographic position, what will be the change in the 
distribution of public expenditure? Falling numbers of children coupled with an ageing 
population should result in a shift in expenditure up the age distribution. Figure 9 
compares the degree of intergenerational redistribution in 1998 and 2050 in Irish Public 
Expenditure plotting discounted net expenditures by age. Here we use the same discount 
rate and growth rate for comparative purposes so that we can isolate the effect of the 
ageing population. As expected, we notice an upward shift in the age expenditure 
distribution. Because the fertility rate decrease happened before 1998, there is only a 
small impact on child related expenditures. We notice however, a large increase in the 
net expenditures for the 20-30 age group as net taxes fall because of the fall in the size 
of this cohort by a third. The increase in the size of the 50-60 population will also 
increase the level of tax paid by this age group. However the biggest effect is seen in the 
over 65 population which increases in size by over 125%.
11.7.Public Finances and Demographic Change
76 Other assumptions such as the changed levels of unemployment are maintained however.
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The focus of this chapter is the degree of inter-generational redistribution of the Irish 
public finance system. So far we have only looked at the distribution of fiscal policy in 
the past. However as the Irish state was only founded in 1921, no full cohort has lived 
its full life within the state. It is therefore necessary to forecast future public spending 
and taxation to complete the lifetime profiles for all currently living generations.
We now forecast the trajectory of public finances. This section takes the assumptions 
underlying the Department of Finance’s Long-term Issues Group predictions of future 
government receipts and expenditures (DOF, 1998) and examine a number of 
alternative scenarios:
• Growth
• Department of Finance Assumptions
• Tax Cut
• Recession
• Price Linked Social Security Increments
The first scenario assumes that expenditure and taxes per person increase at the same 
rate as GNP per capita, averaging 6% until 2000, 4% until 2010 and 2% thereafter. The 
next scenario is the Department of Finance assumptions:
• Taxes increase at the rate of GNP.
• Social Insurance Contributions increase at 80 per cent of the rate of GNP. Other 
revenues increase at the rate of prices. As a result revenues will tend to fall slightly 
relative to average income over time.
• Public Service Pay and Pensions are expected to rise a rate of 2 per cent per annum 
above inflation.
• Social Welfare benefits per recipient will rise at 1 per cent above the rate of 
inflation. As this is below the growth rate, it will have the effect of a falling 
replacement rate over time and as a result will cause benefits to fall relative to 
earnings. The numbers of unemployed are assumed to decrease to 100,000 by 2050
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and recipients of lone parent, carers, disability and supplementary welfare benefits 
increasing by 10, 10, 6 and 7 per cent respectively per annum until 2010.
• Health Expenditure which has risen steadily over recent decades, with a slight dip 
recently is expected to rise to 10% of GNP in 2035 due to the age population and 
due to the greater expectations from a public health service.
• Although the number of children will fall, education expenditure is assumed to 
follow the rate of growth of GNP. Therefore either the expenditure per student will 
increase or the number of students will increase.
• EU expenditures are expected to rise to £300m and other non-capital expenditures to 
grow at 2 per cent above the rate of inflation. Capital expenditures will remain at 4.5 
per cent of GNP. Also it is assumed that a contingency fund of 2.4 per cent of GNP 
will be maintained over the course of the forecast.
The third scenario, assumes a once off cut in taxes in 1999 of 1 per cent of GNP. Over 
the remainder of the forecast, the DOF assumptions are followed. Scenario 4 takes the 
DOF assumptions but holds social welfare payments constant in real terms. The final 
scenario examines a less optimistic scenario. It assumes a 15 year downturn with similar 
rises in recession related welfare benefits such as unemployment, disability, lone parent 
etc to the rise during the period 1980-1995. In addition rather than following the DOF 
forecast we use the assumption that current spending patterns are otherwise maintained.
Figure 10 compares the trend in the resulting annual budget position of each economic 
scenario. The Department of Finance projections forecast taxation rising at the rate of 
economic growth, while most expenditures rise at below the growth rate below the 
growth rate of the economy. Starting from a position of a budget surplus, in the absence 
of policy change, on the basis of the assumption, this will result in an increasing budget 
surplus over time. Part of the reason also is a fall in the numbers of the groups with the 
highest usage of public services, the young and the elderly, combined with not only an 
increase in the working age population, but also an increase in the labour participation 
rate. However once the population starts ageing, the budget surplus diminishes. If taxes 
and benefits rise at the rate of economic growth, then the picture is less rosy. Although 
budget surplus initially rises, it peaks earlier and starts falling sooner. A once off tax cut 
will result in a trend parallel to the DOF trend, while price linked social security 
increments will result in a progressively better budget position than the DOF central
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forecast. All of these assumptions however assume a reasonable stable economic 
climate with falling and then moderate unemployment levels. In the final scenario, we 
assume that there is an economic downturn that lasts 15 years with a similar year on 
year change in the expenditures on recession related social expenditures as the 
economic downturn of the period 2010-2025. The effect of this recession would have 
quite a strong consequence on public expenditures coming in tandem with demographic 
changes.
11.8.Lifetime Redistribution across Generations
The next step is to apply the economic and demographic projections to our age fiscal 
incidence assumptions. This will allow us to examine the differential lifetime 
redistributive impact on different generations and identify which cohorts will do 
relatively better from the state over their lifetime.
Figure 11 describes the cumulative net gain per survivor over the lifetime of 5 cohorts, 
bom in 1921,1941, 1961, 1981 and 1998. This figure follows the Department of Finance 
projection. Here we see the continuation of the trend identified in figure 6. Amongst the 
cohorts bom 1921-1961, there is a progressive worsening of their lifetime position as 
the each pay more taxes, while the earlier cohorts received higher public expenditure 
without the higher taxes. For the 1921 cohort, those living into retirement will be net 
beneficiaries from public expenditure. For the 1941 cohort only those living into their 
80’s will on average be net lifetime beneficiaries. However by the time of the 1961 
cohort will on average be a net loser from the state at all ages. It must be noted that 
these figures represent averages. Those who spent their lives in receipt of benefit will 
always be likely to be net beneficiaries regardless of their birth cohort. Likewise the 
lifetime rich will tend to be net lifetime losers. For these cohorts, the trend is similar to 
that reported by Hills (1995) for the UK. However at this stage, the pattern changes. 
Public expenditure levels fall, but so does, taxation levels. As a result the cumulative 
age distribution is flatter. Although cumulative gains are higher at the end of the 
education cycle, because of increased participation, the cumulative losses are lower for 
the 1981 and 1998 cohorts. Meanwhile because of the assumption about the relatively 
lower increase in pension in old age, these cohorts do not have has great a net gain in 
retirement as the other generations.
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In this figure we examined the average net gain per survivor. However with rising life 
expectancy over time, it can be expected that cohorts with higher survival rates will 
have over the whole cohort higher lifetime gains than those with lower survival rates. 
Bigger cohorts will also tend to have higher gains. We can see this effect in figure 12. 
Later cohorts have returns by the end of their lifetime more similar to that of the earlier 
cohorts. We also notice the fact that the 1961 and 1981 cohorts are larger than the 1998 
cohort is. Total expenditures during the education cycle are higher and result in a higher 
net gain peak, while because of larger size combined with the higher average tax rates 
faced, the net losses are lower than we saw under the per survivor basis. Because 
benefits are similar in size and because life expectancies are not that different the 
relative size of the cohort is the most important factor determining their relative position 
into retirement and the end of their lifetime.
These analyses have used the Department of Finance central projections. We now 
examine the sensitivity of the results to different economic forecast assumptions in table
2. The values represent the average net lifetime gain of each cohort relative to the size 
of the cohort at birth. For each scenario, we observe a similar pattern. The oldest cohorts 
will have had the highest net gains, which will tend to fall for the next cohorts before 
going negative and then with the lowest point reached around the cohort bom in 1961. 
Thus this cohort will face the highest burden of financing the relatively good position of 
the early. For the remaining cohorts alive in the 1998, the position looks relatively 
better, rising almost continuously by cohort until the 1990’s when the average net 
benefit remains constant. Because of the assumptions used, the later cohorts net benefits 
are as a result almost entirely from the projections made. The earlier the cohort the more 
accurate the lifetime position because most of the net benefits will already have 
occurred. Amongst the economic scenarios, in terms of the net benefit of public 
expenditures, the one which provides the highest benefit for each cohort, is the one that 
assumes a continuation of current expenditure patterns, followed by a recession 
(Recession) around 2010. The constant spending pattern (Growth) is the next most 
beneficial, followed by the tax cut, the Department of Finance projection and lastly 
because of the gradually diminution of social welfare payments, Price indexed SW is 
the least beneficial. Conversely however, the assumptions that are most beneficial to 
current generations are least good for the public finances. Finally, we notice for the later 
generations, under 3 of the assumptions, although better off than the 1950-1970 
generations, no generation becomes a net beneficiary of public expenditure. Only in the
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case of the two assumptions based on constant expenditure patterns do any generations 
become lifetime net beneficiaries.
11.9.Fiscal Sustainability: Generational Accounting
So far we have examined the position of generations alive in 1998. The relative 
generosity of previous generations will have an effect on the net relative position of 
later unborn generations. Thus expenditure on current generations affects the fiscal 
sustainability of current government policy. Relatively generous provision will have the 
effect of placing a burden on future generations, while relatively cautious provision will 
have the effect of giving a bequest to later generations. In order to measure the fiscal 
sustainability we utilise a concept due to Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991), 
known as Generational Accounting.
Generational accounts compare the position of current generations in terms of future net 
government expenditure with the position of future generations. Under the generational 
accounting hypothesis, it is assumed that current public policy is continued for those 
currently alive. Thus the government’s intertemporal budget constraint does not affect 
these generations. The constraint however is assumed to apply to future generations. 
The intertemporal budget constraint can therefore be regarded as a source of conflict 
between generations as fiscal policy that benefits current generations will place a burden 
on future generations.
Within the generational accounting framework, two measures are typically used. The 
first measures the inheritance of future generations due to fiscal policy applied to 
currently alive and past generations. It is defined as current net government wealth 
minus the present value of the net benefit of current generations. Here generational 
accounts only focus on future net expenditures. Past net expenditures are incorporated 
by the net wealth of the public sector currently. In any case, the cohorts examined in the 
previous section consider only these generations bom since the foundation of the Irish 
State. Many other generations lived part of their lives in the Irish State and thus make an 
impact on current net wealth. This level measure is therefore a measure of the net future 
burden of current fiscal policy. The second measure typically used is a measure of the 
difference between the average net benefit obtained by current generations and that 
achieved by future generations. This difference measure therefore provides a measure of 
the fiscal sustainability of current government policy. If the net tax burden of newly
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bom and future generations is equal, then current fiscal policy is sustainable. However 
if the net benefits of current generations are greater than that of future boms, then fiscal 
policy is unsustainable. Conversely if net benefits of the future bom are higher, there 
may be cause for greater expenditure on current generations.
Generational accounts have now been developed for many countries. 17 are included in 
Kotlikoff and Leibfritz’s (1998) paper. Of these only 3 countries have negative 
imbalance and thus do not have substantial fiscal sustainability problems. This is a 
finding also found in a recent study of generational accounts for Ireland by McCarthy 
(1995).
There are a number of concerns about generational accounts however. Firstly 
generational accounts typically compare the position of the newly bom with future 
generations. Doing this they make the assumption that the treatment of newly bom is 
representative of all generations currently alive. This is a steady state assumption that is 
not justified by the analysis in the preceding section, where we have seen that fiscal 
policy most definitely has not been in a steady state for past generations. Banks et al. 
(1999) argue that rather than maintaining the assumption of a continuation of current 
policy, one should maintain the current longer term fiscal stance in the projections. The 
projections should therefore incorporate announcements about future policy 
developments. They also argue that generational imbalance does not correspond with 
conventional measures of fiscal sustainability such as the Golden Rule. As Samuelson 
pointed out intergenerational redistribution can be infinitely lived, with each generation 
gaining more than they put in. Another criticism of the approach is the static nature of 
the analysis. In other words, generational accounting does not incorporate the fact that 
much of the information used by the account is in fact endogenous (See Buiter, 1995). 
Therefore generational accounts should more properly by taken into account in a 
general equilibrium framework. Thus the generational account does not incorporate the 
welfare changing second order effects to private welfare. He also notes that the equal 
sharing rule of unallocated public spending does not necessarily effect all groups 
equally. Another empirical problem noted by Banks et al. (1999) relates to the fact the 
generational accounts typically are based on age-income profiles produced using cross- 
section data. Because of age and cohort effects, these may not represent the true 
permanent age-income distribution and thus may in fact bias the future projections on 
which the accounts are based. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, generational
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accounts serve a useful illustrative tool. Buiter (1995) describes them as being useful 
but that should be handled with great care.
Our projections are described in table 3. We divide the total into 2 groups, the total net 
present value of the generational account for each generation cited and the average 
generational account per member of the particular generation. Within these groups, we 
consider:
1. The generational account for all generations alive in 1998, bar those aged 0.
2. The generational account for the newly bom generation in 1998.
3. The resulting generational account for those bom in the future assuming a fixed 
intertemporal budget constraint.
4. The forecasted generational account for those bom in the future assuming a 
continuation of the projection assumptions.
Result 3 when taken for all members of the generations is equal to the sum of result 2 
plus 1 plus the net public sector wealth of £ 30 billion in 1998. Result 4 relates to the 
budget constraint of future generations if current policy is continued. The first 
consequence we notice is that the residual budget constraint for future generations for 
each scenario is positive. Therefore the result of each scenario is a bequest from current 
generations to future generations. The reason for this is that most of the later 
generations alive in 1998 are expected under the policies examined to be lifetime net 
losers from public expenditure. Price indexation of social welfare payments causes the 
biggest transfer of resources to future generations, thus resulting in a transfer from the 
poor to future generations. The next most generous transfer is on the basis of the 
Department of Finance assumptions. However a large component of this assumption is 
on the basis also of quite modest indexation of social welfare benefits and thus the 
direction of the transfers will be similar. At the other extreme are the scenarios based on 
current spending patterns, GROWTH and RECESSION. Here the extent of the transfer 
is much less.
We now turn to the second measure, the difference of the average gain per member of 
each cohort examined. The amounts described here for result 2 are the same as the result 
reported in table 2 for the 1998 generation. Here, we find that in every case, except for 
the RECESSION scenario, on the basis of a revenue neutral budget constraint, that
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future generations have higher net benefits per capita than the newly bom generation in 
1998. Therefore on this basis, fiscal policy is sustainable. Unexpected shocks to the 
economy may however reverse this finding. In each case however, because transfers to 
future generations are primarily being financed from older generations currently alive in 
1998, that the average per capita net present value for these generations is substantially 
lower than that for the newly bom and the future generations.
The results may be sensitive to the assumption about the discount rate. In table 4, we 
examine the sensitivity of the Department of Finance projection to the discount rate 
assumed. Here we see that substantially the same conclusions can be drawn when using 
discount rates of either 1% or 3% higher than the growth rate. Although the direction of 
the results are broadly the same, the difference between the net present value is quite 
different.
11.10. Inter-Generational Redistribution
In this final section we try to gauge a measure of total redistribution between 
generations. The standard measure of redistribution as discussed in chapter 1, is the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index. This index measures the difference in income variability 
for income after government intervention through taxes and public expenditure with 
income variability before this intervention, ceteris paribus. The more redistributive the 
system the less variable disposable income will be relative to pre-intervention income. 
A problem exists however, when one examines income between generations due to the 
use of a discount rate. Discounting will tend to equalise the inter-generational pre­
intervention income and may even reverse the direction of the standard of living. 
Therefore any measure of redistribution will strongly depend on the discount rate used.
In order to construct this index, we need to know both the pre (gross) and post 
(disposable) government intervention lifetime income of each generation. Like other 
static incidence studies, we assume that gross income is disposable income minus net 
government expenditure. So far we have derived measures of net government 
expenditure per generation under various assumptions. Unfortunately there are no 
household level national accounts available for Ireland. As a result it is not possible to 
impute generational gross income in the same manner as we have done in the rest of this 
chapter. We do however know the level of GNP in Ireland for the period studied. 
Examining the relationship between gross household income and GNP in other
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countries (in the OECD national accounts for example), one notices a clear relationship 
between the two numbers, with household gross income consistently 75-80% of GNP. 
Utilising the method described above, we can impute a value for gross income by 
multiplying GNP by 0.775 and assigning gross income using the age incidence 
assumption for gross income described in table 1 each year. Summing discounted gross
• 77income we can produce lifetime gross income. Disposable income is net benefits plus 
gross income. Although the measure of gross income is quite crude, the Reynolds- 
Smolensky depends mainly on the distribution of net expenditure over the distribution.
We decompose the Reynolds-Smolensky index into a component that accounts for 
progressivity or in this case the transfer of income from rich to poor cohorts and 
horizontal redistribution, a measure of the change in ranking of generations of post 
intervention income relative to the ranking of pre-intervention income. The 
progressivity component is valued at 0.02, a slight degree of redistribution from rich to 
poor generations, while the horizontal redistribution component is -0.01, summing to 
total redistribution of 0.019. Using a higher discount rate reduces the degree of 
inequality across generations and in fact reverses the direction of the redistribution, with 
horizontal redistribution becoming more important than vertical redistribution. As the 
discount rate tends to 0, the degree of vertical redistribution from rich to poor increases 
to 0.027, with the degree of horizontal redistribution tending to zero. Therefore as we 
can see the degree of inter-generational redistribution is quite sensitive to decisions 
about the discount rate. Nevertheless if we compare the degree of redistribution between 
generations, we see that the effect is quite small relative to the impact of a tax-benefit 
system over a cross-section of the population.
11.11. Conclusions
In this chapter we attempted to examine the issue of intergenerational redistribution in 
Ireland. In addition to public intergenerational transfers, there exist private 
intergenerational transfers. For example bequests will tend to run in the opposite 
direction to public transfers, while private transfers will tend to be in the same direction. 
Seniority rules will tend to result in older workers being paid more relative tot heir 
marginal productivity than younger workers, resulting in a transfer to young working 
age to old working age. However with rapidly rising education levels of the young
77 In order to compare GNP in different years, we need to use a different discounting factor to the growth 
rate. Here we use the long term growth rate for the economy, 2.5%.
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relative to the old and with much of the growth in the Irish economy occurring in high 
technology sectors where seniority rules tend to be less important, then the impact of 
seniority on inter-generational transfers will become less important. Other 
intergenerational transfers include the care of dependants. These include the care of 
children and elderly relatives, which again move in the same direction as public 
transfers, but also in child care provision provided by grandparents, where transfers 
move in the opposite direction.
However looking at transfers between generations at one point in time tells us nothing 
about true inter-generational redistribution. It simply measures the level of 
redistribution over the life-course. In order to compare the degree of redistribution 
between generations it is necessary to look at the government’s effect over the lifetime 
as life-course redistribution may in fact balance out over the lifetime, to result in no net 
gain. In this chapter, we have tried to generate measures of the net benefit from public 
expenditure over the lifetimes of different cohorts. Because no cohort has spent an 
entire lifetime in the Irish State, due to its foundation in 1921, it has been necessary to 
make projections. Doing this we can compare the net benefit of different generations 
alive in 1998, noting however, that results for the older generations alive at the time are 
more accurate due to a lower reliance on projected information. Results are also 
dependent on our assumptions necessary to allocate aggregated information to 
individual cohorts. Nevertheless, there appears to be clear gaining generations; those 
bom before the second world war, who gained both from relatively low taxation during 
their working years, and from a modem welfare state in the latter part of their lives. 
Subsequent generations will tend to be net losers, with the generation bom around 1960 
being the generation with the largest net loss. These generations have worked during the 
period of the highest taxation and may have relatively lower welfare benefits in 
retirement, depending on the assumption followed. We also notice that periods of 
recession result in higher net gains from public expenditure. This highlights that 
positive intergenerational transfers may not necessarily result in gaining generations 
having higher welfare levels, as presumably an individuals welfare would be higher 
from being in work and pay taxes and thus than being unemployed and receiving 
benefits.
In order to examine the long term sustainability of the system, we use a method known 
as generational accounts. The principle results are that the system is sustainable. This is 
a result that is different to many other countries. In Auerbach et al’s. survey, only 3 of
17 were in a similar position. Much of the change has occurred in the last decade and 
relates to the medium term positive forecast. A second result is that under most 
projection assumptions unborn generations gain more that current generations, 
indicating a degree of intergenerational redistribution from the present to the future. 
However relative to the degree of redistribution between people in a particular year, 
relative to the income of entire generations, intergenerational redistribution is relatively 
small.
One however must be cautious in interpreting these results. In a similar way to other 
studies of its kind, relatively crude projections were used as a basis for this chapter. 
Although it seems that public expenditure is sustainable, care needs to be taken if policy 
changes were introduced as a result of these positive indicators. It may seem that 
because of the negative generational imbalance, one can loosen the public finances 
substantially. However such policy changes cannot be examined in isolation. Policy 
changes will themselves have impacts on the wider economy. For example we can see 
at present the impact of loose fiscal policy on inflation, with Ireland having amongst the 
highest inflation rates in Europe and still targeting tax reform on the top of the income 
distribution. Rising inflation in a single currency area will have detrimental effects on 
competitiveness and the in turn reduce the ability of the economy to maintain its strong 
growth. It is important therefore to incorporate a model of the economy into projections 
of this kind.
Despite these general equilibrium drawbacks and the problems described in earlier in 
the chapter, it is argued that generational accounts are a useful policy tool for 
government fiscal policy. Auerbach et al. (1991) highlight that governments 
traditionally take the budget debt and their deficits as their primary indicators of fiscal 
policy. For example the EMU convergence criteria included an objective of maintaining 
budget deficits with 3% of GDP. Similarly the USA has instituted legislation that aims 
to balance budgets in the medium term. They argue that these objectives are not 
however concerned about generational balance, that fiscal policy is sustainable in the 
long term. Therefore, generational accounts should be incorporated, as a measure of 
fiscal sustainability by governments as is the case in Norway, Italy, Japan and New 
Zealand (Fehr and Kotlikoff, 1998).
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Tables and Figures
Table 11.1. Components of Public Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP 1921-1998
Year Social
Welfare
Education Health Capital Other Benefits Costs Net Benefit
1921 3.9 2.9 0.4 13.1 22.3 42.6 27.5 15.1
1925 3.4 2.7 0.5 12.1 22.4 41.1 25.2 15.8
1930 3.4 2.8 0.9 10.5 19.1 36.6 24.3 12.3
1935 4.2 3.0 1.3 10.9 24.9 44.2 31.4 12.8
1940 5.0 2.6 0.7 12.5 26.6 47.3 29.8 17.5
1945 4.3 2.0 1.1 10.1 23.3 40.7 26.8 13.9
1950 3.9 2.4 1.2 9.7 32.2 49.3 33.8 15.5
1955 5.2 2.1 1.4 7.9 28.1 44.7 31.5 13.2
1960 4.8 2.2 1.2 6.7 24.8 39.6 29.8 9.8
1965 5.4 3.0 1.6 6.0 27.9 43.9 34.2 9.7
1970 6.8 4.1 2.7 5.4 32.4 51.4 37.3 14.1
1975 10.0 4.8 5.6 5.2 36.1 61.7 36.4 25.4
1980 9.4 5.5 7.3 4.7 32.7 59.5 42.0 17.6
1985 14.4 5.5 7.1 4.9 33.7 65.6 57.4 8.2
1990 11.4 4.9 5.7 3.9 22.3 48.2 53.0 -4.7
1995 11.3 5.3 6.7 3.5 24.9 51.8 54.2 -2.4
1998 10.2 4.8 6.1 3.0 28.3 52.3 58.5 -6.2
Source: CSO Statistical Abstract various years and Imputation by Author
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Table 11.2. Net Per Capita Gain by Generation (different forecast scenarios)
Year of Birth DOF Growth 1 % Tax Cut Price Indexed SW Recession
1921 56810 57597 56824 56280 57617
1926 41878 43374 41902 40881 43442
1931 31570 34216 31616 29837 34387
1936 16483 20351 16635 14006 20670
1941 -511 4942 -223 -3689 5488
1946 -19066 -12382 -18597 -22979 -11466
1951 -34858 -26746 -34107 -39914 -24235
1956 -45521 -36562 -44443 -51563 -32459
1961 -51108 -41600 -49693 -57999 -35686
1966 -30853 -21727 -29261 -37855 -14647
1971 -26853 -17378 -25026 -34468 -8655
1976 -28023 -17792 -25978 -36448 -6950
1981 -22975 -11910 -20898 -31818 482
1986 -14202 -3808 -12382 -23037 9553
1991 -6637 1857 -5029 -15481 16366
1996 -6276 2242 -4831 -15130 17369
1998 -7038 2205 -5660 -15833 16674
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 11.3. Generational Balance (Discounted total expenditure per person)
Total in £ million DOF Growth 1 % Tax Cut Price Indexed SW Recession
Current generations -154714 -119720 -149597 -181629 -91100
Newly bom generations -378 118 -304 -850 895
Generation born in 1999 125092 89602 119901 152479 60206
Future generations forecast -26506 -2137 -23344 -50503 35338
Per capita £
Generations (aged 1-99) -43907 -33976 -42455 -51545 -25854
Newly born generations) -7038 2205 -5660 -15833 16674
Generation bom in 1999 25651 18373 24587 31267 12346
Future generations forecast -5435 -438 -4787 -10356 7246
Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 11.4. Sensitivity Analysis using DOF forecast (Discounted total expenditure 
per person)
Total in £ million GNP +2% GNP +1% GNP +3%
Current generations -154714 -154478 -147073
Newly born generations -378 -1256 348
Generation born in 1999 (revenue neutral) 125092 125734 116725
Future generations forecast -26506 -115468 9662
Per capita £'s
Current generations -43907 -43840 -41739
Newly born generations -7038 -23397 6488
Generation born in 1999 (revenue neutral) 25651 25900 23827
Future generations forecast -5435 -23785 1972
Source: Author’s Calculations
Figure 11.1. Costs and Benefits as a percentage of GNP 1921-1998
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Source: Author’s Calculation and CSO Statistical Abstract various years.
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Figure 11.2. Average Education Spending in £’s per Survivor, 1921-1998
(discounted to 1998)
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Figure 11.3. Average Social Welfare Spending in £’s discounted to 1998 per 
Survivor, 1921-1998
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Figure 11.4. Average Health Spending in £’s discounted to 1998 per Survivor,
1921-1998
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Figure 11.5. Average Taxation in £’s discounted to 1998 per Survivor, 1921-1998
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Figure 11.6. Net Gain in £’s discounted to 1998 per Survivor, 1921-1998
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Figure 11.7. Age Distribution of Irish Population, 1961, 1991, 2050, 2100
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Figure 11.8. Child, Elderly and Total Dependency Ratios, 1926- 2100.
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Figure 11.9. Intergenerational Net Gain (£million) 1998, 2050
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Figure 11.10. Trend in Budget Surplus under different Scenarios 1998-2100
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Figure 11.11. Net Gain per Survivor in £’s discounted to 1998, 1921-2100
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Figure 11.12. Cumulative Net Gain per Cohort in £m’s discounted to 1998, 1921-2100
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Chapter 12. Redistribution in the Irish Tax-Benefit System: A 
Summary o f Findings
12.1.Introduction
In chapter 1, we outlined a number of objectives of this thesis. The primary objectives 
were to fill some of the gaps in knowledge about the redistributive effect of the Irish 
tax-benefit system.
Although the primary objective of the thesis was to examine the extent of redistribution 
in the Irish tax-benefit system, in order to do this a dynamic microsimulation model had 
to be designed to measure the inter-temporal aspects of redistribution. In the next 
section we summarise some methodological developments made in the construction of a 
flexible dynamic microsimulation framework. In many respects this is the primary 
contribution made by this thesis. In section 3, we summarise the principle forces in the 
Irish Tax-Benefit system. Section 4 discusses the contribution made by the instruments 
that make up the system to overall redistribution at a point in time. Section 5 considers 
the redistributive effect of the system with regard to income variability over the life- 
course. Section 6 is analogous to section 4, considering instead a longer accounting 
period of the lifetime. The extent of redistribution over the lifetime is compared with 
redistribution at a point in time. Because of life-course factors, much of the 
redistribution in the tax-benefit system will be accounted for by redistribution within a 
persons lifetime. Section 7 compares the extent to which the tax-benefit system 
redistributes inter-personally (between individuals) or intra-personally (within an 
individual’s lifetime). The final dimension examined looks at redistribution between 
generations, considering which generations benefited most from the tax-benefit system.
12.2.Methodological Developments
The main methodological development of this thesis has been to conceptualise the key 
characteristics of dynamic microsimulation models and construct a software framework 
to implement the model used in this thesis, combined with the flexibility required for 
other purposes.
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The first advance is that framework can be used to simulate both synthetic cohorts and 
therefore act as a dynamic cohort model, as well as simulating full population cross- 
sections over time, acting as a dynamic population model. Although the latter feature 
has not been demonstrated here, it is a feature of the underlying computing framework.
In order to be able to use the model framework for future purposes, it was necessary to 
use parameterisation. While a certain degree of parameterisation is commonplace in 
microsimulation models, the degree of parameterisation and the related generalised code 
employed in this framework is quite extensive. For example it is possible to add new 
behavioural processes and vary the order in which they are simulated without having to 
re-program the model. Different units of analysis can be defined without recoding. A 
general method has been designed for parameterising behavioural processes.
Similarly, as the data structure is defined outside the model, when adding new variables 
to the model, alterations need only to be made in a parameter file without the need for 
restructuring the model. It therefore improves the transparency and the robustness of the 
model, reducing the possibility of error and makes the model easier to change. A final 
innovation has been in the construction of tabulation program to produce the tables and 
statistics used by this thesis taking longitudinal information as input.
Another methodological advance is in the ability of the framework to allow behavioural 
processes to incorporate information about tax-benefits and resulting budget sets on 
their simulation. In this model, the decision to work, work part-time, become self- 
employed and seek work if out of work are simulated to depend upon the tax-benefit 
system in operation. The flexibility in the design of the framework allows the 
EUROMOD tax-benefit model to be used to simulate the tax-benefit information 
required by the model. So in these cases, the model can simulate alternative outcomes 
from the tax-benefit system if different choices were made, so these potential choices 
can feed in to the actual decision simulated.
Although the dynamic cohort model was the first application of this modelling 
framework, because of its flexibility, the framework was subsequently used to simulate 
detailed micro-level consumption patterns for 12 EU countries (See Baldini et al., 
2001). These simulations were utilised within the EUROMOD tax-benefit model as an 
input into the simulation of indirect taxes.
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Another application of this framework has been in the construction of a new Pensions 
Dynamic Microsimulation Model for the UK Department of Work and Pensions, 
Pensim2. Although the code has not explicitly been used, as it is desired that the model 
be simulated in different operating system, much of the lessons learnt in the 
development of this framework are being employed in Pensim2. For example Pensim2 
will utilise the method of parameterising as well as the model engine algorithms used to 
implement these parameters.
12.3.Redistributive Forces
Chapter two described the main characteristics of the Irish tax-benefit system and 
describes the main trends in the components from 1955 to 2000. Over the period 
examined, income taxes have gradually increased in importance, reaching a peak in the 
late 1980's before falling back during the 1990"s. The social insurance and assistance 
systems have also expanded both in terms of the coverage of the population, the demand 
for benefits and the value of benefits. Again these trends levelled off in the 1990's.
One of the main distinguishing features in the Irish Tax-Benefit System relative to other 
European tax-benefit systems is minor role of insurance in the benefit system. The 
primary role is one of poverty alleviation. Although the largest benefit instruments are 
nominally called insurance benefits and depend on the payment of insurance 
contributions, the objective of these instruments are primarily redistributive rather than 
income replacement. For longer-term contingencies such as old age, the provision for 
income replacement is left to the private sector. An example of this is that replacement 
rates or the ratio of income out of work to in work are relatively low by European 
standards. However because of the extra payments for dependants even in social 
insurance benefits, the replacement rates for families are higher. Recently there has been 
an upward trend in replacement rates due in part to the reduction in income taxation and 
also in part to bring up the value of shorter term benefits to be similar to the value of 
longer term benefits.
One of the conclusions of this chapter was policy reform that has taken the form of 
temporary responses to particular problems in the system has resulted in one of the most 
complicated benefit systems in Europe. This level of complexity, besides the in built 
poverty traps, causes itself negative behavioural disincentives. At one extreme the 
complex benefits system reduces the likelihood that families will claim the benefits they
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are entitled to. At the other extreme, families will spend so much time claiming the 
benefits they are entitled to that they will not have time to look for work.
12.4.Redistribution Across the Population
Chapter 3 attempts to investigate the impact of the Irish tax-benefit system on 
redistribution over a cross-section of the 1994 population at points in time. It tries to 
assess the importance of different instruments as redistributive mechanisms and 
assesses the impact of the series of policy reforms instituted over the last 14 years.
As a whole, the Irish tax-benefit system is quite redistributive, transferring resources 
from rich to poor, however between 1987 and 2000, the primary direction of reforms 
has been to reduce the redistributive effect of the system as a whole. In fact taking the 
underlying population as given, disposable income inequality increased by 14% purely 
on the basis of the policy reforms alone. This trend of these reforms has been in the 
opposite direction of reforms in other countries. In the future this trend will have to 
change if the government hopes to achieve its anti poverty targets outlined in its recent 
National Anti Poverty Strategy.
Focusing on sub-components, we found that changes to income taxes were the primary 
force in the aggregate impact of the reform. Due to the improved economic position 
between 1987 and 2000, the system has become more generous with resources 
transferred in the form of reduced personal taxes and social contributions. Also due to 
indexation polices benefits have fallen as a proportion of market income, effectively 
resulting in a transfer of resources from benefits to income tax reduction. Although both 
income taxes and social contributions have become more progressive over time, the 
large cut in the value of these instruments has resulted in a lower redistributive effect. 
The cut in the value of benefits relative to incomes has also seen the redistributive effect 
of benefits fall.
12.5.Redistribution Over the Life-Course
This chapter examined the degree of redistribution over the life-cycle. As background 
we considered the position of people at different parts of the life-cycle in 1994. The age 
incidence of taxes and benefits follows a familiar U-shape pattern, where benefits 
exceed taxes early in life and in retirement, while taxes exceed benefits in the main 
working years. Children and elderly were found to live in households with a lower
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standard of living than working age people. Poverty rates were also found to be higher 
for these groups.
We also utilised the dynamic microsimulation model to simulate the life-course of a 
synthetic cohort. We first considered individual demographic and labour market 
behaviour over the life-cycle. Comparing employment rates of the simulated life-course 
with individuals with different life-courses in the 1994, we find that total employment 
rates are higher in the simulated cohort. This is a result of the different education 
attainment of the simulated cohort and the population. Given the huge social and 
economic changes that have occurred in Ireland in the last 20 years, a cohort of the 
population living their lives under mid 1990’s behaviour than the population that have 
lived their lives in the period to 1990. When one decomposes by education level, we 
find that employment rates across the life-cycle are quite similar to those experienced 
by the population in 1994.
The pattern of redistribution over the life-course is similar to that of the population, 
where the points during the life-cycle with the highest market incomes ages 40-60, 
coincide with the highest benefit-tax rate. The exception is the tax-benefit position of 
the elderly. While the current elderly have relatively low education levels and low 
pension entitlement, the simulated cohort will have a much higher education level and 
much higher accumulated pension rights and savings. As a result income in retirement 
is much higher. We find also, that because the poorest people die earliest, that the 
benefit -  tax rate falls as the cohort ages through retirement as the oldest are richer on 
average than younger retired people.
In addition, at every point on the age distribution, especially in retirement, there is 
redistribution from males to females. This redistribution takes place both through the 
tax-benefit system as women on average receive more benefits than taxes relative to 
men and through the family.
Overall we find that tax-benefit system substantially reduces life-course income 
variability. The most important instruments for reducing life-cycle income variability 
are social assistance during the early working lives, income tax during the main 
working years and social insurance in retirement.
Decomposing by education level, we see that the tax-benefit system reduces the 
variability of incomes across the life-cycle for all education groups. Life-cycle
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variability is reduced to a greater extent for lower education groups than for University 
educated. This reflects the progressive nature of the tax-benefit system, where groups 
with higher average incomes such University educated face higher average net tax rates. 
Again reflecting the progressive nature of the system, this effect is stronger for females 
than it is for males.
12.6.Redistribution Over the Lifetime
This chapter assesses the redistributive effect of the Irish tax-benefit system over the 
lifetime. The principle conclusions are that the tax-benefit system over the lifetime 
redistributes from men to women. This result is robust to assumptions about sharing 
between spouses within the household.
Overall the system redistributes from rich to poor, but the overall degree of 
redistribution is less than that exists from rich to poor when income is based on shorter 
accounting periods. The principle reason for this is because social insurance benefits are 
much less redistributive over the lifetime than at particular points in time.
We also decomposed the variability of incomes into the effect of personal income 
characteristics. The most significant result was the impact of the tax-benefit system in 
reducing the inequality due to the effect labour market history and human capital have 
on incomes.
12.7.Intra-Personal Redistribution
This chapter focuses on the degree of redistribution across an individuals life-cycle 
relative to the amount of redistribution between individuals. The chapter found that the 
lifetime rich (top quintile) were always on average net contributors to the system, while 
the poorest in the bottom were net beneficiaries of the system over their entire life- 
course, confirming that those with higher incomes will tend to have more intra personal 
redistribution.
Here we reported the high degree of immobility for those at the very top and the bottom 
of the income distribution. The lifetime can be characterised as permanently poor at the 
bottom, those in regular well paid employment in top three quintiles, with those in 
quintile 2 being characterised as being in lower paid marginal employment, moving 
regularly in and out of work. Most mobility tended to occur in individuals earlier years.
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Between person variability was found to be more important than intra-lifetime income 
variability. It was found that the tax-benefit system as a whole reduces inter person 
variability more than intra personal variability over the life-course. However Intra­
personal redistribution when measured in terms of self-financed benefits over the whole 
lifetime was found to be more important than inter-personal transfers. The conclusion to 
be drawn is that in the cohort that has been simulated, intra-person redistribution is 
similar to inter-person redistribution. Overall intra-personal redistribution was found to 
be less important than for the UK and Italy, but more important than Australia, 
highlighting the targeted nature of the Irish tax-benefit system.
12.8.Inter>Generational Redistribution
In the final chapter we examined the issue of intergenerational redistribution in Ireland, 
trying to generate measures of the net benefit from public expenditure over the lifetimes 
of different cohorts. There appears to be clear gaining generations; those bom before the 
second world war, who gained both from relatively low taxation during their working 
years, and from a modem welfare state in the latter part of their lives. Subsequent 
generations will tend to be net losers, with the generation bom around 1960 being the 
generation with the largest net loss. These generations have worked during the period of 
the highest taxation and may have relatively lower welfare benefits in retirement, 
depending on the assumption followed. We also notice that periods of recession result 
in higher net gains from public expenditure. This highlights that positive 
intergenerational transfers may not necessarily result in gaining generations having 
higher welfare levels, as presumably an individuals welfare would be higher from being 
in work and pay taxes and thus than being unemployed and receiving benefits.
Measuring the extent of redistribution between rich and poor generations, we find that 
the results are sensitive to assumptions about the discount rate used. We find that there 
is a slight degree of redistribution from rich to poor generations. Nevertheless if we 
compare the degree of redistribution between generations, we see that the effect is quite 
small relative to the impact of a tax-benefit system over a cross-section of the 
population.
12.9.Final Points and Future Directions
In summing up we must identify some of the caveats in the analyses that have been used 
and identify some future extensions and directions of work.
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Over the course of the thesis we have identified a number of potential further studies 
and dimensions to be investigated regarding redistribution in the Irish Tax-Benefit 
System. The analyses have been typically first round incidence studies. Further work 
could be done to examine issues such as the change in the deadweight losses associated 
with the different tax-benefit systems over time. We have not examined any political 
economy motivations for the processes of redistribution in Ireland. This is another 
potential area of fruitful research. As highlighted in earlier chapters, Ireland in the post­
war period, and especially over the past two decades, has lived through periods of 
enormous social and economic changes. It would be interesting to examine the effect of 
the changing macro-economic environment on the whole process of redistribution in the 
Irish Tax-Benefit system.
It must be noted that the results of the cross-section of the population in 1994 used in 
the study and the simulated cohort are not directly comparable for a number of reasons. 
Firstly the unit of analysis used is different. In the cross-sectional analyses the 
household has been used while in the dynamic microsimulation model, unit of analysis 
is the family. This is as a result of the fact that household formation such as the decision 
to leave home and the return of elderly parents to live with their children is not captured 
in the dynamic model. Given the importance of multiple nuclear family households in 
Ireland, it is important to develop an understanding of the processes involved.
Secondly, in 1994, the social insurance system had not fully matured and therefore 
many elderly pensioners were recipients of social assistance. Social Assistance therefore 
plays a more important role than in our simulated population, where the whole cohort is 
assumed to spend their lives paying contributions for social insurance pensions and then 
receiving them in retirement. A similar point can be made about the coverage of 
occupational pensions, where coverage in this cohort is higher than in the population as 
a whole in 1994. Another important difference is that the average education level in this 
cohort is much higher than for the population as a whole. This will result in 
correspondingly higher employment rates. Lastly as a steady state model based on 
transition rates that applied at the start of an economic boom, it will produce higher 
stocks of employment than the stock that existed as a result of flows in the pre-boom 
period. These issues suggest that it may be more appropriate to ether simulate an actual 
cohort through a particular period of time, allowing for period effects as in the case of 
Van de Ven (1998) or simulate a number of cohorts or an entire population as in the 
case of Dynamic Population Models.
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On another note of caution however, the degree of intra-personal redistribution found in 
a tax-benefit system is quite sensitive to the assumptions regarding the degree of 
mobility within the population as a whole. Because the panel data on which models 
such as this one used here, have typically been too short in length for reasonable models 
of labour market career paths, assumptions have to be made about the degree of 
mobility. These assumptions may have a strong bearing on the results. It would be 
useful therefore to extend this analysis to measure the sensitivity of the results to 
different mobility assumptions.
Another area for analysis would be to examine the impact of a policy reform that 
extended income replacement in retirement, as at present Ireland has no earnings related 
pension nor any compulsory savings for retirement. This coupled with an increasingly 
flexible labour market, means that social assistance must be used more extensively in 
Ireland for retirees than in other countries. Another avenue for research is to improve 
the econometric models used in the simulations to utilise longer panel data sets in 
incorporating later waves of the European Community Household Panel and also 
through the use of more sophisticated behavioural modelling.
Another area for an analysis is in comparative redistribution studies. Because the model 
links a dynamic model that generates a synthetic panel to a tax-benefit microsimulation 
model, EUROMOD that contains the rules for each tax-benefit system in the European 
Union, it would be possible to examine the inter and intra-personal redistribution in 
different European countries.
Throughout the thesis the phrase this is beyond the current study... has been used. In 
many cases we have had to make severe approximations and compromises in the 
methods that have been used and in the processes that have been included. For example, 
the modelling of savings processes is a current gap, one that could be usefully 
incorporated in a dynamic microsimulation model. This however is an area where no 
work has been done in Ireland. Similarly further work could be done to model economic 
influences on demographic behaviour, again an area of limited research so far. 
Microsimulation models can therefore as Burtless (1996) points out provide an 
organising framework to identify knowledge and data gaps and for creating an agenda 
to fill them.
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